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Lashkar-i-Tayyiba Remains Committed to Jihad

By Farhana Ali

Soon after the Mumbai blasts in India, Pakistan took swept action to detain suspected Lashkar-i-Tayyiba operatives involved in the attacks. The arrests are controversial as they exposed a well-known secret--jihadi networks are alive and well in Pakistan. What Pakistan is able or willing to do to mitigate Lashkar and its parent organization, Jama'at-ud-Da'wa, is a more important question that deserves attention. This question is addressed in a new article by myself and a Pakistan-based journalist posted today in the new issue of the Sentinel, released by the West Point Combating Terrorism Center.

While the investigation is ongoing, there are two assumptions that I think can be made: (1) the Lashkar is unlikely to disintegrate or disappear; the organization may gain new recruits in the short-term as a reaction to the government's crackdown; and (2) U.S. security and counter-terrorism officials will probably never gain access to the detainees or other Lashkar members, who along with other jihadi networks are a vital tool for Pakistan's survival, a point made in an article by reporter Josh Meyer of the Los Angeles Times.

Here is a segment from the Sentinel article:

"While LeT/JuD is local and al-Qa`ida a transnational movement, arrests of senior al-Qa`ida commanders in LeT safe houses suggest a link between the two groups, although the details of this relationship remain opaque. Nevertheless, there are similarities between al-Qa`ida and the LeT/JuD. The LeT/JuD appeals to a global audience despite being a local group. Like al-Qa`ida, the LeT/JuD network has an ideological framework that attracts members outside of Pakistan; it is not uncommon to find members from Central Asia and the Arab world with LeT, or to find Lashkar’s participation in activities outside of Pakistan. In addition, the LeT/JuD benefits from a support network outside of Pakistan that includes Saudi Arabia, a country with whom JuD leader Hafiz Saeed developed relations in 1985 when he studied in the kingdom, and subsequently received support from during and after the Afghan jihad. Many of the similarities end there, however. The LeT/JuD remains a local organization with local ties to Pakistani militant groups. Despite its shared strategic vision with al-Qa`ida, Lashkar is focused on attacks against Indian and Western targets inside the subcontinent....

The Deccan Mujahidin, the group which claimed responsibility for the Mumbai attacks, is likely a pseudonym for Lashkar. The attacks in Mumbai showed a level of sophistication that reflects the group’s coming-of-age. The LeT/JuD’s legitimate activities in the name of charity, education, and public service (all under the guise of religious ideological doctrine) provide the organization a cover for its extreme excesses. With a veneer of secrecy, Lashkar can operate under the radar and not raise suspicion from local authorities. Its camouflaged activities—networks of legitimate mosques, schools, media and publications work—help the organization sustain its presence inside Pakistan and abroad."