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June 2009 Archives

How the FBI Broke Saddam - Part 3

By James Gordon Meek

Saddam Hussein loved to talk - and to b.s. his sole interrogator, FBI Supervisory Special Agent George Piro.

But, as we first reported in the New York Daily News in 2007, Piro - backed up by a team of FBI agents and crack CIA analysts - knew Saddam’s history too well. Where there were gaps, Piro was able to parry with the imprisoned leader to get credible answers. “High Value Detainee-1” was soon blabbing so freely it was hard for him to keep his lies intact.

Once secret FBI files on the Saddam interrogations, which I have been reporting the past week, show that as the weeks wore on Saddam opened up more and more. The FBI-CIA team leveraged its strategy to “overwhelm” - and break - Saddam by confronting the deposed dictator with evidence of his crimes against humanity.

He was soon boasting of terrible misdeeds against his own people - in order to set the historical record straight, which Piro had encouraged.

On Mar. 21, 2004, the FBI team in Baghdad reported they had conducted 16 interviews of Saddam and a dozen with his former henchmen, including ex-foreign minister Tariq Aziz and a death-dealing thug nicknamed “Chemical Ali.” Noting Saddam’s willingness to engage in “dialogue, not an interrogation,” the FBI’s Baghdad agents told Washington that Piro spent several sessions “discussing non-threatening topics,” and that Saddam felt relaxed enough “to talk freely and to boast of past accomplishments.”

But Saddam also quit eating in some unexplained protest, the FBI memo said - though he had grown so dependant on the G-man providing for all his needs that “Hussein announced he was ending his hunger strike for the benefit of SSA Piro.”

“As the rapport and dependency between Hussein and SSA Piro continues to grow, more complex topics are being introduced into the interviews,” such as detailed questions about gassing Kurds in northern Iraq and suppressing the 1991 Shi’a uprising, the once-secret memo reported.

“In the past, Hussein would have refused to discuss these topics. However, he has increasingly allowed himself to be drawn into discussions… [due] to the non-threatening manner in which they are being posed,” the FBI file said.

More on how the FBI needled Saddam into confessing his crimes in my full post at the Daily News' Mouth of the Potomac Blog.

Swat Analysis: Focus Shifts to Waziristan, Taliban Reaches Muzaffarabad

By Animesh Roul

'Swat Analysis’ is a Daily brief on the resurgent Taliban and their safe sanctuaries in Pakistan. The brief focuses on the developments in Swat province, NWPF and other Taliban hotspots. This is the concluding brief.

The Pakistani army has initiated military offensive code named “Rah-e- Nijat” in Waziristan to quell terrorist movement there, after flushing out Taliban/TNSM militants from Swat and Malakand region. The government claimed that military operation in Swat is nearing end. However, on the ground, the operation “ Rah-e-Rast” is far from over in Malakand region as security forces are still holding search and sweep operations in Swat and Dir areas. In Upper Dir’s Ghazi Gai area, Taliban and local militias are still confronting each other. It is believed that most of the senior Taliban leaders operating in Swat have either fled to Waziristan or crossed the border to Afghanistan.

Started since Mid June, the ongoing Waziristan operation targets Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan chief Baitullah Mehsud and his band of terrorists, including suspected al Qaeda leaderships hiding in the area. In the latest wave of operations in Ladha and Wana in South Waziristan, Taliban hideouts were targeted. In North Waziristan also security forces are engaged with Taliban militants who have been resorting to ambush tactics on security convoys and IED attacks recently. While the military engaged in shelling Taliban/al Qaeda hideouts there, the government has offered millions of rupees as head money for any information on Mehsud and his accomplices from South Waziristan, Bajaur, Mohmand, and Darra Adamkhel. The other Taliban leaders with head money were identified as Molvi Faqir, Abdul Wali, Qari Shakeel, Hakimullah Mehsud and Qari Hussain.

Taliban’s 'Ustad-e-Fidayeen' Qari Hussain, a close aide of Baitullah Mehsud and chief trainer for suicide bombers, was reportedly among many killed in US drone attacks in South Waziristan recently. However, there is no confirmation as such about his death till now.

The intra-fighting within Taliban leaderships emerged when Turkistan Bhittani, a dissident Taliban militant commander has spoken out against TTP’s Baitullah Meshud. Much before Bhittani’s resentment, another dissident Taliban commander Qari Zainuddin raised the standard of revolt. He was later killed by Baitullah’s followers in Dera Ismail Khan.

Taliban’s tentacles reached Pakistan Administered Kashmir (PAK) last week when a suicide bomber blew himself up targeting an army vehicle in Muzaffarabad, in an apparent retaliation of June 23 drone (U.S. unmanned aerial vehicles) attacks in South Waziristan. For the first time Taliban forces marked their presence in PAK region which traditionally dominated by ‘Kashmir-India- Centric’ terrorist outfits like HIzbul Mujahidin, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish- e- Muhammad.

Pakistan’s Interior Minister Rehman Malik in an interview indicated that Swat like situation might arise in south Punjab where a fleeing Taliban could take shelter. Meanwhile, in the latest search operations around Punjab province, Pakistan security forces have arrested nearly 40 suspected terrorists from various parts of the Punjab province as part of a countrywide crackdown. From the capital Islamabad, at least 25 pro-Taliban militants were arrested who were plotting attacks against vital installations and Embassies and security establishments. In Karachi, city police managed to bust a Taliban hideout and neutralized five close associates of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan Chief Baitullah Mehsud in a shootout near Gadap town.

It seems the war against Taliban forces in Pakistan will be long and winding one. The war in Swat province may be over soon, but for now, Islamabad administration is more concerned about the spill-over Taliban forces who might take shelters in or trying to regroup in volatile Waziristan, or Punjab and exterminating the top Taliban leadership there.

