Disrupting Tehran's Export of Technology and Weapons

By Matthew Levitt

Earlier this year, Cyprus impounded the Iranian-chartered freighter Monchegorsk, a vessel laden with war materiel bound for Syria (and perhaps beyond). This episode highlights the shortcomings of current UN and European Union sanctions on Iran, and underscores the need for a more systematic approach for dealing with Tehran's efforts to transfer technology and arms to radical allies in the Middle East and elsewhere, even as Washington seeks to engage Iran.

The Monchegorsk case show how even as the Obama administration seeks to engage Tehran, the Islamic Republic has continued to work to undermine U.S. interests and to support anti-American elements around the world, as demonstrated by its ongoing efforts to resupply Hamas, support Hizballah's efforts to destabilize Egypt, and assist Iraqi insurgents. For this reason, the United States needs to better constrain Tehran's ability to arm allies and surrogates hostile to U.S. interests. Doing so would enhance Washington's leverage in possible negotiations with Tehran, contain Iran should such diplomatic efforts fail, and prevent Iran from contributing to the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East and beyond.

The full article is available here.

Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: A Global Intelligence Imperative

By Michael Jacobson

This afternoon, the Washington Institute published a piece by Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, the former DOE intelligence chief and head of the CIA's WMD Department in the Counterterrorism Center. In the article, Mr. Mowatt-Larssen lays out the threat the US still faces from nuclear terrorism, and outlines some steps the US and the international community should take to mitigate this dangerous situation. One particularly important step, in Mr. Mowatt-Larssen's view, would be to establish a full-fledged intelligence office at the IEAE.

Here is an excerpt from the piece:

As Mohamed ElBaradei's term as head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) draws to a close, the organization is struggling to choose a new leader. After deadlocking on an initial vote in March, a new round of nominations closed on April 27, with the next vote scheduled in the coming months. While the IAEA sorts out changes at the top, the United States should try to expand the agency's mandate and responsibilities. One such change would be the establishment of a full-fledged intelligence office, which would dramatically improve the agency's ability to identify and deter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

Post-September 11 Urgency

After the September 11 attacks, the CIA faced the daunting prospect of al-Qaeda seeking a nuclear bomb and collaborating with Pakistani nuclear scientists in an effort to build one. A mood of grim determination gripped the U.S. intelligence establishment, a sentiment highlighted by CIA Director George Tenet when he stated that "We are behind the eight ball" in tracking al-Qaeda's efforts to obtain WMDs.

This threat galvanized an unprecedented response, which stimulated a degree of risk taking, experimentation, and creativity that would have been impossible under normal circumstances. U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies abandoned traditional methods of conducting business and worked together in unprecedented ways to defuse the threat. Government agencies agreed to colocate officers and work together as an integrated team, drawing from a well of capabilities that included everything at the U.S. government's disposal. The United States also shared raw leads and information with dozens of countries in the war on terrorism, most notably with our new Russian partners. Washington went to extreme lengths to ensure information was passed to anyone who might have answers, including Syria, Sudan, and Iran. Conventional rules limiting the sharing of information were suspended in favor of sharing everything with everyone. In all, the CIA passed WMD-related leads and analysis to over two dozen countries. In fact, in the process of averting a WMD-enabled al-Qaeda, the United States and its allies were able to thwart attacks in the formative stages in several countries.

To read the rest of the piece, click here

NEFA Foundation: Exclusive English-Language Video Interview with Taliban Spokesman in Pakistan's Swat Valley

By Evan Kohlmann

The NEFA Foundation has obtained an exclusive English-language interview with Haji Muslim Khan, the spokesman of Tehrik-e-Taliban Swat Valley (Pakistan). During the interview, conducted on April 27, Muslim Khan discussed the Taliban implementation of Shariah law in Swat and neighboring regions. When asked about the notion of "moderate Taliban" versus "hardline Taliban", Khan began laughing and replied, "No, there is no difference... they are the same." Khan also accused U.S. President Barack Obama of ordering a Pakistani military attack on the TTP in Swat, referring to Obama as "an enemy of Islam and Muslims."

Part one of two of the interview is now available on the NEFA Foundation website.

NEFA Foundation: Transcript of Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri on "Six Years Since the Invasion of Iraq"

By Evan Kohlmann

The NEFA Foundation has obtained a transcript of a video statement from Al-Qaida Deputy Commander Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, titled, "Six Years Since the Invasion of Iraq. And, Thirty Years Since the Signing of Peace Treaty with Israel." In the video, al-Zawahiri said, "Obama's victory is an admission from the American people of the failure of Bush and his bandits, and that the people are...[finished] with their stupidity, losses, lies, and hoaxes." However, according to al-Zawahiri, "what Obama is seeking…[in] increasing the military…[presence] in Afghanistan, and the continuation in raiding Pakistan, is pouring oil on the already burning fire, and will have you encounter more losses, casualties, and handicapped."

The transcript can be downloaded from the NEFA Foundation website.

Counternarcotics Offers Chance to Cooperate with Tehran

By Michael Jacobson

Earlier this week, the Washington Institute published an article by Michael Braun, the former DEA Operations Chief and fellow CTB expert, on one area in which increased cooperation with Iran may be possible -- counternarcotics efforts.

Here is an excerpt from the piece:

On March 31, Washington took its first step toward engagement with Tehran through a diplomatic encounter with the Iranian government at the Afghanistan conference in the Hague. Even though the initial contact was awkward, it was clearly a step forward for the Obama administration, and both countries agreed that the opium/heroin trade was a destructive force in both the region and the world. As such, the United States should consider using collaboration on counternarcotics as an effective means to jump-start diplomacy with Iran. Although such an approach would be difficult, it could succeed if both sides focused solely on law enforcement, without the intrusion of politicians, intelligence operatives, and diplomats.

Background

Afghanistan produces roughly 90 percent of the world's opiates -- principally opium and heroin -- and the resulting drug trade fuels the Taliban's war effort. The Taliban is becoming increasingly reliant on this illicit multibillion-dollar industry to fund its operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and there is evidence of growing al-Qaeda involvement.

The UN's 2008 World Drug Report states that more than half of the world's opiate users -- over 9.3 million people -- reside in Asia and are found mostly along the major drug trafficking routes from Afghanistan. More than 2.3 million of the users live in the Middle East and Southwest Asia, many in Afghanistan and Iran.

Estimates for the number of Iranian users vary widely. Iranian government sources report that between 1.2 million and 2 million Iranians are addicted to opiates, while other estimates are generally higher, especially when frequent users are added to the figures. In other words, at least 2.5 percent of the adult population is addicted, and since 90 percent of Iranian users are male, 5 to 8 percent of adult men in Iran are using opiates regularly.

Opiates are the traditional intoxicant of choice in Iran, with opium use well established in tradition, in contrast to the negative social image of alcohol consumption. Opium was a significant problem in Iran before World War II, when it was the drug's leading international producer. In the decades before the revolution, much progress was made in addressing drug addiction, but the problem roared back after 1979.

To read the rest of the piece, click here:

National Security and The Rule of Law in Combating International Terrorism

By Michael Jacobson

This afternoon, the Washington Institute hosted Todd Hinnen, the Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Law & Policy in DOJ's National Security Division, as part of a speaker series we've been hosting with senior US government counterterrorism officials.

