Counterterrorism Blog
The first multi-expert blog dedicated solely to counterterrorism issues, serving as a gateway to the community for policymakers and serious researchers. Designed to provide realtime information about terrorism cases and policy developments.
 

Fixing Our Pakistan Problem

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

I have an article in the new issue of the Journal of International Security Affairs examining the problem of support for religious militancy within Pakistan's military and intelligence services. An excerpt:

Shortly after 9/11, U.S. deputy secretary of state Richard Armitage gave Pakistan the ultimatum that, in [Pervez] Musharraf’s words, “we had to decide whether we were with America or with the terrorists, but that if we chose the terrorists, then we should be prepared to be bombed back to the Stone Age.” The first major battlefield in the war on terror was Afghanistan, and Pakistan’s geographic proximity and historical support for the Taliban made it strategically important. Armitage’s threat (along with several carrots) prompted Musharraf to announce a dramatic about-face, and closely align with the U.S. Musharraf declared on January 12, 2002, that “no Pakistan-based organization would be allowed to indulge in terrorism in the name of religion.” He banned five jihadist groups that day, including Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed.

The ISI [Inter-Services Intelligence agency] had already developed a distinctive strategic and ideological outlook prior to 9/11 that favored support for stateless Islamist fighters. Hence, along with his changed policies, Musharraf sacked pro-Taliban commanders at the top levels of the ISI and military. Altogether, he “forced the reassignment or resignation of Pakistan’s intelligence chief, two top generals and a number of other military commanders—most of whom were regarded as pro-Taliban or Islamist.”

In addition to the firings, Musharraf made other changes aimed at purging officers with extremist sympathies from the military and ISI. In February 2002, for example, Pakistan began “to disband two major units of its powerful intelligence service that had close links to Islamic militants in Afghanistan and Kashmir.” But this was not enough to transform the strategic and ideological outlook of either institution. Many military and ISI officers remained tied to the Taliban militants and mujahideen with whom they had built relations over the course of two decades. Moreover, the Frankenstein monster of Pakistan-created jihadist groups was now out of control: Pakistan created many such groups, and supported them for over a decade. It couldn’t simply cut them all off at once.

You can read the full article here.