Counterterrorism Blog

The oft-repeated question of where Pakistan is heading is often answered with uncertainty about the country's future. In a Congressional briefing on Thursday, March 19th, I presented three key themes, which I have outlined below.

First, Pakistan is a failing democracy. At the very least, Pakistan's democratic experience is fraught with confusion and constant concern about its ability to counter extremists as well as contain its own domestic political crisis. While the restoration of the Chief Justice is a positive sign, Pakistani leaders have yet to resolve their political differences. The current struggle for political power could either lead to a coalition or a tug-of-war with consequences for both the U.S. and Pakistan.

Secondly, Pakistan's strength lies with its people. This is an obvious point that has been highlighted by analysts and military strategists for years. however, who to engage in Pakistan is not easily identifiable.

U.S. strategy towards Pakistan recognizes that while Pakistan is in danger, the opportunities to engage local populations to counter extremist networks is critical. Though I advocate the need to strengthen local Pashtuns, through legitimate NGOs by secular-oriented groups, any U.S. effort to include the locals must not sideline the central government. A proposal submitted to the World Security Network examines at length how money flow for FATA projects can be achieved in a timetable acceptable to the U.S. and Pakistan. The proposal, drafted by former Pakistani Ambassador to the U.S. Riaz Khokhar, is worth a read. Engagement should also include the people of Kashmir, a disputed territory that Pakistan hopes to resolve with U.S. commitment and guidance.

Third, Pakistan needs a multi-faceted and holistic approach to achieve tangible results in the short-term to combat multiple threats. An unpopular policy, from the U.S. perspective, is Islamabad's negotiation with Taliban factions--the once hard-battled Islamists who were enemies of the state. Pashtuns in Peshawar and Pakistani military commanders reveal a war weariness, and are therefore ready to talk to the Taliban to cease hostilities and pave the way towards reconciliation.

While the U.S. has maintained a non-negotiations policy with terrorists, negotiations might lead to a semblance of stability in the region, even while the use of Shariah law is seen as a tool to weaken the state's control of the tribal and settled areas. The use of religious doctrine, itself, is not in question. Many moderate Muslims support the Shariah, but the question of who has the right to interpret and introduce Shariah is wide and without any easy answers. Who within Islamic scholarship is responsible and responsive to the community is an issue to be resolved..

Therefore, religious leaders with little to no training in Islamic jurisprudence have created a climate of fear, at least for outsiders. Contrary to Western perception, the Taliban pose the greatest threat, not to the United States or Britain, but to local, secular, nationalist Pashtuns. In a dinner party in Peshawar, where I was the only woman, I engaged proud Pashtuns. Two local men shared their views:

A scholar at Peshawar University, Dr. Ijaz Khan, remarked, "The problem of Pakistan is in Islamabad and not in the FATA. We live in a non-democratic state where security dominates everything else. With security, the security establishment dominates. A state that resists democratization in Islamabad, Lahore or Karachi [the three main cities] cannot be expected to accept the democratization of FATA.”

A former political agent and senior leader, who remains anonymous for security reasons, said, "Tribal leaders are energetic, liberal and not willing to follow the instructions of religious commanders. I am confident that with some financial aid, we can organize an army (lashkar) in the tribal areas to fight against Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and the Pakistani spy agency that supports them. Spending billions of U.S. dollars on war on terror is not enough. The U.S. regime must think over the strategy of making friends in tribal area with direct financial support to them; this is a policy that I know the Punjabi-dominated military rulers care least about. They don’t care about development projects in the FATA and so it is the Pakistani government that is destroying the existing poor infrastructure of this area. I would ask the U.S. to directly support the tribal elders rather than give money that lands in the pockets of the military or political elites.”

In reality, secular Pashtuns feel exploited by the central government. The hope they once harbored for their nationalist, secular party, the Awami National Party (ANP), is replaced with helplessness.

Given the solemn gravity of Pakistan's problems, I offer three solutions: a) insist on a coalition government to diffuse further political wrangling for power; b) initiate reform at the local level by supporting local leaders, including Americans such as Todd Shea, whose NGO (Comprehensive Disaster Relief Services, now registered as SHINE in the United States) operates in Pakistan-held Kashmir. He provides medical relief to patients at less than $2.00 per person. His story is remarkable and riveting; c) improve America's image in the region with creative use of the media. Touted as "public diplomacy" projects, the use of media to counter radicalization is one way to replace feelings of hate and revenge with messages that include respect for self and society.

In conclusion, the never-ending chain of crises in Pakistan is reason to worry about its future. A U.S. government-sponsored meeting last week on Pakistan stressed the need to reevaluate the policies of the previous administration. The need to reassess U.S. policy in a volatile country is forcing the U.S. to carefully consider the value of strategic communications. How the U.S. will deliver and frame a message that achieves its mission objectives in Pakistan is an ongoing discussion and will likely involve future research.

This is a critical time for Pakistan and the United States. Despite the two countries’ differences, both countries share similar goals—both want to win the war in Afghanistan. Both want a final outcome that guarantees long-term stability in the region. To ensure that U.S. strategic and foreign policy objectives are met, we know we need to stay engaged with Pakistan. We know that the U.S.-Pakistan partnership is a long-term relationship; what we don’t know is which leader we need to engage in the coming weeks and months, and whether Pakistan will stay the democratic course.