Previous Briefs on Swat Operation and Anti-Taliban offensive in Pakistan:

1."Taliban Retaliation, Tribal Backlash and 'Greater Pakhtunistan' Buzz" (June 7, 2009)
2."Rampaging Taliban Militants Spread Chaos Across Pakistan" (May 31, 2009)
3."Rah-e-Rast, Desperate Taliban and Divided Elites" ( May 20, 2009)
4."War, Disintegration and other Narratives" (May 5, 2009)
5. "Keeping an Eye on the Resurgent Taliban" (April 27, 2009)

How the FBI Broke Saddam - Part 2

By James Gordon Meek

Saddam Hussein was defiant in his first meetings with his American captors. But soon it was time to begin whittling down his ego, bloated by decades of absolute power in Iraq. Brute force, however, was not in the gameplan.

By mid-February 2004, FBI Supervisory Special Agent George Piro had sat down with Saddam Hussein three times - as I reported exclusively for the New York Daily News on Friday - and listened to the toppled tyrant yap away about his great accomplishments leading ragtag Iraq out of the Stone Age.

The FBI prides itself on “rapport-based” interrogations that have a high success rate for yielding confessions from the likes of 1993 World trade Center bomber Ramzi Yousef and CIA headquarters killer Mir Aimal Kasi. There was no “ticking bomb” scenario with Saddam - just inherent political pressure - so the interrogation proceeded carefully and cautiously over months.

The strategy involved executing a subtle emotional attack, digging out Saddam’s soft spots and exploiting them. Prick his ego.

Saddam had revealed little, so far - and neither had Piro - other than stating he remained in Baghdad until the day before his capital fell to American-led forces in April 2003. He said he instructed his henchmen in a final meeting, “We will struggle in secret.” After fleeing Baghdad, he gradually dispersed his bodyguards one by one to avoid drawing Coalition forces’ attention. Saddam had evaded capture for nine months, until U.S. viceroy Paul Bremer made his famous exultation in December 2003: “Ladies and gentleman, we got him!”

Piro asked if Saddam ever used body doubles, as was widely believed. “No, of course not,” he scoffed. “This is movie magic, not reality.”

But as the fourth interrogation began on Feb. 13, Saddam wanted answers from Piro.

“Let me ask a direct question. I want to ask where … has the information been going? For our relationship to remain clear, I want to know,” he demanded. Piro replied that he was a “representative of the U.S. Government” and told Saddam many U.S. officials saw his reports, and that readership “may include the President of the United States.” Saddam seemed pleased, commenting that he did “not mind” if the interviews were published.

Piro turned to Saddam’s WMD stockpiles but his quarry brushed it off, saying, “We destroyed them. We told you… By God, if I had such weapons, I would have used them in the fight against the U.S.” Hadn’t Saddam’s own decision to defy the UN on WMD inspections led to crippling sanctions and then a war that ousted him from power? “This is your opinion. I answered,” the stonewaller said. “We (Iraqis) are among the few remaining cavaliers.”

Read my full post on how the FBI began to whittle away at Saddam’s ego - as well as the FBI source documents - at the Daily News' Mouth of the Potomac Blog.

Hizb ut-Tahrir America Conference Venue Cancels

By Madeleine Gruen

HTA image - a matter of time.png The Aqsa School is unwilling to play host to Hizb ut-Tahrir America's (HTA) Khilafah Conference, according to an announcement that has been posted on HTA's Khilafah Conference 2009 web site. The event was scheduled for Sunday, July 19th.

The Aqsa School, an Islamic school located in Bridgeview, Illinois, was announced as the conference venue in the promotional video that was released by HTA earlier this month. The HTA conference web site provides no further explanation for the cancellation. The Aqsa School web site does not mention the Khilfafah Conference-- officially titled "Fall of Capitalism and Rise of Islam"-- or the subsequent cancellation.

It is possible that the school did not welcome the association with HTA, which adheres to extremist Islamist ideology. It is also possible that the board and administrators of the school anticipated unwelcome attention from the public and government officials as a result of hosting the conference.

HTA intends to find a new venue in which to hold the conference, according to the conference web site. Now that HTA has come out publicly, and is thus openly linked to the Khilafah Conference concept, it may be difficult for it to find a venue willing to host the event.

To read more about HTA's history, and its transition from covert to public operating status, please see my recent post on the Counterterrorism Blog.

Iran Sanctions: Still A Viable Option?

By Victor Comras

Earlier this month I had the opportunity to address a Canadian House of Commons Foreign Relations Subcommittee concerning the potential use and impact of sanctions on Iran and its quest for nuclear weapons. This oral testimony can be found here. At that time we were all awaiting the outcome of the Iranian Presidential elections and there was much speculation that a significant change might be in the offing. The outcome of those elections did effect change, but few could have predicted the context or direction those changes took.

We are now faced with an even more dangerous Iran – An Iran in the throes of a domestic upheaval that has illegitimized the government as representative of the Iranian people, hardened its position vis a vis the outside world, and made productive dialogue with Iran’s current leaders a virtual impossibility. What Western government leader would, in the present context, now be willing to engage with, and thereby strengthen and re-legitimize the Ahmadinejad administration and his Mullah regime overseers?

Yet, through all the turmoil in Iran there is no indication that those now ruling Iran have indicated any willingness to change course, or slow down their unmonitored uranium enrichment and their daily advances toward nuclear weapons capability. Each day brings Iran closer to that irreversible point after which Iran’s neighbors, and the rest of the world, must consider Iran to be nuclear weapons capable. It is that point that risks setting off an unstoppable proliferation of nuclear weapons programs in the Middle East, and beyond.

If dialogue with the current Iranian regime is not now possible, other options must be pursued. And the one option that stands out is for the West to apply significant sanctions pressure against the Ahmadinejad regime, and the mullahs, IRGC and other quasi military forces that are upholding it. We don’t need a UN Security Council resolution to accomplish this. But, we do need our European allies and friends, and other countries opposed to what is going on in Iran to join us in apply such measures. Europe remains the key. Western Europe alone accounts for Iran’s largest slice of trade and largest sources of revenues. Together we must impress also on the UAE, and especially Dubai, that it can no longer do business as usual with Iran with regard to circumventing sanctions Iran, or providing Iran’s corrupt leaders a safe place to deposit their money.