Here is an excerpt of Mr. Hinnen's remarks:

As Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Law and Policy, I oversee a small (but growing) team of lawyers whose mission it is to do the 30,000 foot level strategic thinking, policy development, and legal analysis for the Department to support the operational intelligence collectors, investigators, and prosecutors who carry out this important work in cooperation with our partner agencies throughout the law enforcement, homeland security, and intelligence communities.

It will probably not surprise you, then, that I am predisposed to view the development of an appropriate legal framework as essential to effectively combating terrorism for reasons that are both principled and pragmatic.

It is essential on grounds of principle because the law has defined this nation, a nation of laws not of men, since its founding. “Reverence for the laws,” as Abraham Lincoln observed, is the “political religion of the nation.” It would by a Pyrrhic victory if, in our struggle to preserve this country against the threat of international terrorism we sacrificed so central a part of what this country stands for and why it has been a model for the rest of the world.

It is essential on grounds of pragmatism because a lawless response to terrorism—one for instance that includes torture, black site prisons, and indefinite detention without due process—undermines our moral credibility and standing abroad, weakens the coalitions with foreign governments that we need to effectively combat terrorism, and provides terrorist recruiters with some of their most effective recruitment material.

Our success in combating terrorism, then, depends in large part on the development of a comprehensive set of legal authorities that not only thwarts attacks, takes dangerous terrorists off the streets, and brings them to justice, but also strengthens international coalitions, engages the support of Muslim governments and populations around the world, and deprives terrorists of a recruitment narrative.

An effective legal framework must also be enduring and fundamental. It must be enduring in the sense that it needn’t be abandoned to address exigencies. It must include within its purview carefully considered authorities that allow us to respond to the next opportunity to capture an al Qaeda operative somewhere in the world or, God forbid, the occurrence of another attack.

To read the remainder of Mr. Hinnen's prepared remarks, click here

Throwing the Book at Tehran

By Michael Jacobson

On April 7, 2009, the U.S. Treasury Department designated as a proliferator Li Fangwei, the commercial manager for the Chinese company Limmt, for providing support for Iran's missile program. Treasury also blacklisted eight aliases of Limmt, which was originally designated in 2006, in addition to six other Iranian entities. The same day, the Manhattan district attorney's office, acting in coordination with Treasury, unsealed a 118-count indictment against Li and his company for attempting to conceal transactions that transited the U.S. financial system. While the Treasury action was hardly surprising -- given the number of Iran-related designations over the past several years -- the role of other law enforcement agencies in the Iran effort is a fairly recent trend, one that the Obama administration should encourage as negotiations with Tehran move forward.

Law Enforcement Actions

In announcing the indictment, Manhattan district attorney (DA) Robert Morgenthau made clear that his office was becoming actively involved in the broader effort against Iran, noting that he would "make every effort to prosecute [Limmt], which is perhaps the largest supplier of weapons of mass destruction to the Iranian government." Morgenthau added that one of the purposes of the action was to "let people know that the Iranians are deadly serious about acquiring materials for long-range missiles and for atom bombs." Like Treasury, Morgenthau emphasized that the Iranians are attempting to acquire this technology through deceptive conduct -- in this case, through Limmt's aggressive use of front companies to hide the blacklisted company's involvement in the transaction.

This was not Morgenthau's first strike against Iran's illicit activities. In January, the Manhattan DA's office was part of a settlement agreement reached with the Justice Department regarding the violation of U.S. sanctions laws by British bank Lloyds TSB. Lloyds acknowledged that from 1995 to 2007, it had falsified information on wire transfers involving sanctioned countries, such as Iran, so transactions could pass through the U.S. financial system unnoticed. Under the agreement, Lloyds admitted responsibility for the criminal conduct and paid $350 million, split evenly between New York county and the federal government.

U.S. federal law enforcement agencies have also been stepping up efforts over the past year. On April 3, Baktash Fattahi, an Iranian national residing in the United States, was indicted for attempting to export restricted military aircraft parts to Iran. Ten others were also charged, including a number of Iranian businessmen operating out of Dubai. The investigation was a team effort involving agents from various agencies, including Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the Departments of Defense, Commerce, and State.

To read the rest of the piece, click here

The Islamist Move to East Africa

By Douglas Farah

On of the most important parts of the growth of al Qaeda related groups or other armed and like-minded organizations, is the transfer of knowledge and technologies. It is something at which al Qaeda has excelled, both in the transfer of "lessons learned" in fighting U.S. and European troops, and in adapting and sharing what works. This is true with the IEDs, suicide bombing technology and other areas.

So the Associated Press story on the move to transfer technology from the Pakistani border regions to Africa is worrisome, particularly given the ties that already exist with the al Shaab movements and al Qaeda's infrastructure in Kenya, Tanzania and South Africa.

Africom, struggling to find a home and a mission that is viable in the region, is handicapped by a severe lack of intelligence resources on the ground.

The cluster of militants now believed to be operating inside East Africa could pass on sophisticated training and attack techniques gleaned from seven years at war against the U.S. and allies in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. officials said.

"There is a level of activity that is troubling, disturbing," Gen. William "Kip" Ward, head of U.S. Africa Command, told The Associated Press. "When you have these vast spaces that are just not governed it provides a haven for support activities, for training to occur."

I personally don't like the use of ungoverned spaces as a definition of areas where the state is not present. Almost all of those spaces are, in fact governed, just not by state actors that we recognize. But the pirate clans certainly govern some parts of the Somali coast, al Shaabab other parts, and the fragile government a few others. My full blog is here.

An Empirical Examination of the Radicalization Process of Homegrown Terrorists

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

Yesterday, the institute I direct -- FDD's Center for Terrorism Research (CTR) -- unveiled our major empirical study of the radicalization process for homegrown terrorists. Homegrown Terrorists in the U.S. and U.K.: An Empirical Study of the Radicalization Process, which I co-authored with CTR research analyst Laura Grossman, examines behavioral manifestations of the radicalization process in 117 homegrown "jihadist" terrorists from the United States and United Kingdom. Our launch event, part of FDD's Leading Thinkers series, was a roundtable discussion of the study that featured CT Blog Editor Douglas Farah as a respondent, and included fellow CT Blog Contributing Experts Farhana Ali, Madeleine Gruen, Michael Jacobson, and my colleague at FDD Walid Phares in the roundtable.

Here is an excerpt from the introduction to the study, generously contributed by Brian Michael Jenkins, senior advisor to the president of the RAND Corporation:

Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Laura Grossman have produced an important study that adds to our knowledge of terrorist radicalization. It draws on empirical data drawn from an examination of 117 “jihadist” terrorists in the United States and the United Kingdom to trace the initial arc of their trajectory into terrorism. It concludes that religious beliefs play a role in radicalization, a finding which itself is not surprising but is likely to be controversial.

Terrorists do not fall from the sky. They emerge from a set of strongly held beliefs. They are radicalized. Then they become terrorists.

The analysis offered by Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman does not enter the definitional swamp of whether the beliefs that propelled these individuals into terrorism should be regarded as an extreme—and many would add, perverted—form of religious faith, or as a political ideology that justifies violence with selected tenets of religious faith.

The observation that religious belief plays a role in the initial radicalization process should not be interpreted as an indictment of faith. It does not suggest that a particular religion is more terrorist-prone than another. This is not a discussion about how one views God. It is an analysis of the attributes of radicalization....

Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman identify six indicators of jihadist radicalization. The first three of these have to do with how rigidly (or legalistically) one may interpret one’s religion, who he comes to trust or not trust, and how he views the relationship between the West and Islam. These indicators are observable only through the statements made by subjects themselves or what they have related to others. The second three indicators, which comprise manifesting a low tolerance for religious deviance, attempting to impose one’s beliefs on others, and expressing radical views, are more easily observable.

Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman find evidence among their subjects of all six indicators, some more powerful than others. Interestingly, the sixth indicator—the expression of radical political views—was found in most of the terrorists in the study, regardless of whether the other indicators were present. This suggests that religious faith alone does not propel one into terrorism—radical political views are prerequisite. We still need to know more about how radicalized persons ultimately are recruited or recruit themselves into terrorism—the second part of the arc. Is it a matter of heightened anger or of whom they happen to encounter, a natural leader committed to violence or someone who steers them to a terrorist recruiter?

The reader should be reminded that the researchers are looking at the radicalization process through a rearview mirror. The subjects of the study were selected because they were terrorists, not because of their beliefs. The researchers asked how the terrorists got there, and they discovered clusters of indicators that recur sufficiently to suggest a shared trajectory of radicalization.

Fixing Our Pakistan Problem

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

I have an article in the new issue of the Journal of International Security Affairs examining the problem of support for religious militancy within Pakistan's military and intelligence services. An excerpt:

Shortly after 9/11, U.S. deputy secretary of state Richard Armitage gave Pakistan the ultimatum that, in [Pervez] Musharraf’s words, “we had to decide whether we were with America or with the terrorists, but that if we chose the terrorists, then we should be prepared to be bombed back to the Stone Age.” The first major battlefield in the war on terror was Afghanistan, and Pakistan’s geographic proximity and historical support for the Taliban made it strategically important. Armitage’s threat (along with several carrots) prompted Musharraf to announce a dramatic about-face, and closely align with the U.S. Musharraf declared on January 12, 2002, that “no Pakistan-based organization would be allowed to indulge in terrorism in the name of religion.” He banned five jihadist groups that day, including Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed.

The ISI [Inter-Services Intelligence agency] had already developed a distinctive strategic and ideological outlook prior to 9/11 that favored support for stateless Islamist fighters. Hence, along with his changed policies, Musharraf sacked pro-Taliban commanders at the top levels of the ISI and military. Altogether, he “forced the reassignment or resignation of Pakistan’s intelligence chief, two top generals and a number of other military commanders—most of whom were regarded as pro-Taliban or Islamist.”

In addition to the firings, Musharraf made other changes aimed at purging officers with extremist sympathies from the military and ISI. In February 2002, for example, Pakistan began “to disband two major units of its powerful intelligence service that had close links to Islamic militants in Afghanistan and Kashmir.” But this was not enough to transform the strategic and ideological outlook of either institution. Many military and ISI officers remained tied to the Taliban militants and mujahideen with whom they had built relations over the course of two decades. Moreover, the Frankenstein monster of Pakistan-created jihadist groups was now out of control: Pakistan created many such groups, and supported them for over a decade. It couldn’t simply cut them all off at once.

SWAT Analysis: Keeping an Eye on the Resurgent Taliban

By Animesh Roul

‘Swat Analysis’ is a Daily brief on the resurgent Taliban and their safe sanctuaries in Pakistan. The brief will be posted in regular intervals focusing on the developments in Swat province, NWPF and other Taliban hotspots.

The scenic Swat valley (an administrative district in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan is under complete control of Pakistani Taliban since the Islamabad administration succumbed to the demands of the militants and allowed them to implement Sharia law. The so called peace deal between Taliban and the NWFP government, effective from February 16, gave more power to Taliban elements to run parallel government and to exploit its abundant natural resources to fund their terrorist activities (they call it Jihad). The Taliban group in Swat led by Maulana Fazlullah, and pro Taliban religious extremist outfit Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) led by Sufi Muhammad have been ruling the region with active support from Taliban umbrella group, Baitullah Mehsud's Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). At present, the Taliban consisting of Pakistanis, Afghans, Chechen and Tajik militants are well trained and equipped with SUVs, Kalashnikov assault rifles and rocket launchers posing greater threat not only to Pakistan’s integrity, but to the South Asian region at large.

President Zardari signed the agreement, the Sharia Nizam-i-Adl Regulation 2009, on April 13, 2009 only to allow tranquility in the area. However, Mullah Fazlullah has said that the Taliban would accept only Islamic writ in the Valley and the whole Malakand division. Taliban forces also want Sharia rule all over Pakistan sooner or later. Terming democracy as unIslamic, TNSM chief Sufi Muhammad said recently that the prevailing political system in the country contravenes Islam and the Quran. He even accused Pakistan’s political elites of appeasing the USA and allies by thrusting the system of 'kafirs' or infidels on the people of the country.

On April 27, Pakistani forces retaliated against the rampaging Taliban in NWPF, following Taliban's Buner pullout couple of days back. Pakistan forces have killed nearly 50 Taliban militants in the latest renewed offensive against Taliban hideouts in Dir and Swat.

After this the TNSM which has been the face and voice of Taliban in Malakand region pulled out of the already fragile February 16 (2009) peace deal. In the face of this dangerous development, Taliban’s only English speaking spokesman Muslim Khan indicated strongly that the militants would not lay down their arms at any cost. The TNSM threatened earlier to quit the peace deal if Darul Qaza and the qazi courts are not established in Malakand division as per the deal. (The deal reportedly encompasses the whole Malakand Division that includes Swat, Dir (both Lower and Upper), Buner, Shangla, Chitral, Malakand areas and Kohistan in NWFP)

The situation remains volatile and unpredictable in Pakistan's NWFP, as a 20 member Ulema delegation reached Swat for talks with Suif Mohammad and members of shura of TNSM.

Another Missing Element in the AfPak Analysis

By Douglas Farah

To build on my CTB colleague Walid Phares recent post, there is another missing element in the analysis of the Taliban's recent advances in Pakistan.

It is the concept or religious precept of taqiyya in Islam and fully embraced by radical Islamists (including the Muslim Brotherhood.

It blesses the concept of disguising one's beliefs, intentions, convictions, ideas, feelings, opinions or strategies from the enemy and the infidel. In practical terms it is manifested as dissimulation, lying, deceiving, vexing and confounding with the intention of deflecting attention, foiling or pre-emptive blocking. See this paper for a deeper look at what the term implies.

So, when the Taliban negotiates certain terms of its taking over parts of Pakistan and promises certain behaviors in return for limited power there, they have no intention of keeping to the terms of the agreement.

Under the terms of taqiyya, such behavior, which we widely view as duplicitous, is simply part of the accepted ways to spread sharia law and the caliphate. It has no moral consequence except to raise the esteem of the practitioner of this art in the eyes of his cohorts. My

The Taliban’s “AfPak” Strategy: A Jihadi Preemptive War

By Walid Phares

As the U.S. administration and its allies are devising a new strategy for the next steps in Afghanistan, the jihadists have already begun their next move — but this time it’s inside Pakistan. As I’ve written over the past few months, we need to look at Afghanistan, Pakistan and India as one regional battlefield where the “other side” is coordinating strategically, acting methodically and for sure beating the international coalition in speed. If Washington and its allies fail to see the big picture in the fight against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, which unfortunately may be the case now, the rapidly deteriorating situation will soon exceed the northwestern provinces of Pakistan to spill over to both Afghanistan and India, if not beyond. That’s how I suggest “reading” the recent worrisome leaps achieved by the Taliban from the SWAT valley into the neighboring district of Buner. So what’s the story and why should we consider it as a crossing of the red lines?

