Strategic analysis of the Mumbai attacks: Few points to project

By Walid Phares

As the Indian Government has issued its various reports on the Mumbai attacks and as a number of Think Tanks worldwide are issuing their evaluation and projections, the long term debate about what the operation meant, was meant to become and could generate in the future is now wide open. Pakistan's Government evaluation is focusing on minimizing the possibility of an inside assistance to the perpetrators. The Indian Government and agencies are focusing on determining the responsibility of Islambad's Government. In the West and also in Russia, analysts are studying the ability of international or local (called Homegrown) Jihadists of producing similar attacks in the future. As a contribution to the ongoing discussion I have briefed a number of US Representatives and members of the European Parliament on some points of projection and published several short pieces over the past month. Many of these points were expanded by colleagues. Following is an article published by the World Defense Review. I have added an interview with ETWN aired just before the inauguration of the new Administration.

As part of a panel held in the US Congress to review the Mumbai attacks, I raised four points in my global analysis of the Terror operation and its strategic goals:

1. The Jihadi decision-making process leading to the Mumbai operation.

2. What I define as the "strategic war room" ordering the operation. That is, the level of command behind this attack and other terror strikes. Such a discussion is needed because the media debate about the identity of those implicated in the operation has blurred the understanding of the public and thus needs to be clarified.

3. The strategic goal of the operation was designed by the higher levels in the Jihadi decision-making web above those who executed the operation. The execution team – killed and detained – was made of 10 individuals. But, it is very possible that the full number of those involved in the entire operation may be not yet determined. In this regard I am surmising that the "terror commandos" may have been ordered to action in Mumbai in order to trigger a crisis that only the higher level may know about.

4. The long range goals for this operation, meaning at the strategic level in the region.

"Architecture" of the attack

The "architecture" of the operation shows two components. First, there was an insistence on behalf of the perpetrators to draw "Indian participation" in the operation by using the name "Deccan Mujahedeen," referring to the previous attacks by the "Indian Mujahedeen" (IM). In October 2008 there were significant arrests of IM; there were Indian statements indicating that there are a large number of IM still on the loose; and there is fear of them striking back. Those who issued the Mumbai press release are trying to insinuate that they are the Deccan province "chapter" of the IM. If in the future, there is activity – in Assam for example – or other parts of India, they will use the name of that region to issue a press release in this sense. This reminds us of Al Qaeda's "local identities" in the Levant; Al Qaeda in Iraq, Al Qaeda in Arabia, etc. The focus is on looking "credible" in terms of statements and identity. But when you compare the declared identity of the perpetrators with the many traces left behind by the organizers of the strike, you'd draw different conclusions. If you come by sea and use dinghies, and make traceable cell phone calls to India's neighbor to its west, you are forcing every investigator to blame Pakistan. I am inviting the reflection that on the one hand there is an effort to show this is a local jihadi operation in India, but on the other hand evidence was left on purpose to show the link to Islamabad.

The strategic war room

If one analyzes the names of groups thought to be involved starting with the "Islamic Students Union of India" and the Laskar e-Taiba, (LeT) and examines the chain of interests – you'd see that the decision to strike was made at a regional Jihadist level. It comes at the heal of previous incidents inside India on one hand but if you project the operation's indicators it would lead you on the other hand to the logic that a decision had been made on a much higher level than local Jihadists inside India. That decision was most likely made in the war room including al Qaeda and the Taliban, with the LeT being "subcontracted" for the operation. The information supply may have been provided by infiltrated elements within the Pakistani security apparatus. If you look at the grand scheme and the direction of events, you will see the strategic interests of the Taliban and Al Qaeda while the execution was perpetrated by the LeT.

Long Range Goal

Third is the long-range goal. In most analysis and in any investigative paths followed, you'd conclude that the final outcome desired is to affect the relations between India and Pakistan. Two indicators are to be observed: One is the immediate reaction by the Jihadi websites as well as comments on Al Jazeera and other media asserting that the only root cause of the attack is Kashmir. The same editorial line was also adopted in many international media usually influenced by the Jihadi claim over Kashmir. This push seems to force the debate to be about Kashmir and not the jihadist movement.

However, another indicator began developing since a press release from the Taliban stated, "We will defend Pakistan from an attack by India." Thus, one can reconstruct the moves. Step one was for a group of Jihadists to attack India under the Kahsmir claim and to provoke India to mobilize against Pakistan. Step two was for Jihadi groups to state that they will defend Pakistan. Through this strategy, the Taliban and their allies think they would "shame" Islamabad into discontinuing its operations in Waziristan. In the mind of al qaeda – it would be odd and psychologically unpopular for the Pakistani Government to order more military pressure on the Taliban inside their country if India is mobilizing on its Eastern border. Striking in Mumbai is designed to relieve the pressure from Waziristan.

