The Colombia Paradox
By Douglas Farah
The recent GAO report on the lack of success of U.S. aid to Colombia is striking because it lays out the fundamental paradox of the multi-pronged war there.
The GAO finds, as many of us have written about, that the $6.1 billion in U.S. aid since 2000 has helped Colombia achieve notable successes. This is especially notable in recouping territory and dismantling much of the infrastructure of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and the disarming (with many flaws) of the United Self Defense Forces (AUC). Both are designated terrorist organizations, and both presented direct and real threats to the Colombia state.
But despite those historic gains, the production of cocaine has not diminished. The GAO report says (borne out recent conversations I had with senior Colombian police and military leaders) that cocaine production has actually increased. Here is what the report found:
From 2000 to 2006, estimated opium poppy cultivation and heroin production declined about 50 percent, but coca cultivation and cocaine production increased over the period. To put Colombia’s 6-year drug reduction goal in perspective, we note that although U.S. funding for Plan Colombia was approved in July 2000, many U.S.-supported programs to increase the Colombian military and police capacity to eradicate drug crops and disrupt the production and distribution of heroin and cocaine did not become operational until 2001 and later. Meanwhile, estimated illicit drug cultivation and production in Colombia continued to rise through 2001, with estimated cultivation and production declining in 2002 through 2004. However, the declines for coca cultivation and cocaine production were not sustained. In addition, the estimated flow of cocaine towards the United States from South America rose over the period.
The obvious question is, why is this so? My full blog is here.
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