Let’s be clear. The low-impact sanctions now on the table simply will not work. We need to move forward now on putting in place sanctions that really target Iran’s political and economic vulnerabilities – the elements that can truly heighten the stress on its leaders. These vulnerabilities include Iran’s fragile financial system, Iran’s energy sector, Iran’s transportation and communication sector, and Iran’s elite investment entities..

Iran’s leaders will only change course if and when they are convinced that the international community will, in fact, take the steps necessary to deprive them of the resources they depend on to retain their positions of power and authority, or that they have squirreled away. Iran’s Mullahs and favored business leaders must be made to feel the pinch of sanctions. So far they have enjoyed a free ride, and with corruption running high throughout Iran’s ruling circles, there is quite a bit of their money outside Iran that could and should be frozen.

Europe, Japan and Canada should be convinced to join with us now also in cutting off Iran’s access to high tech items, including potentially dual-use, equipment and expertise. Together, we must put Dubai and the freeport of Jebel Ali on notice that we will no longer countenance their acting as intermediaries for transshipments of such goods to Iran.

With a daily consumption of more than 18 million gallons of gasoline Iran must now import some 180 to 200 million gallons of gasoline per month. The availability of gasoline exports to Iran should be curtailed. Rising petroleum prices have already been the cause of civil unrest, and gasoline shortages could have a significant impact on local business activity and put increased pressure on Iranian leaders to alter course.
Europe, Canada and Japan should also act restrict Iranian ship access to their ports, and refuse to insure or re-insure, or at least impose extra premiums on insuring, Iranian ships and cargoes.

Travel restrictions on Iran’s leaders should also be broadened, and cultural, sporting and scientific exchanges with Iran curtailed.

These are examples of measure that can be taken now to convince Iran we mean business. These are the kind of measures that give us our last best chance of heading off a graver crisis just a few years down the road.

Can Hezbollah Launch Long-Range Terror Attacks?

By Aaron Mannes

In his new book Homeland Security, Assessing the First Five Years, former DHS secretary Michael Chertoff argues:

Al-Qaeda and its network are our most serious immediate threat, they may not be our most serious long-term threat….[Hezbollah] has developed capabilities that Al-Qaeda can only dream of, including large quantities of missiles and highly sophisticated explosives.
Chertoff’s statement is conventional wisdom among many terrorism experts. Shortly after 9/11 then Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage stated:
Hezbollah may be the 'A-Team of Terrorists' and maybe al-Qaeda is actually the 'B' team.
But Hezbollah has not carried out a successful out-of-area attack since the 1996 Khobar strike. Is Hezbollah still capable of carrying out long-range terror attacks?

In 1992, exactly one month after Israel assassinated Hezbollah Secretary-General Abbas al-Musawi, the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires was bombed. Two years later, on July 18, 1994 Hezbollah bombed the Jewish communal offices in Buenos Aires, at least partially in response to Israel’s capture of Hezbollah leader Mustafa Dirani on May 21 and a bombing of a Hezbollah training camp on June 2.

In contrast, it has been almost a year and a half since Hezbollah terror master-mind Imad Mughniyeh was assassinated. Hezbollah has threatened revenge against Israel for the assassination of Mughniyeh. But attempts to kidnap Israeli tourists and bomb the Israeli embassy in Baku have been foiled. Azerbaijan borders Iran and Iran has a very large Azerbaijani population, so Hezbollah and its IRGC allies should have had a relatively easy time carrying out an attack.

Has Hezbollah’s ability to launch an attack deteriorated, or is it merely biding its time? In and of itself, this is an important question – but it achieves even greater significance in light of the unstable situation in Iran. One constraint on Western action is the concern of long-range terror by Hezbollah and its allies in the IRGC. If that threat is not be as significant as previously assessed, then one barrier to action is lowered.

Read the full post here.

How the FBI Broke Saddam - Part 1

By James Gordon Meek

Where were Iraq’s WMD? How close was Saddam Hussein to Al Qaeda, really?

These were vital - but still unanswered - questions when the Iraqi despot was yanked out of a spider hole in December 2003 and placed in U.S. military detention. Lives were at stake - along with the entire political rationale for the U.S.-led coalition invading Iraq. Only one man could say for sure, and now that the U.S. finally had him in custody, they had to find out.

There was only one way: Break Saddam.

The FBI’s newly-declassified interrogation files on Saddam Hussein, reported exclusively in yesterday’s New York Daily News, stand in contrast to the dark view espoused by Team Bush: extreme interrogation techniques extract confessions from “high-value” detainees who resist questioning.

The CIA and FBI were intent on getting Saddam to explain what happened to the missing weapons of mass destruction, his operational ties - if any - to Al Qaeda and admit his own crimes against humanity by gassing and slaughtering his own people. CIA WMD hunter David Kay had resigned in frustration in late January 2004, and the missing arsenal was vexing Team Bush just as special prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald was beginning his probe of the White House over leaks in retaliation against Iraq war critic Joe Wilson.

The pressure was intense.

A young, Arabic-speaking, Lebanese-American FBI agent named George Piro was picked to get Saddam to confess. Detailed interrogation plans were drawn up, and Piro sat down with one of the most brutally ruthless world leaders of the late 20th century, prepared to play mental chess with a master of manipulation, whose intelligence ranged from cunning street smarts to quirky political intuition.

The first FBI interrogation of Saddam Hussein al-Tikriti - in a program codenamed “Desert Spider” - took place Feb. 7, 2004, in a dingy cell at Baghdad International Airport. Memos obtained by The News through a 2006 Freedom of Information Act request for Saddam’s file show that top FBI and Justice Department officials had decided Feb. 6 not to read high-value detainees Miranda rights or to identify interrogators to detainees in any way other than as “representatives of the United States Government” or “U.S. Government agents.” Saddam assumed Piro was a top Bush aide - not a low-ranking street agent.

