March 2009 Archives

Finally Getting Serious About Heroin in Afghanistan: Is it Too Late?

By Douglas Farah

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Finally, the world, from the United States to Iran, is recognizing their own self interest in taking on the opium and heroin traffickers in Afghanistan. Iran, for the first time, seems to understand that it's own self-interest to curb its rapidly-growing internal consumption of the drugs that have passed through its territory fairly freely.

As the Associated Press reports, the DEA is gearing up in the region as well, seeking to implement a model similar to the one used to dismantle the Colombian cartels

The surge of narcotics agents, which would boost the number of anti-drug officials inside Afghanistan from a dozen to nearly 80, would bolster a strategy laid out last week by the Obama administration to use U.S. and NATO troops to target "higher level drug lords."

Detailed plans described to members of Congress behind closed doors earlier this month suggest the effort will be modeled after the federal Drug Enforcement Administration's campaign against drug cartels in South America.

Rep. Adam Smith, D-Wash., who chairs the House Armed Services terrorism subcommittee, said the DEA's effort is aimed at crippling the Afghan narcotics networks by driving up the costs of the opium trade.

"Any financing effort is really going to focus on the drug trade and the DEA is going to have to play a key role," Smith said.

But the issue is much more complex than just getting rid of the poppies, because so much time has elapsed and the traffickers have such a huge head start.

In a brilliant book that will be published in May, Gretchen Peters outlines how the Taliban and others in the heroin trade have such a surplus of opium that the short-term effect of any crackdown will drive prices up sharply, allowing the criminal organizations to unload their surplus while raking in massive amounts of cash.

The question is, will there be enough staying power for the cycle to come around far enough to actually have an impact on the production cycles. That we won't know for some time. My full blog is here.

Forging a New Alliance: Pursuing Peace with the Pathans

By Farhana Ali

The President’s plan for Afghanistan is thoughtful and a considerable departure from the previous administration. But the central question remains unanswered: Who should the United States engage to guarantee long-term stability in the region? We all agree that strengthening the local communities’ capacity to govern and guide their own future is essential. To succeed, the United States will need to identify who it can trust to rebuild the tribal and settled areas.

Several scholars and journalists agree that building tribal coalitions and working with the population is key to helping the Afghan and Pakistani people take control of their communities. Former deputy national security adviser for Iraq and Afghanistan, Meghan O’Sullivan, believes the important lesson from Iraq can help the U.S. achieve its strategic goal in the AFPAK region, as it is called for short. She writes,

“Building the Afghan army and police is vital, but it is a medium-to-long-term project…While many of Iraq’s lessons do not fit Afghanistan (or Pakistan), the centrality of population security is one wroth remembering as the president recommits America to solving the challenges of Afghanistan and Pakistan.”

In an effort to understand the various players, I asked the PakNationalists, a group of professionals disenchanted with the current political squabble in Pakistan as well as U.S. meddling, to comment on whether talking to the Pathans (Pashtuns) is an effective strategy. Earlier today, Ahmed Qureishi, a talk show host and policy analyst in Islamabad, sent me this email:

“Pashtuns are not necessarily the Taliban, nor are the Pathans secular. They are moderately religious-cum-secular. And no matter how secular a Pashtun in FATA or Kandahar is, he will still fight invaders and occupiers. His silence can be bought through bribe. But for how long? You can buy his silence for some time but never his loyalty.”

While no one advocates a relationship based on short-term monetary gains, the Pathan nationalists I know are seeking United States’ support to weaken hard-battled Islamists.

Not surprisingly, many Pathans desire peace and not all are opposed to a dialogue with the West. The Chairperson of a marketing firm in Karachi told me this week that building a partnership with the Pathans is possible when the right people and right tools are used. His approach is relatively simple and safe. He said, “I trained seventy business men from all the agencies of the FATA in May 2008 at a hotel in Karachi. The title of the training was ‘Bringing FATA Business men into Pakistan's main business stream.’ All of the participants said they wanted peace, development, education for women, libraries, information centers, medicine, and job opportunities in their areas.” In reality, the Pathans are no different than most Americans who want the basic necessities of life.

Like the Karachi businessman, the United States needs to engage local Pakistanis capable of providing essential training and resources to the people of the FATA. The cliché of “talking to the Taliban” may be one approach, though it is seen as the current of underlying discord between Pakistan’s elites and the extremists. Dividing the Taliban, who are mostly Pathans, into the “good” and the “bad” creates a false binary that assumes the United States and its partners in the region can conquer one over the other.

What is needed to reform the social and political construct of the tribal region is a nuanced approach that understands the various political allegories of different groups competing for power and prestige. Therefore, a more sound strategy is to involve the Pathans willing to protect their home and honor. A former political agent and senior, well-respected Pathan in Peshawar said to me,

“Tribal leaders are energetic, liberal and not willing to follow the instructions of religious commanders. I would ask the U.S. to directly support the tribal elders rather than give money that ends up in the pockets of the Pakistani military or political elites.”

Engaging the local Pathans will force the United States to rethink how much money and material it is willing to hand over to weak governments in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Investing in local partners, such as the strong-minded and secular-oriented Pathans, may be just what the President needs to restore America’s standing in the region.

Farhana Ali advises the U.S. military and policymakers on Pakistan; she is a former political officer with the U.S. government and a policy analyst with the Rand Corporation.

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Pakistan: Lahore under Siege, Hostage Crisis Engulfs the City

By Animesh Roul

Almost a month after the attack on Sri Lankan cricketers, Lahore city experienced another major Terrorist strike. On Monday, March 30, at least five grenade blasts reportedly took place inside a police training center in Manawan, Lahore and at the same time, around 25 armed terrorists stormed the center, taking around 500 inmates hostage.

According to reports, terrorists wearing police uniforms and carrying loads of arms and ammunition have entered into the police center, firing and lobbing grenades indiscriminately. While the fatality figure is likely to increase, as per the latest media reports, 20 people have been killed and more than 50 others injured thus far.

According to Geo TV News, Pakistan Army and paramilitary already taken position around the police training center and a gun battle is undergoing now. The injured policemen have been evacuated from training facility.

The terrorists tactics and the fidayeen style operation suggests Lashkar e Taiba (LeT)’s and Jaish-e-Muhammad's (JeM) hand in the siege. However, involvement of foreign Jihadists (there are plenty: Uzbeks and Afghans), Taliban and Al Qaeda elements can’t be ruled out.

Attacking a police academy clearly shows that terrorists have undermined a vital State institution which maintains law and order and which stands for the security of common people in the country. Terrorists, arguably, wants to prove that they are more powerful than security forces and nobody’s safe under this present administration. However, the demand from terrorists is yet to come while the hostage crisis is persisting.

Stopping Narco-Terrorism Requires Strong "Immigration Enforcement Tripod"

By Michael Cutler

We have heard so much about the meltdown of Mexico at the hands of the drug cartels that have engaged in what can only be described as acts of terrorism to intimidate the citizens and the leaders of Mexico. The slaughter of thousands of Mexican and the torture and beheading of police officers, military and government officials are threatening the survival of that nation's government and the violence has been spilling over the border that is supposed to separate Mexico from the United States. Phoenix, Arizona now suffers an average of one kidnapping or home invasion each day! It is not just members of the drug cartels that we need to be concerned about but also members of violent gangs such as MS-13 and gangs of virtually every ethnic group from the Russian mob to members of Asian gangs. There are, undoubtedly members of terrorist organizations living, working and concealing themselves in cities across our nation today!

It has been estimated that there are probably about 4,000 ICE agents assigned to working on various immigration enforcement activities across our entire nation. To put this in proper perspective, the City of New York has been described as being the ´safest big city in America. New York has over 8 million residents and its police department has roughly 37,000 police officers to protect those who reside, work and visit New York. So the United States of America has about ten percent the number of ICE agents for the entire country as there are cops patrolling the streets of New York City.

Let me explain why the interior enforcement program is absolutely essential to the safety of our citizens and the very survival of our nation especially as the United States confronts the growing threat posed by not only the Mexican drug cartels but other criminal and terrorist organizations comprised primarily by aliens. In order to do this, I would like to describe the concept of the "immigration enforcement tripod."

Simply stated, the immigration enforcement tripod means that the immigration inspectors (now known as CBP inspectors) enforce the immigration laws at ports of entry; the Border Patrol agents enforce the immigration laws between ports of entry; and the special agents who are assigned to enforce the immigration laws from within the interior of the United States comprise the third leg of the enforcement tripod.

It is the third leg of the tripod that has been all but ignored and continues to be ignored to this very day. These agents of ICE (Immigration and Customs Enforcement) should be conducting a number of critical missions to make certain that our nation's borders are secured and that there is real integrity to the immigration system that the terrorists were so easily able to circumvent. Among the missions that need to be carried out by ICE agents are:

Employer Sanctions:

Conducting investigations of factories, restaurants, hotels, farms and other places where people are employed to make certain that illegal aliens are not being gainfully employed. When an illegal alien is employed, both the employer and the illegal alien employee are violating the laws. Both need to be punished. Illegal aliens who are employed should be taken into custody and made to appear before an immigration judge for a removal (deportation) hearing. The unscrupulous employer who can be proven to have knowingly hired illegal aliens should be fined and face other legal sanctions should the practice of hiring illegal aliens be found to be continuing.

By making it clear that illegal aliens would not have an easy time of securing illegal employment in the United States, more Americans would be able to find jobs, wages earned by American citizens and lawful immigrants would be far more likely to be spent and invested in the United States (this is especially significant at a time when our government is claiming to be seeking to stimulate the American economy) and would reduce the number of illegal aliens streaming across our nation's borders making it easier to gain control over our nation's borders, especially the perilous southern border.

Fraud Investigations:

Special agents need to conduct investigations of fraud that fall under two basic categories, fraud schemes and fraud documents. Fraud schemes can also be divided into two broad categories, visa fraud and immigration benefit fraud. Fraud can be thought of as a lie committed in writing in an application to provide a person with a benefit that the person in question would not be entitled to if all of the relevant information was known to the person (adjudications officer or other official) at the time that the application for that benefit was being processed.

For the purposes of immigration, such applications might involve an application for a visa that would permit an alien to seek entry into the United States either temporarily on a nonimmigrant visa, such as a tourist visa, student visa or business visa, to name just a few of the visas that are available, or on an immigrant visa that provides the alien with a green card and thus accords that alien lawful immigrant status.

An example of a fraud scheme is the United States citizen or lawful permanent resident alien who marries an alien to provide that alien with resident alien (immigrant status) for money or other benefit. In such marriages, the couple does not really live together as a true couple but get married as part of an arranged "business deal." When an investigation discloses that this is the case in a particular "marriage," the citizen or immigrant spouse should be prosecuted for entering into a criminal conspiracy to violate our nation's immigration laws as should the alien spouse who sought to use this fraud scheme to acquire a green card. The alien who was seeking to acquire resident alien status through fraud should then be taken before an immigration judge to seek his (her) removal (deportation) from the United States.

There are other such fraud schemes that involve the concealment of material facts that enable aliens to enter our country and/or embed themselves in our country. Often terrorists are charged with visa fraud because it is often far easier to show that an alien succeeded in entering our country by committing fraud than it is to prove that an alien is a terrorist.

In the case of fraud documents, we can include identity theft, the alteration of legitimate identity documents and the creation of counterfeit identity or supporting documents such as Social Security cards, birth certificates and other such documents.

Today, there have been many reports about how easily aliens can and have gamed the immigration benefits program. Among them have been criminals and terrorists. The solution is not to ignore the problem but to develop the resources to conduct the necessary investigations and law enforcement activities that would bring real integrity to the program that provides millions of aliens with the keys to the kingdom in a truly perilous era.

The adjudicators at USCIS (United States Citizenship and Immigration Services) are rewarded for moving the applications that are stacked on their desks as they try to keep up with the ever increasing number of applications filed by ever more aliens who have become emboldened to file applications for a variety of immigration benefits including applications for residency and United States citizenship based on fraud. These bureaucrats must feel like Lucy and Ethel in that hilarious episode of "I Love Lucy" when Lucy and her friend got jobs at the candy factory and they attempt to wrap morsels of bonbons hurtling at them at ever increasing speed on a conveyor belt moving at warp speed.

The solution, in my judgment, is not to rush the process and compromise integrity, but to go after those who would commit fraud and convince those who would apply for applications that there is a serious price to be paid for attempting to defraud our government! This would, undoubtedly cause a sharp reduction in the number of new applications filed. This would cut waiting times for those who file legitimate applications and simultaneously making it easier for the adjudicators to screen out the fraud and create a bureaucracy that would have far greater integrity.

In this way everyone but the bad guys would win. This is called deterrence and must be applied to the immigration benefits program that has such serious national security implications! This can only be achieved by hiring a large number of special agents for ICE and providing them with the training and the resources to create an immigration bureaucracy that has real integrity.

Alien Smuggling / Human Trafficking Investigations:

When aliens are smuggled into the United States, the goal is generally not to simply set foot in the United States near the border but rather to enable the illegal alien to make his (her) way to the city they desire to go to after running our nation's borders or otherwise entering the United States by circumventing the inspections process. In addition to the obvious ploy of running our nation's borders, some smuggled aliens stow away on ships or aircraft. Therefore it is important to seek to identify so-called "safe houses" where smuggled illegal aliens may be held until family members or other can provide the funds to the smugglers. It is also important to seek to identify the transporters who, working in cahoots with a smuggler, may use various vehicles to enable illegal aliens to travel across our country.

It is important to note that smugglers who assist illegal aliens in surreptitiously entering the United States, they also often engage in smuggling narcotics across our nation's borders and often use illegal aliens as "beasts of burden" to carry a load of narcotics on their person. That is why such illegal aliens are referred to as "mules."

Sometimes the aliens are made to carry narcotics in their person by swallowing narcotics stuffed into condoms that are then retrieved at a “safe house” within the United States. A number of years ago I assisted the DEA in New York in executing a search warrant in Staten Island where such an operation was being run out of an apartment in an apartment building in which people, mostly citizens of Nigeria, entered the United States at John F. Kennedy International Airport with such condoms in their stomachs. They were met at the airport by a member of the drug organization who drove them to an the apartment where they were given massive doses of a laxative and then one of the workers would use a strainer to retrieve the drug-laden condoms from the toilet. It was only after that all of the condoms had passed through their bodies that these aliens were allowed to leave the apartment to hide in plain sight among the many other illegal aliens who have taken up illegal residency in our country. In some instances, the condoms would burst before they got off the airplane, often causing the "swallower" to perish because of a massive overdose.

Criminal Alien / Fugitive Investigations:

The agents who are assigned to this unit are responsible for locating aliens who have been convicted of crimes in the United States and have been sentenced to prison sentences. Some of these aliens may have been lawfully admitted to the United States as lawful immigrants (resident aliens) or they may have entered our country illegally. Regardless of how these aliens entered our country, by virtue of their criminal convictions, these aliens are now subject to removal from the United States.

Additionally, the agents in this squad also seek to arrest illegal aliens who had been deported (removed) from the United States and then, in one way or another, managed to reenter the United States without authorization. A criminal alien (aggravated felon in the parlance of the Immigration and Nationality Act) is subject to a maximum of 20 years of incarceration for the crime of reentry after deportation.

I am particularly proud of the fact that in the early 1980's I had approached then-United States Senator Al D'Amato of New York and convinced him to work with the administration, back then, to have deportation hearings conducted in correctional facilities (rather than wait many years, in some instances, for a criminal alien to be released). I also convinced him to sponsor legislation to promulgate legislation that would differentiate between administrative law violators who were deported from the United States and criminal aliens who were deported from the United States after serving their criminal sentences.

Before that law was enacted, their was no distinction between criminal aliens and aliens who had no felony convictions. Any alien who had been deported and then illegally reentered the United States was facing a maximum of two years in jail. Under the new law, the penalty for criminal aliens (aggravated felons) was created.

Task Force Investigations:

There are a number of task forces that combine local, state and federal law enforcement agencies. The idea behind these task forces can be summed up by one word: synergy. This means that the total is greater than the sum of the parts.
I spent roughly ten years as a senior special agent of the INS assigned to the Organized Crime, Drug Enforcement Task Force. For about 4 years I was the INS representative of the Unified Intelligence Division (UID) of the DEA in New York.

As the INS representative to the UID, some 20 years ago, I decided to compile arrest statistics to see how much of an involvement aliens had in narcotics-related crimes. Back then, some 60% of the defendants who had been arrested by DEA in New York City were identified as being "foreign born" while some 30% of those defendants, nationwide were identified as being "foreign born."

The idea that foreign nationals are heavily involved in narcotics trafficking is not a new problem. It is just a huge component of the problem that our nation's "leaders" have refused to address!

In both assignments, it became readily apparent that by working with other law enforcement agencies against drug trafficking organizations that all sorts of benefits to the effectiveness of these efforts could be greatly enhanced. Immigration was a major component of this operation, but we always suffered by an extreme lack of manpower and resources, especially where immigration was concerned.

There are other such task forces involving terrorism, gangs and other such serious threats to the safety of our people and the security of our nation.

As an INS (now ICE) special agent, information contained in immigration files offer tremendous insight into the risk of flight of criminals. This issue is of great importance when a criminal is arrested and is being arraigned. A federal magistrate or a judge is supposed to consider two primary issues in fixing bail: danger to the community and risk of flight.

The alien file often contains a veritable track record of past instances where a criminal alien may have used multiple identities, was deported and reentered the United States illegally on numerous occasions or failed to show up for immigration hearings. The participation of an ICE agent in a criminal investigation may also enable other agencies and prosecutors to not unwittingly enter into a plea bargain deal in which an alien is able to plea bargain away a criminal charge that would result in his deportation from the United States.

ICE agents can also help to bring additional charges against a criminal aliens such as visa fraud, benefit fraud or other such charge. Additionally, there is a charge that calls for a 5 year jail sentence for an illegal alien found to be in possession of a firearm. Only an ICE agent can provide the necessary evidence that the defendant found to be in possession of that weapon is, indeed, an illegal alien.

ICE agents can be instrumental in "flipping" informants. There are provisions of law that can be used to provide an informant and his family, with lawful status in our country if they are instrumental in assisting law enforcement agents in major criminal investigations.

ICE agents can also arrest members of criminal organizations on immigration violations without ever tipping their hand that they are part of a task force that has targeted other members of a terrorist or criminal organization. These benefits also can help those cities whose leaders are not so screwed up that they declare their cities to be "sanctuary cities."

When a community has a large illegal aliens population, all sorts of businesses spring up in support of that large illegal alien population. These businesses include mail drops services, money-wire services (remitters), telephone arcades and disposable cellphone businesses, document vendors and others that are helpful to illegal aliens and absolutely essential for criminals, drug traffickers and terrorists.

If our nation is to gain the upper hand in the many threats that confront our nation and our citizens, it is absolutely essential that there be an adequate number of ICE agents and supporting resources to make the interior enforcement of the immigration laws the priority is desperately needs to be. Anything that ignores the vital interior enforcement mission is doomed to fail!

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“Here I Come”: Jamrud Mosque Mayhem Shows Taliban Resilience

By Animesh Roul

Nearly 75 people killed including security force personnel and over 150 others injured in a deadly suicide blast triggered inside a mosque during Friday prayers near Baghiari check post area in Jamrud (Khyber Agency) on March 27. The Mosque was located on the busy Peshawar-Torkham Highway, which is one of the important NATO supply routes.

Undoubtedly, the blast was targeted at the worshippers (mostly people from nearby villages), and security forces stationed inside and near the Mosque premise. Even though no organization has taken responsibility for the mosque attack, the finger of suspicion pointed towards the Taliban elements who warned to attack security posts on the supply route for NATO and US troops in Afghanistan.

Jamrud is not new to the Taliban’s explosive tactics. The region has witnessed a series of suicide attacks, shootings, kidnappings and lootings, mostly targeted at the NATO supplies, in the recent past. Taliban elements repeatedly warned the administration of severe consequence, if they can’t cease military operations in Khyber, Swat and other tribal areas.

Personnel of Frontier Corps and tribal militia Khyber Khassadar Force (KKF) who are guarding NATO supply routes and involved in counter-Taliban operations, have been bearing the brunt of Taliban/Al Qaeda offensive for quite some time. Earlier this month (March 03), Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) distributed leaflets at Landikotal area urging the Khassadar Force to vacate all the check posts along the Pakistan-Afghanistan Highway in Khyber Agency. After repeated warnings, TTP attacked a KKF checkpoint in the Jaba area of Jamrud where they abducted and later killed at least two KKF personnel.

Late last year, the government launched operation ‘Daraghlum’ (in local Pashto, it means “Here I come”). The recent stepped up Taliban offensive (including Jamrud Mosque attack) perhaps has direct links to that operation. This brief military operation against Taliban and criminals in Khyber Agency resulted in unearthing of large quantity of looted arms, ammunition and other goods, including that of the NATO supplies.

According to sources, for quite some time, Taliban and other militant elements have been gathering inputs about the nearby villagers (of Kafar Tangi, Sur Kamar, Saifr, Ghundai, and Shakas) who helped army and paramilitary in many successful raids in recent months. On February 06 this year Pakistan army killed over 50 Taliban terrorists in an operation near Chapri and Feroz Khel areas along the border of Orakzai and Khyber Agencies in FATA with the help of local inputs (human intelligence). However, the administration misread Taliban’s strength and the operations as success and wrongly believed that they had neutralized all groups operating in Khyber agency.

The Jamrud mosque mayhem happened during a time when the Washington administration announced a new Afghans strategy in which the neighboring Pakistan is key part of the vexed conflict (AfPak). Only couple of days ago, the US has offered 5 million USD as reward to find and capture Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud and al Qaeda operative Sirajuddin Haqqani and Abu Yahya Al-Libi. These head money notwithstanding, most of the senior Taliban and Al Qaeda members are still at large and operating with impunity in the tribal dominated areas of Pakistan.

By Walid Phares

The evaluation of President Obama's grand strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan is now developing in the national and international defense and security sectors, both public and private. Expectedly, the discussion will have to go in two directions: the design of the grand strategy based on a reading of past experience on the one hand and a periodic review of the execution. The Obama Administration was quick to indicate that it intends to create a measurement of success as outlined by the press conference announcing the plans. Hence in this post we will not analyze the plan thoroughly but indicate to readers where would the most challenging issues be in the forthcoming discussions. In future post a structural and functional analysis will be offered in light of the Presidential announcement but also in the framework of a re-reading of the past eight years, a task I do contend wasn't fulfilled comprehensively yet by the national security and counter terrorism community yet.

In very short, the general direction of the strategy seems to be sound and in line with what the defense and CT sectors would have expected, meaning a determination to defeat a central Terror force stretching on both sides of the Afghan Pakistani borders. But from there on, the evaluation of the sub strategies can differ. In short the administration’s plan to send 4,000 additional U.S. troops as trainers to prepare the native forces is a step in the right direction. The fight against the jihadi war machine in that region must meet the strategic threat posed by the Taliban network and the Al Qaeda organization. As accurately described by President Obama, they threaten not only NATO troops and the government in Kabul, but also Afghan civilians and, just as importantly, the democratically elected government in Pakistan.