The Return of the Shining Path: Latin America's Downward Spiral

By Douglas Farah

The CNN report on the re-emergence of the Shining Path rebels (Sendero Luminoso) almost buries the most important element of the story. The terror unleashed by Sendero (massacres of civilians, the desire to carry out Pol Pot's dream of decapitating the urban and creating a utopian rural society, targeted assassinations, infrastructure destruction etc.) is financed by their access to drug money.

It is easy to forget that Sendero was among the most brutal and merciless the Western Hemisphere has ever seen. The arrest of the movement's mastermind, Abimael Guzman, sent it in a downward spiral. It almost disappeared. And now it is back.

The cocaine corruption and accompanying terror of Latin America knows no ideological stripe. It fuels the FARC in Colombia and the paramilitaries (see this latest indictment of the Colombian paramilitary leader to see the role cocaine plays in that movement).

There are several things of concern here, beyond the immediate danger Sendero poses in Peru. One is that is shows how badly beaten groups (such as the FARC) can survive and revive, given the right economic conditions (access to coke money) and political conditions (deep disillusionment with the government, government corruption etc). They don't simply disappear. My full blog is here.

Jihad Corsairs on High Seas: What's Behind them?

By Walid Phares

Most of the media discussion about piracy in the Gulf of Aden has drifted understandably towards the sensational part of the story: how are the Pirates able to roam the Ocean? Is paying them ransom a better option than to engage them militarily? Last but not least, will a military intervention against the Pirates worsen the situation; will it lead to a massive escalation in Somalia and a Vietnam like quagmire for many years to come?

The armed bands on the waters are still roaming the seas of Aden and the Indian Ocean across from Somalia and Kenya, are not impressed with the dozens of naval units dispatched by powerful navies from around the world.

What is behind this Piracy phenomenon, what lays ahead if the international community intervenes and what could develop in that region if the latter is late to intervene or doesn’t meet the challenge? It appears the strategic challenge is even bigger than the mere piracy. Indeed the strategy now contemplated by regional powers could become a major military debacle. Here is why:

Making Smugglers Pay: Underwriting Egyptian Border Security

By Matthew Levitt

Just over a week ago, Egyptian police detained a man who was transporting $2 million dollars to North Sinai to be smuggled to Hamas in the Gaza Strip. This came on the heels of two separate attempts by Hamas to smuggle nearly $10 million dollars from Egypt into the Strip. This was not their first attempt to smuggle a large amount of cash into Gaza, nor will it likely be the last. The United States should encourage the Egyptians to crack down on the organization's bulk cash smuggling more effectively and push Cairo to develop an asset forfeiture regime, using funds seized under this program to finance more-robust law enforcement efforts along the border. European and American programs aimed at combating bulk cash smuggling offer a useful example for a similar Egyptian initiative.

Since the armed takeover of Gaza in 2007, the international community has put in place broad sanctions prohibiting financial support for Hamas. To circumvent these economic sanctions, Hamas has frequently turned to bulk cash smuggling to obtain necessary funds. In February 2009, for example, following the Gaza conflict, Egyptian border police caught Hamas officials attempting to smuggle suitcases holding around $9 million in cash into the Strip. The following month, Hamas officials returning from reconciliation talks in Egypt attempted to smuggle $850,000 in cash hidden in candy tins. Both cases were clearly in violation of Egypt's prohibition on persons leaving its borders carrying more than $10,000 in undeclared cash.

While these efforts were thwarted, Hamas has succeeded on many other occasions. According to Palestinian officials, in June 2006, former Palestinian foreign minister and Hamas member Mahmoud al-Zahar successfully crossed the Egyptian-Gaza border with $20 million in cash stuffed into twelve suitcases. Similarly, in November 2006, two Hamas lawmakers, Mushir al-Masri and Ahmad Bahar, smuggled in more than $4 million.

Egyptian police officers, historically underpaid, have accepted bribes in exchange for turning a blind eye to weapons smuggling through tunnels into Gaza. Several media reports suggest that Egyptian police stationed at border crossings are more than willing to do the same in regard to cash. The recent seizure of these funds, however, represents an opportunity not only to crack down on illicit financial activity but also to boost the meager salaries of Egyptian border guards and finance their underresourced mission of securing the Egyptian border.

The full article, co-authored with Becca Wasser, is available here.

Indonesians Arrested in Malaysia

By Kenneth Conboy

It has recently come to light that the Malaysian authorities have used their Internal Security Act to detain three Indonesian nationals. One of them, Agus Salim, was detained on 5 March for unknown reasons. Two others, 60-year-old Abdul Matin Anol Rahmat and Johar Hassan, were arrested at their homes in Johor state on 1 April. Of these two, Abdul Matin has been confirmed as being a likely member of Jemaah Islamiyah. Given that Hassan was arrested on the same date and in the same vicinity, it is a fair bet that he is also thought to be a member of JI.

The Internal Security Act has long been portrayed as draconian and oppressive. However, the Malaysian government has defended the law as necessary to protect national security and ensure stability. With these three latest arrests, it is estimated that 30 persons are being held in a prison in northern Malaysian without trial.

Cybersecurity and Counterintelligence

By Douglas Farah

The Obama administration is about to unveil its cybersecurity review, and the turf battles are brewing. What is seldom mentioned in the debate is that this is perhaps one of the most important issues the Obama administration will face.

The cypersecurity issue is an important part of the broader counter-intelligence effort, an effort that was woefully inadequate in past administrations, and one that is costing our nation dearly. As noted in the article above, the Chinese have stolen every single advanced weapons system design we have made in recent years, through human intel operations and electronically.

As the Wall Street Journal recently reported, our entire electrical grid has been mapped for foreign powers. Not just for the fun of it, and not to steal vital state secrets that will benefit them right away.

Rather, it is an embedded program that could remain passive for years, but could be activated in a second if to disrupt the entire electrical supply should they feel the need to. It is not a targeted effort at some parts of the country, but rather an ambitious effort to map the entire grid. Talk about thinking big!

We are only beginning to understand how penetrated our systems are, and the need to push back are figure out what the other guys are doing, why, and how to disrupt it. My full blog is here.

NEFA Foundation: Transcript of Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP) Training Camp Video

By Evan Kohlmann

The NEFA Foundation has transcribed and translated video messages from senior commanders of the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP) featured alongside recently-released footage of a TIP training camp located somewhere in northwest Pakistan. The speakers featured in the video include the current emir of the TIP, "Shaykh Abdulhak", along with "Abdullah Mansur" and "Commander Seyfullah." During his address, Mansur scoffed that the Chinese were merely "a so-called 'Dragon', the proof being the fear and terror they felt as a result of our operations and threats during the Beijing Olympics. They became like a frenzied bird, and that is why every Muslim in East Turkestan must become involved in specifically undertaking military training." Seyfullah boasted of the quality of the courses being taught to recruits at TIP training camps in Pakistan: "Thanks to Allah, we trained them on various weapons which are accessible to us, and which the mujahideen are presently using around the world. We gave them Shariah, political, and military lessons-such as in explosives and tactics, heavy and light weaponry, and lessons in intelligence and other military sciences."

