Fixing Our Pakistan Problem
By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross
I have an article in the new issue of the Journal of International Security Affairs examining the problem of support for religious militancy within Pakistan's military and intelligence services. An excerpt:
Shortly after 9/11, U.S. deputy secretary of state Richard Armitage
gave Pakistan the ultimatum that, in [Pervez] Musharraf’s words, “we had to
decide whether we were with America or with the terrorists, but that if
we chose the terrorists, then we should be prepared to be bombed back
to the Stone Age.”
The first major battlefield in the war on terror was Afghanistan, and
Pakistan’s geographic proximity and historical support for the Taliban
made it strategically important. Armitage’s threat (along with several
carrots) prompted Musharraf to announce a dramatic about-face, and
closely align with the U.S. Musharraf declared on January 12, 2002,
that “no Pakistan-based organization would be allowed to indulge in
terrorism in the name of religion.” He banned five jihadist groups that day, including Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed.
The ISI [Inter-Services Intelligence agency] had already developed a distinctive strategic and ideological
outlook prior to 9/11 that favored support for stateless Islamist
fighters. Hence, along with his changed policies, Musharraf sacked
pro-Taliban commanders at the top levels of the ISI and military.
Altogether, he “forced the reassignment or resignation of Pakistan’s
intelligence chief, two top generals and a number of other military
commanders—most of whom were regarded as pro-Taliban or Islamist.”
In addition to the firings, Musharraf made other changes aimed at
purging officers with extremist sympathies from the military and ISI.
In February 2002, for example, Pakistan began “to disband two major
units of its powerful intelligence service that had close links to
Islamic militants in Afghanistan and Kashmir.”
But this was not enough to transform the strategic and ideological
outlook of either institution. Many military and ISI officers remained
tied to the Taliban militants and mujahideen with whom they had built relations over the course of two decades. Moreover, the Frankenstein monster of Pakistan-created jihadist
groups was now out of control: Pakistan created many such groups, and
supported them for over a decade. It couldn’t simply cut them all off
at once.
You can read the full article
here.