These Army trainers, along with the 17,000 Marines and Army personnel the president wants to deploy into combat operations in Afghanistan, should be part of a global campaign to defeat the terror forces strategically. In that sense, the decision extend and tries to solidify the campaign that began in 2001 not abruptly end it.

But the administration must not fall into the trap of striking militarily and failing politically inside the two battlefields. In all versions of the strategy, NATO and Afghan-Pakistani forces must defeat the Taliban on the ground to be able to engage with the country’s civil society. One sub strategy we warn against is the so-called striking a deal with “moderate Taliban” while pushing back against the “bad Taliban.” Such a move, within the grand design could generate a disaster for the whole strategy which sound in its inception. The Administration must remained focused on winning the war against the jihadist hydra while engaging the forces of civil society.

Another area of concern would be the sub strategy of "development" in tribal area based on the $ 1.5 Billion pledged by the Administration. The sectors to be targeted for such aid can either make the success or the failure of the economic aid component.

I'll expand further in these areas in future posts.

Following is a radio interview on Dateline Washington on the Strategy.

09 Dateline Obama Strat AfPak.mp3

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New Af-Pak Strategy: More Effort on Pakistan Needed

By Aaron Mannes

President Obama announced his new Pakistan-Afghanistan strategy today. Except for advocates of a strict counter-terror strategy in Afghanistan (as opposed to the administration’s plans for a counter-insurgency strategy that includes a healthy dose of nation-building), there is little to disagree with in the specifics. But in the big picture, while a new strategy may be needed for Afghanistan – the key front may be Pakistan.

In the President’s statement Pakistan is primarily seen in terms of Afghanistan, that is how the growing Taliban presence in the Northwest Frontier Province provides support for the Afghani Taliban. If keeping up pressure on al-Qaeda is the top U.S. priority then this makes sense. But while there is no question that this should be towards the top of the foreign policy to-do list, it may not be number one. Keeping al-Qaeda on the run is a CT operation, heavy on intelligence and precision strikes. But the worst outcomes in Pakistan are truly the stuff of nightmares and preventing them will require a far greater commitment of resources (not just in financial and material terms, but also in terms of time and focus by decision-makers and key agencies).

Read the full post here.

Smart Power and Dumb Budgeting

By Michael B. Kraft

(The following has been updated to include references to President Obama's Afghanistan strategy announced Friday and the Kerry-Lugar amendment to restore the Senate Budget Committee cuts.)

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“Smart Power” is the current buzzword for the best way to counter a wide variety of national security threats, but dumb budgeting procedures remain a major obstacle.

Congress already is slicing away at the Obama administration’s Foreign Affairs
Fiscal Year 2010 budget containing increases in foreign assistance programs to improve economic and social conditions in countries that are breeding grounds for violence and terrorism.

Meanwhile on the home front, the FBI testified to Congress that it is continuing its emphasis on countering terrorism threat that began after 9/11. But officials acknowledged that the FBI needs more agents to combat corporate and financial fraud and drug trafficking. (See below.)

These developments reflecting the tugs and pulls of contradictory pressures and competition for resources were illustrated this week as the Congressional budget committees acted on the Obama Administration’s budget proposals, imposing cuts in the foreign assistance programs with their smart power components.

The House Budget Committee on Wednesday recommended a budget that would cut $5.5 billion from the administration’s $53.8 billion request. The Senate Budget Committee followed the next day although it made a lighter cuts— $4 billion.

While these cuts were made from a request that was initially a $5.8 billion 13.6% increase from the FY 2009 levels, this does not reflect the whole picture according to Dr. Gordon Adams, a former associate OMB director for national security and international affairs who is now a fellow at the Henry L. Stimson Center. He said that if the second FY 2009 supplemental is enacted by Congress, the overall 2010 budget for State, USAID and foreign affairs agencies as proposed by the House Committee would end up a billion dollars lower than in 2009. If the Senate figures prevail, there would be no increase over FY 2009.

This is at a time when virtually the entire foreign affairs establishment, led by Defense Secretary Robert Gates with his November 26, 2007 speech, is calling for allocating more resources for “smart power” foreign assistance and civil affairs activities in Afghanistan, Iraq and other trouble spots. He and many military men have said that that the military cannot do the job alone.

President Obama, in announcing his Afghanistan strategy Friday, said the United States would send hundreds of additional civilians and diplomats to Afghanistan to help improve that country's governance and economy. This would be in addition to the 4,000 additional troops he announced would be deployed to help train and advise the Afghan army.

Various non-government groups have pushed for increased funding for Smart Power, including the Center for U.S. Global Engagement, a bi-partisan group which on March 4 held a major event with speakers including former Secretary of State Powell and Sen. Robert Martinez (D-New Jersey) of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and other former officials of bioth parties. The Center released a “Report on Reports” summarizing 20 reports by a diverse groups of institutions and experts who support the use of enhanced non-military tools to help deal with weak and failing states. Conferences and seminars on smart power are regular events in Washington, including one held Tuesday at Ft. Meyer that featured several retired generals as speakers and included a panel with Andy Cochran, founder of this counterterrorism blog and Matt Levitt, a regular contributor, that discussed integrating and balancing soft and kinetic power.

Despite these efforts, as Dr. Adams noted, it is widely perceived that “International Affairs budgets do not have the strong constituency supporting defense, and as a result are vulnerable to these cuts.” The Defense Department’s full $533.7 billion request was approved. Dr. Adams said in a statement following the House Budget Committee action that the foreign affairs budget cuts reflect “the Committee and the Congress’ reluctance to consider all elements of national security spending together, as part of U.S. national security strategy. The result of such cuts could be a further weakening of the civilian tool of American statecraft.”

(Following the Senate Budget Committee's Actions, Senator John Kerry (D-Massachusetts), Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Senator Richard Lugar (R-Indiana), the senior Republican member, said they will offer a Senate floor amendment to restore the $4 billion cut by the Senate Banking Committee. The U.S. Global Leadership Campaign, in emails urging support for the amendment, said "Anything less than the request level of $53.8 billion will greatly hamper the Administration's effort to implement a "smart power" strategy to elevate diplomacy and development in U.S. global engagement.")

By dumb budgeting, I don’t mean to cast aspersions on the Budget Committees –they have a tough job. But the whole process, involving a great amount of detail, lends itself to making across the board cuts, based on percentages compared to previous year budgets, instead of a close examination of the needs for individual programs. The prolonged use of continuing resolutions to extend funding at the previous fiscal year’s level for a few months at a time because Congress has not passed the appropriations bills on time greatly complicates the planning, scheduling and implementation of foreign assistance and training programs.

The Budget Committees set the overall spending ceiling for the administration’s budget request. A conference committee will work out the differences between the higher Senate version and the deeper House cuts. The authorizing committees also make their recommendations but it has been many years since Senate Foreign Relations Committees and House Foreign Affairs Committees have been able to pass authorizing bills. This is partly because members have been reluctant to vote twice on foreign assistance funding –opening themselves up to campaign opponents who might criticize them for “foreign giveaways.”

Consequently, the real power has shifted to the Appropriations Committees which will then consider the details, authorize on appropriations bills –formerly a no-no-- and make their recommendations to the full House and Senate. However with the Budget committee allocations squeezing down from the top and the Appropriations subcommittees and full committee often making additional cuts in the foreign assistance program, it is likely that additional cuts will be made in the overall foreign affairs account and individual programs.

At stake could be such important but relatively small counterterrorism programs such as the State Department’s Antiterrorism Training Assistance Program (ATA), which improves the counterterrorism capabilities of civilian officials of friendly countries. The FY 2009 request was $141.5 million but about $17 million is earmarked for Afghanistan includes protection for the President of Afghanistan. The figures for 2010 will, like the rest of the budget, not be available until April but officials have indicated that they hope for some increases to meet the growing needs as Al Qaeda inspired terrorists continue to pop up in many countries. For more details, see the link to the discussion we held for the House Foreign Affairs Committee last month.

SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE

Meanwhile during a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing Wednesday, FBI Director Mueller said that countering the terrorism threat was still the number one priority although the focus left fewer agents to counter non-terrorism crime.

The New York Times interpreted this as the Obama administration “moving to solidify one of the most significant shifts of resources put into place under President Bush: the transformation of the Justice Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation into agencies where the top priority is counterterrorism rather than conventional law enforcement.”

On another terrorism-related issue Mueller urged Congress to renew portions of the USA PATRIOT Act that have sunset provisions and are scheduled to expire in December unless renewed by Congress.

A key provision is the so-called “roving wiretaps” that allows federal officials to seek wiretaps on all the communications devices utilized by a terrorist suspect, instead of seeking a separate warrant for each blackberry, cell phone or regular phone. Such authority was originally allowed in Mafia and other racketeering cases and was later extended to terrorism cases. The American Civil Liberty Union has opposed the Patriot Act as a “disastrous violation for Americans’ rights. But this roving wiretap act is one provision that should clearly be maintained to avoid unnecessary delays every time a terrorists suspect changes phones.

It is important that a balance be maintained between with civil liberties and security concerns and of course it is appropriate to review the sunset legislation in an objective matter. At the same time those who advocate and accept the ACLU’s opposition to these issues should understand that it should also be one’s civil liberty to be able to fly on an airliner or work in a landmark office building without being blown up.

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Reforming U.S. Counter-Terrorism Assistance Programs

By Andrew Cochran

On February 12, Professor Yonah Alexander and I co-chaired a special seminar titled, “Reforming U.S. Counter-Terrorism Assistance Programs,” on Capitol Hill in Washington. Our keynote speakers were Rep. Brad Sherman, the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade, U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs; and Rep. Edward R. Royce, the Subcommittee Ranking Member. Our panelists were Contributing Experts Michael Kraft, Victor Comras, and Matthew Levitt.

The event was co-sponsored by the Counterterrorism Foundation; the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies, the International Center for Terrorism Studies at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, and the Inter-University Center for Legal Studies at the International Law Institute.

You can download the transcript of the event here, and thanks to Assistant Newslinks Editor Brett Wallace for preparing the transcript. Towards the end of the Q-&-A session, we heard from the Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the State Department, Ambassador Dell Dailey, who attended along with Deputy Coordinator for the Programs Directorate, Gina K. Abercrombie-Winstanley. We also thank Michelle Zewin, Prof. Alexander's assistant at the Potomac Institute, for her help.

Will We Ever Know The Truth About Airline Security on 9/11? (Updated March 26)

By Andrew Cochran

Here is what we still don't know, over seven years after the 9/11 attacks, about airline and airport security on that day:

1. We don't know if all of the metal screening machines at the airports involved had been tested and were actually working as designed;

2. We don't know if the security personnel working on those machines and screen passengers were qualified and properly trained to find barred and dangerous items; and

3. We don't know how the terrorists made it through the checkpoints with their deadly box-cutters, knives and mace.

All that, and more, was unilaterally designated by the aviation industry defendants as confidential, wrongfully exploiting a protective order issued by a federal judge in 2004, designed only to protect trade secret and competitive information. The order was entered in lawsuits filed by families of 9/11 victims against certain airlines, security companies and others responsible for airline and airport security (the "aviation defendants") on that fateful day. The remaining three families, out of 96 who filed lawsuits, have challenged the defendants' "confidential trade secrets" designations, claiming that one of their major motivations for filing lawsuits and not going into the no-fault Victims Compensation Fund created by Congress was to ask questions, demand accountability and shed light on the checkpoint failures that allowed 19-for-19 hijackers to board aircrafts with prohibited weapons and hazardous materials. While the families have access to this information within the confines of the litigation, the public does not.

Today, the attorneys for the victims' families, joined by news organizations, will stand before a federal judge and argue for their latest motion to release a huge stash of documents (a million pages or more) which could finally reveal the truth about the status of airline and airport security leading up to and on that horrible day.

The idea that the airline and airport security regime in existence over eight years ago is a "trade secret" is preposterous. Yet, in producing aviation industry documents and witness testimony to these families, the aviation defendants designated over 99% of the evidence (documents and transcripts) to be trade secrets. None of the machines in operation on 9/11 at any airport in the U.S. are in use today - all have been upgraded by orders of magnitude. All of the personnel now working them on that day were released and/or retrained with much tougher federal standards.

Yes, I represent the attorneys of the 9/11 victims before Congress and the Executive Branch and have assisted them in ensuring the release of government documents pertinent to the issue. But that doesn't change the point: there is no logical reason to permanently seal industry documents on old, outdated, and replaced airline and airport security procedures or the sworn testimony of nearly 200 witnesses who have testified in these cases.

The procedural rules which govern the confidentiality of "trade secrets" don't exist to protect businesses from public embarrassment and possible civil liability. Ironically, trade secrets and competitive information are usually intended to be kept secret from other industry members, in this case, the secrets are shared among all of the aviation defendants, but kept secret from everyone else. Civil litigation in the United States is meant to conducted in full view.

UPDATE, March 26: The federal judge told the victims' attorneys that he favors not publicly disclosing the evidence until a trial occurs. A trial date has not been set.

NEFA Foundation: New Zawahiri Audio - "Crusade Sets Its Sights on the Sudan"

By Evan Kohlmann

The NEFA Foundation has obtained a new audio recording from Al-Qaida Deputy Commander Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri released on March 24 and titled, "Crusade Sets Its Sights on the Sudan." During the recording, Dr. al-Zawahiri insisted, "I am not defending Umar al-Bashir or his regime, nor am I defending what it has done in Darfur and elsewhere; rather, I am asking our Muslim Ummah to look at the matter in a comprehensive way which takes in all of its dimensions. The issue isn’t one of Darfur and solving its problems: the issue is one of making excuses for more foreign interference in the Muslims’ countries in the framework of the contemporary Zionist Crusade. Why aren’t they putting Bush, Blair, Olmert, Barak, Musharraf and Putin on trial? ...Why hasn’t the United Nations moved to protect the Palestinians in Gaza from Israeli barbarity and criminality, while it pretends to cry over the suffering of the people of Darfur? ...I tell our people in the Sudan: the Sudanese regime is too weak to defend the Sudan, so you must do what was done by your brothers in Iraq and Somalia, who defended their countries when the official regimes were powerless to do that, and not only that, but much of them fled or surrendered. So make preparations – by training, equipping, storing and organizing for a long guerilla war, for the contemporary Crusade has bared its fangs at you. I tell our Muslim brothers in the Sudan: we are with you, and all Mujahideen and Muslims are with you, and we shall – with Allah’s help – do all that is in our power to help you." Al-Zawahiri also issued "a message to our people in Darfur. I tell them: don’t allow the Crusade to turn your suffering into a pretext for the occupation of the homelands of Islam."

An English transcript of Dr. al-Zawahiri's recording can be downloaded from the NEFA Foundation website.

Britain's Double Vision of Hezbollah?

By Walid Phares

The British government’s announcement to open a dialogue with “the political wing of Hizballah” is most troubling. In a statement to a parliamentary committee, Bill Rammell, the British foreign office’s minister for Middle East affairs, rationalized the decision on the grounds of what his office perceives to be “more positive developments within Lebanon.”

This British declaration underscores a pervasive failure to properly understand the structure of the Iranian-backed terrorist organization. At worst, the call to distinguish between the group's political and military wings (in terms of decision-making) may be driven by a desire to construct imaginary facts for diplomatic and political purposes. Are officials selling a false image of what Hizballah is so that they join the foray of the “sitting, talking and listening” with Iran and Syria's regimes now underway?

Very possible. But it would have been much better to inform the public that the government intends to talk to a terrorist organization for purpose of national interest, rather than claiming the talks are only with the political wing. Eight years after 9/11 and the subsequent attacks worldwide, citizens are much better informed about jihadi organizations than they were in the 1990s. Officials in the UK and the US must realize that claiming there are two Hizballah(s) will not fly with most of the public.

Organization Chart.jpg
Hezbollah's organizational chart: one centralized entity with multiple tentacles

Hizballah was founded by the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards, Pasdaran, in 1981. Its military organization responsible for terror operations is part of the Consultative Council (majliss al shawra), which is Hizballah’s supreme command, along with, the organization's legislators, Fatwa clerics, financial executives and political operatives. This "politbureau" of Hizballah oversees the military, security, doctrinal and political actions of the entire apparatus -- there is no structural delineation.

Furthermore, the Jihad Council, Hizballah's War Department, which issues the orders for acts of terror, is headed by the Secretary General of the organization, Hassan Nasrallah and includes many of the organization’s “political leaders”: Hashem Safi al Din, Hussein al Khalil, Abbas Ruhani, Ibrahim Aqil, Fuad Shukr, Nabil Kauq and others.

Hezbollah's chart showing clearly that it is one organization with the military and terror networks under the Shura Council

Hizballah is not the IRA, which had a clearer delineation between its militia and its military wing, the Sin Fein. Moreover, Lebanon is not Northern Ireland. Yes, British citizens can be easily led to make the comparison by government using the clichés by which most Britons remember the IRA, but the attempt to fool the public will be short lived. The lack of separation between Hizballah’s political and military operations is well documented in public sources. Any suggestion to the contrary is simply ridiculous.

If the British government wishes to make that distinction, they will find themselves incapable of answering the most basic questions. Mr. Nasrallah, Hizballah’s secretary general and purported partner in any dialogue, is a la fois the chief political executive of the organization and Hizballah's supreme military commander. How then will meeting Nasrallah be political, when he is the commander in chief of the militia and its security apparatuses? Will diplomats meet with him between 9 and 11 AM when he is a secretary general and avoid him at other hours when he wears his military hat? It simply doesn't make sense.

If the British government wishes to engage in talks with a terrorist organization, it must make that case and not obfuscate its true intentions of working with the Hizballah’s political wing. At the end of the day, Hizballah will remain who it is, who it says it is and who it will continue to be: a terrorist organization devoted to Jihad against the West. It is more honest to try to convince the public that time to talk with Hizballah, Iran and Syria, and even perhaps Hamas, has come. It will be more productive to acknowledge that some liberal democracies aren't able to carry the load of a confrontation with the jihadists than to attempt to rewrite history and reality.

Even if the British government chooses to engage with Hizballah -- which is certainly a questionable strategy -- they should not do so on the false pretense that there are “two Hizballah’s” just as there were two IRA’s. There are not, and the British people are well aware of that fact.

Moreover, any negotiations which are premised on such a mis-characterization of the interlocutor cannot possibly succeed for the British. Hizballah, on the other hand, can and likely will.

**********

Dr Walid Phares, author of The Confrontation: Winning the War on Future Jihad is the Director of the Future Terrorism Project at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies

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Hezbollah: Narco-Islamism

By Matthew Levitt

Earlier this month, the United Kingdom announced that it is reopening dialogue with the political wing of Hezbollah. Unlike the United States, the United Kingdom has only banned Hezbollah's terrorist (External Security Organization) and military wings. Meanwhile, the European Union has not yet designated any part of Hezbollah -- military, political or otherwise -- although it did label Imad Mughniyeh, the late Hezbollah chief of external operations, and several other Hezbollah members involved in specific acts of terrorism.

But despite the differences between U.S. and European perceptions of and policies toward Hezbollah, there is one critical area where all parties' mutual interests converge, namely law enforcement. Regardless of divergent political considerations or definitions of terrorism, combating crime and enforcing sovereign laws are straightforward issues. More than any other Islamist group, Hezbollah has a long record of engaging in criminal activity to support its activities. The United States and its European counterparts have a particularly strong shared interest in combating the group's increasing role in illicit drug trafficking.

Just this past week Admiral James G. Stavridis, the Commander of U.S. Southern Command who has now been nominated to head NATO troops as Supreme Allied Commander Europe, testified before the House Armed Services Committee about the threat to the United States from the nexus between illicit drug trafficking -- "including routes, profits, and corruptive influence" -- and "Islamic radical terrorism." While Hezbollah is involved in a wide variety of criminal activity, ranging from cigarette smuggling to selling counterfeit products, the connection between drugs and terror is particularly strong.

The nexus between drug trafficking and terrorist activities -- specifically those of Hezbollah -- represent an immediate law enforcement challenge for the United States and its European allies. While the Europeans may not view Hezbollah as a terrorist organization, they are certainly eager to prevent Hezbollah from running criminal enterprises within their borders. Countries are particularly determined to prevent the importation of illegal narcotics across their borders, whether by organized criminal networks, terrorists groups, or the hybrid narco-terrorist networks that DEA officials describe as "meaner and uglier than anything law enforcement or militaries have ever faced."

So while there is no common understanding between the United States and the United Kingdom on whether or how to engage Hezbollah or even how to classify Hezbollah and its various component parts, there is no "gray area" as to whether drug trafficking is illegal. The United Kingdom and other European nations are no less eager than the United States to combat the flow of drugs into their countries and to prevent Hezbollah from operating criminal enterprises within their territory.

The British decision to openly engage Hezbollah politically is misinformed, to be sure. But do not be surprised if the Brits talk to Hezbollah "political" leaders on the one hand while arresting some of their cohorts involved in illicit narcotics on the other. Officials may openly describe these actions as targeting criminals, not Hezbollah, but the effect will be much the same.

The full article, written for Middle East Strategy at Harvard (MESH), is here.

NEFA Foundation Report - "The Union of Good: INTERPAL and the U.K. Member Organizations"

By Evan Kohlmann

The NEFA Foundation has released a new report by NEFA Senior Analyst Steve Merley titled, "The Union of Good: INTERPAL and the U.K. Member Organizations." The Union of Good (UG) is a coalition of Islamic charities that provides financial support to both the Hamas “social” infrastructure, as well as its terrorist activities. In November 2008, the U.S. Treasury Department designated the UG. The U.K. is an important area of operation for the UG, with six known member organizations operating within its borders, including INTERPAL, probably the single most important UG member. As with the UG itself, the U.K member organizations, their donors, and their leaders are often associated with the global Muslim Brotherhood and are themselves frequently inter-related, sometimes sharing Trustees, banks, and in some cases, using each other to deliver aid and/or donating to each other. The U.K member organizations appear to also deliver aid in a similar manner, donating to “partner” organizations in the Palestinian Territories, many of which are associated with Hamas and who are responsible for use of the aid money. It is often difficult to understand how the UG member charity money is actually used, as funded projects are described in only general terms. Of the six UG member organizations in the U.K, only INTERPAL has been the subject of any substantial investigation. And, despite evidence that INTERPAL aid is going to Hamas-related organizations, the organization continues to operate, although it is facing mounting banking problems probably related to the U.S. designation of the UG as a terrorist entity.

The report can be downloaded from the NEFA Foundation website.

On Rebuilding Gaza

By David Schenker

Earlier this month, Secretary of State Clinton attended an international donors' conference on reconstructing the Gaza Strip and pledged $900 million in US funding for the Palestinians. In the coming months as the rebuilding of Gaza takes center stage, a competition will unfold pitting the ostensibly pro-peace Fatah faction of the PLO against the terrorist organization Hamas. At stake is the political credit for rebuilding Gaza, which was decimated during the three-week January 2009 war.

I’ve written an article published in the March 2009 issue of Jane’s Islamic Affairs Analyst titled “Why the race is on to rebuild Gaza,” discussing the competition between Hamas and Fatah, and comparing it to a similar struggle that occurred following the 2006 summer war between Hizballah and Israel. In Lebanon, the democratically-elected pro-west Government was vying for political credit for rebuilding with Syrian-Iranian backed Hizballah.