The English transcript of the TIP video can be downloaded from the NEFA Foundation website.

NEFA Foundation: Video of Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP) Terrorist Training Camp in Pakistan

By Evan Kohlmann

The NEFA Foundation has obtained footage of a terrorist training camp in Pakistan run by the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP), a splinter faction of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) primarily based in Waziristan and elsewhere in the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan. The TIP is comprised of Uighur Muslims from western regions of China-who have sworn to wage war against the Chinese government and have carried out scattered shooting and bombing attacks.

The video can be viewed on the NEFA Foundation website.

The Inroads of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Obama Administration

By Douglas Farah

First, a note updating my pessimistic view of the Somali pirate hostage taking. I stand corrected, and thank the Navy Seals and others who carried out the rescue operation. Well done!

But, as the the Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Report (free subscription required) makes clear, the news is not all good.

The Muslim Brotherhood legacy organizations have recently made tremendous strides in occupying positions of influence within the Obama administration, at the same time the FBI and other law enforcement officials have move to cut ties to the very same organization.

The MB has only one political agenda-its own. Its organizations strongly backed George W. Bush in 2000 and 2004, (remember the famous picture of Bush hugging the al Arian family?). Hoping for friendlier pastures, the groups switched their support to the Dems in '08. So far, it appears to be paying of. Big time.

The architect is Dr. John Esposito, a long time defender of the MB and the head of the Saudi-financed Georgetown University Prince Alwaleed bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding at the Walsh School of Foreign Service.

The same Dr. Esposito who maintained prior to 9/11 that radical Islam was essentially a myth and certainly no danger. It is hard to imagine any academic being so consistently wrong in their professed field of expertise maintaining much influence, but there he is, deeply enmeshed with all the major MB legacy groups in the country.

What is fascinating is that all the same small groups appear in every event, and, if needed, new groups are created, but all led by the same small group of people. Recall that the Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR) hs a paid membership of less than 2,000-a drop of more than 80 percent since 9/11. Yet it continues to cast itself as the premiere voice of Muslim in America, and is often treated as such.

To be clear: these groups have a clearly enunciated and never renounced policy of toppling the government, hollowing out the institutional structures, and imposing the caliphate here, where Sharia law is the law of the land. As I have often said, if they want to openly join the political process and espouse this, they are welcome and they will be marginalized, even within the Muslim community.

It is the fact that these organizations are front groups for a foreign movement that wants to end our political system (while supporting radical Islam) that I object to.

First is the announcement by the Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy (CSID), a sort of umbrella organization for many of the MB groups in the United States, that Secretary of State Clinton (along with a senior MB leader from Britain who has been banned from the United States previously will be keynote speakers at their 10th anniversary celebration. My full blog is here.

NEFA Foundation: Translated Communiques from the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP)

By Evan Kohlmann

The NEFA Foundation has released English translations of a series of recent communiques issued by the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP) over the past year. The TIP is a splinter faction of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (TIP) primarily based in Waziristan and elsewhere in the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan. It is primarily comprised of Uighur Muslims from western regions of China-who have sworn to wage war against the Chinese government and have carried out scattered shooting and bombing attacks. The translated communiques include threats from the TIP to the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing and an explanation of how the TIP's conflict with China fits into the larger global "war on terrorism."

The translations can be downloaded from the NEFA Foundation website.

The Somali Pirate Fiasco

By Douglas Farah

One thing one has to admit-the criminal/terrorist elements holding the world's shipping lanes hostage have the game figured out. Although one hijacking of a U.S.-manned shipped was thwarted, they have the captain hostage.

Now, other pirate ships, loaded with hostages,are making their way toward the life boat to help insure the pirates escape with impunity.

The U.S. Navy is there, but able to do very little. it is a classic standoff of asymmetrical forces: the USS Bainbridge, armed with cruise missles, in a stalemate with a life boat that is out of fuel and adrift in the sea.

The hostage captain's attempted escape was thwarted. The ships are too far away to help him. And several boats with dozens of other hostages will be arriving before long. Not a pretty scenario, but one that will likely be repeated over time.

Anyone who doubts that non-state actors operating out of either complicit states or stateless regions will have a major economic impact on the world in coming years should now be disabused of that notion.

And, if you think economic shocks are not part of military contingency planning, see this story in Politico about how the Pentagon is now war-gaming different economic scenarios.

“Why would the military care about global capital flows at all?” asked another person who was there. “Because as the global financial crisis plays out, there could be real world consequences, including failed states. We’ve already seen riots in the United Kingdom and the Balkans.”

While the shipping lanes are not capital flows, maintaining them free of piracy (and, in this case, with part of the ransom proceeds going to radical Islamist groups intent on spreading other kinds of havoc around the world) is vital to maintaining capital flows. My full blog is here.

What is Iran up to in Afghanistan?

By Olivier Guitta

Now that Iran has been invited back to the table of negotiations on Afghanistan, I decided to revisit Iran's role in Afghanistan for the Middle East Times.

You can read the whole piece here.
Here is an excerpt:
Last week, Iran was invited to attend the international conference on Afghanistan in The Hague. This invitation was part of U.S. President Barack Obama plan to get Afghanistan's neighbors actively involved in being part of the solution rather than part of the problem. At that conference, Iran unsurprisingly criticized the occupation forces but said that it would help regarding the drug problem. The question remains: how much will Iran help?
After Pakistan and NATO, Iran is the most important player in Afghanistan. Iran has a long history with Afghanistan: Afghans settled in Iran hundreds of years ago. Today an estimated 2 million Afghans are believed to be living in the Islamic republic, but about 50 percent of them are illegal immigrants.

Iran had time and again threatened to deport the illegals, and this especially since Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became president. At the end of 2006 Iran announced a massive deportation of illegal Afghan workers. The idea behind it was to help Iranian workers by heavily fining employers who did not favor Iranian workers.

But some analysts have pointed out that the economic problems are just a populist smokescreen and that almost every illegal immigrant is a man living without his family and without any social protection. Afghans represent an inexpensive source of labor.

A possible factor behind Iran's continued threats to throw out the Afghan workers is because it gives them an additional card to throw down on the table if and when the time comes. Tehran has been blowing hot and cold on this issue. From April 2007 to Jan. 2008 Iran deported some 360,000 illegals. Iran realizes Kabul's vulnerability given its shaky economy. This allows them to pressure the Afghans.

NEFA Foundation: Jihad Website Financing 101

By Evan Kohlmann

The NEFA Foundation has obtained and translated a new post from online jihadi discussion forums about how to finance jihad-related websites without being "ensnared" in a trap by law enforcement: “If you [have] not gotten arrested yet, that does not mean you are not being monitored, and if your use of the electronic payments method has not brought you woes, then that does not mean it is safe...And the brothers missed these principles before, so it caused crises to the electronic Jihad...Here, we will learn from the previous generation, and we'll correct some of the meanings regarding the methods of electronic payments they had followed.” For example, according to the author, "do not ever pay through a credit card connected to you in any way, however distant or hard to trace the connection was.”