Sizing up the G-man, Saddam observed that Piro (an FBI supervisory special agent) was “smart,” and predicted, “Perhaps a conversation between two such educated people will not be useful or successful.” He decreed that it was only important to him what people say or think about him “in the future, 500 or 1,000 years from now.”

The ex-leader ranted about all he had done for Iraq, which “barely had anything” when he came to power in a bloodbath 40 years ago. Piro asked if he had ever failed in his decades as Iraq’s leader, but Saddam countered, “Do you think I would tell my enemy if I made a mistake?”

His ego as yet undiminished by captivity, Saddam gloated that “the only political parties existing in Iraq are the ones with the weapons” - a reference to the growing lethality of the Sunni insurgency - and said it made no difference what anybody thought about him. “Hussein believes people will love him more after he passes away than they do now,” Piro wrote in his first FBI “302” report back to Washington.

Read my complete post on how the FBI broke Saddam Hussein and the original FBI interrogation reports at the Daily News' Mouth of the Potomac Blog.

NEFA Foundation: Transcript of Shaykh Mustafa Abu al-Yazid's Al-Jazeera Interview

By Evan Kohlmann

nefayazid.jpgThe NEFA Foundation has obtained a transcript of an Arabic-language interview Shaykh Mustafa Abu al-Yazid (a.k.a. “Shaykh Saeed”) gave to Al-Jazeera television on June 22, 2009. Asked about Pakistani nuclear weapons, Abu al-Yazid replied, "Allah-willing the nuclear weapons will not fall in the hand of the Americans, and the Muslims take them [weapons] and use them against the Americans Allah-willing.” Commenting on Hezbollah, he said, “Hezbollah, we do not consider it an Islamic Party and it is a rejectionist party as you know, and its loyalty is towards Iran…a complete loyalty. There is no relationship between us and them, and what we mean is the mujahideen from the people of Sunna like Fatah al-Islam in Lebanon; they are the ones we commend and the likes of them.” And addressing Iran, he stated, "Regarding Iran, we consider it a state of hypocrisy and schism, and it is the state that appears Muslim and claims Islam but in fact it fights the Muslims."

The English transcript can be downloaded from the NEFA Foundation website
.

State of Play VI: Malevolent Mashups

By Roderick Jones

I had the pleasure of hosting the Security and Surveillance panel discussion at the State of Play VI conference at New York Law School last week. The panel was designed to try and explore ideas around security and surveillance in virtual worlds. While the overall title of the conference was 'plateau' the feeling on the panel was that constant innovation within and outside of virtual worlds would continue to create new security challenges. Michael Schrage coined the phrase 'Malevolent Mashups', which seemed to describe the future challenge.

Blog of the panel can be found here.

Have the Islamists won in Algeria?

By Olivier Guitta

For the past month, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has perpetrated numerous terror acts including two major attacks against Algerian policemen: one that killed 24 on June 18 and another one that killed 6 on June 22.
While the military aspect of the Algerian regime's fight against Islamists has been well covered, another aspect of this fight has been left in the dark.
In a piece in today's Examiner I make the point that the Islamists have widely penetrated Algerian society.
You can read my whole article here.
Here is an excerpt:

Algeria may be winning the military battle against Islamists, but it’s losing the ideological war. Over the last 10 years, Algeria’s efforts to root out terrorist elements have been undermined by Algerian society’s increasing tolerance of Islamists’ intolerance.

A March 2009 study by the Algiers-based women’s rights group Ciddef documents the regression of Algerian society especially when it comes to the condition of women.

For example, today only 16 percent of Algerians favor the equality of sexes, compared with 27 percent in 2000. And 70 percent of Algerians would like every Algerian woman and girl alike to wear the hijab. Nadia Ait Zai, Ciddef’s founder, explains, “Women are paying the price of ten years of Islamist pressure.”

The proof of this pressure can be seen in the soaring number of young girls throughout Algeria wearing the hijab. For example, the mother of a 6-year old girl in Dergana explained that at the beginning of the school year, her little girl came back from school with a hijab.

When asked by her mother, who does not wear the hijab, why she was doing this, the child replied, “But it’s a duty! God asked us to do so! … And you are a kafra [infidel], God will make sure you will suffer in hell.”

FBI Replaces Brotherhood Tainted Liaison with Brotherhood Tainted Liaison

By The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT)

A top FBI official met Wednesday with the vice president of the Islamic Society of North America, a move which followed the Bureau's decision "to use ISNA as their official point of contact with the American Muslim community," an email from an intelligence community veteran that was widely distributed Wednesday said.

The FBI has not yet commented on the claim. But the IPT has confirmed that the meeting did take place at FBI headquarters. The decision to make ISNA the FBI's contact point came over the objections of case agents and supervisors investigating Muslim Brotherhood activity in the U.S.

Last year, the FBI cut off outreach communication with the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), after evidence in the Hamas-support trial against the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF) raised questions "whether there continues to be a connection between CAIR or its executives and HAMAS." The FBI's case agent testified that CAIR was a Hamas front.

Like CAIR, ISNA was an unindicted co-conspirator in the HLF trial. It is listed among "who are and/or were members of the US Muslim Brotherhood." Jamal Badawi, an ISNA board member, also was named as an unindicted co-conspirator, listed among people who raised money for HLF.

The evidence involving ISNA, however, was not as deep as it was with CAIR. In CAIR's case, its founders are included on a telephone list for members of a secret Hamas support network in the U.S. created by the Muslim Brotherhood. And they participated in a 1993 meeting of Hamas members and supporters called to discuss ways to thwart U.S.-led peace efforts between Israel and the Palestinians.

In that weekend-long meeting, CAIR co-founder Omar Ahmad discussed ways to mislead Americans about their goals and ideology. Executive Director Nihad Awad discussed media strategies to help the cause.

