Strategic Reading in the Gaza Conflict (Part 2): An Eight Points Assessment

By Walid Phares

After having advanced ten questions about the ongoing conflict in Gaza, at the onset of the Israeli military operations against Hamas (December 28, 2008 on CTB) and as Israel chose to commit ground forces inside the enclave, here is a working reading of the main strategic developments and indicators at this time:

1. Israel’s land thrust in Gaza indicates that the long range goal of the campaign is to create changes on the ground, which are supposed to stop Hamas’ future rocket launches inside Israel. Many critics of Israel’s action, particularly the Jihadi propaganda machine, claim the ground operation didn't silence the shooting. But the counter arguments here are that a) the operation didn't end yet and b) Hamas’ ability to launch is linked to its ability to resupply its batteries or to build new missiles. Hence, the final military outcome of the operation, if indeed this is a silence-the-rockets campaign, will only show its success or failure at the end of the operation, or even after the supplies of Hamas are depleted.

2) On the propaganda level, it is clear that the “Jihadi bloc” in the largest (and most mainstream) sense is dominating the airwaves. The combined effects of a number of Arab and Iranian media outlets (including the Qatari-funded al Jazeera, al Manar, al Aalam, etc) on the region’s audiences, as well as the international media treatment of the conflict, all that, has tilted the balance against Israel, so far. But one has to note that the blogosphere is witnessing a different battle. On a variety of web sites and even in some newspapers many dissident voices and pens in the Arab and Muslim world are voicing their opposition to the Iranian-led “strategy” of shelling Israel. The anti-Hamas wave is not necessarily a pro-Israel mood, but an anti-Iranian attitude.

3) On the diplomatic level, one can see two messages. A surface narrative adopted by both the “Iranian led bloc” and their opponents in Egypt, Riyadh and the West Bank, that is a criticism of Israel’s action in Gaza. And a deeper game underneath: The Tehran “axis” is inciting political escalation but would accept a cease fire based on the initial status quo. The anti-Iranian bloc (Egypt, PA, Saudi, Jordan, etc) does not wish a victory for Iran’s allies in Gaza but a come back to Abbas’ Authority to the area. Interestingly, two governments who were neutral on the conflict in general decided to shatter this “official” neutrality: Qatar’s Emir has sided with Hamas and Turkey’s AKP Government has blasted Israel openly. Hamas’ new equation is now showing clearly who’s who in the region.

4) Many in the analyst community have been speculating on Hezbollah’s next moves. Some predict that Hezbollah has to strike in order to fulfill its “alliance duties” while other commentators go as far as asserting that the Iranian backed organization in Lebanon will sell out Hamas. I believe the two assessments are extreme. Hezbollah, as much as Syria and Iran are solidly behind Hamas, is part of the “axis.” But the timing and weapons of intervention against Israel is a matter of regional consultation with Tehran. Hezbollah is awaiting Iran’s decision as to where and how to strike, and more importantly, when. Analysts need to better understand the geopolitics of the region and its players.

5) Hamas will continue to fight inside Gaza and launch rockets onto Israel until it loses (or about to lose) its command and control systems inside the enclave. It is only then that it may strike beyond the scope of its tactics: meaning deeper inside Israel with suicide bombs and possibly overseas. One has to understand the escalation parameter that Hamas and its backer, the Iranian regime, have adopted. Also keep in mind, that Hamas’ and the “axis’” immediate goal is to reach a cease fire, thus not using the last-choice-weapons is a rational choice, for now.

6) From the statements made by Mahmoud Abbas’ cabinet and spokespersons over the past days, one can conclude that the PA is very nervous about a Hamas victory, because it will mean the final demise of the Fatah legacy and influence. But Abbas is also nervous about a full “regime change” in Gaza because it would frame his government as a “collaborator” with Israel. Hence the most pragmatic position Abbas can adopt at this stage is to condemn "Israeli" actions but wait for final results on the military level.

7) President Bush will continue his support to Israel (with concerns over the humanitarian situation) and his criticism of Hamas till January 20th. At first, President elect Obama will continue a US policy of backing its ally and supporting a two-state solution. But the forthcoming administration may try a different route, possibly identical to French President Sarkozy’s shuttle diplomacy in the region. However, as I believe, the Iranian confrontation with Israel (via Hamas) is much deeper and wider than any moderation can reduce, at this stage.

8) The United Nations' institutions will eventually become the last resort to resolve the crisis but only after a new strategic landscape would have emerged in Gaza. The US is vetoing any Security Council resolution which will bring back the status quo ante. A resolution in the UN General Assembly can be easily voted by the OIC members, but won't have effects on the military situation. The Secretary General has already called for a cease fire but would need a chapter 7 resolution from the Security Council to seriously end this round of violence.

More assessment is to come.

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Dr Walid Phares is the Director of the Future Terrorism Project at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies and a visiting scholar at the European Foundation for Democracy. He is the author of The Confrontation.

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