A translation of the post can be downloaded from the NEFA Foundation website.

NEFA Foundation Report: "Core Al-Qaida in 2008: A Review"

By Evan Kohlmann

The NEFA Foundation has released a new report by NEFA Director of Analysis and Research Ronald Sandee titled, "Core Al-Qaida in 2008: A Review." Delivering the Intelligence Community’s annual threat assessment in February 2009, Director of National Intelligence Dennis C. Blair noted that, “In Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), al-Qa’ida lost significant parts of its command structure since 2008 in a succession of blows as damaging to the group as any since the fall of the Taliban in late 2001.” A few months earlier, then-CIA Director Michael Hayden had also addressed the significant developments impacting core Al-Qaida: “In the past year alone, a number of senior al-Qa’ida leaders who have sought refuge in the tribal areas have died, either by violence or natural causes. These include a chief of external operations, a senior commander who plotted attacks against the coalition in Afghanistan, a seasoned explosives expert and trainer, a veteran combat leader, and a senior operational planner.” This NEFA Foundation Special Report examines, in depth, the notable losses that Al-Qaida suffered in 2008, its efforts to repulse ideological attacks by respected voices in the extremist community, and assesses the organization’s ability to carry out attacks against the West.

The report can be downloaded from the NEFA Foundation website.

A New Look at the Muslim Brotherhood in America

By Douglas Farah

While the Muslim Brotherhood-dominated Islamist groups debate whether to cut off contact with the FBI and other US government institutions, the Hudson Institute has just published a comprehensive report that makes it clear why such ties are not healthy.

It is worth remembering that the FBI, as the Investigative Project reported, cut off contact with CAIR, the primary MB legacy organization amid mounting concern about the Muslim advocacy group's roots in a Hamas-support network.

The decision to end contacts with CAIR was made quietly last summer as federal prosecutors prepared for a second trial of the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF), an Islamic charity accused of providing money and political support to the terrorist group Hamas, according to people with knowledge of the matter.

CAIR and its chairman emeritus, Omar Ahmad, were named un-indicted co-conspirators in the HLF case. Both Ahmad and CAIR's current national executive director, Nihad Awad, were revealed on government wiretaps as having been active participants in early Hamas-related organizational meetings in the United States. During testimony, FBI agent Lara Burns described CAIR as a front organization.

The FBI cutoff badly hurt CAIR and other legacy groups, because their main currency in collecting money and portraying themselves as the voice of the Muslim community in the United States, depends almost entirely on trumpeting its access to the U.S. government.

Now, Steven Merley's piece explores both the origin of the Muslim Brotherhood in the United States, as well as its ties to the European Brotherhood.

It is a good and timely reminder (and should be widely read by policy makers in the Obama administration, as well as gatekeepers across the government) of why cutting off CAIR's access was long overdue. My full blog is here.

Reconciling The State Secrets Doctrine with Due Process in Terrorism Related Cases

By Victor Comras

A few weeks ago I wrote a short piece for Jurist commenting on US District Court Chief Judge Vaughn Walker's recent ruling in the Al-Haramain Oregon NSA wiretapping case. That ruling held that the court be allowed to review classified information relevant to the case in order to determine whether its availability for review by counsel is critical to due process and fairness in the proceedings. If so, Judge Walker ruled, opposing counsel must be afforded a conditional opportunity to view such evidence (see below).

This ruling represents a significant departure from previous holdings, and has proved quite upsetting to the affected government agencies. The Justice Department immediately appealed Walker’s ruling arguing that the government, not the courts, is best able to determine whether or not divulging classified information would pose a reasonable danger to national security. To their evident surprise the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld Walker’s ruling. Justice lawyers have now again asked that Judge Walker reconsider the order, and have indicated that an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court is quite likely.

The procedures outlined by Judge Walker’s order require that the Justice Department propose to the court arrangements to segregate and secure relevant classified information which the court could then review ex parte to determine whether or not the information should be deemed critical to due process and fairness in the case. If so, one or a few of Al Haramain’s attorneys would be granted conditional access to view the information after they first obtained the requisite security clearances. For its part, the Justice Department was ordered to facilitate such clearances provided that the attorneys otherwise meet all other security clearance requirements. While this clearance process is reportedly moving forward, the Justice Department has so far refused to present to the court the procedures requested.

The Al Haramain case is among some 40 different lawsuits challenging NSA and the various telephone companies that cooperated with the wiretapping program. These cases have all been consolidated and assigned to Judge Walker. Several of the cases include challenges to the legislation passed last year by Congress that would grant immunity to the telephone companies for their cooperation in the program.

Last week the Justice Department filed new motions with Judge Walker in one of the cases, Jewel v NSA, that alleges that NSA ran illegal taps on their calls. While maintaining that the NSA program only targeted those “reasonably believed to be associated with al Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist organization,” the Justice Department reasserted its “state secret ” claim, arguing again that disclosing the criteria actually used to determine which phone conversations to target would involve "disclosure of highly classified NSA intelligence sources and methods." Since individual customers would otherwise be unable to show that their messages were the ones intercepted, they could not have any substantive grounds on which to pursue their lawsuits.

The “state secret” doctrine is also front and center in another civil action case against a Boeing subsidiary alleged to have transported five terrorism suspects to countries where they were tortured.

President Obama campaigned on a pledge to bring greater transparency to government actions related to the war on terrorism. He has already scrapped several controversial Bush Administration “war on terrorism” practices, such as trials by military tribunals and waterboarding, and he has ordered the closing of Guantanamo. But, the new administration has shown greater caution in domestic cases involving agency regulations pursuant to IEEPA, FISA and the Patriot Act. Many of these cases have raised important 4th and 5th Amendment concerns. After 9/11 American agencies were given broad new powers to monitor daily American activities, and to incarcerate, designate and freeze the assets of those suspected of financing or engaging in terrorism. U.S. Federal courts were reticent to test these measures against traditional constitutional standards, and left the Bush Administration considerable leeway when it came to implementing them.

Presidential Candidate Obama’s made a point of criticizing the Bush Administration’s frequent use of the State Secrets Doctrine. For example his candidate website contained the following prominent Bullet:

Secrecy Dominates Government Actions: The Bush administration has ignored public disclosure rules and has invoked a legal tool known as the "state secrets" privilege more than any other previous administration to get cases thrown out of civil court.”

Given the increasingly important role that classified information is playing with regards to regulatory actions, and the increasing concerns being voiced with regard to protecting 4th and 5th constitutional rights, it would make sense to build into the system some possibility for classified information to be considered without jeopardizing sources and methods. Perhaps some thought should be given to the establishment of special new Federal Bar of Attorneys pre-cleared and enabled to be available as co-counsel in cases involving (requiring) some access to classified information. That would put such special defense counsel on equal footing with many of their prosecuting attorney brethren who already possess such clearances. After all, both are already equally considered to be duly appointed officers of the court. The burden would be on attorneys applying to membership to such a special Federal Bar not only to demonstrate their suitability for such clearances, but to front some of the costs that the clearance process regularly entails. These costs could then be passed on in the course of the usual fees charged to clients.

Remaking the Pentagon for the 21st Century

By Douglas Farah

It is clear that the current debate over the future configuration of the military is a divisive and extremely important one.