In the evidence admitted by the court, ISNA officials were not named among members of the Hamas support network, called the Palestine Committee. But FBI investigative records show it held a significant role in the Brotherhood's U.S. activities. According to an FBI memorandum from the 1980s obtained via the Freedom of Information Act, past "ISNA conferences provided opportunities for the extreme fundamentalist Muslims to meet with their supporters ... The annual conferences are used for both religious and political purposes. The political purpose is to further the Islamic Revolution, which includes providing anti-U.S. and Israel publications and publications that support the war effort of Iran in the Iran-Iraq war."

The Brotherhood is an 80-year-old Egyptian movement which seeks to spread the rule of Shariah, or Islamic law, throughout the world. But some top FBI officials are not convinced the Brotherhood is a problem, a law enforcement source said Thursday. This, despite the fact that FBI investigation has uncovered documents showing the U.S. Brotherhood's goal is "a kind of grand Jihad in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within and "sabotaging" its miserable house by their hands and the hands of the believers so that it is eliminated and God's religion is made victorious over all other religions."

The problem, the source said, is too many FBI officials have developed friendly individual relationships with the leadership of groups like ISNA. "As an FBI agent, we use facts and evidence and truth to base our decisions and not because we went to dinner with someone."

ISNA's roots in the Brotherhood are clearly established. Internal Muslim Brotherhood records in evidence the HLF trial show ISNA was created by Muslim Brotherhood members in the U.S. who had been leaders of the Muslim Students Association. In addition, the Chicago Tribune and federal prosecutors in Dallas have documented the link.

Read our full post on the ISNA-FBI developments here.

Terrorist Financing on the Internet

By Michael Jacobson

Since the September 11 attacks on the United States, al-Qaeda has come under growing international pressure. In response, the terrorist organization has increasingly relied on the internet to spread its message and gain support throughout the world. While its use of the internet for propaganda and recruiting purposes has received wide publicity, al-Qaeda has also utilized the internet for a variety of other purposes, including terrorist financing. Al-Qaeda is far from alone among terrorist organizations in exploiting the internet for financing. A wide range of other terrorist groups -- including Hamas, Lashkar-i-Tayyiba and Hizballah -- have also used the internet to raise and transfer needed funds to support their activities.

The internet offers broad reach, timely efficiency, as well as a certain degree of anonymity and security for both donors and recipients. Although governments throughout the world now recognize that the internet is an increasingly valuable tool for terrorist organizations, the response has been inconsistent. For the United States and its allies to effectively counter this dangerous trend, they will have to prioritize their efforts in this area in the years to come.

Click here to rest the rest of this article, which was published in the June issue of "The Sentinel," the West Point Counterterrorism Center's monthly journal.

More Terrorists Arrests in Indonesia

By Kenneth Conboy

With a presidential election slated for 8 July, the Indonesian security forces have recently gone into overdrive while making a series of arrests of terrorist suspects. Over the past couple of days, the police counter-terrorist unit, Special Detachment 88, has detained two radicals believed to be Singaporean nationals. The first, Syamsul Anwar alias Somad bin Soba, was arrested in Bandar Lampung, Lampung province. The second, Husaini, who had been living in Malang, East Java province, was picked up while en route to Central Java.

Both were thought to have infiltrated into Indonesia in 2002 along with Slamat Kasteri, a Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist who escaped from a Singaporean prison last year and was re-captured in Malaysia on 1 April. Along with Kasteri, the two men arrested in Indonesia this past week were thought to have been tied to an aborted plot to bomb Changi International Airport in Singapore.

Residents near Syamsul Anwar’s house in Bandar Lampung expressed shock over his reported ties to terrorism. He was said to spend his time driving a pedicab and attending prayer sessions at a local mosque.

Also arrested in Indonesia this past week was Syaifudin Zuhry in Cilacap, Central Java. Zuhry was reported tailed for months and is thought to be closely tied to JI fugitive Noordin Top.

West Africa in the New Cocaine Pipeline

By Douglas Farah

Yesterday the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee's Subcommittee on Africa held what Chairman Russ Feingold (D-Wisconsin) called a wake up call on the growing threat of cocaine trafficking through West Africa.

I testified there on the ties of the emerging groups in West Africa to the FARC and my fellow CTB contributor Michael Braun testified as well.

I think it is a tremendously important development because, in the end, there are two major consequences for the United States: the money from that trade will strengthen the criminal pipelines in our hemisphere because most of the money comes back here and; the human cost of putting that much new money into the existing criminal pipelines in a region where there has already been horrendous violence surrounding far less valuable commodities.

The amount of money in play here is enormous, particularly given the weak state of governments, civil society, law enforcement, the judiciary etc. There is little that can be done to avert the wholesale implosion of the region.

One of the reasons for this is the dismal state of governance in West Africa is that since the early 1990s the region has suffered a series of conflicts centered on natural resources, particularly diamonds, timber, oil, and gold. Profits from these "honey pot" wars fueled the rise of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone with its child soldiers and unspeakable atrocities; fed the wars sustained by Liberia's Charles Taylor; and contributed to the rampant corruption and weak or failed institutions in almost every country. These natural resources, while valuable, pale in comparison to the money the cocaine trade generates. For example, at the height of the "blood diamond" trade in Sierra Leone and Liberia, the total value of the diamonds being smuggled out was less than $200 million. The potential to fuel conflicts over the cocaine pipeline, the most lucrative commodity so far and one whose profits are several orders of magnitude larger than diamonds, is truly frightening.

Given Hezbollah's long-established presence on the ground in the region and the closeness of its operatives to that community, it is also reasonable to assume that Hezbollah and the drug traffickers, operating in the same permissive environment, will cross paths. It is precisely this type of environment that allows for the otherwise unthinkable alliances to emerge. Most are short-lived, centering on specific opportunities and operations that can benefit both groups, but others are longer lasting and more dangerous.
My full blog is here.