If we review the message by Zawahiri few weeks ago, we see that he warned the incoming US administration as follows: "If you increase the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan, there will be escalation on the battlefield." Two weeks later the Jihadists hit Mumbay, aiming at creating tensions between India and Pakistan. In al Qaeda and the "War room" logic – the projected equation would give the Jihadists more room to operate in the region as a whole. It will be difficult for the U.S. government to launch an all out offensive following the promised build-up coming in Afghanistan to squeeze the Taliban, while there are extreme tensions with India.

Pakistan redeployment:

A legitimate concern among observers is to wonder about Pakistan's near future redeployment. The United States and NATO have used Coalition support funds to have Pakistan redeploy to be able to engage the Jihadists on its western border with Afghanistan. Will there be a tipping point where either the Pakistan army pulls out of its ongoing operations to get ready for redeployment? As we examine the strategic balance of power in the region the option of withdrawing some of these forces away from the north western frontier can surely create a dramatic shift. But even if the regular forces were withdrawn from the area, the intelligence service would remain there. Would the local Jihadists prefer to have the intelligence services? It is to be analyzed further. The second point of interest for the investigation is that for those who engineered this operation in Mumbai, this may not be the end of the process. This is not the final chapter if indeed this is a strike against India to force it to strike back at Pakistan. We would have to look at what would inflame the Pakistani people and army: it could be an assassination or any sensational violence.

Al Qaeda involvement

Some in the US intelligence have dismissed an involvement by al Qaeda. Their reasoning is based on the fact that it "doesn't bare the usual hallmarks" of the Bin Laden organization. But in my reading of the group's structure, al Qaeda does not always involve its own central units in the execution of every single Jihadi operation. They execute "central operations" as praetorian guards, but they also "subcontract" operations in many regions. In the sub Indian continent, I would assume that in the decision-making there must be some sort of al Qaeda participation in the back and forth talking, but in the execution, once a group is tasked, there is no need for al Qaeda assets. In this case since Laska e Taiba provided the infantrymen. The "central units" of al Qaeda didn't have to be used.

Propaganda

Let's also be aware that it is likely that as the terrorists seized locations in the city for many hours, this urban jihad was also aimed at creating the televised footage for the future. The product may not even be produced by LeT but some Jihadists at some point will use the photos and video from the clashes for indoctrination and recruitment purposes.

Muslim victims

As in many similar operations by Jihadists, Muslims have been killed during the shooting. Many commentators have wondered if this fact should be highlighted in the campaign to delegitimize the terrorists. I believe such facts needs to be cited but more important is that Muslim entities should condemn the attacks and raise the issue. India's Muslim community is very large and many of its members are holding important positions in national and local government. India's current vice president, ministers, deputies and high ranking officers, including the police commissioner in Mumbai are Muslims. These leaders are well positioned to condemn the Jihadi attacks and delegitimize this radical ideology.

Laskar's future operations

What can one learn in the aftermath of the Mumbai attacks? And ironically how will the Jihadists improve their action in future strikes?

They have reversed the previous logic: you are not going to achieve one specific goal; you are fighting for the bigger goal. Second, if you look at the numbers involved in the operation the scenarios are becoming wider and wider. Maybe the next operation won't be a copy cat but a copy cat plus. The next might be against hotels and schools. The invitation is open to improve upon it.

Laska e Taiba and US Homeland Security

Last but not least, one has to look at the extension of LeT outside the Indian subcontinent and its presence overseas, including in America. This operation is an eye opener with implications on US homeland security. In the late 90's a Terror group, the so called "paintball jihad network" based in Virginia, was dismantled and its members were tried. Some of them are of them are serving time now. The Counter Terrorism community is invited to review the archives of the trial and media reports and re-analyze their training, tactics and targets. Before 9/11, they openly claimed affiliation with Laskar e Taiba and said they were involved in terror activities in Kashmir. But now that we've seen LeT striking way south of Kashmir and as experts confirmed the "Laskar" has support in their Diapora, one has to project that LeT cells may be tasked to also attack within liberal democracies, including particularly in America.

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— Dr. Walid Phares is Director of the Future Terrorism Project at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies (FDD) in Washington, D.C., and a visiting scholar at the European Foundation for Democracy in Brussels. He is the author of the recently released book, The Confrontation: Winning the War against Future Jihad

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Interview on EWTN: Analyzing the Mumbai attacks; "The Urban Jihad"

http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=6971240770845409239