While Secretary Gates, bowing to the budget realities of the Obama administration, is cutting programs while moving toward a stronger focus on irregular warfare and special forces,the clear resolution to the debate is that both sides have considerable merit. Some common ground must be found, and it is a question of focus, not a question of either or. The recent North Korean missile challenge also serves as a reminder that traditional state actors and threats cannot be ignored.

There is no doubt that non-state armed groups are occupying more space around the globe, both in areas of obvious strategic concern to the United States, and those that may not seem to be of particular concern but contribute to overall instability. Most of these groups are irregular, fragmented and more similar to the movements in Afghanistan/Pakistan than regular movements.

While it is often difficult to see the specific security challenge these groups pose, the overarching threat of radical Islamists operating in this manner is not. All the major Islamist terrorist attacks against the United States (1998 US Embassy bombings in East Africa, 2000 USS Cole, 9/11) were all carried out by a non-state actor operating from what was conventionally described as a failed state (Afghanistan). That threat was underestimated by successive administrations, and the price paid has been horrific.

But the groups that will form the most pressing threats in the future, I believe, will be modeled on Hezbollah, able to mass troops, deploy advanced weapons systems and fight for territory, while remaining outside of direct state control. My full blog is here.

NEFA Foundation: Letter from American Jihadi Fighting in Somalia

By Evan Kohlmann

The NEFA Foundation has published a letter written by "Abu Mansoor al-Amriki"--an American mujahid recently featured in a Shabaab al-Mujahideen video from Somalia--dated January 8, 2008 and titled, "To the beloved Mujaahideen (in specific) and the Muslims (in general)." In the letter, Abu Mansoor scoffed that "the picture [that has been] presented to the world was the 'moderate' picture of the [Islamic] Courts [Union ]... Despite these facts even the Kuffaar could see something else behind the scenes. They publicized that there is an 'extremist' group (according to their description) lurking within the government of the Courts. They were right on about most of this except for mistakenly believing that the leader of this extremist group was Hasan Thaahir Uways."

A copy of the letter can be downloaded from the NEFA Foundation website.

American Interests in Pakistan

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

My latest at the Weekly Standard examines the recent turmoil in Pakistan, and the implications of Nawaz Sharif's ascendancy. An excerpt:

Where would a Sharif government stand on U.S. Predator strikes carried out on Pakistani soil? The present government has been distinctly more accommodating than its predecessor. In 2007, [Pervez] Musharraf's last full year as president, the United States located over 20 terrorist targets in Pakistan and requested permission to strike about 15, but Pakistan's leadership approved only 3 strikes. In contrast, Zardari has authorized over 30 hits in his seven months as president, allowing the United States to eliminate several high-value targets.

"Sharif has said that the United States needs to end drone strikes," according to Kamran Bokhari, the director of Middle East analysis at the private intelligence firm STRATFOR. "Though he knows that you will say one thing when you're out of office, but do different things when in office, it would be difficult for Sharif to work aggressively with the United States in the war on terror." Most likely, Sharif would narrow the circumstances in which drone strikes could be authorized.

And in two other policy areas, a Sharif government would likely be uncongenial to the United States. It would probably take a more aggressive stance toward Kashmir, detracting from the fight against jihadists. "If Pakistan's military is geared to fight India," a high-level Pakistani official asked me, "how can they fight insurgents?"

And Sharif would likely push for the extension of sharia law, as he did both times he was prime minister (in 1990-1993 and 1997-1999). While this probably wouldn't threaten U.S. strategic interests, it would bode ill for Pakistan's women and religious minorities.

Sharif is aided in his rise by a sympathetic media, who ignore his shortcomings and help him "cultivate the image of a strong man who does not budge from his stance," in the words of commentator Yahya Hussaini. Officials in Zardari's government raised this concern with me. One complained that several recent pro-Sharif rallies were shown repeatedly on television before they had attracted many participants, and that the saturation coverage helped to increase their size.

You can read the full article here.

Lashkar-e-Taiba's Kashmir Offenisve

By Animesh Roul

Originally published as "Lashkar-e-Taiba Resumes Kashmir Operations Against Indian Forces in Jammu and Kashmir," Terrorism Monitor, (Jamestwon Foundation) Volume: 7 Issue: 8, April 03, 2009.

I just published one article on Lashkar e Taiba's Spring offensive in Jammu and Kashmir. Here is an excerpt

After lying low for a few months following the November 2008 Mumbai carnage and the subsequent crackdown on its leadership and camps in Pakistan, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) has once again resumed operations in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). LeT fighters engaged Indian regulars of 1 Para and 6 Btn. Rashtriya Rifles (a counterterrorism paramilitary created in 1990 for use in Kashmir) in a five-day firefight, beginning on March 20 in the Shamasbari forest range of Kupwara District, close to the Kashmir Line of Control (LoC) – a military control line constituting a de facto border between Indian and Pakistani-controlled Kashmir. The LeT claimed responsibility for the ambush on an army patrol party and the subsequent encounter in which 17 militants and eight soldiers (including a major) were killed (Kashmir Live, March 25; NDTV, March 24). The Indian Army ascribed its losses to the technical sophistication of the insurgents and their extensive use of GPS systems in the densely forested region. According to Brigadier Gurmit Singh; "The militants killed in the encounter were highly trained, well equipped. We have recovered the latest weapons, communication systems and maps from them” (Kashmir Observer, March 27).

....After recently overhauling its infrastructure in J&K, the LeT has reportedly vowed to continue lethal strikes against the security forces and vital installations in the state. Claiming responsibility for the Kupwara encounters, the LeT’s elusive spokesman, Abdullah (Gaznavi) Muntazir, told local media; “The encounter which ensued turned out to be a long-drawn-out battle… [it] should serve as an eye-opener for New Delhi... India should understand that the freedom struggle in Kashmir is not over… it is active with full force” (Rising Kashmir [Srinagar], March 25).

...The LeT has positioned around 800 cadres under newly designated leaders in charge of J&K operations. The new leaders were identified by Indian intelligence sources as Shahji (a.k.a. Abu Anas), Hyder Bhayee (a.ka. Bilal, a.k.a. Salahuddin), Huzefa (a.k.a. Abdul Gaffar) and Walid, the LeT’s “top man for ammunition supply and finances” (Indian Express, March 7). The four senior LeT commanders reportedly replaced Mumbai attack masterminds Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi, Zarar Shah and Yousuf Muzammil, all currently in Pakistani custody.

For the complete article, read here.

Download the full text of the issue here.

Smart Power and Dumb Budgeting (Updated)

By Michael B. Kraft

SMART POWER AND DUMB BUDGETING (UPDATED)

(The following updates the posting of March 27)

As the Obama Administration's budget wends its way through Congress the full Senate yesterday approved an amendment to restore the $4 billion the Budget Committee made in the foreign affairs budget that includes funds for the committee stage.

Senator John Kerry (D-Massachusetts) , chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Sen. Richard Lugar (R-Indiana), the senior Republican, sponsored the amendment, which was approved by unanimous consent. A large number of non-government organizations weighed in to lobby for the amendment.

“Smart Power” is the current buzzword for the best way to counter a wide variety of national security threats, but dumb budgeting procedures remain a major obstacle.

The House of Representatives already is slicing away at the Obama administration’s Foreign Affairs Fiscal Year 2010 budget that proposes increases in foreign assistance programs to improve economic and social conditions in countries that are breeding grounds for violence and terrorism.