Where is Pakistan Heading?

By Farhana Ali

The oft-repeated question of where Pakistan is heading is often answered with uncertainty about the country's future. In a Congressional briefing on Thursday, March 19th, I presented three key themes, which I have outlined below.

First, Pakistan is a failing democracy. At the very least, Pakistan's democratic experience is fraught with confusion and constant concern about its ability to counter extremists as well as contain its own domestic political crisis. While the restoration of the Chief Justice is a positive sign, Pakistani leaders have yet to resolve their political differences. The current struggle for political power could either lead to a coalition or a tug-of-war with consequences for both the U.S. and Pakistan.

Secondly, Pakistan's strength lies with its people. This is an obvious point that has been highlighted by analysts and military strategists for years. however, who to engage in Pakistan is not easily identifiable.

U.S. strategy towards Pakistan recognizes that while Pakistan is in danger, the opportunities to engage local populations to counter extremist networks is critical. Though I advocate the need to strengthen local Pashtuns, through legitimate NGOs by secular-oriented groups, any U.S. effort to include the locals must not sideline the central government. A proposal submitted to the World Security Network examines at length how money flow for FATA projects can be achieved in a timetable acceptable to the U.S. and Pakistan. The proposal, drafted by former Pakistani Ambassador to the U.S. Riaz Khokhar, is worth a read. Engagement should also include the people of Kashmir, a disputed territory that Pakistan hopes to resolve with U.S. commitment and guidance.

Third, Pakistan needs a multi-faceted and holistic approach to achieve tangible results in the short-term to combat multiple threats. An unpopular policy, from the U.S. perspective, is Islamabad's negotiation with Taliban factions--the once hard-battled Islamists who were enemies of the state. Pashtuns in Peshawar and Pakistani military commanders reveal a war weariness, and are therefore ready to talk to the Taliban to cease hostilities and pave the way towards reconciliation.

While the U.S. has maintained a non-negotiations policy with terrorists, negotiations might lead to a semblance of stability in the region, even while the use of Shariah law is seen as a tool to weaken the state's control of the tribal and settled areas. The use of religious doctrine, itself, is not in question. Many moderate Muslims support the Shariah, but the question of who has the right to interpret and introduce Shariah is wide and without any easy answers. Who within Islamic scholarship is responsible and responsive to the community is an issue to be resolved..

Therefore, religious leaders with little to no training in Islamic jurisprudence have created a climate of fear, at least for outsiders. Contrary to Western perception, the Taliban pose the greatest threat, not to the United States or Britain, but to local, secular, nationalist Pashtuns. In a dinner party in Peshawar, where I was the only woman, I engaged proud Pashtuns. Two local men shared their views:

A scholar at Peshawar University, Dr. Ijaz Khan, remarked, "The problem of Pakistan is in Islamabad and not in the FATA. We live in a non-democratic state where security dominates everything else. With security, the security establishment dominates. A state that resists democratization in Islamabad, Lahore or Karachi [the three main cities] cannot be expected to accept the democratization of FATA.”

A former political agent and senior leader, who remains anonymous for security reasons, said, "Tribal leaders are energetic, liberal and not willing to follow the instructions of religious commanders. I am confident that with some financial aid, we can organize an army (lashkar) in the tribal areas to fight against Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and the Pakistani spy agency that supports them. Spending billions of U.S. dollars on war on terror is not enough. The U.S. regime must think over the strategy of making friends in tribal area with direct financial support to them; this is a policy that I know the Punjabi-dominated military rulers care least about. They don’t care about development projects in the FATA and so it is the Pakistani government that is destroying the existing poor infrastructure of this area. I would ask the U.S. to directly support the tribal elders rather than give money that lands in the pockets of the military or political elites.”

In reality, secular Pashtuns feel exploited by the central government. The hope they once harbored for their nationalist, secular party, the Awami National Party (ANP), is replaced with helplessness.

Given the solemn gravity of Pakistan's problems, I offer three solutions: a) insist on a coalition government to diffuse further political wrangling for power; b) initiate reform at the local level by supporting local leaders, including Americans such as Todd Shea, whose NGO (Comprehensive Disaster Relief Services, now registered as SHINE in the United States) operates in Pakistan-held Kashmir. He provides medical relief to patients at less than $2.00 per person. His story is remarkable and riveting; c) improve America's image in the region with creative use of the media. Touted as "public diplomacy" projects, the use of media to counter radicalization is one way to replace feelings of hate and revenge with messages that include respect for self and society.

In conclusion, the never-ending chain of crises in Pakistan is reason to worry about its future. A U.S. government-sponsored meeting last week on Pakistan stressed the need to reevaluate the policies of the previous administration. The need to reassess U.S. policy in a volatile country is forcing the U.S. to carefully consider the value of strategic communications. How the U.S. will deliver and frame a message that achieves its mission objectives in Pakistan is an ongoing discussion and will likely involve future research.

This is a critical time for Pakistan and the United States. Despite the two countries’ differences, both countries share similar goals—both want to win the war in Afghanistan. Both want a final outcome that guarantees long-term stability in the region. To ensure that U.S. strategic and foreign policy objectives are met, we know we need to stay engaged with Pakistan. We know that the U.S.-Pakistan partnership is a long-term relationship; what we don’t know is which leader we need to engage in the coming weeks and months, and whether Pakistan will stay the democratic course.

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NEFA Foundation: Hamas Addresses Prisoner Swap - "Zionist Occupation Bears Full Responsibility"

By Evan Kohlmann

The NEFA Foundation has obtained a communiqué from Hamas' "military" wing, the Ezzedeen Al-Qassam Brigades, addressing the prisoner swap. According to the statement, "The Zionist enemy has not provided any new offer recently. What Olmert has tried to propagate in the Zionist media in recent days is maneuvering for internal political purposes and for absorption of popular protest within the entity, But, in fact, his move did not refer to any actual intention to complete the swap agreement.” It continued, “The enemy [needs] to understand that hindrance of the exchange deal will have a negative impact, and the only realization is disappointment and great loss."

An English version of the statement can be viewed on the NEFA Foundation website.

The President's message to Iran: Is the regime interested?

By Walid Phares

President Obama addressed a message to the Iranian people and leadership calling on the regime to open a new page in the strained relationship. Tehran answered quickly that its expectations are to see Washington change its behavior. In comments made on Russia Today TV, I clarified that the Iranian regime expects the Obama Administration to take more steps including apologizing for so-called ‘past mistakes’. But the US Administration is on a different track, as far as we know. It is giving Ahmedinijad a chance to begin changing its own policies. While on the surface, we see a moment of rapprochement, the actual issues to discuss are still too tough to solve. Washington wants to engage Iran on the ground of stopping the military nuclear program and ceasing support to Hezbollah and Hamas, while Tehran considers these matters as a no-go area of concession.

By Aaron Mannes

A few years ago I wrote a short post about it on my old blog, which I re-post below. (The old blog is now defunct, but I am slowly posting it into The TerrorWonk.) At the time, this was seen as the future of terrorism. In retrospect, there are enormous barries to terrorist groups producing and delivering WMD in major quantities. In a chapter of the Stimson Institute's October 2000 publication Ataxia: The Chemical and Biological Terrorism Threat and the US Response, Amy Smithson shows how little Aum accomplished relative to its massive investment in chemical and biological weapons. The sarin attacks killed 12 on crowded Tokyo subways. Supposedly 5500 were injured by the sarin attacks, but the vast majority experienced minor symptoms and or were merely scared - there were 54 serious injuries. While these injuries and deaths were tragic, conventional attacks on subways have wreaked much more terrible damage. Suicide bombers on London's subway in July 2005 killed 52, bombs planted on the Mumbai trains killed 209 in 2006, and the Madrid train bombings killed 191 people.

Relative to the investment (and Aum Shinrikyo had far more resources and expertise than most terrorist groups are likely to acquire - including a number of qualified scientists) WMD production does not pay off.

Read the complete post here.

Is Bin Laden Worried About his Relevance?

By Douglas Farah

The two most recent statements by Osama bin Laden, after a long silence, seem to me to indicate he is worried about how relevant he remains in the global jihadist movement. They also make clear that the core al Qaeda leaders still want nothing less than a global revolution and uprising.

The NEFA Foundation's recent translations of bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri show the two leaders, whose most notable achievement in recent years has been to survive (and that is no small achievement, but stops making headlines after a while) are trying desperately to interject their thoughts and leadership over conflicts and groups that are out of their orbit of direct influence.

The most recent one, "Fight on, Champions of Somalia," is, in effect, a lambasting of the current Somali leadership of Sheikh Shareef as too moderate, and a hand-wringing over how any serious Islamist could engage in negotiations with non-Islamists.

How can intelligent people believe that yesterday’s enemies on the basis of religion can become today’s friends? This can only happen if one of the two parties abandons his religion. So look and see which one of them is the one who has abandoned it: Shaykh Shareef or America? ...These sorts of presidents are the surrogates of our enemies and their authority is null and void in the first place, and as Shaykh Shareef is one of them, he must be dethroned and fought."

This clearly someone who has no real influence on the ground and is reduced to watching from the sidelines, shouting instructions that no one feels obligated to listen to.

This is not to imply there is not a strong ideological/theological affinity among these groups, only to point out that bin Laden and Zawahiri are trying to become relevant in theaters of operations where they are no longer the guiding lights, and least in an operational sense.

Just a few days earlier, bin Laden had released a statement called "Practical Steps to Liberate Palestine," which of course are not practical at all, and regard a conflict in which al Qaeda has been notably absent (and has lost out to the Muslim Brotherhood).

Like Zawahiri's statements a few days before that, it consisted largely of lamenting the state of Palestine while trying to place that conflict in the context of global jihadist movements. My full blog is here.

NEFA Foundation: New Usama Bin Laden Audio - "Fight On, Champions of Somalia"

By Evan Kohlmann

The NEFA Foundation has obtained a new audio recording released on March 19, 2009 of Shaykh Usama Bin Laden, titled "Fight On, Champions of Somalia." During the recording, produced by Al-Qaida's As-Sahab Media Foundation, Bin Laden condemned the decision of former Somali Islamic Courts Union (ICU) president Shaykh Shareef to join in a peace initiative with the interim Somali government. According to Bin Laden, "as a result of inducements and offers from the American envoy in Kenya", Shaykh Shareef "changed and turned back on his heels [as an apostate], and agreed to partner infidel positive law with Islamic Shari’ah to set up a government of national unity, and this partnering is greater polytheism which expels one from Islam. How can intelligent people believe that yesterday’s enemies on the basis of religion can become today’s friends? This can only happen if one of the two parties abandons his religion. So look and see which one of them is the one who has abandoned it: Shaykh Shareef or America? ...These sorts of presidents are the surrogates of our enemies and their authority is null and void in the first place, and as Shaykh Shareef is one of them, he must be dethroned and fought."

An English transcript of Bin Laden's latest message can be downloaded from the NEFA Foundation website.

NEFA Foundation: Palestinian Al-Qaida Faction Claims Murder of Israeli Policemen

By Evan Kohlmann

The NEFA Foundation has obtained and translated a communiqué from a previously unknown Palestinian Al-Qaida faction claiming responsibility for the murder of two Israeli policemen in the West Bank. According to the statement from the “World Islamic Front for the Liberation of the Al-Aqsa Mosque / Al-Aqsa Army” (dated March 15), “a unit of the al-Malhamah Brigades… has executed an attack on a Zionist vehicle on patrol, killing two police officers in the southern al-Aghur region of occupied Palestinian territory, near the Massua settlement. The incident took place on Sunday, March 15, 2009… At about 6:35 pm, three mujahideen from the al-Malhamah Brigades ambushed the Zionist police vehicle on Road No. 90, in Wadi Arabah, and shot two Zionist police officers. Praise be to Allah, the unit was able to safely return to its base. This blessed operation was launched as a response to the call issued by the Mujahid Shaykh Usama Bin Laden, may Allah protect him, in his sermon, ‘Practical Steps to Liberate Palestine.’”

An English translation of the communique can be downloaded from the NEFA Foundation website.

Who Rules Pakistan?

By Farhana Ali

The celebration in Pakistan is understandable. The New York Times and international media show men dancing in the streets to honor the return of a dismissed Chief Justice, Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry. Backed by the Sharif brothers, the lawyers’ movement and the long march worked. But the use of street power to force the Pakistani government to acquiesce could spell trouble in the coming weeks.

I spoke today by phone to a senior commander in the Pakistani military, who wished to remain anonymous. He expressed his concern about the future of Pakistan, should the Chief Justice reopen cases that have been left dormant for over a year. The officer stated, “If the Chief Justice decides to put Musharraf on trial, then the military will see this as interfering in their affairs. The military would never like to see their former chief of the army ridiculed publicly. Also remember that the Chief Justice will always be skeptical about Zardari [the current President] because he reinstated him under pressure from the Army. I can’t imagine that Zardari will tolerate the Chief Justice for long; then there is the case of the missing persons which the Chief Justice has been actively pursuing…The position of the Chief Justice has become a puzzle and would keep causing instability. You will see this in a couple of months.”

By Michael Braun

I testified today before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere of the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee about the cycle of guns, drugs, and violence in Mexico. A segment of my testimony is below, and you can download the entire testimony here.

"The Mexican cartels’ ‘corporate’ headquarters are set up South of our border, and thanks to corruption, cartel leaders often carry out their work in palatial surroundings. The cartel leaders manage and direct the daily activities of ‘command and control cells’ that are typically located just across the border in our Country. Those command and control cells manage and direct the daily activities of ‘distribution, transportation and money laundering cells’ all across our Nation.

The cartels operate just like terrorist organizations, with extremely complex organizational structures, consisting of highly compartmentalized cells: distribution cells, transportation cells, money laundering cells, and in some cases assassination cells or ‘hit squads.’ Many experts believe Mexican and Colombian drug trafficking organizations are far more sophisticated, operationally and organizationally, then Middle Eastern terrorist organizations. In fact, some experts believe that Middle Eastern terrorist organizations actually copied the drug trafficking cartels’ sophisticated organizational model for their advantage. This sophisticated organizational model continues to thwart law enforcement and security services around the globe. Cell members are so compartmentalized that they possess little, if any knowledge of the greater organizations that encircle and support their nodes; therefore, they can share little of value with law enforcement when apprehended.

The Mexican cartels rely heavily on three of their most important tradecraft tools to maintain power: corruption, intimidation and violence—the ‘hallmarks of organized crime.’ If they can’t corrupt you, they will intimidate you; if that doesn’t work, they will turn to brutal violence. Without the hallmarks of organized crime, the cartels simply cannot effectively operate. The Mexican cartels spend hundreds of millions of dollars to corrupt each year, and they have succeeded in corrupting virtually every level of the Mexican government. If anyone believes for one minute that these powerful syndicates are not looking north into the United States to corrupt—they’re obviously blind. We are already experiencing a spillover of drug related violence, and it’s not just in communities along our SWB. It’s also playing out in places like Atlanta, Chicago, Omaha, Seattle, Maui and Anchorage.

We must also understand that the Mexican cartels operate with Fortune 100 corporate efficiencies. They are masters at creating demand, expanding their markets and developing a diverse product line. They have pushed into West Africa, into places like Guinea-Bissau, the quintessential example of ungoverned space, and established a transshipment base for the movement of multi-ton quantities of cocaine into the rapidly developing markets of Europe and Russia."

Syria ready to switch sides? Not so fast

By Olivier Guitta

Much hope is placed on Syrian president Bashar al-Assad's. Is he going be up to it?
I wrote an article for the Middle East Times on this topic.
You can read it in full here.
Here is an excerpt:

Syrian President Bashar Assad has become the hottest ticket in the world, from Washington to Paris and from Riyadh to Cairo. Everybody wants to meet him, be seen with him and get on his good side. That is an amazing turnaround from three years ago where he was shunned and viewed as a pariah. Syria has suddenly become the key to solving the insoluble problems of the Middle East. And in a way it is true, but the question remains: what does Assad really intend to do and ask for?
The Syrian president has been testing the waters for a few months now regarding a rapprochement with the West. It started with France and French President Nicolas Sarkozy's active overture to Damascus, due in part to the constant advice and friendly pressure from Qatar. This French diplomatic move was not well viewed at the time by the George W. Bush administration because since 2004, France and the United States had worked hand in hand in isolating Assad. Assad knew quite well that the new incoming Barack Obama administration would be very much inclined to reach out. Which it did very recently by sending two emissaries to visit Assad in Damascus.

The thinking is that Syria is the weakest link to getting at Iran and if a wedge could be driven between the two countries, then it would be much easier to pressure Tehran and decrease the mullah's leverage on the international community.

In fact, by getting Syria to switch camps, Hezbollah and Hamas, Tehran's two most powerful proxies would be dramatically weakened.

But easier said than done, Damascus is not ready to give up its alliance with Tehran.

Iran in Latin America Finally Acknowledged as a Problem

By Douglas Farah

After several years of reporting on the increasing ties of Iran to Latin American insurgent and criminal groups (see this paper and this one I did for the International Assessment and Strategy Center), it is nice to see senior officials now finally acknowledging the seriousness of the issue.

"We have seen... an increase in a wide level of activity by the Iranian government in this region," (Admiral James) Stavridis told the Senate Armed Services Committee.

"That is a concern principally because of the connections between the government of Iran, which is a state sponsor of terrorism, and Hezbollah," he said.

Unfortunately, the admiral did not note the Iranian financial institutions in Venezuela and Panama, or other visible and worrisome aspects of the Iranian presence.

What one has to ask oneself is, why is Iran so willing to spend precious resources in a region where it has no religious, cultural, historical or linguistic ties? As we see below, the multiple promises of economic aid are seldom fulfilled, nor is there any accounting of the Iranian money that flows to these governments. Yet, their diplomatic missions grow exponentially, offering the perfect cover for the Quds Force and Hezbollah to move freely.

Some of the activities of Iran in Nicaragua are outlined by Todd Bensman, who has been one of the few journalists to pursue the issue. My full blog is here.

Iraq: Winning the War with Women

By Farhana Ali

Over the past year, there is more attention being given to the trend of female suicide bombers in Iraq. Earlier this month, I was invited as a guest speaker by Columbia University to present my research findings on women in Iraq's insurgency. The same week, I offered a similar presentation at Rutgers University School of Law, which devoted an entire day to "The Gender Dimensions of Terror." This week, I received two interview requests from international journalists about female bombers in Iraq, which makes it clear that the world community continues to seek answers to the bomber behind the veil.

While the world is fascinated by women who strap on the bomb, there is far less attention to an even greater issue which is the majority of women who do not kill. My recent article, "Iraqi Mothers Call for Change," which appeared in The Middle East Times on March 17th, highlights the need to mobilize Iraq's non-violent women for long-lasting reform and stability. The article begins here:

The spectacular news of a female suicide bomber in Iraq is a showstopper. Not surprisingly, female suicide bombers receive the greatest attention in the media. But women who care for and nurture the next generation are more important to the future of Iraq.

Women who engage in non-violent activities in a war-torn society represent a powerful human resource for their country. They are members of parliament, community leaders, health officials, lawyers, educators, and importantly, the mothers of Iraq.

If we care about rebuilding Iraqi society, then we must mobilize women. This requires support from Iraqi men. Without them, women will not have a chance at survival, equal employment, equal access to higher education, or equal rights as citizens. By empowering women in Iraq, the United States has an opportunity to promote long-lasting change.

The U.S. government is taking slow but steady steps to include women in the political and economic process. The U.S. government is holding more private sessions with Iraqi women in an effort to understand their needs and improve their daily lives. In a recent email from a U.S. commander, I was asked to join a women's conference this year aimed at recognizing women's issues.

Other organizations in the United States are focused on helping women cope with trauma. An American psychologist is raising funds for a women's trauma center in Diyala, where women have taken part in suicide attacks.

All these initiatives are positive signs of progress, but will take years to result in change for women who have long suffered from years of occupation. Hence, the war is not yet over.

To make sure that we win the war in Iraq, the United States should demand more support from Iraqi men. Too often, men allow women certain freedoms if it benefits them. For example, the often-glamorized U.S.-sponsored Daughters of Iraq program is a wonderful initiative but is likely to fail if the Iraqi government - controlled by men - do not allow women to do more than just search other women.

For now, the Daughters of Iraq program provides women with an income. But these are desperate women who have no other means of survival. An Iraqi woman who once worked at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad told me, "The program will never work in the long run because the religious conservatives can't accept a woman in a uniform. In Iraq, security is a man's responsibility."

In recent years, men in Iraq perceive women as a threat to their stability. This is especially true as more women in Iraq detonate. To detect the bomber under the veil, men began to hire women for the sole purpose of looking for female suicide terrorists. As authorities began to arrest would-be female bombers, it became apparent that women could pose a serious threat to civil society. But how do we know that all the women that have been detained since the war are terrorists?

In reality, there are hundreds, if not thousands, of women languishing in jails throughout Iraq on terrorism charges. It is unclear how many of these women have been charged for committing an actual crime. There is no accurate figure of how many women in Iraq's jails are murderers vice mothers.

At a recent lecture at Rutgers University School of Law, where I presented my work on women in Iraq, I met an American lawyer, Vincent Warren, the Executive Director of the Center for Constitutional Rights. He told me he met many women being held at Abu Ghraib because they are believed to be accomplices in terrorism - they allegedly have a husband, brother, or son in the al-Qaida organization. What we don't know is if the female detainees support their violent men or are falsely accused.

Of the accused, jail is the worst rehabilitation center in Iraq for women. When journalist Anita McNaught was first to interview Rania, the 15-year old girl with a bomb hiding under her veil, she called to tell me, "This girl has a horrible future. She will be abused by men behind bars. She would have been better dead than alive."

Outside of jail, women are calling for change. The country's nearly 1 million war widows desire progress. Like men, women seek opportunities to feel normal again. In a patriarchal society, women understand that men are central to their survival. Therefore, we can only hope to improve the lives of women in Iraq by making sure that men are included in any gender-based project. As men are gatekeepers of Iraq, as well as obstacles for reform, we should demand that men develop policies to protect the rights of women - the mothers of the nation.

« Close It

Michael Braun to Testify Again on Mexican Narco-Terrorism

By Andrew Cochran

Michael Braun, our newest Contributing Expert and former Chief of Operations at the DEA, will testify tomorrow before the U.S. House Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere during a hearing titled, "Guns, Drugs and Violence: The Merida Initiative and the Challenge in Mexico." Michael testified last week on this subject before another Congressional committee and posted his testimony here. Michael is now one of three principals at Spectre Group International, LLC, which provides specialized consulting services to governments and private sector clients worldwide. EDIT: Dr. Rachel Ehrenfeld writes that a federal law enacted in 2006 calls for a study of the potential application of mycoherbicides, fungi which occur naturally, to eliminate drug crops, but no such study has been undertaken. Defoliation exercises weren't successful in Colombia, but to my knowledge didn't include this technology, so perhaps a study would be useful.

