Truce with the Taliban at a Tipping Point

By Farhana Ali

Earlier this week, a truce between the Pakistani provisional government and the leader of a militant group was designed to restore peace to the once-idyllic Swat valley. Today’s breaking news of a Pakistani journalist found dead after he was abducted and brutally murdered in Swat could be viewed as a setback to a fragile peace agreement. The latest tragic incident also raises concerns about the use of dialogue with a tenacious Taliban.

On Al-Jazeera English Sunday night’s program, I stated that any agreement with the Taliban is risky business. Historical record has proven the Talibs, as they are called, are unable to keep their end of the bargain. Then why does Pakistan take a chance on militant leaders? The answer is simple. Pakistan can only fight one war at a time. This was the rationale offered to me by a senior Pakistani military commander. In a recent phone conversation, I was told that the Pakistan Army is under pressure to fight extremists in the tribal areas, guard against a possible Indian threat, and battle hard-core jihadists in the Swat valley. The commander, who wished to remain anonymous to protect his identity, said, “We do not have the manpower or the equipment to keep fighting like this. If America expects to win in Pakistan, then we need more assistance.”

But how much help will Pakistan need to neutralize its terrorism problem and secure its borders? On 60 minutes, Pakistan’s President Asif Zardari requested a multi-billion dollar aid package from the United States to mitigate the multiple insurgencies. Meanwhile, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Yousef Giliani suggested that the Taliban and al-Qaeda are under control. Despite their conflicting views, the central government is unable, or unwilling as senior U.S. analysts have suggested, to stabilize Pakistan by de-legitimizing the extremists’ argument for violent jihad.

While there is no magic figure, assistance to Pakistan should not be measured by numbers alone. Help-is-on-the-way may be comforting to senior Pakistani officials, but discomforting to others who see aid as a form of coercion. In the past, U.S. offered far-reaching assistance packages to Pakistan in exchange for their cooperation to aggressively target al-Qaeda, the Taliban and local militias. Ironically, the result has been the growth of extremism, supported by criminal gangs and religious leaders. The impact is international—a concern the U.S. has expressed publicly.

In the current climate, dialogue with militants may be better than the use of brute force. Senior risk analyst Ahmed Quraishi in Pakistan supports negotiations with the Taliban, even while criticizing the central government. In an email, Ahmed wrote, “The current Pakistani government is weak, with or without the Swat deal. The government does not have the guts to confront the Americans on their political failures in Afghanistan that have created problems for Pakistan. The [Pakistani] government couldn't win the trust of anyone…despite being in power for one year.”

Islamabad may appear infantile and inexperienced, but not inadequate. Behind the civilian elites is a mindful military, with both the power and prestige to affect change. Sources inside Pakistan acknowledge that Pakistan’s senior military commanders rule the country by advising the central government of the consequences and costs of their decisions. A retired Pakistani General told me, “The military is the dominant player. The civilian government can not lead the country without them.”

Above all, a Pakistani government perceived as weak will affect its bargaining power with the Taliban. If the peace deal in Swat fails, Islamabad will need to consider other options. Negotiations should remain at the top of the list, but talks can only be effective when international pressure on Pakistan to eliminate terrorists is within a reasonable timetable and with realistic demands.