INDIA: Assam Bombers Had Outside Help

By Frank Hyland & Animesh Roul

This article is another in the ongoing series by Animesh Roul and Frank Hyland, portraying the mounting problem of international terrorism in India.

A variety of “signatures” present themselves to CT investigators following any terrorist attack. In the case of the 30 October multiple bombings in India’s Assam region, the heightened level of sophistication evidenced in the attacks indicates that the local perpetrators almost certainly had help from outside the country.

A series of improvised explosive devices (IED), possibly numbering ten or more, were timed to detonate at midday on 30 October, turning markets and other locations teeming with shoppers and office personnel into scenes of chaos, killing over 80 people and wounding almost 500 others. In addition to reports of the use of a grenade in one attack, and the concealment of IEDs in the near-ubiquitous rickshaws and motorbikes, a car bomb was reportedly detonated near the home of the Chief Minister of Assam, Tarun Gogoi. Investigators reported that large quantities of High Explosive (HE) materials had been incorporated into the IEDs and that the sequencing of the attacks suggested strongly that timers had been employed as well. Indian authorities acknowledged that they had had some advance notice of the intent of the perpetrators to carry out one or more attacks in the area, but were taken aback by the scale of the incidents. [For additional details, please see, Serial Blast in Northeast India: ULFA/HuJI Hand Suspected ! By Animesh Roul on CT Blog, dated 30 October]

The Assam region in India’s northeast has suffered separatist attacks for decades, part of the ongoing internecine strife that has plagued the multiethnic area since the creation of the nation of India in 1947. Assam has become the base for a large number of separatist groups, and literally thousands of Indian citizens have lost their lives in attacks over the past two decades. The proximity of Assam to mostly-Muslim Bangladesh, home to a growing number of radical groups and their headquarters in recent years, makes it much simpler to plan, support, and carry out attacks inside India.

The United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) remains the primary suspect in the 30 October attacks. Founded in 1979, the group first established bases in Myanmar and Bangladesh, then began its campaign for an independent Assam in 1990. Reminiscent of Al-Qa’ida’s leadership redoubt along the lawless Pakistan/Afghanistan border, ULFA’s headquarters and leadership hideout is suspected to be in the China/Myanmar border area. ULFA is reported to be among the groups within India that have received training, funds, and other support from Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISID), another of the “Cat’s Paws” in the two nations’ persistent, ongoing armed struggle with each other.

Suspicion that ULFA had received external help rests on the aforementioned heightened sophistication of the 30 October attacks, contrasting markedly with previous incidents attributed to ULFA. Many of the ULFA attacks in the past have been on the order of kidnapping, ambushes of Indian authorities, and the targeting of economic-related facilities, although incidents using IEDs in 2004 and 2007 did take place.

The prospects for Indian authorities are not pleasant. Once delivered and absorbed, the training and technology used in the Assam blasts belongs to the perpetrators. India can expect more of the same in coming days, months, and years unless and until the underlying political situation is resolved.

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