Letter from Kashmir: Meeting with the "Mother of Martyrs"

By Farhana Ali

In Kashmir, the mother of martyrs is a neglected story. The struggles of women living in conflict zone are also rarely documented. The reasons are understandable. There are considerable risks involved when traveling to an occupation, where women are difficult, but not impossible, to reach. In Kashmir, as is true of most conflicts, I was told that women "suffer the most," noted one Kashmiri female political activist. Last winter, I met many Kashmiri women--"war widows" as they are called--to understand how women survive conflict. This is the theme of my forthcoming book on women in war, which examines why women kill (or do not kill) when living under years of occupation. A recent story published by The Middle Times online illustrates one mother's trauma. Some excerpts:

"Called a freedom fighter and a terrorist, Maqbool was a potent threat to both India and Pakistan but a charismatic individual who had a transformative effect on Kashmiris' aspirations for independence from two nuclear-armed rivals. For years, Maqbool evaded capture by living as a fugitive in the underground world, a fact that slipped past his mother. To this day, Amina is unaware of her son's importance to Kashmir's separatist parties. She believes he was innocent.

I did not understand why Maqbool's activities were guarded like a well-kept secret from his mother. It defied Western perception that mothers of martyrs control their children's participation in guerrilla movements.

According to Tahir, women like Amina are naïve. "She is illiterate," he told me, "She is accused of murderer and conspiracy, Maqbool's arrest by Indian authorities and subsequent hanging on Feb. 11, 1984 sparked a wave of resentment and ridicule against India that persists today. In her heavenly voice and a thematic display of emotions, Amina views her son as the valley's great martyr, or Shahid-e-Kashmir. She knows he is venerated by her people. However, her son's death brings little comfort to a woman who lives for her children."

U.S. Arrests Man For Shipment to Iran of Helicopter Engines, Aerial Cameras

By Andrew Cochran

A multi-agency task force today announced an arrest and indictment of a suspected arms trafficker who sought to ship helicopter engines and advanced aerial cameras to Iran. The mastermind of the sale allegedly intended to use companies in Malaysia, Ireland and the Netherlands to funnel the arms to Iranian entities, including the Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Company. That company was designated on September 17, 2008 by the Treasury Department with other Iranian firms for activities in support of WMD proliferation and for providing support to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Iranian citizen Hossein Ali Khoshnevisrad was arrested on Saturday when he arrived at San Francisco International Airport. According to an affidavit filed in the case, in 2007 Khoshnevisrad and his company, Ariasa, purchased 17 turbo-shaft helicopter engines from Rolls-Royce Corp. in Indiana. The helicopter engines were then exported from the U.S. to a “book publisher” in Malaysia, and later shipped to Iran. Additionally, in 2006 Khoshnevisrad instructed a Dutch aviation parts company to order several aerial panorama cameras designed for use on bombers, fighters and surveillance aircraft, from a Pennsylvania company and then ship them to Iran.

The case shows that the Iranian regime continues to acquire advanced Western technology, by any means necessary, for military use. You can download the criminal complaint and associated affidavit here.

Drones Buzz Pak Town Eyed As Bin Laden's Hideout

By James Gordon Meek

Since I began writing about Osama Bin Laden's Al Qaeda in the late 1990s, and particularly after the 9/11 attacks, I've been dogged by a basic question posed by countless friends, colleagues and kin: "Where's Osama and why can't we just kill him?" I've often struggled with a tortured explanation of his suspected hideout in Pakistan's Hindu Kush mountains, which I knew from my mountaineering and trekking experience to surely be one of the most austere places on Earth. Any effort to nail Bin Laden there would be limited by high elevation, harsh terrain and severe weather, not to mention the difficulty of operating in a stealthy manner and raucous Pakistani politics. But it's no worry for Bin Laden, who knows the goat trails well.

But you can't explain the inherent difficulties of finding and killing Bin Laden, as we did in Sunday's New York Daily News, without first establishing that he is suspected by the U.S. of living in the mountainous Chitral region of the Hindu Kush - which we did in a separate story Sunday about the hunt itself.

Last fall, CIA Director Mike Hayden chided top Al Qaeda leaders for living on the run while running the terror network "from an isolated outpost in northwestern Pakistan." The dominant terrain of Pakistan's far corner bordering Afghanistan is the Hindu Kush, home to some of the tallest peaks on the planet. U.S. military officers pointed to that region, known as Chitral, as a possible haven for Bin Laden when I was in Afghanistan in late 2005. In 2006, CNN analyst and Bin Laden expert Peter Bergen cited a senior intelligence source who told him Chitral was a good place to look for the Al Qaeda founder.

Below are links to the two stories that ran in the paper, plus two lengthy blog items with additional reporting and quotes. The Mouth of the Potomac Blog items also include links to some of the source material we drew from, including local press reports - which the Daily News confirmed - about the seven drone sorties spotted over Chitral since August. Missile attacks have never occurred in Chitral, which is 300 miles north of the Waziristan tribal areas where the U.S. has launched 39 strikes and killed eight mid-level Al Qaeda leaders since June.

"If they are in Chitral but aren't shooting right now, they have intel to suggest a bad guy is there and they are trying to build a targeting package," surmised a former U.S. counterterror operative with recent experience hunting Al Qaeda leaders. "It often takes days or weeks to confirm that you have the right guy, and that you can take the shot in a way that minimizes casualties."

Where's Osama? Try Chitral, Pakistan, an ex-trekkers' paradise buzzed by US drones

Why it's so hard to find and kill Al Qaeda's founder in the mountains of Pakistan

Team Obama pledges 'Aggressive effort' to nail Bin Laden

Rising militancy in the Hindu Kush mountains may help him

Mumbai 2008

Lashkar-i-Tayyiba Remains Committed to Jihad

By Farhana Ali

Soon after the Mumbai blasts in India, Pakistan took swept action to detain suspected Lashkar-i-Tayyiba operatives involved in the attacks. The arrests are controversial as they exposed a well-known secret--jihadi networks are alive and well in Pakistan. What Pakistan is able or willing to do to mitigate Lashkar and its parent organization, Jama'at-ud-Da'wa, is a more important question that deserves attention. This question is addressed in a new article by myself and a Pakistan-based journalist posted today in the new issue of the Sentinel, released by the West Point Combating Terrorism Center.

While the investigation is ongoing, there are two assumptions that I think can be made: (1) the Lashkar is unlikely to disintegrate or disappear; the organization may gain new recruits in the short-term as a reaction to the government's crackdown; and (2) U.S. security and counter-terrorism officials will probably never gain access to the detainees or other Lashkar members, who along with other jihadi networks are a vital tool for Pakistan's survival, a point made in an article by reporter Josh Meyer of the Los Angeles Times.

Here is a segment from the Sentinel article:

"While LeT/JuD is local and al-Qa`ida a transnational movement, arrests of senior al-Qa`ida commanders in LeT safe houses suggest a link between the two groups, although the details of this relationship remain opaque. Nevertheless, there are similarities between al-Qa`ida and the LeT/JuD. The LeT/JuD appeals to a global audience despite being a local group. Like al-Qa`ida, the LeT/JuD network has an ideological framework that attracts members outside of Pakistan; it is not uncommon to find members from Central Asia and the Arab world with LeT, or to find Lashkar’s participation in activities outside of Pakistan. In addition, the LeT/JuD benefits from a support network outside of Pakistan that includes Saudi Arabia, a country with whom JuD leader Hafiz Saeed developed relations in 1985 when he studied in the kingdom, and subsequently received support from during and after the Afghan jihad. Many of the similarities end there, however. The LeT/JuD remains a local organization with local ties to Pakistani militant groups. Despite its shared strategic vision with al-Qa`ida, Lashkar is focused on attacks against Indian and Western targets inside the subcontinent....

The Deccan Mujahidin, the group which claimed responsibility for the Mumbai attacks, is likely a pseudonym for Lashkar. The attacks in Mumbai showed a level of sophistication that reflects the group’s coming-of-age. The LeT/JuD’s legitimate activities in the name of charity, education, and public service (all under the guise of religious ideological doctrine) provide the organization a cover for its extreme excesses. With a veneer of secrecy, Lashkar can operate under the radar and not raise suspicion from local authorities. Its camouflaged activities—networks of legitimate mosques, schools, media and publications work—help the organization sustain its presence inside Pakistan and abroad."

Saudi Arabia and Iran on a collision course

By Olivier Guitta

I just wrote an article for the Weekly Standard on the recent escalation of tension between Riyadh and Tehran.
You can read the whole piece here.
Here is an excerpt:
A few weeks ago, an adviser to Iran's supreme leader called Bahrain Iran's 14th province. Not only did Bahrain react indignantly, but--more important--so did Saudi Arabia. For, even as a potential conflict between Iran and Israel grabs headlines, tensions have been building between Tehran and Riyadh. The Saudis fear both Iran's nuclear program and its expansionist agenda.

And that's not all. The Iranian Revolution of 1979 launched a far-reaching competition between Shiite Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia for control of Islam and the ummah, the worldwide community of Muslims. Since Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became president, Iran has increased its expenditure of money, energy, and time on proselytizing populations, from Africa to the Gulf.

Saudi Arabia, more than any other Sunni country, feels threatened by this new wave of Shiite proselytizing. Saudi social affairs minister Abdel Mohsen al Hakas has called it unacceptable, and King Abdullah himself has accused Shiites of trying to convert Sunnis, pointing the finger at Tehran. The matter is of vital concern to the kingdom, which prizes its position as the cradle of Islam--all the more since Ahmadinejad and Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah are now among the most popular figures in the Arab world.

Iran's expansionist strategy is not limited to religious affairs. Hundreds of Lebanese Shiite Hezbollah fighters who got their military training in Iran have infiltrated the Gulf since last year in order to "militarize" the Shiite communities of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain. Their mission is to prepare to destabilize these monarchies, targeting vital national interests and Western interests (both embassies and businesses) in the event of a U.S. or Israeli military strike against Iran.

Playing the Russian card against Iran?

By Olivier Guitta

I recently wrote an article for the Middle East Times, looking at the avenue of using Moscow to get to Tehran: something the Obama administration is looking at.
You can read my full article here.
Here is an excerpt:
By any measure, Iran is fast advancing its nuclear program. For the international community, time is of the essence. In light of the negative reactions from Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and more importantly from Supreme Leader Ali Khameini who recently stated that U.S. President Barack Obama was on the same wrong path as former President George W. Bush, the U.S. president's overture to Tehran does not look promising.
Hence, the sanctions route seems the privileged alternative at this time. But in order for this option to be effective one large player needs to be on board; and that is Russia.

In light of this, the revelation that Obama had sent a 'secret' letter to Russian President Dmitry Medvedev to incite Russia to be tougher on Iran against the promise of the United States giving up its missile defense system in Eastern Europe, is not surprising.

In fact, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates acknowledged that he had told the Russians a year ago about that possibility. Nonetheless the fact that it was made official by the new incoming president carries more weight. But the Russians seem very much unfazed by the proposal.

NEFA Foundation: German Al-Qaida Member Bekkay Harrach - "Islam and the Finance Crisis"

By Evan Kohlmann

The NEFA Foundation has obtained and translated a German-language video recording of German Al-Qaida member Bekkay Harrach (a.k.a. “Abu Talha the German”) produced by the As-Sahaab Media Foundation. During the video, titled “Islam and the Finance Crisis", Harrach asked, "Where are the taxes that the German people now need so urgently? They are spent in Afghanistan for soldiers who are doing anything other than fighting.” He stated, "I will try to bring the causes of the crisis to light and suggest - according to the Islamic economic system that is based on the Sharia - a rescue package for the newly-born crisis. After the collapse of communism, the West has proudly boasted that capitalism was THE financial system. But it has not just once fallen on its face but several times. What is now the solution and which financial system is now in question?”

An English transcript of Harrach's speech can be downloaded from the NEFA Foundation website.

Syria's Strategy in Lebanon: Historical Overview

By Walid Phares

As discussions broaden in Washington and Brussels about the possible new engagement policies with the Assad regime, as the international criminal court tribunal in the Hariri assassination case is moving forward and as Arab regimes express their concerns about the global Western change in attitude towards the Iranian regime, Infocus Policy Review dedicated its current Spring issue to Syrian related articles. Following is my own article published under the title of "Syrian Strategy in Lebanon." The piece sumamrize the initial Syrian strategic goals in Lebanon, as designed by Hafez Assad in 1976 and resumed by Bashar since 2000. The article reviews the past Bush and current Obama Administrations' positions towards Baathist Syria. It also addresses the rise and failures of the Cedars Revolution and the direction US policy should take to contain Assad's ambitions in Lebanon and counter the Terror forces operating out of this country.

Cedars Revolution 1.jpg

Since the advent of Hafez al-Assad's dictatorship in Damascus in 1971, Syria's role in the region, and particularly in Lebanon, has been described in two diametrically opposing narratives. The difference between these two narratives is so wide that one of them has to be wrong.

The school of engagement insists on Assad's unavoidable role as a pacifier in the region. To many diplomats, experts, and policy makers in the West —including paradoxically in Israel and the United States—the Alawite regime is seen as a stabilizing force that can absorb radicals and defuse a regional war.

Yet, it is almost impossible to refute mountains of evidence of Syrian Baathist involvement in violence both against its own citizens and against Lebanese, Palestinians, Arabs, and Westerners. There has been 39 years of internal oppression in Syria, 29 years of occupation of Lebanon, 25 years of support to Hezbollah's terror activities, and decades of involvement in political assassinations in Lebanon and beyond.

A thorough historical analysis leads observers to the conclusion that the Baathist regime in Damascus bases its survival not on potential reform but on its non-negotiable control of Lebanon.

Syrian Control of Lebanon

From Hafez to his son Bashar, the ruling elite in Syria has used stratagems ranging from penetration, invasion, occupation, terror, divide and conquer, regional manipulations, and diplomatic diversions, all to ensure that Lebanon remains under Damascus' wing. Syria will not grant its small neighbor freedom, because that freedom has the potential to devastate Syria's one party regime. By keeping Lebanon under control, even if shared with the Iranian-backed Hezbollah, the Assad regime ensures its own survival.

This explains the scope of Syrian maneuvering with the West, including the United States, over the years. Hafez al-Assad, when visited by a myriad of Secretaries of States, always promised peace with Israel—an American strategic goal—in return for an understanding of his "interests" in Lebanon. The shrewd dictator never delivered on peace, but always gained power over his weaker neighbor.

But after the death of Hafez in 2000, and a dramatic change in international and regional circumstances, Bashar's regime experienced significant setbacks—an amalgam of his own wrong decisions and unexpected opposition in Lebanon. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559 in 2004 stripped Syria of its legal basis for the occupation of Lebanon, and the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in 2005 shattered its legitimacy as a protector of peace. The surge of the Cedars Revolution following these two events accelerated international pressures leading to Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon. The Syrian era in Lebanon appeared to have come to an end, while an era of accountability for the dictatorship at home was seemingly about to begin.

Another set of circumstances, however, reversed the fortunes of the Lebanese and Syrian peoples, who were inching closer to meaningful change. Thus, the fate of this Khomeinist ally is at a crucial crossroads today. It is either reaffirming its authoritarian dominance on the Eastern Mediterranean or vacillating towards regime collapse.

The Hariri International Tribunal appears to be able to make or break Syria's future. The regime in Damascus knows the high stakes involved, and has devised lethal strategies for regime survival and renewed dominance in Lebanon. The Assad regime seems to be reasserting power in Lebanon via violence, aided possibly by a change in strategic direction in Washington. These strategies are the result of many decades of patient planning by the Assad regime.

To understand the complex crossroads, one must look at Syria's historical ambitions in Lebanon, Hafez al-Assad's achievements in this regard, the extension of Syrian power across Lebanese politics, Iranian influence, and other factors. Only then can the strategies of the Syrian regime be placed in context.

Pre-War Policies

The Assad dynasty's ambitions in Lebanon are only a contemporary and extreme expression of a much older Syrian Arab nationalist claim over the country of the Cedars. Indeed, Syria was actively destabilizing Lebanon long before the Lebanese Civil War.

Syrian Pan-Arabists rejected the formation of the modern state of Lebanon in 1920 and subsequently the independence of the Lebanese Republic in 1943. In fact, the Syrian government even refused to open an embassy in Beirut.

In 1958, when Syria was part of the United Arab Republic (UAR) with Egypt, Egyptian leader Gamal Abd al-Nasser sponsored an armed insurrection against the pro-Western government of Camille Chamoun, prompting a year-long civil war. A decade later, in the late sixties, the Baathist regime in Damascus helped Palestinian forces infiltrate Lebanon, drawing the small state into the wider Arab-Israeli conflict.

Finally, with the coup d'etat that brought Hafez al-Assad to power in 1971, a more lethal era of Syrian intervention in Lebanon began.

Syrian Intervention, 1976-1990

It took Hafez 15 years of warfare and political assassinations to secure his occupation of Lebanon. Syria launched its first invasion amidst the second Lebanese civil war that erupted in April 1975. Syria's success can be partially attributed to Syrian-backed militias that had been challenging the Lebanese Army since 1969.

As the country split into factional enclaves, Assad fueled the fights, assisting one party against another, until Syrian troops marched into the Bekaa Valley and northern Lebanon in June 1976. Later that year, those invading forces were legalized as "deterrent forces" within the Arab peacekeeping expeditionary army.

The Baathist military and intelligence soon penetrated most of the country. The Syrians encountered fierce resistance in 1978 in the East Beirut enclave, mostly inhabited by Christians. The regions with Sunni, Druze, and Shiite majority, however, remained under Syrian occupation.

Syria retreated during the Israeli offensive in 1982, but returned to the center of the country soon thereafter. By October 1990, profiting from the diversion of the U.S.-led campaign against Saddam Hussein's Iraqi forces in Kuwait, Syria entered the last free zones of Lebanon.

1990 Invasion.jpg
Syrian invasion of the free areas between June 1976 and October 1990.

Syrian Occupation, 1990-2005

During the 1990s, Syria and Iran enjoyed dominance in Lebanon, with Damascus controlling the government, and Tehran sponsoring Hezbollah. Under the joint occupation, Syria and Iran penetrated and subdued Lebanon's institutions. Indeed, the presence of the Syrian army was only one layer of the occupation. Syria also had economic, political, and militia control.

In May 2000, with Israel's withdrawal from southern Lebanon, Syria and Iran were in complete control. In June, with the passing of Hafez, Bashar inherited the Baathist-Khomeinist "province" his father built. Bashar was dedicated to keeping this acquisition, which had become a crucial asset to the Syrian regime. Indeed, most of the unofficial income feeding the Damascus military and Mukhabarat (intelligence services) was produced in Lebanon. Syria took a percentage on all commercial transactions. Syria also grafted from Lebanon's markets, drug trafficking, and more.

A free Lebanon would not only endanger an authoritarian Syria, but it would mean a massive loss of income for Syria.

The Cedars Revolution

Since 1990, a minority of Lebanese activists has protested Syria's occupation, both inside the country and in the Diaspora. However, U.S. and Western policy had always cast Syria as a stabilizer in Lebanon and potential peace partner with Israel. Moreover, with hundreds of millions of Iranian dollars pouring in to Hezbollah and filling the coffers of Syrian officers, a web of financial interests had been created, which included Lebanese politicians.

However, after the death of Hafez in 2000, an opposition movement rose —first the Christians, then the Sunnis and Druze—to challenge Syria in Lebanon. After 9/11, the West was more receptive to the anti-terror uprisings. Diaspora-based groups successfully lobbied the U.N. to issue a Franco-American backed resolution, UNSCR 1559, calling for Syrian withdrawal and the disarming of Hezbollah. Bashar responded with a campaign of violence against Lebanese reformers, culminating in the assassination of Rafiq Hariri, a former ally turned Syria critic.

The convergence of anti-Syria sentiment among Christians and Muslims produced the Cedars Revolution. The movement grew rapidly, culminating in a rally of 1.5 million demonstrators on March 14, 2005. Under mounting international pressure, Assad pulled his regular forces out of Lebanon.

This was widely considered to be a victory for the Cedars Revolution. Unfortunately it was not a conclusive one. Bashar has since moved to counter the Cedars.

cedar revolution 2.jpg

Syria's Counterattack

In a speech acknowledging Syria's withdrawal, Bashar hinted that a "second army" would stay behind and destroy the achievements of the Cedars Revolution. Indeed, with the combined power of Hezbollah, pro-Syrian militias, local Sunni Jihadists, and pro-Iranian Palestinians, Syria destabilized the Lebanese government of Fouad Seniora in 2005. A series of Syrian-sponsored assassinations—political activists, journalists, Lebanese army officials, and legislators Gebran Tueni, Walid Eido, Antoine Ghanem, and Pierre Gemayel—all but crippled the Cedars Revolution.

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Syrian forces withdrawing from Lebanon

The Iranian-backed Hezbollah, aided by Syrian intelligence, also launched an invasion of the Sunni segment of Beirut and another attack against a Druze mountain enclave. In the subsequent Qatar-mediated agreement with Lebanese reformers in May 2008, Damascus secured the provisions that Hezbollah would retain its weapons, and that a pro-Syrian contingent would join the Lebanese cabinet. Thus, through proxies and allies, Assad was back in Beirut.

Hezbollah invades Beirut, May 2008

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Hezbollah militias invade Beirut

Lebanon subsequently elected army commander Michel Suleiman as its new president. Suleiman chose to stand half way between Hezbollah and the Cedars Revolution. This was a setback to the Cedars and a boost to Damascus. To the Assad regime, this is indeed a half victory. Its chances of taking back more of Lebanon now depend on the resistance of the Lebanese and perhaps the new direction in Washington.

Root Causes of Syria's Return

Why was Syria able to regain ground in Lebanon? Conversely, why did the Cedars Revolution lose the terrain despite all its advances?

For one, the Cedars Revolution was managed poorly. The politicians of the March 14 movement—who enjoyed a magnificent boost from U.N. resolution 1559—had the international community on their side after years of Western lethargy. They were given a mandate by millions of citizens to act firmly and swiftly. However, they missed the opportunity to expand the "revolution," clear out remaining Syrian political actors, isolate Hezbollah, and ask the United Nations for multinational forces or other assistance. In short, they failed to position Lebanon to confront the "second army."

Second, Washington tergiversated in its support to the Cedars Revolution. It failed to grant direct financial support to a flurry of local NGOs to organize civil society in general, and to rally Shiite dissidents against Hezbollah. While the White House and senior leaders in Congress sought to isolate Syria, powerful voices in Washington (State Department, Baker-Hamilton Commission, and others) still hoped to "reengage" Bashar.

Third, leaders from the U.S. Congress, including House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, sent a strong message of sympathy to Assad in 2007. When she visited him in Syria, she broke his isolation, practically encouraging his ailing regime to re-conquer its lost turf in Lebanon.

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Hezbollah and Syrian intelligence zones of operations

As a result, two major international initiatives to secure Lebanon's freedom were compromised. Notably, a deployment of a multinational force along the Syrian-Lebanese borders, crucial to shut down the Iranian supplies to Hezbollah, didn't materialize. Moreover, the international tribunal for the Hariri assassination has been delayed for years.

Free from escalating pressures, the Syrian regime is moving back in to settle old scores.