Defending the City: NYPD's Counterterrorism Operations

By Michael Jacobson

This afternoon, the Washington Institute hosted Richard Falkenrath, the NYPD Deputy Commissioner for Counterterrorism, as part of a lecture series the Institute has been running since late 2007 with senior US counterterrorism officials.

Here is an excerpt of his remarks:

The threat is both external and internal. The external threat, I think, is best understood by the federal government and by the Beltway experts. I think the internal threat – the homegrown threat – is far less well understood by counterterrorism experts in Washington. And there’s a reason for that, which is our entire counterterrorism intelligence collection process in the United States requires predication. It requires various conditions to be met in order for the FBI or the other agencies involved to proceed with their investigations.

Now, that predication is usually foreign intelligence of one kind or another. And when we get it, the federal government is well-positioned to proceed with counterterrorism investigations. It’s far more difficult when there is no connection to a foreign terrorist organization, and when there’s no connection to any terrorist organization – when it’s just an individual or a small number of individuals who may be watching television or downloading videos or getting on Web sites, but not actually connected to anyone who we know to be bad, but who might themselves decide to go try something.

And in other countries, we’ve seen this occur. Britain has a very bad problem – homegrown terrorism problem – but there have been other cases, particularly in Europe, and it could happen in the United States. The events of last month in the Bronx...illustrate that. And what happened there was four individuals from outside of New York City – from the Newburgh area of New York – decided to carry out a
terrorist attack against two synagogues in Riverdale part of New York.

To read the entire transcript of the event, click here.

Hizb ut-Tahrir America Launches Web Site to Promote July Conference

By Madeleine Gruen

Hizb ut-Tahrir America (HTA) has a launched a Web Site to promote its July 19th, 2009 Khilafah Conference in Bridgeview, Illinois.

http://www.khilafahconference2009.com/

The site provides an agenda for the conference, but does not provide a list of invited speakers or any contact information for the organizers.

The well-designed site indicates that HTA is taking steps to create an impression with the public and with its target audience that it is a solidly established institution.

Most likely, HTA's membership and support base in the United States numbers only in the hundreds. Due to the fact that HTA's operations have been largely clandestine until now, it has been difficult to determine the size of its ranks. However, several known members have status and influence in universities and in their communities.

For more information about HTA's activities in the United States, and their recent transition to the public phase of operations, please see my recent post on the CTB.

Kids Martyrdom Videos Get New Sophistication, Huge Audience

By The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT)

The little girl's dark brown eyes look heavenward as she sings,

When we seek martyrdom, we go to heaven.

You tell us we're small, but from this way of life we have become big.

Without Palestine, what does childhood mean?


This is not a song from Hamas television in Gaza, nor is it a Hizballah anthem. "When We Seek Martyrdom" is the latest hit from a production house called Birds of Paradise. It is racking up millions of hits on Arabic and worldwide websites. Birds of Paradise, which appears to be based in Jordan, is quickly becoming one of the most popular children's groups in the Arab world.

My country and my blood are like its sands

Without Palestine, what does childhood mean?

Youtube, has dozens of editions and edits of the video, ranging from Arab parents having their children parrot the lyrics to Jihadists using it as background music in terrorist videos. "[Birds of Paradise] is one of the most widely distributed children's songs group in the Arab world, and it seems to have crossed the ocean to Canada and Britain," wrote journalist Fawzia Nasir al-Naeem in the Saudi Arabian newspaper, Al-Jazirah.

"Birds of Paradise" represents a new wave in Jihadist youth indoctrination. It is far more professional, better edited, and presented in a much more kid-friendly style than previous Jihadist children's programming. The themes are easily digestible even for toddlers. Child actors portray Israeli soldiers, all wearing yarmulkes, who ruthlessly gun down other children shown playing and dancing. Minutes later, the kids exact revenge and kill the soldiers.

See our report, and the video, here.

Hizb ut-Tahrir America Enters Public Stage

By Madeleine Gruen

HT flag splits American Flag.jpgHizb ut-Tahrir America (HTA) has indicated that it has transitioned from its covert status to a public phase of operations by issuing an announcement, signed in its own name, that it will host a conference in July 2009 to support the establishment of a Caliphate. The promotional video can be viewed on YouTube. The event, titled "The Fall of Capitalism and Rise of Islam," is scheduled for Sunday, July 19th, 2009, at the Aqsa School in Bridgeview, Illinois.

Bridgeview is a suburb of Chicago. Chicago has been a major hub of HTA's activities for the past ten years, approximately. According to information available on the internet, the Aqsa School is a private Islamic primary and secondary school. Although HTA's Khilafah conference will be held at the school, there is no public indication that the school, its staff, or its board members are directly involved with HTA.

Last fall, after HTA issued a leaflet in its own name calling for Muslims not to participate in the U.S. elections, I wrote a brief post on CTB about the possible transition of HTA to the second stage of its development. According to party doctrine, Hizb ut Tahrir (HT) implements its strategy in three stages--The first stage is the covert level of development in which members are recruited and trained. In the second stage, members promote the party's methods and objectives publicly in order to win the support of the Muslim population. The final stage is the establishment of an Islamic government and military, in order to carry HT's "message to the world."

Indeed, HTA's announcement that it will host the Khilafah conference in July indicates that the U.S.-based branch now perceives itself as solidly prepared to emerge from its covert status into the second stage. HTA has held Khilafah conferences, and other major conferences, in the past, but has only done so from behind fronts and covers.

Other international branches of HT that have advanced from the developmental stage to the public phase have done so after achieving a level of internal fortitude that would enable the branch to withstand opposition. The transition may indicate that HTA perceives a level of comfort in an operating environment in which aggressive challenge from the government or the public is not anticipated. In order to sustain operations publicly, the branch leaders must be confident that members are loyal and committed to HT's objectives.

