Afghanistan and the Question of Force Restructuring
By Douglas Farah
Toronto Globe and Mail has an interesting look at how increasingly complex the Taliban's attacks in Afghanistan are, belying the notion that the group is somehow in retreat there.
This is, of course, due in no small measure, to the Taliban's enormous revenue stream from opium and heroin, a pipeline that insures the groups is not only well armed, but able to expand its arsenal, training and capabilities. It is also due, in part, to the Afghan government's dismal performance in corruption and development, giving people little reason NOT to side with the rebel forces.
At the same time, the Obama administration is carefully considering how to define victory in Afghanistan in a way that will make it more attainable.
"One of the concepts we embraced in Iraq was recognition that you can't kill or capture your way out of a complex, industrial-strength insurgency," Petraeus said in an interview this month with Foreign Policy magazine. "The challenge in Afghanistan, as it was in Iraq, is to figure out how to reduce substantially the numbers of those who have to be killed or captured."
This debate is closely tied to the debate over the future of the military as we know-that is, what kind of military do we need to fight the wars of the future?
The Wall Street Journal has an interesting column by Mackubin Thomas Owens looking at this question. While the answer he gives is the most obvious-one equipped to fight several different kinds of war, both conventional and and small wars and insurgencies-he does remind us of some of the basic questions that need to be asked by advocates of the different camps. My full blog is here.