The Way Forward

The Cedars Revolution must now counter the Baathist-Khomeinist resurgence in Lebanon by taking a series of steps.

First, the international community should unanimously adopt the principle that any Lebanese elections that take place in the country must take place free of the influence of militias. Indeed, districts where militias are in control should not be validated. Accordingly, U.S. and international support to the Lebanese government must be proportional to the ability of this government to distance itself from terror groups and illegal militias, particularly Hezbollah.

The Lebanese opposition to the Syrian-Iranian axis must also re-internationalize its quest by calling on the U.N. Security Council to extend its protection to Lebanon. To this end, Lebanon's borders with Syria must be put under multinational control.

Washington can support this re-internationalization by conveying to Damascus that any future dialogue can only be based on disarming Hezbollah and reforming Syrian policy towards Lebanon.
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Dr Walid Phares is director of the Future Terrorism Project at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and secretary general of the Transatlantic Parliamentary Group on Counter Terrorism. He is the author of The Confrontation (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).

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NEFA Foundation: New Bin Laden Audio - "Practical Steps to Liberate Palestine"

By Evan Kohlmann

The NEFA Foundation has obtained a transcript of a new audio recording from Al-Qaida leader Usama Bin Laden titled, "Practical Steps to Liberate Palestine". During the recording, Bin Laden asks, "how long must our family in Palestine live in fear, while we enjoy security – albeit a false, temporary security? For how long must the people of Gaza live under siege, while we live in comfort and luxury – at least for the time being? And for how long will we sit while their hearts burn for their children, who were burned by the white phosphorous bombs with the collusion of Arab rulers, which caused even brave and mighty men to cry, due to the enormity of the event." He continued, "the holocaust of Gaza in the midst of this long siege is an important and historic event and an articulate tragedy which affirms the need for detachment of the Muslims from the hypocrites. It is not right that our condition after Gaza be like our condition prior to it: rather, the order of the day is serious action and preparation for Jihad, to bring about truth and cancel falsehood."

A complete English transcript of Bin Laden's message can be downloaded from the NEFA Foundation website.

A Terrorist Financing Newsletter for Financial Institutions

By Dennis Lormel

In the last week, the FBI’s Terrorist Financing Operations Section (TFOS) published and released a Terrorist Financing Newsletter. The newsletter is for financial institution use only and not intended for public dissemination. It is available to financial institutions through the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) under the 314A What’s New section.

In March 2008, TFOS Section Chief (SC) Brian W. Lynch was the guest speaker for the monthly teleconference of the Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Leadership Group. The AML Leadership Group is sponsored by Deloitte. It is run by Deloitte’s Joe Hanvey, who does a fabulous job lining up quality speakers to address significant AML issues. The AML Leadership Group is a model forum for meaningful information sharing at the grass roots level. During the session that featured Brian, he discussed the critical importance of Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) information to TFOS for terrorist financing investigations. He stated that he intended to work with FinCEN to provide financial institutions with a newsletter devoted specifically to terrorist financing.

There’s an old saying, “no good deed goes unpunished.” In this case, it took SC Lynch an entire year to get the appropriate approvals at FBI Headquarters to release the newsletter. Oh, how I miss bureaucracy (NOT)! Fortunately, Brian had the perseverance and will to ensure the newsletter was published. FinCEN deserves credit for facilitating the dissemination of the newsletter through the 314A What’s New section. Section 314A of the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act allows law enforcement to share and request information from financial institutions.

In SC Lynch’s introductory remarks he stated “This newsletter was developed to provide you with information related to terrorist financing matters, to include analysis, case presentations, trends, methodologies, etc. It will be published on an intermittent basis. Again, thank you for your continued efforts in addressing terrorist financing issues.”

When arguing the benefits and burdens of the BSA, one of the constant themes has been that law enforcement does not provide feedback. I addressed this recently in an article I wrote entitled Terrorist Financing: Balancing the Benefits and Burdens of Reporting Requirements http://www.ipsaintl.com/news-and-events/articles/pdf/lormel-balancing-the-benefits.pdf . TFOS’s Terrorist Financing Newsletter is an excellent feedback mechanism.

I spoke to a bank compliance officer about the newsletter. The compliance officer told me the newsletter was a great way to give some feedback to institutions. The compliance officer also stated one of the challenges we face in the industry is justifying the time and cost for BSA reporting. This goes to the heart of the benefits and burdens debate. In our current economic environment this is extremely important. The compliance officer concluded our conversation by noting that terrorism has taken a back seat to the economy. Any spin to interrelate the two is helpful.

TFOS’s Terrorist Financing Newsletter accomplishes this. One of the most telling comments in the newsletter was the fact that the FBI found approximately 2000 Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) that were related to terrorist financing in 2007. In my view, that is extremely important and speaks volumes about BSA reporting requirements. In the totality of SARs reports filed in 2007, 2000 SARs represents a fraction of the total number of SARs filed. However, every single SAR identifiable to a terrorist financing case could be the key to disrupting or preventing a terrorist attack. I strongly encourage everyone in financial institutions, who have access to the 314A mechanism, to read the newsletter. It is quite informative and is a positive step on the part of the FBI to delineate the important contribution BSA data makes to terrorist financing investigations. Additionally, the FBI would welcome feedback about the newsletter and terrorist financing issues. The newsletter provides contact information for such purposes.

The BRN-C's Birthday Bash

By Zachary Abuza

Yesterday marked the 46th anniversary of the founding of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional, a Malay separatist movement in southern Thailand. A hardline splinter of the organization, BRN-Coordinate, has been at the forefront of the insurgency since January 2004. More than 3,600 people have been killed, and nearly twice that number have been wounded. To commemorate the event, the BRN-C killed three soldiers and seriously wounded four more.

Since the September 2006 coup that displaced Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, there have been high hopes that the successive governments would reverse the abusive policies of the Thaksin administration and quell the violence. All have failed. The interim government of Surayud Chultanont deserved credit for at least trying: but they were in denial about the Islamist and secessionist goals of the movement. They entered into talks with “insurgents” representatives of the insurgent organizations that through in the towel in the 1990s, only to be surpassed by the hardline BRN-C, who have demonstrated on willingness or need to negotiate. The two prime ministers of the People’s Power party, didn’t give a damn, barely mentioned the south, and were so fearful of another coup that they let the military do whatever they wanted.

And what the Royal Thai Army wanted were weapons systems that in no way conform to the threats the country faces. Since the September 2006 coup, the RTA rewarded itself with a significant budget increases. In December 2006, it announced major arms purchases worth Bt7.7 billion. The purchases included Swedish Gripen jet fighters, Ukranian armored personnel carriers, Chinese surface-to-surface missiles, and submarines, hardly the weapons systems needed to combat an insurgency. This was followed with a second wave of arms purchases worth $191.3 million in September 2008. This round included a Singaporean built amphibious frigate, Russian anti-aircraft missiles, as well as some Israeli small-arms. Torpedoing insurgents the military can’t even find? It was only in January 2009, in the third tranche of arms imports that were more oriented for counter insurgency. They include, 6 Russian-made Mi-17 helicopters, nearly 100 South African-made armored personnel carriers, and 80 Ukranian APCs and assault rifles.

With the backroom dealings and politicization of the judiciary that led to the Democrat Party’s assumption of power on 15 December 2008, there are once again high hopes that the insurgency will be quelled.

Obviously unconcerned about the possibility of a coup, having the full backing of the military and monarchy, Prime Minister Abhisit pledged greater civilian oversight over the military. Abhisit has spoken of the Democrat Party’s deep ties in the south, their traditional stronghold. He reiterated the failed pledges of former Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont’s regime to engage in samanchan - reconciliation.

This does not bode well for the south and suggests that little progress will be made under the leadership of the Democrats: they still fail to see the insurgency for what it is and fail to acknowledge the goal to establish an independent Islamic state. In five years, those responsible for the violence have not entered into talks with the government. For them, there is nothing to reconcile.

And though they are not winning, neither are they losing. Few, if any, insurgent leaders have been captured and their ability to conduct operations across four provinces on a daily basis remains intact.

In the 90 days since assuming power, Abhisit has proven unable to quell the violence. 95 people have been killed and 149 wounded. Among the dead are 5 police, 14 soldiers, 24 rangers and village defense volunteers and 62 civilians. The 149 wounded include, 31 police, 58 soldiers 9 rangers and village defense volunteers, and 51 civilians. There have been 35 bombings and 7 attempted bombings. Insurgents have beheaded 7 of their victims and desecrated 6 additional corpses. Today, 2 more schools were arsoned.

This rate of violence is unsustainable and the reality is, large swaths of the southern Thailand are ungoverned territory. It is now year 6 of the insurgency; it is time for the Thai government to get serious. How many people will be killed on the BRN’s 47th birthday?

National Security, the Financial Crisis and Bernie Madoff

By Dennis Lormel

On February 12, 2009, Director of National Security (DNI), Dennis C. Blair, testified before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. DNI Blair provided the Committee with the Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community. The first sentence of the assessment states:

“The primary near-term security concern of the United States (U.S.) is the global economic crisis and its geopolitical implications.”

This was the first time in six years that terrorism was not listed as the primary threat to the country. Fraud and other criminal activity resulting in the laundering of illicit funds have always been considered a threat to our national economy. The current financial crisis was primarily driven by the frightful combination of fraud, greed and arrogance. The magnitude of that fraud, greed and arrogance has clearly shaken not only our national economy but the global economy as well. In so doing, as noted by DNI Blair, the resulting international instability created by the financial crisis has become the most significant threat to our national security.

Bernard Madoff appeared in U.S. District Court in the Southern District of New York on March 12, 2009. He pleaded guilty to 11 felony counts, including securities fraud, mail fraud and money laundering. The fraud and Ponzi scheme involved a reported $65 billion. Madoff has clearly become the poster child for the fraud, greed and arrogance that symbolize the financial crisis.

As a former FBI Agent, with extensive investigative experience in sophisticated fraud and financial crime schemes, I was intrigued by a statement Madoff made to the court during his pleading. He said “… and as the years went by, I realized my arrest and this day would inevitably come.” Someone needs to ask Madoff the question “at what point in time did you realize that your scheme would be detected?” How many years ago did Madoff reach his conclusion? In my experience, at that point in time, Madoff began planning his exit strategy.

Big time fraudsters usually theorize that their schemes have a certain shelf life, and at some point, their fraud will be detected. Therefore, many of these fraudsters make contingency plans and devise exit strategies. In many cases, that would mean fleeing the U.S. and relocating to a safe haven such as Robert Vesco and Marc Rich did. Interestingly, Madoff did not. So what was his exit strategy? Could he have been laundering funds for an extended period of time, in an attempt to separate them from his fraud and give such funds an air of legitimacy for his family or other designees to benefit from at the expense of his victims? Could he have been insulating co-conspirators by focusing guilt solely on himself and confessing at a preordained time to protect them?
Hopefully, prosecutors, investigators and government appointed Trustee Irving Picard will ask these questions and assess Madoff’s exit strategy. As a result, they should be able to recover or account for missing funds and identify other individuals who wittingly participated in the fraud.

Congress should take into account that the questionable activities of Madoff, and many other prominent business executives have contributed to our financial meltdown, thereby undermining the economy and threatening our national security. In this context, Madoff, and other despicable business executives and fraudsters should be considered economic terrorists. As such, Congress should strongly consider legislating more stringent criminal and civil penalties. Current penalties for white collar criminals are not as harsh as they should be considering the state of our current economy. Madoff, for example, should be sentenced to life in a maximum security facility and subject to forfeiture of all assets owned by him and his wife, and perhaps the assets of his immediate family as well. That is unlikely to occur. He will more likely be sentenced to a minimum security facility and have many millions of dollars in assets protected and in safe keeping for his wife and others.

It’s bad enough to be consumed by greed and arrogance, but when prominent business executives cross the line and allow greed and arrogance to result in millions or billions of dollars in fraud, they should be considered economic terrorists. As economic terrorists, when they are convicted, they should face the same criminal and civil penalties as other domestic or international terrorists.

Money, Guns, & Drugs: What's Fueling the Violence in Mexico

By Michael Braun

Today I testified before the Subcommittee on National Security & Foreign Affairs of the U.S. House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform on the escalating violence in Mexico. My viewpoint arises from my 34 years in law enforcement and as a U.S. Marine. I served for almost four years as the Assistant Administrator and Chief of Operations with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, and for one year as the Agency’s Acting Chief of Intelligence. I also served in a number of DEA offices throughout the United States, including service on both our Southern and Northern borders, on both our East and West Coasts, in the Midwest, as well as two years in various countries in Latin America.

Here are several paragraphs of that testimony, and you can download it in its entirety here.
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Drug related violence is nothing new to Mexico, but the intensity and duration of hostility currently ongoing in Mexico is unmatched by any experienced in the past. Why? Because President Calderon and his Administration had the courage to admit that the Mexican drug cartels had become so powerful that they challenged the authority of the Mexican government at all levels, and were becoming more powerful than their government’s security institutions. The cartels had successfully destabilized democratic governance and eroded political stability, which is exactly what they had worked hard to achieve for many years.

The Calderon Administration was even more courageous when they developed and implemented a long-term strategy to take back Mexico from the traffickers. When this strategy was implemented, the cartels were already feuding amongst themselves for lucrative turf, as they had so many times in the past. When the cartels came under simultaneous attack by the full weight of Mexico’s security forces, over 45,000 Mexican military personnel bolstered by the country’s federal law enforcement services, they began to lash out like never before. There were over 6,000 drug related murders in Mexico in 2008, and 530 Mexican law enforcement officers were killed in the line of duty, of which 493 were drug-related homicides. To put that into context, 140 police officers were killed in the line of duty in the United States in 2008, of which 41 were killed by gunfire.

The level of brutality exhibited by the Mexican cartels and their assassination teams exceeds anything we have witnessed in Iraq and Afghanistan in the past. The number of beheadings last year alone numbered about 200, and some of those were police officers. The head of one police officer was actually impaled on a spike on top of a wall in front of a police station with a note stuffed in the mouth warning the police to show more ‘respect’ for the traffickers. Traffickers have actually broken into the communications network of law enforcement in the Tijuana area to broadcast the identity of the next round of law enforcement officers to be targeted for assassination, only to find the bullet riddled bodies of those officers on the streets of Tijuana a few hours later.

Which takes us back to the question, “Why?” Roughly 90% of all the cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine and marijuana consumed in our Country enter the United States from Mexico. The money generated by the cartels’ global drug trafficking is staggering. The United Nations estimates that the drug trade between Mexico, the U.S. and Canada generates about $147 billion dollars annually, and the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) estimates that our fellow citizens here in the U.S. spend about $65 billion dollars annually to satisfy their insatiable appetite for drugs. The United Nations estimates that the entire global drug trade generates about $322 billion dollars annually. No other illicit global market comes close to those numbers. The National Drug Intelligence Center estimates that somewhere between $8 - $24 billion dollars in ‘bulk currency’ alone transits our Country each year destined for the cartels’ coffers in Mexico—ultimately smuggled across our Southwest Border.

A Major Criminal Investigation into the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe

By Douglas Farah

The Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Report (free subscription required) brings the otherwise unreported here news of a major criminal investigation into several Muslim Brotherhood leaders and groups in Germany and Belgium. The raids were publicly announced in Germany, but have not been widely reported. The site also provides links to other reports, particularly by the NEFA Foundations on some of those under investigation.

What is striking is the stature of the institutions that were raided on suspicion of money laundering, criminal activities, acquisition of property under false pretenses, and aiding "Islamists" and violent Islamic jihadists.

One thing this shows is that, despite the constant protests to the contrary, at least the German prosecutors and those of several other nations, believe there is, in fact, a transnational Ikhwan organization. There is, but the Brotherhood usually denies its existence.

It also shows the wealth and power the group has acquired over time. It set up in Germany in the early 1960s, and has rolled on, virtually unchallenged and unexamined, since. This is not unlike the MB groups in the United States, as outlined by prosecutors in the Holy Land Foundation case, who have spread influence as a "mainstream" Islamic organization.

This case is particularly important because it goes to the intricate financial, real estate and mosque structure the MB has build over several decades in Europe, where it has often served as a gateway for those who join violent jihad.

According to the GMBDR:

Also, according to sources in Germany, the Belgian aspect of the investigation involves Al-Aqsa Belgium, the Belgian member organization of the Union of Good, a coalition of charities headed by global Muslim Brotherhood leader Youssef Qaradawi that is designated by the U.S. as raising funds for Hamas., a group directly linked to Yousef al-Qaradawi. My full blog is here.

Is Al-Qaida in Iraq on the Rebound?

By Evan Kohlmann

Yesterday, after nearly two months of total silence, Al-Qaida's "Islamic State of Iraq" stepped forward to claim credit for last Sunday's devastating suicide bombing attack targeting a line of recruits outside a police academy in Baghdad. According to a statement from the ISI--an English translation of which has been provided by the NEFA Foundation--"Our brother said ‘Allahu Akhbar’ and detonated his belt amongst them, leaving more than thirty apostate volunteers killed and no less than sixty others injured—several of which were seriously wounded." This incident in Baghdad and a spate of other recent renewed attacks across the country have given rise to concerns that Al-Qaida may be on the rebound in Iraq. This is a particular worry as U.S. troops begin to withdraw from Iraq, handing responsibility over ever larger parts of the country into the hands of local security forces.

Despite these disturbing signs, it should also be emphasized that this is only the first communique from Al-Qaida in Iraq since January 19. Thus far, over the first three months of 2009, the "ISI" has issued a total of merely five text communiques, one audio recording from Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, and a single rather boring and uneventful propaganda video. That is an astonishing and precipitous decline for an organization that, at its height in 2005 and 2006, would often release more than a dozen statements and accompanying video in a single day. While it is certainly still premature to declare Al-Qaida in Iraq as "dead" or "finished", the latest suicide bombing attacks in Baghdad certainly seem to be more acts of desperation than reflective of a sudden resurgence in Al-Qaida popularity or influence.

Pulling the Curtain Back on Counterthreat Finance Initiative... Finally

By Andrew Cochran

Today, in a hearing room before (maybe) 50 people and with no "media elite" reporters present, a Congressional subcommittee finally pulled the curtain back on the single most effective counterfinancing measure in this decade, the joint Defense-Treasury counterthreat financing initiative. After covering this issue for 18 months, I was beginning to think that the success of the Iraq Threat Finance Cell, and the close coordination between Defense, Treasury, financial institutions, and payment system experts would never receive the attention and funding they deserve. Hopefully this hearing and the December 2 memorandum institutionalizing the concept at DoD are just a beginning to more funding, more personnel, and more success at stopping the financing of the most dangerous terrorists.

The testimony from Lt. Gen. Fridovich, the director of the SOCOM Center for Special Operations, includes illuminating details of the coordination mechanism, some of which I have not seen before in public statements. For instance, the testimony indicates that Threat Finance cell concept is being developed and/or deployed widely against a number of asymmetric threats. Gen. Fridovich also discussed some of the meetings with the private and nonprofit sector, in which a number of Contributing Experts here have been involved, and touched on the emerging technologies which are a focus of discussion in these meetings. Key excerpts from that testimony:

"(S)emi-annually, in April and October, we convene a Threat Finance Working Group as part of our Global Synchronization Conference. This brings together roughly 100 Counterthreat Finance analysts, investigators, and case agents from all the Geographic Combatant Commands, Functional Commands like Strategic Command and Joint Forces Command, the Combat Support Agencies, the InterAgency, most notably Treasury, State, FBI, DEA, and DHS/ICE, our British, Australian and Canadian colleagues, and various representatives of the private sector. This has become the premier forum for US Government Threat Finance exchange. Exchange with the coalition, and the private sector has been especially informative as we learn how better to deal with the rapidly developing cutting edge financial technologies like internet and cellphone money transfers.

I have studied testimony on this subject presented in 2005, and can see that this Threat Finance working group has become what was then envisioned by bringing community together and operationalizing each agency’s unique knowledge, skills and authorities to maximize impact on financial facilitators. (Editor's Note: here is the 2005 testimony.)
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We are posting Threat Finance analysts, very carefully selected threat finance analysts, at several of the Combatant Commands, and we are working hard within the DoD community to develop Threat Finance analyst training. This highlights a simple key to fostering interagency success, which is to add value to other’s efforts.
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We then share our expertise on these target sets with any and all InterAgency members, most especially Treasury and law enforcement, looking to operationalize results on targets DoD cannot currently reach via kinetic means. Right now these target sets include Al Qaida’s External Facilitation Network, by which we mean those gentlemen operating in places like Kuwait and Pakistan, Europe and Asia to move money for IEDs, suicide-bombers and the like into Iraq and Afghanistan. We are also working against Al Shabaab, Lebanese Hezbollah and certain Iranian elements as they continue to develop a global financial facilitation infrastructure to rival that of Hezbollah and sometimes linked thereto."

As a warmup to today's hearing, National Public Radio interviewed Matt Levitt, Dennis Lormel, and me - you can listen to those interviews at the NPR website.

Dealing with Hamas: Future Pathways for Britain

By Matthew Levitt

Last week I spoke at the Quilliam Foundation in London on whether or not the international community should engage Hamas. The following is a summary of my remarks:

The new Obama administration has placed a renewed focus on trying to move forward the Israeli-Palestinian negotiation process. The biggest problem is the nature of Hamas and its control of Gaza. I believe Hamas is part of the problem, not part of the solution.

Should we engage with or recognize Hamas? The three wings of Hamas are not disparate. Hence we don't just have the problem of having Hamas continuing to engage in violence, but also that they have not decided who they want to be: Do they want to be an Islamist political party that pursues its goals through legitimate political means or do they want to be a group engaged in terrorism and political violence while also pursuing their goals through political activity? Moreover, does it want to be a political party responsible for and to its constituency or a social movement responsible only to its members?

There is a huge cost in allowing parties that use violence to engage in the political process at the same time. We need to make demands of them if they are to be accepted by the international community. The US made a colossal error in encouraging political elections that involved Hamas before there was proper civil society set up in the territories. Civil society, not elections, is the bedrock of democracy.

The other issue, which is more fundamental, is that Hamas is expressly against a two-state solution. FBI material used in Holy Land Foundation trial in the U.S. demonstrated that Hamas was in fact very disturbed at the prospect of a two state solution.

Perhaps most disturbing is not Hamas' acts of violence targeting civilians, but their strategic and successful radicalization of Palestinian society. They are engaged in a broad-based radicalization campaign that seeks to shift the Israeli-Palestinian conflict away from an ethno-nationalist conflict over how to compromise over disputed land, to one based on demonization of the "other" and mutually exclusive religious principles. To the extent Hamas succeeds in this radicalization, peace-making becomes infinitely more difficult.

Hamas is part of the problem because of its commitment to violence and an extremist ideology that refuses to accept the "other" and rejects a two-state solution. That said, the problem is with Hamas, not with religiously observant or even conservative Palestinians. Indeed, Hamas is not monolithic; there are splits and fissures within the movement which should be exploited. For example, in 2003 Hamas leaders in the Gaza Strip debated whether or not to 'go Muslim Brotherhood' -- that is, to cease engaging (overtly at least) in violence and to become more of an Islamist party. This debate was shouted down quite vociferously, but even the fact that they did have this debate is telling.