The conference promotional video does not provide a list of speakers or an agenda for the conference. However, Khilafah conferences hosted by branches of HT in other countries most often include prominent HT members invited from overseas. It is likely members of HT will travel from abroad to the conference in Bridgeview, Illinois, to enhance the credibility of HTA and to solidify the commitment of its members.

The promotional video for the July conference appears to have been created by an Australian member of HT, which indicates some degree of coordination between the organization's branches. This particular member has created promotional videos for HT conferences in Indonesia and in Australia.

Although HTA appears to have transitioned to the second stage of development, it is important to note that aspects of HTA's activities will continue to be conducted covertly, such as recruitment and ideological training.

HT is not designated as a terrorist organization in the United States, however many consider it to be a stepping stone to more militant organizations.

For more information on Hizb ut-Tahrir, please see Hizb ut-Tahrir: Islam's Political Insurgency, by Zeyno Baran.

For more information on the background of Hizb ut-Tahrir America, please see my article in the Jamestown Terrorism Monitor.

New Bolivia Paper: Into the Abyss

By Douglas Farah

The International Assessment and Strategy Center has just published a paper I wrote on the rapidly-deteriorating situation in Bolivia: Into the Abyss: Bolivia Under Morales and the MAS.

The study outlines several of the more dangerous elements of the Morales government and his ties to Venezuela and Iran. Among them are:

o The systematic de-institutionalization of the nation's fragile democratic structures, including the judiciary and independent auditing agencies;
o A complete restructuring of the military patterned after the Venezuelan model of integrating the armed forces into a host of civic and traditionally civilian roles;
o A radical restructuring of the military doctrine, endorsing the asymmetrical warfare tactics embraced and employed by radical Islamist groups and formally adopted by Hugo Chávez and the Venezuelan military;
o A complete restructuring of the nation's intelligence apparatus, advised by Cuban and Venezuelan experts on internal security;
o Growing ties to the FARC and other armed groups in Latin America;
o Permanent confrontation, insults and attacks-verbal and physical-on members of the press, leading to numerous international expressions of concern.

Of greatest concern is the little-discussed endorsement of Chavez of the a doctrine of asymmetrical warfare against the United States based on the principles pioneered by radical Islamist groups.

Since 2005 Chávez has rewritten Venezuela's security doctrine to scrub it of all outside, "imperialist" influences. To replace the old doctrine, Chávez and the Venezuelan military leadership have focused on developing a doctrine centered on asymmetrical warfare, in the belief that the primary threat to Venezuelan security is a U.S. invasion. One of the main books he has adopted is Peripheral Warfare and Revolutionary Islam: Origins, Rules and Ethics of Asymmetrical Warfare (Guerra Periferica y el Islam
Revolucionario: Orígenes, Reglas y Ética de la Guerra Asimétrica)
by the Spanish politician and ideologue Jorge Verstrynge.
My full blog is here.

Captured Terrorist Bombs Explode in Indonesia

By Kenneth Conboy

The late Jemaah Islamiyah bomber, Azhari Husein, who was killed when his house in East Java was raided in 2005, appears to have struck from beyond the grave. On 17 June, several of his bombs, which were being kept as training aids, blew apart a warehouse of the Indonesian police Mobile Brigade just south of the capital Jakarta.

The explosions took place at around 0215 on 17 June and are believed to have been caused when torrential rains prompted a short circuit in the warehouse. The explosions were heard for 5 kilometers and broke windows in several adjacent houses.

Sources in the Indonesian media said the warehouse stored several home-made bombs seized from Azhari's hideout in 2005, as well as several other bombs seized during the capture of JI suspects in 2007. They were being used by counter-terrorist units to study how terrorists put together their devices.

Defeating al-Qaeda and Neutralizing Its Support Networks

By Michael Jacobson

This afternoon, the Washington Institute published a piece by Ali Soufan, a former FBI agent, who was one of the Bureau's lead investigators and interrogators in a number of key international terrorism investigations, including the 1998 embassy bombings and the 2000 attack on the USS Cole. Mr. Soufan has received considerable attention in recent months for his op-eds for the New York Times and testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee on the issue of interrogations.

In the piece for the Institute, Mr. Soufan discusses interrogations and provides recommendations on the division of labor between the FBI and CIA, but he also offers his broader thoughts on US counterterrorism strategy.

Here is an excerpt:

In mid-June, a group of tourists visiting Yemen's tribal areas were brutally murdered by terrorists most likely connected to al-Qaeda. This tragic event underscores a particularly difficult challenge for the United States and its allies: as al-Qaeda's activities are undermined in one part of the world, it adapts and moves its operations elsewhere. Yemen and Somalia -- where the al-Qaeda-linked al-Shabab movement is now a major force -- are the latest examples of this phenomenon. To thwart al-Qaeda's versatility, our counterterrorism strategy must adapt to the terrorist organization's changing modus operandi and theaters of battle. We also need to improve our ability to counter asymmetrical threats, which require more than just a military response. Against a foe like al Qaeda which operates in the shadows, it's intelligence that is crucial to defeating them. It is therefore crucial that we use the best and most effective intelligence-collection methods, and that our key counterterrorism agencies work seamlessly together.

To read the rest of the piece, click here.

NEFA Foundation: "Target: America": The Conspiracy to Establish a Terrorist Training Camp In Bly, Oregon"

By Madeleine Gruen

The NEFA Foundation has released the 19th report in the “Target: America” series, which focuses on the conspiracy to establish a jihad training camp in Bly, Oregon in late 1999 through early 2000.

In October1999, Seattle native, James Ujaama came up with the idea of opening a jihad training camp outside of the tiny town of Bly, Oregon, where his acquaintance from the Dar-us-Salaam mosque in Seattle, Semi Osman, had moved with his family to a 160-acre abandoned sheep ranch. Ujaama proposed the training camp idea to his spiritual mentor, London cleric Abu Hamza al-Masri. Al-Masri, who had a track record of facilitating and funding jihad training for his followers, saw potential in Ujaama’s idea, and sent two of his closest followers, Oussama Kassir and Haroon Rashid Aswat, from London to the United States to investigate further.

