Targeting Terrorists' Financial Networks: A Moving Target
By Matthew Levitt
As Michael Jacobson and I wrote in The Jerusalem Post, despite being under geographic siege and financial sanction, Hamas was still able to smuggle some 80 tons of explosives, roadside bombs and longer-range rockets into Gaza over the course of the past cease-fire.
It is ironic, then, that one of the most effective counterterrorism tools since 9/11 has been targeting terrorists' finances. Disrupting terrorists' means of financial support frustrates their ability to operate, while following the money trail up and down the financial pipeline can reveal to investigators otherwise covert terrorist networks.
As the current conflict illustrates, these tools face multiple challenges, the most pressing being the ability to be flexible enough to keep up with a constantly moving target. And therein lies the fundamental catch-22: In response to each successful disruption of illicit financing, be it of a terrorist, proliferation or other illegal nature, our adversaries change the way they raise, move and store.
Terrorist groups like Hamas will continue to adapt the way they raise and move funds to evade scrutiny, forcing governments to closely monitor evolving trends in terrorist financing and develop effective strategies to respond quickly.
While these are difficult challenges, the potential rewards of both denying terrorists access to money and following the money trail as an intelligence tool are well worth the effort.
Just consider this: The 9/11 Commission concluded that al-Qaida's cash flow on the eve of the September 11 attacks was "steady and secure." Compare that with the comment earlier this year by the director of National Intelligence noting that over the previous 12-18 months al-Qaida had difficulty raising funds and sustaining itself.
The full article is available here.
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