The difference between the moderates and extremists in Hamas is really one over tactical flexibility rather than strategic change. In the immediate we have a big problem not just because Hamas is in control of Gaza, but because it is the most extreme and militaristic part of Hamas that is in control of Gaza. In the wake of shura council elections in Gaza last summer, for example, the relative moderates within Hamas were pushed out by people affiliated with or members of the Qassam brigades in Gaza, reportedly including Brigades chief Ahmed Jabari.

The full summary is available here.

CFT: The Imperative of Interagency Synergy

By Matthew Levitt

Earlier today I had the opportunity to testify before the The House Armed Services Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities at a hearing on "Tracking and Disrupting Terrorist Financial Networks: A Potential Model for Inter-agency Success?"

I argued that the transnational threats facing the United States and its allies today in terrorism, proliferation, insurgencies and more are not static threats; rather, they are constantly evolving in response to events on the ground -- including our efforts to combat them. Our response to these threats will be as successful as it is coordinated internally across our own interagency and more broadly among the U.S. and its allies.

The Iraq Threat Finance Cell (ITFC), based in Baghdad, is a perfect example of one such interagency effort that works. Co-led by the DoD and Treasury, it was established in 2005 with the purpose of enhancing the collection, analysis and dissemination of timely financial intelligence on the Iraqi insurgency. It has become a key component of interagency and MNF-I efforts to detect, identify, and disrupt financial networks supporting insurgent and terrorist elements operating in Iraq. The new Afghan Threat Finance Cell builds on the demonstrated success of the ITFC.

We have undoubtedly made great strides in our counterterrorism efforts in general, as well as in counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq, and our measures to combat the financing of such threats in particular, even as we have far to go. Interagency efforts like threat finance cells in Iraq and Afghanistan are one reason for these successes.

My full testimony is available here. The audio and video of the panel, which also featured Mr. Edward Frothingham III, Principal Director for Transnational Threats in the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense and Lieutenant General David P. Fridovich, Commander of the Center for Special Operations at the U. S. Special Operations Command, are available on the Committee's website.

The U.S.-Somali Experience

By Douglas Farah

After years of debate over whether it could happen, started almost immediately after the 9/11 attacks, there is a clear case of a radical Islamist group actively and successfully recruiting inside the United States: the case of al Shabaab (the Youth) in Somalia.

The most famous case was that of Shirwa Ahmed, a 27-year-old college student from Minneapolis who blew himself up in Somalia on Oct. 29 in one of five simultaneous bombings attributed to al-Shabaab. The group has been designated a terrorist organization by the United States, and it has close links to al-Qaeda.

As the Washington Post reports, this is becoming an increasing worry to U.S. officials, in part because the use of a U.S. passport is so valuable.

Since November, the FBI has raced to uncover any ties to foreign extremist networks in the unexpected departures of numerous Somali American teenagers and young men, who family members believe are in Somalia. The investigation is active in Boston; San Diego; Seattle; Columbus, Ohio; and Portland, Maine, a U.S. law enforcement official said, and community members say federal grand juries have issued subpoenas in Minneapolis and elsewhere.

Officials are still trying to assess the scope of the problem but say reports so far do not warrant a major concern about a terrorist threat within the United States. But intelligence officials said the recruitment of U.S. citizens by terrorist groups is particularly worrisome because their American passports could make it easier for them to reenter the country.

This represents a movement toward the "Europeanization" of the Islamist threat in the United States, where terrorists recruit among the disasporas in an adopted country (or where the young people are second generation and feeling lost between two worlds.) The recruits, with the requisite language skills and knowledge of how society functions, are far easier to hide plain site than foreigners would. My full blog is here.

NEFA Foundation: A Unique Look Inside the IMU's "Jundullah Studios"

By Evan Kohlmann

The NEFA Foundation has obtained new video footage of day-to-day operations inside "Jundullah Studios", the official media wing of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)-an Al-Qaida and Taliban mujahideen ally fighting in pockets along the Afghan-Pakistani border. Jundullah Studios is responsible for producing several recent mujahideen propaganda videos of note, including at least two recordings featuring German-speaking militants fighting in Pakistan and Afghanistan. In contrast to the popular notion of "terrorists hiding in caves", this video reveals a significantly more sophisticated infrastructure, including at least half a dozen laptop computers, video players, and even a full-size office-style copy machine. Quite clearly, Jundullah Studios is broadcasting from a fixed location with a steady power supply, and-at least based on what is being displayed on the laptops-a relatively speedy Internet connection, as well.

The video footage can be viewed on the NEFA Foundation website.

A Year After the Reyes Killing: Lessons Learned From the FARC

By Douglas Farah

Although a few days late, it is worth looking back at the year since Raul Reyes, the second in command of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) was killed in a permanent camp he had set up a few kilometers across the Ecuadorian border.

Not only was Reyes the first member of the FARC secretariat killed in more than 40 years of war, but he was well established enough to have 600 gigabytes of information on the hard drives and computers that were also captured. For an interesting look in Spanish at the international structure of the FARC see this interactive map in Semana magazine.

The result has been a severe weakening of the FARC, once the hemisphere's most feared guerrilla army that had, in recent years, drifted into terrorism, drug trafficking and kidnappings as its chief way of sustaining itself.

The documents provide an unprecedented look into the correspondence and inner workings of the FARC, its relationships with governments (Venezuela, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Libya etc.), its business development and aspirations, its ties to specific drug trafficking organizations, such as that of the Norther Valley, its political strategy and the creation of its front groups, and much more.

The first lesson is that the FARC, as a prototype of self-financing, non-state actors, had used the drug money to greatly expand its influence across Latin America and into Europe. These groups almost always find ways to link up with other groups, both religious and secular, because they need the same "shadow facilitators" to operate. My full blog is here.

The Attack on Syria's al-Kibar Nuclear Facility

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

The new issue of inFocus is devoted to discussion of Syria, and the possibility of engagement with the country. My colleague Josh Goodman and I contributed an article about Israel's attack on Syria's al-Kibar reactor in September 2007. An excerpt:

Syria's response in the wake of Israel's bombing was curious. The regime sought no retaliatory measures. It did not even ask the U.N. Security Council to discuss or condemn the incident. Rather, satellite photos show Syria's efforts to scrub the site of any traces of the nuclear reactor that Syria denied having. Reuters reported that Syria bulldozed the area, "removed debris and erected a new building in a possible cover-up." Former U.N. weapons inspector David Albright, president of the prestigious Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), told the New York Times, "It looks like Syria is trying to hide something and destroy the evidence of some activity. But it won't work. Syria has got to answer questions about what it was doing."
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) director Mohammed ElBaradei condemned the U.S. and Israel for their "shoot first and ask questions later" approach. Nonetheless, the IAEA began probing Syrian nuclear activity, and Syria gave its inspectors access to the al-Kibar site in June 2008. (Syria later refused IAEA requests to revisit al-Kibar and examine three other related sites.)
The IAEA released a report on November 19, 2008, containing a number of relevant data points. The report establishes that construction of the al-Kibar facility began between April 26 and August 4, 2001. Based on analysis of satellite imagery, the IAEA also notes:

Imagery taken prior to and immediately after the bombing indicates that the destroyed box-shaped building may have had underground levels. Its containment structure appears to have been similar in dimension and layout to that required for a biological shield for nuclear reactors, and the overall size of the building was sufficient to house the equipment needed for a nuclear reactor of the type alleged.

To read the whole article, click here.

Focus to Remain on Terrorist Financing

By Matthew Levitt

Yesterday, the Obama administration officially nominated three new senior Treasury officials, including David S. Cohen to be assistant secretary in dealing with terrorist financing. Coming on the heals of the decision to keep Undersecretary Stuart Levey at the helm of the office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, all signs are that the new administration intends to keep a strong focus on protecting the U.S. financial system from abuse, taking offensive action to prevent illicit actors from enjoying easy access to the U.S. and international financial systems, and following the money as a means of identifying terrorist financiers and operators up and down the financial pipeline.

As I argue in a piece written for Oxford Analytica, with more activities out of the public eye than in it, counterterrorism efforts are, by their very nature, difficult to assess. However, financial measures in particular have proven quite successful, and those who follow the money are increasingly being called on to use their skills and tools against the hardest targets. The Obama administration is likely to continue leveraging these tools against a variety of transnational threats, using them in tandem with diplomatic, law enforcement, regulatory, intelligence, and other tools.

The full article is available here.

The Economic Crisis: Al Qaeda's Response

By Michael Jacobson

The Washington Institute just published a piece by Richard Barrett, the head of the monitoring team for the UN's 1267 al Qaeda/Taliban Committee. Richard's piece discusses how al Qaeda has responded to -- and tried to take advantage of -- the global financial crisis.

Here is an excerpt:

The deepening global financial crisis has focused international attention on failing companies, rising unemployment, and diving stock markets. Little attention, however, has been given to the downturn's significant effect on terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda, which has altered its central message and is facing dwindling financial resources. Although the economic situation has likewise affected government and private-sector counterterrorism efforts, steps can be taken to improve the current counterterrorism financing regime even in these troubled times.

Background

Al-Qaeda's immediate reaction to the financial crisis has been to claim credit for the economic misfortunes of the West. The group argues that today's financial problems are the consequences of the September 11 attacks and the cost of the subsequent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda leaders have always regarded the West's consumerism as a key vulnerability and have consistently espoused attacks against economic targets. Despite complaining that the Muslim world's resources benefit Western countries and their allies more than they do the Muslim community, terrorist leaders regard oil as the treasure of their future caliphate.

It was notable that both Usama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri issued statements encouraging attacks on oil refineries in the months before the failed attack on the Abqaiq oil-processing plant in Saudi Arabia in February 2006. Considering that Abqaiq is the largest facility of its kind in the world and represents 60 percent of Saudi Arabia's daily output, a successful terrorist attack there would have significantly disrupted global energy supplies. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula issued a statement following the attack, stating that it was part of "the war against Christians and Jews to stop their pillage of Muslim riches."

Al-Qaeda's focus on economic targets will likely sharpen under the current economic conditions, prompting more strikes on oil facilities on land or against ships at sea -- a capability already demonstrated by the attack on a French tanker off the coast of Yemen in October 2002.

To read the rest of the piece, click here:

The Myth of the Two Talibans

By Walid Phares

Taliban Militias

In an interview with the New York Times this week (March 7), President Barack Obama said he “hopes U.S. troops can identify moderate elements of the Taliban and move them toward reconciliation.” The proposition came as a conclusion to a larger picture: the battlefield situation in Afghanistan. According to the New York Times he said the United States “was not winning the war in that country” and thus the door must be opened to a “reconciliation process in which the American military would reach out to moderate elements of the Taliban much as it did with Sunni militias in Iraq.”

Following these statements a flurry of comments exploded throughout the international media: while most of the mainstream press and networks in the West praised the “new daring turn” in US policy, that is, the readiness to “engage the Taliban,” most of the pan Arabist and Jihadi sympathizer outlets in the region warned the move won’t be successful. In a panel discussion on BBC TV Arabic in which I participated, a noted expert in Islamist affairs from Amman said “there is no such thing as Taliban independent from the high ups like Mullah Umar.” Another panelist, a seasoned Afghan journalist from Kabul added: “In Iraq, you have a bigger US force, and a totally different geopolitical context than in Afghanistan. Besides, he added, why would Washington want to engage a Terror force which is not accepted by the population?” This was a small sampling of the brouhaha reigning in the debate about the real strategic intentions of the Obama Administration.

The Imbroglio of Good and Bad Taliban

In fact by my observations, it is even more complicated than that: the US Administration is being advised that any change in strategy in Afghanistan is better than the previous situation. It is being told that the surge model as applied in Iraq may work, if modified to meet Afghanistan’s “complexities.” The President must also be attracted to the idea that an “engagement” with some quarters of the Taliban will fit perfectly with the global idea of engagement, sit down and listening that he seems to have adopted for the entire region.

But many questions still need to be answered. Does the plan require a dialogue with the Taliban organization as a whole or with elements “within” the organization? Apparently the US channel is to be established with “elements” not with the leadership of the network. Then the next question is: if they aren’t part of the top leadership, are these elements able to sway the entire organization towards engagement? Apparently not, according to experts on the Taliban, both in Afghanistan and Pakistan. So, the goal is to sway these factions – called moderates - from the Taliban, not to steer the entire group in another direction.

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Mullah Omar, supreme emir of the Taliban

Here we have to pause and come to the first “complex” conclusion: while President Hamid Karzai has extended an olive branch to Mullah Omar to join the Government, an invitation quickly rejected, President Obama is announcing a more modest goal that is to identify “moderate elements” from the Taliban and “strike a deal with them.” But the modest narrative of the goal doesn’t make it necessarily reachable. Here is why.

If the “moderate Taliban” we’re looking to identify are “inside” the network, when they engage with the US, they will be lethally ejected by the hard core of the group, backed by al Qaeda. Hence the next question will be to know if those “dissidents” would actually secede and form a “moderate Taliban” organization working with the US and the Karzai Government. From the names available on such a list, including the former “Taliban ambassadors” to Pakistan and the international community and those who sought Saudi Arabia’s help in launching a dialogue, we can’t see strong commanders willing to surge militarily against the mother ship. As far as we can project, there are no leaders and radical clerics who would carry that task of establishing an all-out new “good Taliban,” even with millions of dollars as incentive. A Taliban civil war is not going to happen, for now. But is there another more attainable goal? According to the Obama Administration and some experts, there may be other options.

Little “talibans?”

In recent months a new concept has been pushed via the Defense and counter terrorism circles arguing that instead of chipping off from the actual “Taliban” militia on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistani border, attention must be focusing on harvesting the local “taliban” (little ts). According to this theory, the little “ts” are individuals and groups who have joined the large umbrella under Mullah Umar but not the membership of the organization, or have proclaimed themselves as “taliban affiliates.” Hence, in comparison with the Iraqi Sahwa movement backed by US Coalition, these sub-militias of all walks of life would become the target of American political charm and dollars. If identified and reached out to – so believe the architects of the forthcoming Afghan “surge” - they will become the Afghani parallel to the Sahwas of Mesopotamia. Note that President Obama specified that it will be the “American military who would reach out to these moderate elements.” Meaning they will be dealt with from a lower level rather than from a full fledged diplomatic perspective.

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Abdul Salam Zaeef, former Taliban ambassador

In that case, unlike what the media has been speculating about, this is not a US dialogue with the party it is at war with, headed by Mullah Umar and his emirs. It is not even an attempt to break the mother ship into two and recuperate the more moderate branch. There are no takers for a massive retreat from the Taliban into the arms of Kabul’s Government or Washington’s “infidel” generosity.

What the US move is about is much more pragmatic and realistic: nibbling off from the wide pool of angry people and shifting them from frustration with Karzai to enmity towards Umar. Indeed, there are tens of thousands of armed males aggregating in villages, clans, tribes and neighborhoods, who wear turbans and sometimes claim they are Taliban for a thousand reasons. These sub-militias aren’t particularly ideological or maybe do not even understand much of the doctrine they claim following. A number of experts and some strategists believe today that these men of the Afghan underworld can become the “new army” against the “bad Taliban.” Can they?

In fact not only it is possible but it should have been the case eight years ago. However, there are two fundamental mistakes not to make.

Don’t announce them as the “moderates”

First, the Obama Administration and the US military strategists must not see these new war constituents, nor announce them as who they aren’t. These sub-militias sought to turn the tide against the real Taliban aren’t your “moderate” guys. In reality they have no firm ideological affiliation. With few exceptions perhaps, the tribal and urban forces to be targeted for “integration” will simply shift alliances or allegiance for money and power. The American, Western and international public must not be led to believe that a piece of architecture will be successful in transforming radicals into moderates or swaying away bands of armed men from extremism, let alone Jihadism. The mutation to moderation happens not via cash deals but through years of schooling, an efficient media and perseverant NGO work. It happens from younger into older age. Hence forget about the “identification of moderate” part of the Obama strategy. Inducing civil societies into liberalism, or even moderation, needs Government crafting of a kind that doesn’t exist in Washington or Brussels for the time being.

In addition, these militias and militants to be swayed away from Waziristan’s exiles aren’t going to produce a national reconciliation. They do not represent the radical ideological web which is behind the war against the new Afghan democracy. National reconciliation takes place between two or more large, historical and strategic forces. Instead we’re talking about recuperation of elements extracted from the Taliban, not reconciliation with the latter. Hence US stated goals should be even more modest in this regard.

Don’t call them “taliban”

The second fatal mistake not to commit is to call them Taliban, proto-Taliban or crypto-Taliban. Even if for publicity purposes it suits the goal of soothing the US and Western public, constructing a fictive identity to a plethora of tribal-urban sub militias will backfire on the whole campaign. Here is why.

Since they aren’t a breakaway faction from the main organization, they can’t form another Taliban to challenge the Mullah Umar leadership. And since they have no ideology of their own they won’t be able to de-radicalize others. Hence if they are baptized as the other “taliban,” instead of using the credibility of the name to push back against the bad guys, the name will ultimately transform them into what we don’t want them to be: Taliban! Void will be filled by the forces with a greater doctrinal power, forceful clerics, and historical leadership. If we call them nice Taliban or “little ts” we would be throwing them back into the arms of the forces we want to sway them from. Knowing what I know from the Jihadist strategies, it won’t take long before the two Talibans would eventually sit down and strike a deal, and overwhelm the Kabul Government.

Learn from Iraq

If the Iraq Sahwa model is the inspiration for an Afghan engagement with local forces, we need to learn the right lessons from it. In Iraq, the US didn’t create good al Qaeda versus bad al Qaeda; it didn’t identify moderate elements from al Qaeda to pit them against the mother force. The political dimension of the surge, relied heavily on recruiting tribes, social cadres and Sunni elements regardless of their affiliations and empowering them via a “new” organization, called Sahwa Councils. We gave these new local allies an identity of their own, not the identity of the forces they fought.

But more important, the greater dimension of the surge wasn’t the mere rise of the Sahwas but the moving forward of the democratic political process with its political parties, NGOs, movements and media. Swaying Sunni militias against al Qaeda was only one component of the strategy; the larger strategy was to sustain pressures until Iraqi forces, legislators and ministries are up and running. By comparison in Afghanistan, we should make the case of a similar, not necessarily identical process: mobilizing popular militias, giving them an identity of their own, not calling them Taliban, and not expecting them to be the missing link to the future but a force helpful in pushing the political process forward until it can resist, contain and reverse the Taliban.

How to measure victory and defeat

President Obama, and before him President Bush, were always trying to measure the success in the war in Afghanistan. While the latter spoke of victories, our current President speaks of failures. The real issue is how to measure victory or defeat. Is destroying al Qaeda and Taliban bunkers a definitive indicator of victory? Are the relentless terror attacks by the Jihadists the other definitive measurement of failures? I don’t think either parameter gives us an answer. Rather it is the battle taking place over the conquest of the minds and hearts of the school children and teens of the country that will make or break that burgeoning Democracy. Unfortunately neither the past nor the current Administration seems to see the war of ideas with such urgency.

Let’s be accurate and transparent

My recommendation to the Obama Administration is to be relentlessly accurate in describing the choices it intends to make in Afghanistan and in the confrontation with the Jihadists worldwide. If its final intention is to cut a deal with the Taliban – in this article I won’t argue about the choice - it must faithfully inform the US public of this choice instead of developing a phased narrative of disengagement.

But if it seriously intends to fight the Taliban and al Qaeda by isolating them further inside Afghanistan and mobilizing the international community, the Administration also needs to prepare the American and Western public for that choice. For in this age of hyper globalization, the Jihadi forces have an astonishing capacity to outmaneuver the smartest strategies devised by their enemies and, on the other hand, the public here at home has developed a surprising ability to understand the intentions of both the Terror forces and of its own Government. Transparency is everything in this age.
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Dr. Walid Phares is the Director of the Future Terrorism Project at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, a visiting scholar at the European Foundation for Democracy and the author of The Confrontation: Winning the War against Future Jihad

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New Policy Exchange report on PREVENT

By Lorenzo Vidino

British think tank Policy Exchange released today a very thought-provoking report on the PREVENT strategy, one of the strands of Britain's counter-terrorism policy. Authored by Shiraz Maher and Martyn Frampton, the report critiques British authorities' tendency to rely on non-violent Islamists in order to counter violent ones. The report, titled Choosing our Friends Wisely, is very timely, given the apparent shift taking place within the British government on the matter. The whole report is very interesting, but I found the comparison made at page 17 particularly noteworthy:

Imagine if members of the violent neo-Nazi group Combat 18 were to begin a terrorist campaign against the state and Britain’s ethnic minorities. How would the British state respond? By arresting and imprisoning members of Combat 18, refusing to tolerate the burning of mosques, synagogues and other institutions. The state would also rebut Combat 18’s most purist conceptions — including the idea that Britain could ever revert to being a ‘pristine white homeland’.

But imagine if, in order to bring this campaign of white neo-Nazi violence to an end, the state decided to co-opt an element of the white nationalist movement, precisely because its ‘grievance’ narratives were widely believed amongst the white population. Broad swathes of Whitehall, not least the Security Service and police, would argue that ‘alienated’ and ‘excluded’ white youth must be persuaded that they, too, can enjoy a stake in the political system. Imagine further that in order to rebut Combat 18’s narrative – that participation in the political process is pointless because mass immigration and multiculturalism will continue whichever major political party is in office – the state turned to nonviolent ‘political’ fascists for help, including the most prominent of these, the British National Party and its leader, Nick Griffin. Officials might be impressed by Griffin’s growing ‘maturity’. He does not advocate violence on these shores, instead encouraging his angry young white supporters to participate in the political process in order to stop mass immigration. Precisely because of his previous racist pronouncements, officials might reckon that he possesses the ‘street cred’ needed to appeal to those drawn to terrorism.

But what price might Griffin demand in order to charm angry young recruits away from Combat 18? What ‘narrative’ would the British state encourage him to peddle in order to achieve success? Would the Department for Communities and Local Government begin funding Griffin and assorted white ‘community’ groups to bolster their nonviolent message? Would they start ‘capacity building’ initiatives in white neighbourhoods? Griffin might demand substantial policy changes such as more ‘white history’ being taught at schools and universities by ‘suitably qualified’ white teachers. He would obviously insist on dramatic reductions in immigration and an end to multiculturalism, the ‘root causes’ of white ‘alienation’. Griffin could also stipulate that the government must not show ‘double standards’ in its foreign policy by overthrowing regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq while ignoring the plight of white farmers in Zimbabwe. Perhaps at Griffin’s behest, the Foreign Office could start a series of ‘roadshows’ led by foreign ‘scholars’ such as David Duke. This might be supported by a new inter-departmental government body, the Research,Information and Communications Unit (RICU), which addresses grievances and rebuts Combat 18’s conspiracy theories, but often in white nationalist terms.

Ridiculous? Yes, but this far-fetched scenario parallels much of the government’s existing policy for tackling Islamist violence. If the word ‘Muslim’ is substituted for ‘white’ then the above scenario serves as a fairly close summary of the government’s current strategy. The enemy is defined quite narrowly as al-Qaeda without fully appreciating the divisive ideology that inspires the group’s actions. The British government, in its desperation to prevent violence, has ended up legitimizing the very ideas that fuel it.