The House Budget Committee last Wednesday recommended a budget that would cut $5.5 billion from the administration’s $53.8 billion request. The Senate Budget Committee followed the next day by making slightly smaller cuts-- $4 billion less.

While these cuts were made from a request that was initially a $5.8 billion 13.6% increase from the FY 2009 levels, this does not reflect the whole picture according to Dr. Gordon Adams, a former associate OMB director for national security and international affairs who is now a fellow at the Henry L. Stimson Center. He said that if the second FY 2009 supplemental is enacted by Congress, the overall 2010 budget for State, USAID and foreign affairs agencies as proposed by the House Committee would end up a billion dollars lower than in 2009.

Of course the Senate and House versions have to be worked out in the Senate House Conference Committees. It is far from certain that the Senate position will prevail. And then the Appropriations Committees, which approve the actual spending, will have their own say and cuts often are made during this process.

This is at a time when virtually the entire foreign affairs establishment, led by Defense Secretary Robert Gates with his November 26, 2007 speech, is calling for allocating more resources for “smart power” foreign assistance and civil affairs activities in Afghanistan, Iraq and other trouble spots. He and many military men have said that that the military cannot do the job alone.

President Obama, in announcing his Afghanistan policy last Friday, said the administration planned to send hundreds of additional civilian officials and Foreign Service Officers to Afghanistan along with 4,000 more troops to help train Afghan military and police.l

See last Friday's posting for more details.

Some Healthy Developments in Mexico's "Narco-Insurgency"

By Douglas Farah

As today's Washington Post makes clear, Mexico and the United States now recognize what is happening in Mexico as a narco-insurgency, with all that implies. Not simply drug trafficking. Not pockets of isolated violence. But a direct insurgent challenge to the state.

That recognition, which has been a long time coming, accepts the seriousness of the challenge and the resources that will be necessary to combat the forces arrayed against the state.

This recognition is coupled with another important and heartening public statement by Secretary Clinton that the demand for drugs in the United States and elsewhere, and the flow of weapons, are primary factors in giving the Mexican (and Colombian and Central American etc.) cartels the resource they need to wage this insurgency.

As Clinton said, “Our insatiable demand for illegal drugs fuels the drug trade,” Mrs. Clinton said, using unusually blunt language. “Our inability to prevent weapons from being illegally smuggled across the border to arm these criminals causes the deaths of police officers, soldiers and civilians.”

Accurately assessing the problem is the first step toward developing a joint strategy that marshal and channel the available resources in the most effective way.

While the military is playing a lead role in Mexico, it is a role that is dangerous to the state. The necessity of replacing the corrupted police force is akin to what Colombia faced in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when the Medellin and then the Cali cartels systematically bought the political protection and police cooperation that was needed. Colombia cleaned up the police because, at that time, the military was an even worse bet. The Mexican government is betting that the military is less corruptible than the police. A dicey proposition, and we won't know if that is the correct decision for some time.

The looming challenge is not just the vast resources the cartels can draw on for military training, personnel and equipment, and the ability to effectively outgun the police and military. My full blog is here.

NEFA Foundation: AQ in Yemen Claims Attack on South Korean Tourists

By Evan Kohlmann

The NEFA Foundation has obtained and translated a new statement from Al-Qaida's Committee in Yemen claiming responsibility for a March 16 suicide bombing attack on South Korean tourists near the city of Shibam, naming the bomber as "Abu Ubaidah al-Jarrah." According to the statement, "This was executed in response to the order of Allah's Prophet, prayers and peace be upon him, who said, 'drive the idolaters out of the Arabian Peninsula'; for South Korea's role in the war on Islam, allying with the crusader forces under the slogan of the 'War on Terrorism' in Afghanistan and Iraq; in revenge for the killing of the two courageous commanders Hamza al-Qaiti and Abdullah Batees and their brothers; and, the role of these tourists in corrupting the ideology of the Muslims and their morals, and their dangerous role in spreading Christianity among Muslim children-and so, this operation was executed."

An English translation of the communique can be downloaded from the NEFA Foundation website.

Terrorism Trial in Indonesia

By Kenneth Conboy

Muhammad Hasan (alias Fajar Taslim), the Singapore-born self-proclaimed leader of a terrorist cell arrested in Palembang, South Sumatra, said yesterday that he should be rewarded for plotting to stage a 9/11-style attack on Singapore's national airport. Hasan and six of his fellow militants are currently on trial in South Jakarta for killing a Christian teacher and planning bombing attacks. Hasan faces the heaviest sentence, 20 years.

Hasan does not deny being the leader of the group, but says he will not accept prosecution under a law prepared by infidels. He claims that that he is not guilty according to the Koran, as he was avenging the murder of Muslims in Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine. "I must be freed and compensated for being illegally detained." Somehow, this does not seem likely.

My Written Statement for Congress on Credit Card Use by Terrorists

By Andrew Cochran

Yesterday, the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology of the U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security held a hearing titled, "Do the Payment Card Industry Data Standards Reduce Cybercrime?" The subject of the hearing was to examine whether data security requirements for businesses that store, process, or transmit personal information during Internet payments provide sufficient protection against data breaches, fraud, and terrorism. The subcommittee invited me to submit a written statement on the use of credit cards by terrorists. My statement quoted from and summarized posts by Contributing Experts Dennis Lormel, Matthew Levitt, and Michael Jacobson, and included information from our panel on February 29, 2008, “Meta-Terror: Terrorism and the Virtual World,” with Contributing Experts Evan Kohlmann and Roderick Jones and the Senior Vice President and Chief Technology Officer of VeriSign. You can download my three-page statement, and here is an excerpt:

Credit cards are extremely vulnerable to fraud and are used extensively by terrorists. The internet not only serves as a learning tool for terrorists but also functions as a mechanism to steal credit card information through hacking, phishing and other means. In many instances, when terrorist operatives are apprehended, they have multiple identifications and credit cards in a variety of names in their possession. The terrorists who executed the devastating 2004 Madrid train bombings, which killed almost 200 people, and who carried out the deadly July 7, 2005, attacks on the transportation system in London were self-financed, in part through credit card fraud.

Younes Tsouli, aka “Terrorist 007,” and his two associates, Waseem Mughal and Tariq al-Daour, used computer viruses and stolen credit card accounts to set up a network of communication forums and web sites that hosted everything from tutorials on computer hacking and bomb making to videos of beheadings and suicide bombing attacks in Iraq. They raised funds through credit card information theft and fraud, which were used to support the communications, propaganda and recruitment for terrorists worldwide, as well as to purchase equipment for Jihadists in the field. One expert described their activities as “operating an online dating service for al-Qaeda.” The three men pled guilty to inciting terrorist murder via the internet.

• Stolen credit card numbers and identities were used to buy web hosting services. At least 72 stolen credit card accounts were used to register more than 180 web site domains at 95 different web hosting companies in the U.S. and Europe.
• On one computer seized from al-Daour’s apartment, some 37,000 stolen credit card numbers were found. Alongside each credit card record was other information on the identity theft victims, such as the account holder’s address, date of birth, credit balances and limits.

You can download the testimony by the witnesses from the hearing website. I appreciate this opportunity and thank the subcommittee chairwoman, Rep. Yvette Clarke, for the invitation.