Pakistan Blames 'Anti-Shia', 'Al Qaeda Affiliate' Lashkar-e-Jhangvi for Marriott Hotel Attack

By Animesh Roul

Pakistan's interior Affairs advisor Rehman Malik has blamed the anti Shia, Al-Qaeda affiliate terrorist group Lashkar- e- Jhangvi for the Marriott hotel suicide attack in Islamabad, that killed over sixty people including Czech ambassador, couple of US Soldiers and many foreigners on September 20. Nearly 200 others were injured in the attack. According to earlier reports, the suicide bomber detonated a truck packed with around 600 kg of explosives (RDX) at the Marriott.

Soon after the attack in September last, a lesser known group Fidayeen-e-Islam had claimed responsibility while warning for more such attacks on Westerners. One spokesman identified himself as Ahmad Shah Abdali, reportedly told Al Arabiya TV in Islamabad over phone about the outfit’s involvement and put some condition to stop attacks against the US interests in Pakistan, including an end to the Pak-US cooperation. The initial suspicion was on another Al Qaeda affiliate terror group, Harkatul Jehad-ul Islami. However, Malik has said in the parliament on Dec 22 that the investigating agencies have completed their investigation into Marriott incident which was planned and executed by the LeJ.

For background information of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, read my article here, published in the Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 3 (11) June 3, 2005.

Excerpt:

….Its core objectives: namely the eradication of Pakistan’s Shi’a community and the eventual transformation of the country into a Taliban style Islamic state. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ - Jhangvi’s Army), firmly allied to the Taliban and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and with loose links to al-Qaeda, is undoubtedly the most prolific and callous terrorist organization in Pakistan.

Ostensibly a break-away faction of Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), LeJ was founded in 1996 by an extremist triumvirate within SSP - namely Riaz Basra, Akram Lahori and Malik Ishaque. Inspired by the ideals of SSP’s founding leader Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, Basra and his followers accused the SSP leadership of not following the ideals of its slain leader. Another plausible reason for the emergence of LeJ was the rising violence of Sipah-e-Mohammed Pakistan (SMP), a Shi’a organization formed in 1994, ostensibly to target the leaders of SSP. Many top leaders of the SSP, including Israr-ul-Haq Qasmi and Zia ur-Rahman Farooqi were assassinated by SMP extremists in the following years. However it is widely believed that the split of 1996 was manufactured to protect the political integrity of SSP and enable the so-called breakaway faction to transform itself into a purely paramilitary-terrorist organization. In any case, events since 1996 have proved beyond doubt that the LeJ constitutes the armed wing of the SSP and is ultimately controlled by the leaders of that powerful and Saudi-backed sectarian organization.

...In the years since 1996, LeJ has developed into a formidable terrorist organization; according to one estimate, until 2001 LeJ had been involved in at least 350 violent incidents. However the organization has had to contend with severe setbacks. In 2002, more than 30 Lashkar-e-Jhangvi militants were killed in numerous shootouts that resulted in the deaths of senior leaders. These included Riaz Basra, who was killed along with three associates near Mailsi in Multan on May 14, and LeJ chief Asif Ramzi, who was slain with six accomplices near Allahwala Town in Karachi. The slayings of Basra and Ramzi dealt a severe blow to the foundation of LeJ and its mother organization, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan.

The LeJ differs from many of the other Islamic militant organizations in Pakistan insofar as it shuns media exposure and tries to operate as covertly as possible. Its only outlet to the outside world is occasional faxed messages accepting responsibility for terrorist outrages and through its publication Intiqam-i-Haq. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi has focused most of its attention on Pakistan’s Shi’a minority and Iranian interests.

LeJ began to target Western interests in Pakistan after the United States toppled the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in late 2001. The Taliban was a firm ally of SSP/LeJ and allowed the latter to establish training bases on is territory. Indeed LeJ is believed to have been headquartered near Kabul until the collapse of the Taliban. LeJ militants are believed to have been involved in the kidnapping and subsequent murder of U.S. journalist Daniel Pearl in early 2002. The LeJ was also behind the bomb attack on May 8, 2002 in Karachi which killed 16 persons, including 12 French nationals. In another attack, near the U.S. Consulate in Karachi on June 14 of that year, 12 persons were killed. At least five of the 10 terrorists identified by the Pakistani government are believed to be LeJ cadres. While there have been reports that al-Qaeda has used LeJ to attack western interests in Pakistan (particularly the ones listed above), there is little reliable evidence pointing to a contemporaneous relationship between the hardcore of al-Qaeda and SSP/LeJ. It seems that al-Qaeda’s access to LeJ was severed after the slaying of Riaz Basra in May 2002. Basra allegedly maintained contact with al-Qaeda commanders through Harakat ul Ansar (yet another Pakistani Islamic militant organization).

According to Pakistani law enforcement agencies, the LeJ organization is made up of small cells that do not exceed seven members. A majority of LeJ’s cadres are drawn from the Sunni madrasas in Pakistan. Almost the entire leadership of LeJ is composed of veterans of the Afghan Jihad. Moreover, prior to the collapse of the Taliban, the outfit imparted training in the hard terrains of Afghanistan and later deployed its militants all over Pakistan. LeJ training camps in Afghanistan was located near the Sarobi Dam, Kabul. Organizationally, LeJ is widely dispersed with cells and units all over the country, particularly in Punjab.

For Complete Article, See, "Lashkar-e-Jhangvi: Sectarian Violence in Pakistan and Ties to International Terrorism", Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 3 (11), June 03, 2005.

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