'Jihadi penetration of Pakistan’s armed forces is at the center of all concerns in any new strategy'

By Walid Phares

As the Obama Administration prepares for the deployment of additional forces in Afghanistan and as the Pakistani Government is reviewing the national strategy regarding the Taliban forces in the Northeastern provinces, a parallel strategic debate is taking place in Indian media and research centers abut the Post Mumbai Jihadi threat in the region. Following is the text of an interview I had with India's Daily News and Analysis conducted by Venkatesan Vembu. I have also attached the shorter print version and a follow up piece by Vembu.

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Jihadi areas of operations in the subcontinent

Interview in India's Daily News and Analysis

The deal between the Pakistan government and pro-Taliban forces in the Swat valley is an ominous portent of Pakistan’s slide into jihadism, with strategic implications for India and other countries, warns Walid Phares, a counter-terrorism expert and director of the Future Terrorism Project at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies in Washington. Excerpts from an interview he gave Venkatesan Vembu:

Vembu: How different is the Obama administration’s strategy (vis-à-vis the Bush administration’s) in pursuing the war on terror in Afghanistan and Pakistan?

Phares: As a matter of fact, the Obama administration hasn’t so far issued a strategic document outlining its difference with the Bush strategy in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. People talk of a difference, but so far as we can analyse, there is no fundamental difference in the action to be taken or the general horizons of such a strategy. Regarding Afghanistan President Obama promised during his electoral campaign to send additional troops to Afghanistan when elected. But President Bush and candidate Senator McCain also committed themselves to send as many troops as needed to the battlefield. During the campaign, the Obama pledge to send additional forces to central Asia was in the framework of scoring a point that this was indeed the central front on the war on terror and that the US must withdraw its troops from Iraq. The pledge to increase forces in Afghanistan was intended to encourage the (American) public to accept the withdrawal from Iraq. The difference thus is that the Obama strategy doesn't believe that the US can and should fight on two fronts; its priority is Afghanistan. The Bush strategy, on the other hand, was that the US can sustain efforts on two fronts simultaneously. However after his inauguration, President Obama is now in charge of the war in Afghanistan and therefore he is consulting with US commanders, including with General David Petraeus, head of CENTCOM. So, one assumes that he is sending these additional troops to defeat the Taliban and al Qaeda on the ground, inside Afghanistan. The real question is after this stage is performed, what comes next? One of the possibilities is that the Obama administration may think of opening a dialogue with a weakened Taliban. This will be a radical difference with the Bush/McCain strategy, which would call for defeating the Taliban and engaging alternatives to them.

With regards Pakistan, there are differences in the public stands between Obama and Bush's policies, but so far there is continuity in their methods. When President Obama was campaigning for office, he said he would order attacks inside Pakistan if needed to target al Qaeda infrastructure and membership. President Bush didn't take a public stand on this matter and relied on Pakistan President Musharraf to carry out the attacks. But in reality under both administrations, US military carried out and continues to strike inside Pakistan's borders, particularly in the northwest frontier areas. Will the Obama policy regarding fighting terrorism in Pakistan change in the future? We will have to wait and see how the strikes will evolve.

Vembu: In the past month, US drone attacks inside Pakistani territory appear to have escalated. Does this mark a continuation – and possibly even an extension - of the Bush administration’s strategy?

Phares: The attacks via drones are ordered by the US command proportionate to their perception of the rising threat coming from the Taliban and al Qaeda. The military escalation does not reflect a change from one administration to another; it signals the same strategy of engaging the Jihadi forces implicated in attacks against US and coalition inside Afghanistan. The question is: how will the US strategy evolve after the additional US and NATO forces deploy and begin engaging the Taliban and al Qaeda. The expectation is that Jihadi forces will also escalate their attacks and Taliban-dominated enclaves inside Pakistan will send more forces across the border. Hence, the current strikes inside Pakistan will have to mutate. Either into a massive campaign or, let's not be surprised, a future attempt to negotiate with the Taliban. It could go in two different directions.

Vembu: Are the Obama administration’s strategy more likely – or less – to succeed?

Phares: That depends not only on the military actions to be taken inside Afghanistan and across the border with Pakistan, but also and mainly on the regional strategy that the administration devises. An Obama strategy can be successful if it sends the needed support to Afghanistan and simultaneously crafts a campaign to isolate the Jihadists politically and broaden the coalition in the entire sub Indian continent.

Vembu: Or will Afghanistan prove to be, as some commentators have said, “Obama’s Vietnam”?

Phares: The argument about “Obama's Vietnam" is being advanced by the Jihadi propaganda machine. They used it under the Bush administration and want to use it under the Obama administration. That message was initially sent by al Qaeda's leader, including Osama bin laden and Zawahiri. In reality, Afghanistan will become a Vietnam if the Taliban wins the hearts and minds of a majority of Afghans and is supported by a Pakistan falling to the Jihadists. So far, that is not the case. To avoid a Vietnam-like situation, the US and NATO must make sure that a majority of Afghans reject the Taliban's ideology and that Pakistan doesn't fall into the hands of Jihadists.

Vembu: There are reports that the US is secretly training Pakistan military forces. Given that the ISI and the Pakistani military has been heavily infiltrated by Taliban and the jihadists, how effective will this strategy be? How should the Obama administration address the ISI/military complicity in sustaining the Taliban/Al Qaeda/Kashmir terrorists?

Phares: I believe that US assistance to Pakistan's military is not new, especially after 2001. The goal of such a support, however, is aimed at weakening al Qaeda and the Taliban. I am told it is very specific to the units and apparatuses that are engaged with the radicals in the Waziristan and other districts.

The fact that ISI and the Pakistan military has been inflitrated by Jihadists, not just al Qaeda and the Taliban, is well-known in the US and within the defence sectors. In my analysis, the penetration of Pakistan's armed forces is at the centre of all concerns in any strategy. Many Pakistani officials at very high levels, particularly those who view the Jihadi forces as a threat, know that many sectors have been penetrated, but say this situation has been inherited from previous years and decades. The Obama Administration must be very attentive to the internal threat coming from within Pakistan. In other words, the US must identify the elements that are already confronting the extremists and back them. In the end, it will be a political battle inside Pakistan between the Jihadists and secular forces who oppose them.

Vembu: What are the merits and demerits of the Pakistan government’s strategy in consenting to the imposition of Sharia law in the Swat valley as part of a deal with the Taliban?

Phares: It is regrettable that the Pakistan government had to authorise the signing of such an agreement allowing the imposition of Sharia law on some districts of the country. This is a setback to democracy and pluralism in a country where the progressive sectors of society are known to be looking forward to modernity and secularism. This also reflects the ground reality in some of these provinces: the power of the Jihadi movements. But at the same time one has to admit that the current government has inherited a situation from past years and decades. The spread of fundamentalism… is half a century old and it has increased thanks to the spread of a radical ideology. Hence, the current government has chosen –apparently - to accept the de facto situations in some spots of the country so that it can re-evaluate the situation, perhaps reform some institutions and undertake some restructuring of the military and intelligence sectors so that in the future, there would be a comprehensive strategy to isolate fundamentalism and eventually reverse it with a popular support. If the Swat valley agreement is a prelude to tackle the problem comprehensively later, this would be understandable; but if this was a prelude to a retreat in front of the Jihadists, then obviously the future will be dark.

Vembu: There is a perception that the US gave its tacit consent to this deal. What are the US’ gains and losses from this arrangement?

Phares: Yes, the perception exists, and many experts believe that Washington has given its okay for such a deal. But keep in mind that the US leadership is busy tackling the economic crisis and that its military commanders in charge of the Afghanistan battlefield haven't finished their plans yet. Perhaps at some diplomatic levels, a green light was provided to a Pakistani government inquiry for advice. Meaning, the idea is certainly Pakistani and it is possible that the new US diplomatic team dealing with the region may have consented to the move. But strategically, the US will lose from such a deal because the Jihadists will perceive the deal as a victory for them and will be emboldened to do the same elsewhere including in Afghanistan.

Vembu: The argument has been made that there is a ‘good’ Taliban and a ‘bad’ Taliban. Is it a mistake to make such a disctinction? Has such a distinction ever yielded results elsewhere?

Phares: The notion of a bad Taliban and good Taliban is a myth created by those in the West, and particularly in America, who advocate engagement with the Jihadists. This reflects a poor understanding of the ideology and the nature of the Taliban movement. It is not about good or bad but about an ideology which is totalitarian, and methods that do not recognize international law. The Jihadist ideology is one, although its supporters play many tactics, including manoeuvering their enemies into believing that they can do business with some instead of the others. The Jihadists always teach their followers "al Harbu Khid'aa" ("war is deception"). Unfortunately, many in the West and in the US fall into a trap of war of ideas and naively come to the conclusion that one can do business with the ‘good’ Taliban versus the ‘bad’ Taliban. For example, when the Pakistani government signed the deal of Malacand, the Movement for the Implementation of Sharia didn't declare that would be on the side of the government against the Taliban. Another counter-argument is that if indeed there are the ‘good’ Taliban (who will make peace), what would be the plan to deal with the ‘bad’ Taliban? This is the kind of trap that the Obama Administration must not fall into. Everything will depend on the influence of the new experts in charge of explaining it to the White House.

Vembu: What are the social and political implications for Pakistan of the imposition of Sharia law in the Swat valley?

Phares: It has tremendous implications. It will empower radical Islamists and the Jihadist movements to create a large pool of jihad-indoctrinated people. It is as if Islambad has conceded to the establishment of an Emirate in Swat. The Jihadists are unstoppable. Once they have Sharia control over a province, they will use it to spread their version of Jihad and thus levy a much larger body of youth to be recruited by the Taliban and other groups, such as Lashkar e Taiba. From there on, other provinces in the frontiers areas will follow. But beyond this, expect other districts in the far east, in the centre and the south (of Pakistan) to be impacted. If a movement is contracted to apply Sharia in one part of the country, it will spread till it eventually brings down the (Pakistan) government.

Vembu: Is there a risk from a “creeping Talibanisation” or the spread of the jihadi culture and the retreat of secular politics in Pakistan? How can this be reversed?

Phares: The Malacand agreement is the first step in the so-called “creeping Talibanisation” of Pakistan. President Musharraf himself warned of this “Talibanisation”: he knows what was happening on the ground and inside his own military and intelligence. President Zardari, I assume, knows all too well that this Talibanisation is under way. It all depends on whether he has a plan to counter it. The only way to reverse it is to have secular and democratic forces in Pakistan unleash an awareness campaign to expose the radical ideologies. It is going to boil down to the efforts deployed by Pakistan’s civil society which is opposed to the Talibanisation. It is a war of ideas. The reversal can’t be done only by counter-terrorism operations or political negotiations but by a democratic revolution waged by the forces of democracy inside Pakistan. It is going to be hard and long.

Vembu: The Pakistani government recently released from house arrest Dr A.Q. Khan, a confirmed nuclear proliferator. What message is being conveyed here, and why did not the US administration respond forcefully?

Phares: I would not want to speculate as I am not privy to the circumstances of the release. But my assumptions are as follow. First, there must have been some negotiations between the government and Dr A.Q. Khan about his future activities and a deal may have been reached. Second, whatever knowledge he had spread in the past in terms of nuclear secrets is not possessed by the circles who control these kinds of weapons inside Pakistan and North Korea, and even those who are rushing to build the Iranian bomb. Dramatically put, his knowledge is now bypassed by others. That may be the reason behind the US silence on the issue.

Vembu: Any discussion of the war on terror in Pakistan appears to focus only on the terror camps on the Afghan/Pakistan border areas. The terrorism infrastructure in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, from where much of the terrorism targeted at India is planned and implemented, is never addressed. Is this a ‘blind zone’ for successive US administrations?

Phares: The US government has already designated a number of violent organisations operating on the eastern border of Pakistan as terrorist. In 2002 a Lashkar e Taiba cell that was dismantled in Virginia was tried in court for training to attack targets in India. Its members are serving sentences in the US. The same can be said about Jaish e Muhammed and others. These Jihadi terror organisations have been designated as terrorists and are monitored under international auspices. But when it comes to pressing the Pakistani Government to go after them as well, Washington’s priority is to help Islamabad in countering those operating on the western border first, not because of designation but because they can affect the whole situation in Afghanistan and turn it into a nasty one, leading to the fall of the Karzai government. Knowing that the Pakistani government can barely deal with one front at a time, priority is given to Taliban/al Qaeda first. Besides, India can defend itself with its own forces if attacked by terrorists. But Afghanistan is still weak and needs to be solidified first. In the long run, however, the US administration cannot consider these Jihadi forces as a “blind zone” because eventually these “zones” will be used against all countries involved, beginning with India and Afghanistan, the United States and eventually Pakistan itself.

Vembu: Pakistan has reluctantly acknowledged that the Mumbai terrorist attack was planned and executed from Pakistan. But there are lingering apprehensions about its earnestness in cracking down on the terrorism infrastructure within Pakistan. How should India respond?

Phares: First, I noticed that the architects of the Mumbai operations left all indicators on purpose to show that the road led to Pakistan. They could have mobilised Jihadists inside India to do it and they are available. The war room decided to use Pakistanis coming from the sea instead of Indian Jihadists coming from inland. This means that they wanted a clash to take place between India and Pakistan so that (Jihadists) can grab more power inside Pakistan. There is evidence to indicate that the terrorists had some sort of support in Pakistan from organisations, but also from people in the intelligence and defence apparatus. This brings us back to the realisation that Jihadi penetration exists in Pakistan. Hence, to be objective about it, perhaps one of the reasons the Pakistani Government didn’t unleash a massive crackdown on these circles (as India may have wished) is precisely the internal problem in Pakistan. If the infiltration was benign, I would have expected the Pakistan government to strike hard against the perpetrators’ backers. But because of this situation, one has to expect that the authorities won’t go full fledge in their measures. The bottomline is to understand the ability of the Pakistani Government to fight the Jihadists inside their country, particularly in light of a historic tension with India over Kashmir.

As for India, it can and should escalate its own campaign against Jihadi terrorists inside its own borders and internationally. After Mumbai, the international community is standing in solidarity with the Indian people. This is an opportunity for India to reach out to all anti-Jihadi forces in the world and form a coalition against the terrorists. A few will argue that this is a local feud over Kashmir, but most others will extend their hand to India in this particular fight. So, the best way ahead is for New Delhi to build a vast coalition worldwide: it will need it later when a bigger confrontation with Jihadists inevitably occurs. Regarding Pakistan, my advice to India is to be patient regarding the internal situation in Pakistan. It is more important for India to get a world consensus against terrorists, including from the US, the West, Russia and India, and many moderates in the Arab world, than to expect higher results from counter-terrorism operations inside Pakistan. For now, India should allow and encourage the counter-Jihadi movement in Pakistan to grow.

Vembu: General elections in India are due soon. In the event of the right-wing BJP coming to power – either by itself or as the head of a coalition – it will likely take a more forceful approach against Pakistan, perhaps even launch pre-emptive strikes against camps in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. What are the implications of such an approach for the broader war on terror? Will they advance or undermine the Obama administration’s approach in Afghanistan/Pakistan?

Phares: To be candid about it, if India strikes inside Pakistan in retaliation against terror acts launched by Jihadists coming from across the borders, it will lead to a takeover by the Jihadists inside Pakistan and the country will be seized by Taliban forces with access to nuclear weapons. If the attacks are launched by the Pakistan government, no one can tell India what to do. But as long as the Jihadists aim is to drag the two countries into confrontation, the international community and India must not grant them that wish and engage in military activities on the terms of the Jihadi terrorists. Surely, India can and will evaluate its own national security situation but there are strategic matters to consider. The Jihadi war room in the region wants to strike India so that it will strike back at Pakistan at the timing of the Jihadists. If that happens, the Pakistan military, probably incited by radical elements, will remove its forces from the Waziristan areas and the border with Afghanistan and move them to the border with India. Besides, the moderates inside Pakistan will be isolated. Thus this will unleash the Taliban and free them to operate against the US and NATO in Afghanistan. The Jihadi strategy is clear. India – under any government - can and should act smartly by mobilising against Jihadists first inside its own borders. This will be the best answer to the war room and will create divisions among Jihadists. Second, India has great possibilities to wage a war of ideas with broadcasts and on the Internet in languages that the West has little skills in. Last but not the least, India should convene an international conference against the spread of the Jihadi ideology, inviting Muslim moderates, the US, Russia and the rest of the international community. This is a strategic response to the attacks in Mumbai. Keeping in mind that India will always have the military option open – but only after a strong international coalition is up and running.

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Print short version of the interview http://fdd.typepad.com/files/09-feb-pakwar-dna.pdf

Article by Indian journalist Venkatesan Vembu here http://www.dnaindia.com/report.asp?newsid=1235097

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The Afghan Wilderness: A Tiny Victory

By Andrew Cochran

1LT Aaron Flint is serving on an Afghan Police Mentor Team in Paktya Province, Afghanistan. He's a former staffer in the U.S. Senate, a member of the Montana Army National Guard, and most recently worked as a reporter for KTVQ, the CBS affiliate in Billings, Montana. He sent the following account of our work with the Afghan people with permission to post it here.
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As Doc Sleaford lightly cuts the old bandages off her badly burned skin, Sergeant Dylan McGee holds up her tiny legs, blood dripping into his right hand. In a room next door, soldiers e-mailing their family and friends from the tiny makeshift computer lab are interrupted by the heart wrenching cries of a 9 month old baby girl. To the soldiers she is baby Farida.

Illinois National Guard Sergeant Ben Sleaford first met Farida’s family more than 3 weeks earlier. A group of soldiers from the 101st Airborne Division had gone to the remote, mountainous area to conduct a presence patrol and, if possible, search some caves oftentimes used as refuge by foreign fighters. Meanwhile, a group of Afghan National Police and I stopped by some homes in the area to talk with the locals. One villager offered us the customary chai. His house literally sat on top of hill, with views stretching hundreds of miles. As we drank chai on top of his home, in what literally felt like the roof of the world, a Chinook helicopter passed by closely over head. Meanwhile, “Doc” Sleaford was attracting a crowd back at the vehicles. That’s when Farida’s grandfather approached Doc Sleaford and informed him that his granddaughter had been very badly burned. Doc Sleaford told him to bring her to Combat Outpost (COP) Wilderness so he could work on her in a sterile environment as soon as possible.

Over three weeks later, Farida was finally brought back to see Doc Sleaford. Sleaford and Specialist Powell, the C Troop 1-61 CAV (101st Airborne Division) medic, began inspecting what appeared to be third degree burns covering over 30 percent of Farida’s body. As the medics tore off the old poorly treated bandages, Farida’s uncle shook a SpongeBob Squarepants doll to try and distract her from the pain. Army medics are trained to deal with tough situations, but you could tell by the look in Doc Sleaford’s eyes that this was different. While Doc continued his work, I took the pictures of Farida’s condition up to the tactical operations center to begin e-mailing and making phone calls to see if we could get Farida in to the World Health Organization hospital in Gardez. As Doc put it, it was a miracle she was still alive and didn’t die from infection. As I showed the pictures and the video of Farida’s cries to Charlie Troop’s First Sergeant Marlin Heater, all options appeared to be off dwindling. That’s when 1SG Heater (featured in the 19OCT08 60 Minutes piece on COP Wilderness) said, “I don’t care who I have to call; we need to get that girl help. Even if it means e-mailing them that video clip.” Immediately, 1SG Heater picked up a military laundry bag and began loading it full of supplies: snacks, baby wipes, whatever the family may need for a trip. Soldiers from all over the outpost began donating cash for the family. Within an hour, Farida, her uncle, and a laundry bag full of supplies were loaded onto a Blackhawk helicopter piloted by members of the Wyoming National Guard and flown to the FOB Salerno hospital.

Left picture: Baby Farida looks to SpongeBob for comfort as her uncle holds her following the initial operation. Right picture: Wahdi side chai with the police chief, the Afghan Army Kandak commander, the village malek (leader), and the village Imam (religious leader) during a humanitarian assistance mission.

Periodically we would get reports on Farida’s condition from one of the other Charlie Troop medics whose wife worked as a nurse at the FOB Salerno hospital in Khost; but back at COP Wilderness it was back to life as usual. Back to attending shuras, or meetings with village elders. Back to making trips to the District Centers to meet with our Afghan police or the Subgovernor for that area. And back to making more trips to remote mountain villages. That is, of course, unless we didn’t get snowed in on COP Wilderness. Then- it was an all out snowball fight. At times, the Afghan soldiers would team up with the 101st Airborne soldiers and lob in our direction. Other times, we would team up with the local national workers and ambush the soldiers driving the gator through the main road in our outpost.

At times, I feel as though I spend a majority of my day talking to Afghans rather than Americans. Over a game of Karambull (not sure on the spelling) with the interpreters, the Afghan born American interpreter Tammim tells me of how he used to play the game when he was a kid in Afghanistan. That was before the Soviets invaded of course. Tammim, an American, but also an Afghan, offers a rare insight into the day to day discussions and events taking place in our area of operations. While he spins the disc of the shuffleboard style Karambull game, he tells me how the Soviets needed a hundred tanks if they wanted to cross the nearby Khost-Gardez (KG) Pass road without getting demolished. All along the road lies evidence of the Soviet tactics of simply bombing Afghan homes and villages. Nowhere is it clearer than the KG Pass road, how different the American approach has been compared to the Soviet approach. Those same roads now feature District Centers and clinics built by the US Agency for International Development, schools and bridges built by the American Provincial Reconstruction Team. The economic progress will slowly but surely advance into the most rural, remote portions of Afghanistan. But even with some limited progress evident on the main route, Tammim worries for the future of the Afghan people. “These people want to know that the Americans are going to stay and fulfill their commitment,” Tammim said. “That we’re (the Americans) not just going to pack our bags and leave like we did after the Soviets left. Until then, we will not have the security.”

Fundamental to that security is the training of the Afghan National Police (ANP). Most of it for us is on the job training featuring combat patrols, traffic control points, base defense, presence patrols, and any other joint missions. For some of it, we bring the police to us. One day in early February, as the snow fell on COP Wilderness, two other Joes and I donned our “manjam’s”, or traditional Afghan clothes, that we purchased at an Afghan bazaar. Myself, Sergeant McGee, and Specialist Dominic Winslow (whose mom makes an excellent batch of chocolate “Bourbon Balls”) dressed up like Afghans and served as the OPFOR for urban operations training with the ANP. The Afghans really appreciated the fact that we were wearing Afghan style clothes. McGee and Winslow wore the Pakol, while I put on the turban given to me by one of my interpreters who purchased it in Jalalabad. A couple ANA soldiers stopped in to watch. One of the ANA lieutenants had taught me a Muslim prayer. With my turban on- they laugh, give me the thumbs up, and call me “Mullah Haroon.”

