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Mumbai Whodunnit: Names vs. Networks

By Aaron Mannes


Following the tenets of Journalism 101, the first question about the Mumbai attacks was “who?” Most of the speculation has focused on Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), although their spokesperson and the spokesperson of their political wing (reported by CTBlog’s Evan Kohlmann) have both denied their organization’s involvement. The reality is that the structures supporting this attack go beyond specific organizations.

In a prescient article, “The Supporting Structures of Pakistan’s Proxy War in Jammu & Kashmir,” in the June 2001 issue of Strategic Analysis (a journal of India’s Institute for Defence Studies & Analysis - the article is not a available online) the author, Ajay Darshan Behra argues:

The supporting structures for the proxy war in J&K are much more complex and go beyond Pakistan's unstated policies or strategic objectives. Some of these structures have developed their own dynamics… Since the end of the Cold War, these structures have embedded themselves deeply in the political economy of the region. The Pakistani state does not control them but merely exercises influence over them and is able to exploit them to serve its own strategic designs. It is due to the advantages accruing from these structures that Pakistan has been able to engage India militarily for more than a decade through a proxy war, with little cost to itself. Thus, there may be a grain of truth in Gen Musharraf's statement that the Pakistan Army is unable to stop militants from crossing the LOC. The Pakistani ruling elites are not in complete control of the supporting structures for terrorism, which they have been using for their proxy war in J&K. Because of the above factors, jehad and terrorism in J&K are likely to continue even if the Pakistani ruling elites give assurances about the withdrawal of their support.
The primary factors identified are: the extensive illicit arms trade within Pakistan which ensures that there is an endless supply of weapons, the uncontrollable sources of funding - particularly narcotics trafficking and donations both from within Pakistan and from around the world, and the tens of thousands of radical madrassas that indoctrinate Pakistani youth into radical Islam from Pakistan’s bottomless well of unemployed. The author does not discuss some other related factors, such as the complex geography (particularly the mountainous terrain), which makes controlling substantial parts of the country and particularly the Line of Control (LOC) in Kashmir a daunting problem.

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