Soon enough, it was back on the road to Forward Operating Base (FOB) Salerno for a supply run. Salerno is a large FOB in the city of Khost. The drive takes us down a steep, narrow roadway crowded with supply trucks headed over the KG Pass. Along the way, we are shocked to see how much progress is being made on the road, as the American Lyndon Berger Group (LBG) works to pave the entire stretch from Khost to Gardez. When we finally make it to Khost, we find a low-lying, decent sized city bordering Pakistan that serves as a fruit basket for much of eastern Afghanistan.

As we make it into FOB Salerno, the soldiers enjoy the massive gym, the volleyball courts, coffee shop and bazaar. But for Doc Sleaford and Sergeant McGee, it was a chance to check in on baby Farida. When they found out we were from Wilderness, we were instantly greeted like family by the hospital staff and even the full bird Colonel. The Air Force surgeon who conducted the skin grafts and debribement operation informed us that Farida remarkably won’t lose her legs or even her toes. She said it was obvious that Farida received good care before making her way to Salerno. The hospital ward’s NCO-IC informed us that the whole FOB had adopted Farida and her family while she underwent surgery. The FOB Salerno chapel took a donation, collecting $400 for the family. Word of the good news spread among the local Afghans working on the FOB who stopped by and asked if they could see her. While conducting a follow-on humanitarian assistance mission in Farida’s home village area, I showed pictures of her to all the tribal leaders. They told me, In the Name of the Holy and Merciful Creator, the news of our good work is spreading throughout all the villages.

After holding Farida for the first time since she was flown to Salerno, Doc Sleaford said if this is the only thing he does while deployed here, he can feel like he accomplished something. For those of us fighting in a war where victory is never certain; where the bureaucratic red tape can be mind numbing. At least in baby Farida our team can find one tiny victory. A victory seen through the big brown eyes of a now healthy baby girl.

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Indonesia Update

By Kenneth Conboy

In a South Jakarta courtroom this week, a Singaporean terror suspect admitted that he was part of a plot to hijack an Aeroflot aircraft from Bangkok and crash it into Singapore’s Changi International Airport.

Mohammad Hasan bin Sayanudin, alias Fajar Taslim, was testifying against two other terrorist suspects. All three are charged with killing a Christian high school teacher in South Sumatra province during 2007. They are also charged with plotting to kill two Catholic priests in 2005 and to carry out a bombing of a café in West Sumatra.

According to Sayanudin, those who were part of the Changi plot were in Bangkok when the plan was exposed in the media. He then fled Thailand and escaped to Indonesia in 2001. He moved around Indonesia before settling in Palembang during 2004. He was arrested along with nine others in mid-2008.

In other news, the Indonesian media reported on 6 March that two Indonesian officials went to Washington in early February and met with representatives of the U.S. State Department and Federal Bureau of Investigation. During these meetings, they requested that the U.S. government continue to detain Indonesian-born terror suspect Hambali after the U.S. closes the Guantanamo Bay detention facility. According to media reports, this is because the officials fear that Hambali will be treated as a celebrity by Indonesian religious hard-liners and could “re-energize his old movement.”

Omar al-Bashir: Darfur and So Much More

By Douglas Farah

Beyond the genocide and mass murder that Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir has presided over in his 20 years in office, it is important to remember what al-Bashir is: a radical Islamist imposing the type of sharia law and carrying out policies that most Islamists approve of.

While the International Criminal Court has issued an arrest warrant for al-Bashir for Darfur (and most of the Muslim world has rallied to his defense, as they have remained silent and unmoved by the genocides his regime has perpetrated), that genocide was only one in a long series of actions taken in the name of Islam that have caused us all great harm.

In a case I testified in (now under appeal by the government of Sudan), the court in the Eastern District of Virginia accepted that Sudan “provided material support in the form of funding, direction, training and cover to Al-Qaeda, a worldwide terrorist organization whose operatives facilitated the planning and execution of the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole” in October 2000, while in the port of Aden, Yemen.

When he seized power in 1989 he did so as a self-proclaimed Islamist, in the company of Hassan al-Turabi," who is not only an extremely influential intellectual of the Muslim Brotherhood, but one of Osama bin Laden's earliest and most ardent backers.

The regime of al-Bashir is not an "ordinary" criminal regime, such as that of Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe or Charles Taylor in Liberia. Rather, it is a theologically-motivated regime that provided some of the important theological and financial support for radical Islamist movements around the world. My full blog is here.

Hamas Arms Smuggling: Egypt's Challenge

By Matthew Levitt

This week, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton traveled to Egypt to attend an international conference on the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip. While the rehabilitation of Gaza is high on the international community's agenda, the implementation of any rebuilding project may be premature. Indeed, given Hamas's ongoing weapons smuggling into Gaza, Israel's mid-January unilateral ceasefire may be short-lived. Although the United States and Israel reached an agreement on January 16 to counter the smuggling, Egypt and Israel have yet to forge a similar understanding. The persistence of Hamas's arms smuggling almost ensures an eventual resumption of hostilities in Gaza.

As I wrote in an article co-authored with my colleague Yoram Cohen, It is imperative that Egypt recognize that arms smuggling is not just an Israeli issue but an Egyptian national security priority. The head of the Egyptian parliament's foreign relations committee said on December 3, 2008, that it would not allow an Islamic state on its northern border. If arms smuggling continues, however, such an outcome will become more likely. As such, Egypt needs to adopt a sustained and effective approach to its activities countering the movement of weapons from Sudan to the Sinai Peninsula, as well as the tunnels themselves. First, Egypt should close these tunnels for good rather than temporarily securing them. At the same time, Egyptian security forces should arrest smugglers, target their networks, and impose stricter penalties for these illegal activities. Finally, Egypt should better publicize these efforts in order to create a deterrent effect.

The full article is available here.

Congress to Examine Counterthreat Finance Successes & Plans

By Andrew Cochran

The U.S. House Armed Services Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, chaired by Rep. Adam Smith of Washington, will hold a hearing on March 11 titled, "Tracking and Disrupting Terrorist Financial Networks: A Potential Model for Inter-agency Success?" The focus of the hearing is the Defense Department memorandum signed on December 2 establishing Defense Department counterthreat finance policy and the organizational structure inside DoD for the issue. As I wrote on December 5, the memorandum "permanently institutionalizes the 'threat finance cell' concept which has been the subject of joint operations between the Treasury and Defense Departments for over three years, and that I have written about for over a year here (see previous posts and my remarks on the subject to a money laundering enforcement conference on October 21). Never before has U.S. defense policy officially recognized the need to 'follow the money' and the benefits of working in tandem with the Treasury Department and other relevant civilian agencies."

Next week's hearing will be the most important public Congressional ever on the issue and will give DoD and the Treasury Department a chance to discuss some of the successes in Iraq, to the extent they can do so in an unclassified setting, and the challenges in exporting the concept elsewhere. Hopefully, this initiative will finally receive the accolades and full measure of support that it deserves.

Kashmir Peace: Another Mumbai Casualty?

By Aaron Mannes

"It is too early to say."
Zhou Enlai's response when asked for his assessment of the 1789 French Revolution

In the last week’s issue of the New Yorker Steve Coll reported that in 2007 India and Pakistan where, through diplomatic back-channels, engaged in talks “so advanced that we’d come to semi-colons” on a deal over Kashmir. Unfortunately, Musharraf lost his political credibility and had to resign from the Pakistani Presidency before the deal could be completed. The new civilian and military leaders are, by most accounts, inclined towards continuing the process. But in the wake of the Mumbai attacks, it is difficult to see how this process can be re-started.

Pakistani-Indian rapprochement could be a tremendous aid to the Pakistani leadership in their efforts to stabilize their deteriorating country. If the Mumbai attacks have made that impossible, then the Mumbai terror attacks may prove to be one of the most consequential terrorist attacks in history.

Pakistan in Free Fall
Yesterday’s attack on the visiting Sri Lankan cricket team, while a tactical failure relative to its ambition of copying the Mumbai assault (the cricket players survived and were not taken hostage and overall casualties were limited), was another blow to Pakistan’s domestic and international prestige.

Read the full post here.

Saudi Arabia facing homegrown terrorism

By Olivier Guitta

I wrote an article last week for the DC Examiner on Saudi Arabia's backlash regarding terrorism.
You can read the full article here.
Here is an excerpt:

Saudi Arabia recently released a list of 85 of its most-wanted terrorists. Eighty-three of the individuals are Saudi nationals, the other two are Yemenis. These individuals are suspected of wanting to revive Al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia, attack oil facilities inside the kingdom and overthrow the monarchy.
Because of the pedigree of the suspects, the Saudi regime is taking this threat very seriously. Of the 85, 14 were previously detained at Guantanamo Bay and have undergone the Saudi rehabilitation program for jihadists.
This program that was trumpeted by Saudi authorities as extremely successful is obviously now showing its limits. Indeed rehabilitating hard-core jihadists is a huge challenge, especially when these individuals have been brainwashed since youth.
The Saudi regime has at this point a lot of introspection to do since its education system is at fault along with the hyper-present extremist and intolerant Wahhabism. It is no coincidence that among foreign jihadists in Iraq fighting coalition troops, the Saudis were the largest group.
Most of these jihadists were between 18 and 25 and upon their deaths, preachers would visit their families in Saudi Arabia to underline the virtues of jihad and to confirm their son's martyrdom and his place in paradise.
The role of the Saudi education system in radicalizing its youth is not a secret. Two weeks ago, the Saudi Al Watan published a column entitled: "Who is behind the deviants?"
"Deviant" is the word used in Saudi Arabia to describe terrorists. In this column, the author clearly placed the blame on the education system that teaches youngsters to memorize the Koran but not to learn much in other disciplines.
He also noted that radical preachers have the upper hand throughout the kingdom and pollute the minds of the youth with extremist ideas.

Islamists advancing their agenda through Sharia

By Olivier Guitta

I just wrote an article for the Middle East Times on the expansion of sharia around the world.

You can read the full article here.

Here is an excerpt:
Pakistan recently gave in to the pressure of Islamist militants. Indeed to buy off peace, Pakistani authorities allowed the imposition of Sharia (Islamic law) in the Swat valley.

How long the cease-fire will last is anyone's guess. But in any case, Pakistan has allowed a precedent that could extend to other provinces; in fact the Swat valley is only about 100 miles away from Islamabad, the capital. But Sharia is not just making inroads in Pakistan but actually creeping in the West and in particular in Europe.

One area particularly touched by this phenomenon is the judicial system in Europe. Two recent cases in Italy and France are particularly troublesome. First, in Italy, three members of a Brescia-based Maghrebi family (father, mother and eldest son) were accused of beating up and sequestering their daughter/sister Fatima because she wanted to live a "Western" life.

In the first trial, the three were sentenced for sequestration and bad treatment. The court acknowledged that the teenager was "brutally beaten up" for having "dated" a non-Muslim and in general for "living a life not conforming with the culture" of her family. But on appeal, the family was acquitted because the court deemed that the young woman was beaten up for "her own good." The Bologna public prosecutor's office then disputed the acquittal of the three accused parties, but the Italian Supreme Court of Cassation dismissed it and ruled in favor of the charged parties.

Interestingly two Italian political leaders on the opposite side of the political spectrum, Isabella Bertolini, vice president of the MPs of the right-wing party Forza Italia, and Barbara Pollastrini, a post-communist former minister agreed to condemn the Supreme Court decision: "This verdict writes one of the darkest pages of history of the law in our country."

Isabella Bertolini was upset that the court "allied itself with radical Islam" and Barbara Pollastrini is pushing for parliament to pass as soon as possible a law condemning violence against women: "Now more than ever, it is urgent to defend the rights of a large number of immigrant women victims of an intolerable patriarchal culture."

New NEFA Chart: "Prominent Jihad Media Organizations in Central Asia"

By Evan Kohlmann

The NEFA Foundation has released a new roster I have created charting the eight most prominent jihad media organizations active in Central Asia--namely, Al-Qaida's "As-Sahab Media Foundation", "Labayk Media Productions", "Ummat Studios", the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan's "Jundullah Media", the Islamic Jihad Union's "Badr at-Tawheed Media", the Turkestan Islamic Party's "Islam Awazi Information Center", "Manba al-Jihad Media", and the official media wing of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (the Taliban). Taken together, these various underground organizations are responsible for producing the vast majority of mujahideen propaganda videos that have originated from Pakistan, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, and western China over the past five years.

The chart can be viewed on the NEFA Foundation website.

Indian Mujahideen: Home-Grown Jihadi Threat

By Animesh Roul

Originally published as "India’s Home-Grown Jihadi Threat: A Profile of the Indian Mujahideen," Terrorism Monitor, Volume: 7 Issue: 4, March 03, 2009.

I just published one in-depth article on the growing threat of one indigenous Islamic terror outfit and threat emanating from it. Here is an excerpt:

The Indian Mujahedeen (IM) has emerged as a well-organized jihadi terrorist group in India, claiming responsibility for a number of terror attacks perpetrated in various urban centers of India during 2007-2008. Even though the exact moment of IM's formation is not known, the recent arrest of a number of IM operatives has revealed its possible existence and involvement in terror strikes in India as far back as late October 2005. The name "Indian Mujahideen" was reportedly conceived at a terrorist conclave attended by top leaders of the Lashkar-e-Taiba and Harkat-ul-Jehadi Islami in Pakistani-administered Kashmir in early May 2008. The well-concealed rise of the Indian Mujahedeen as a home grown jihadi organization is not a good omen for India's security.
...The Indian Mujahideen has been trying to garner support from India's teeming Muslim population, often by raising indigenous issues in its manifestos. Since the Uttar Pradesh Court attacks, IM, as a home-grown jihadi outfit, has claimed responsibility for at least four major terror strikes in 2008 that targeted civilians. Each attack came with prior emails to media citing a list of anti-Muslim atrocities in the country. The group justifies the violence by tagging the terror campaign as the “rise of Jihad” and the “revenge of Gujarat.”

...Though many details of IM’s organization remain unclear, some facets of the mystery were unraveled during the interrogations of arrested cadres, documented in the 1,809- page charge sheet filed by the Mumbai Crime Branch. 21 IM members have been charged for conspiracy, damaging a place of worship with intent to insult a particular religion, collecting arms for waging war, and waging war against the country. Most of the accused are from Azamgarh in Uttar Pradesh and are well-qualified professionals (The Hindu, February 18). Among the 21 suspects is Muhammed Saif, who was involved in the September 13, 2008, New Delhi serial blasts and was later captured during the controversial October 19, 2008, Batla House raids, in which two suspects were killed.

By Animesh Roul

Dozens armed terrorists with bullet proof vests, possibly Islamists, attacked the touring Sri Lankan cricket team with rockets, grenades and assault rifles on Tuesday morning as they were on their way to the venue of a Cricket Match in Lahore, Pakistan. The attack reportedly killed at least five security personnel and injured six Lankan cricketers. The players received shrapnel and bullet injuries.

Among the injured players, Kumar Sangakkara, Ajantha Mendis, Thilan Samaraweera and Tharanga Paranavithana have suffered minor injuries in the attack,as per the media report.

Pakistan's Security personnel so far arrested four suspects from model town area of the city.

It’s for the first time Cricket players, who enjoyed the status of Demi- God in the in the entire subcontinent and the game itself considered ‘religion’, faced terrorist wrath. Even though, Pakistan has been plagued by Islamic terror, never before Islamic terrorists have attacked cricketers.

The big question of the time is: why Sri Lankan players faced the music? It is rather intriguing for many as Sri Lanka is no way a western country or ally of USA or UK in the ongoing war on terror.

I presume two things at this juncture when nothing is clear on the ground. I strongly believe that Cricket is not ‘Unislamic’ as this popular sport has nothing to do with any religion. But it could be a reason for Pro-Taliban and Qaeda elements to claim or reinterpret that this is against Islamic tenets, as it is covered by television channels and for the glamour and vulgarity attached to the game.

Again, if one could stretch his/her imagination bit far, it looks like case of terror outsourcing. It is not unthinkable to believe that the Tamil rebels have outsourced the task to Islamic terrorists in Pakistan. Facing severe setbacks at home, Tamil rebels might have planned their last of the remaining arsenals: Guerrilla tactics at home and at the same time, targeting high profile Lankan personalities (Sinhalese or Pro- Government elements) abroad.

However, while the question remains about the true nature of Tuesday’s attack, it vindicates the view that Pakistan is fast sliding into medieval era with absence of rule of law (with Shariat and tribal rule in place in some areas and more coming ahead). The latest event is continuation of the ongoing chaos and violence that have been order of the day in Pakistan. Today’s attack clearly spells the end of Pakistan’s international cricketing position and raises serious concerns about the country’s internal security and security for foreign nationals in Pakistan.

The Credit Crunch, Organized Crime and Terrorism

By Douglas Farah

One of the most interesting side effects of the current credit and banking crisis, as noted in this weekend piece in the Washington Post is the growing influence of those who do have money to lend-organized criminal groups that have billions of dollars they need to keep moving through the money laundering cycles.

There is strong anecdotal evidence that cartels from South America to Southeast Asia and Europe (and likely the United States, but I have not seen anything to reflect that) are stepping in to credit breach, building relations with businessmen desperate to stay in business, who would not normally look to the "informal" economy for a loan.

This will serve to extend the tentacles of these groups even further into the legal society and financial structure. As the article notes, "Stronger organized crime means a weaker state."

The state is already hard pressed to confront organized crime, and the reasons are not hard to find. One side has resources, the other does not.

The story says a new report estimated that organized crime syndicates in Italy - including Naples's Camorra, Sicily's Cosa Nostra, Calabria's 'Ndrangheta - collect about 250 million euros, or $315 million, from retailers every day. That is about a billion dollars every three days, or about $122 billion a year siphoned out of a single economy. Is it any wonder Italy is a constant economic wreck? My full blog is here.

Iraq Withdrawal Can Only Work With Pressure On Iran and Syria

By Walid Phares

Now that President Obama and his aides have announced their plan for U.S. withdrawal from Iraq by August 31, 2010, they must consider what the forces engaged against the Coalition and Iraqi Government plan to do in this time. For the Iranian and Syrian regimes, as well as al Qaeda and other Jihadist groups, can affect the U.S. withdrawal plan.

Per senior U.S. officials, the Iraq war will unilaterally come to an end on August 31, 2010 unless dramatic developments force another strategy. As President Bush declared “mission accomplished” after the removal of Saddam in 2003, President Obama has now declared the end of “all counter-insurgency missions,” by 2010. After that date, from the 142,000 Marines and Army personnel, some 35,000 to 50,000 troops will remain and would be ready to deploy in counter-terrorism missions. Under the “Status of Forces Agreement” with the Iraqi government, all American forces must be removed by December 31, 2011.

After August of next year the mission of U.S. (and possibly some coalition) forces will be to:

1) Train, equip and advise Iraqi security forces.

2) Support civilian operations in Iraq aimed at reconstruction, redevelopment and political reconciliation.

3) Conduct targeted counter-terrorism missions.

At first sight, the plan seems sound and answers a main requirement of U.S. strategy: Maintaining political gains made by the Iraqi political process and pursuing the fight against al Qaeda and other terror groups.

But the public and legislators should realize that for the next stage to be successful, Iraq must be able to withstand any future pressures by the “enemy.”

Map of withdrawal.jpg

If the terrorist forces operating against the Coalition and the Iraqi Government are to vanish as soon as the U.S. pulls out, the withdrawal plan (any version of it) will be smooth and successful. It would be merely a question of logistical management.

But any strategist must ask: what if the other side won’t cooperate? What if al Qaeda and its Salafist ilk, as well as the Pasdaran, the Quds force, Hezbollah, and the intelligence services of Tehran and Damascus decide otherwise? What if they will continue the operations from now till August 2010, and after that date, endlessly?

A logical U.S. response would be to focus on enabling Iraqis to fight the counter insurgency war against the “foes” and grow their capacity until withdrawal D-Day 18 months from now. By the magical date of August 31, 2010, Iraq’s own forces should be able to control their county. The role of the U.S. expeditionary force should be to wage counter terrorism missions in support of the Iraqi armed forces if the insurgency will continue pass that date.

It is very hard to predict what all of our “foes” in Iraq will do. The easiest guess is about al Qaeda and the other Jihadists. All their literature and statements, as well as actions on the ground, show that these forces will continue their attacks regardless of both American and Iraqi planning. The Salafi combat groups, despite their containment by the Sahwa campaign and by counter insurgency activities, have the Sunni Triangle in sight for as long as the “will of Allah” prevails. Hence their aggression against Iraq’s population and institutions is expected to last as long as their ideology and ideologues would also last.

Just as important to the Jihadists are their strategic lines into Iraq. The Jihadists are crossing the Syrian borders constantly and they are backed by ideological and financial circles inside Iraq’s southern neighbor, Saudi Arabia. Thus the success of the Obama plan will hinge on the capacity of his Administration to stop the flow of Jihadism from Syria and Saudi Arabia.

A more complex prediction is about Iran’s plan for a post U.S. withdrawal. Many in Washington today are excited to report that realism will prevail in Tehran as soon as the Obama Administration will “sit” with the Mullahs’ regime and “talk” — some even say “listen.” In short, somehow the group coined recently as the “Iran Lobby in the U.S.” is arguing that withdrawal plans will get no opposition from Iran. Everything will go smoothly and Iraq will be able to control its eastern border, pro-Iranian groups notwithstanding.

I believe otherwise. Iran’s leadership will sit down, talk, and sometimes listen — but it will at the same time continue its actions on the ground until it fulfills its own “mission.” What is that mission? To penetrate, influence and seize 60% of Iraq from Baghdad to Basra as U.S. forces are withdrawing and certainly after the pull out. They will use all the power elements at their disposal: special groups, the Mahdi Army, assassinations, infiltration in Government, etc. Ironically, the pro-Iranian action against U.S. presence will intensify further after August 2010 to hasten the final withdrawal of counter insurgency forces left behind. So in a sense the success of the Obama plan will hinge on the American ability to deter Iran — and its ally Syria — from surging against Iraq’s Democracy while the U.S. is organizing its departure.

Is the 2010 plan doomed? Not at all: It is actually a challenging one and could be successful but is conditioned by the greater context. Withdrawing the bulk of U.S. forces from Iraq after five years of deployment is long overdue, especially if the troops will be used on other fronts. Vice President Biden recently said the Iranians may be surprised where many of these forces would be used. The Obama plan can work if his Administration will move quickly to deter both Tehran and Damascus from filling the void in Iraq. This is the secret equation hovering over all three plans the President has to choose from. If asked, I would advise the shortest stay for the bulk of U.S. forces in Iraq so that they can be engaged in other spots, not only in Afghanistan.

The worst course of action would be to diminish the force in Iraq while encouraging Iran and Syria — directly or indirectly — to “assume responsibilities” on Iraqi land. This would be known by historians as suicide. In the end, all is in the hands of President Obama. If he has a global plan to restlessly wage campaigns against Jihadi powers and forces around the world while winning a war of ideas, the 2010 plan for Iraq will be a stunning move. But if all efforts of the Administration are to pull out from the confrontation with the Jihadists, following the advice of the failed academia of the past, the announced plan will be no more than the beginning of the retreat. I truly hope the vision in the oval office will meet the harsh realities of today’s world.

***********

Dr Walid Phares is the Director of the Future Terrorism Project the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies and the author of The Confrontation: Winning the War against Future Jihad.

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