The men found the conditions on the Bly ranch to be unsatisfactory for the purpose of establishing a jihad training camp and abandoned the plan. However, the evidence presented in the indictments and the recent trial of Oussama Kassir revealed useful information about terrorist training methods. The case also sheds further light on how radicalization and recruitment may occur in the United States.

In May 2009, Oussama Kassir, was found guilty in Manhattan federal court of charges related to his participation in the effort to establish a jihad training camp in Bly. Al Masri and Aswat are both awaiting extradition to the United States to stand trial for their role in the Bly training camp conspiracy, pending their appeals in the European Court of Human Rights.

The entire report can be read at the NEFA Foundation web site by clicking on this link.

Ramifications of a Possibly Armed Muslim Brotherhood

By The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT)

An Egyptian newspaper claims the Muslim Brotherhood may have constituted a large, well-armed wing, with perhaps thousands of operatives, and its purpose is to engage in terrorist operations.

The report, published May 27 in Egypt's Al-Masry Al-Youm, carried the headline, "Why is Security Silent About the Secret Armed Organization of the Brotherhood?" A potential mission for this Muslim Brotherhood armed division would be to send 10,000 trained fighters to south Lebanon (Hezbollah territory) and to Gaza to attack Israel. Author Hussaneyn Kuroum notes there are some Muslim Brotherhood leaders who refute the existence of an armed wing, but the current Secretary General (Guide) Mahdi Akef, has made statements clearly indicating that the organization has such an armed element. The article questions what the Egyptian security services may or may not know about this unit.

Kuroum cites an interview in a separate Egyptian publication with Brotherhood opponent Wahid Hamid, who argues Akef's brash talk has meaning:

"He said that he is prepared to send to South Lebanon tens of thousands of fighters. Will he send them with clubs and swords? Or will they be armed in a modern fashion, besides there being trained to fight? Mahdi Akef also said, 'I am prepared to send fighters to Gaza.' Good. He'll send them with what and how? Sure, armed and trained. The matter is clear. It can be easily concluded."

The public suggestion in a respected, privately-owned Egyptian media source that the Muslim Brotherhood has a significant armed branch should be of keen interest to U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies. If this is true, it should put to rest any consideration by U.S. officialdom to engage the Muslim Brotherhood in substantial dialogue. It would seemingly weigh in favor of designating the Muslim Brotherhood as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO).

Read our entire article here.

NEFA Foundation Report - "Al-Qaida and Europe: The Case of the German-Pakistani Aleem Nasir"

By Evan Kohlmann

The NEFA Foundation has released a new report by NEFA Director of Analysis and Research Ronald Sandee titled, "Al-Qaida and Europe: The Case of the German-Pakistani Aleem Nasir." Nasir was arrested in June 2007 in Pakistan on suspicion of involvement in a bomb plot. Following his return to Germany, Western authorities gained significant insights into Nasir's activities and identified him as a kingpin in the radical Muslim scene in Germany. He recruited young men for the Jihad and sent them to training camps in Pakistan's Tribal Areas. Nasir also went to Pakistan more than once to deliver cash and supplies to al-Qaida's top commanders, including Mustafa Abu Yazid and the late Abdullah Azzam al-Saudi, Abu Zubair al-Masri and Khalid Habib. This paper, which draws heavily on Pakistani intelligence reports and confidential documents to which Sandee gained access, also highlights the close links between al-Qaida and the Lashkar-e-Taiba.

The report can be downloaded from the NEFA Foundation website.

Rep. Wolf Takes on CAIR, and A US-MB Tie to Hamas

By Douglas Farah

Two interesting notes regarding the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood-linked groups in the United States over the weekend.

First, Rep. Frank Wolf (R-Va), took the unusual and courageous step of directly tackling CAIR on the floor of the House last Friday. In his speech, also available on Youtube, Wolf laid out CAIR's history in some detail and asked the FBI and the main Justice Department to clarify the status of their relationships with CAIR.

After reviewing the group's history, Wolf identified one of their most effective tactics and why it is so dangerous:

Given CAIR’s genesis, its associations with known terrorist entities and individuals, and its tactics—namely attempting to discredit anyone who dares to speak out against its organization—their cries of victimization and accusations of religious bigotry appear disingenuous.

Wolf further noted that:

In a federal court filing from December 2007, federal prosecutors described CAIR as "having conspired with other affiliates of the Muslim Brotherhood to support terrorists." The government also stated that "proof that the conspirators used deception to conceal from the American public their connections to terrorists was introduced" in the Holy Land Foundation trial.

In a footnote government prosecutors points out: “(F)rom its founding by Muslim Brotherhood leaders, CAIR conspired with other affiliates of the Muslim Brotherhood to support terrorists…”

Other elected officials, including Democrats like Charles Schumer and Dick Durbin and Republicans like Jon Kyle and Tom Coburn, have taken on CAIR, but Wolf's call to the FBI and other U.S. government agencies to keep a healthy distance from the organization is both timely and important, as CAIR and other MB-linked organizations seek to influence the Obama administration.

The ties of some of these groups to Hamas is shown by this note in the Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Report (free subscription required)

The posting notes that:

In a response to the recent President Obama speech to the Muslim world, Islamic convert Robert Crane makes the interesting admission that he is a “principal adviser” to Hamas leader Ahmed Yousef. In an article in the American Muslim, Dr Crane writes:

"The best approach was taken by Dr. Ahmed Yousef, for whom I served in the 1990s as Managing Editor of his scholarly Middle East Affairs Journal and for whom I have long been a principal adviser. As the Deputy Foreign Minister in Palestine’s legally elected government, and as one of the two intellectual founders in 1983 of the Palestinian Hamas, Dr. Yousef has authority as perhaps the world’s leading Islamist in the search for peace, prosperity, and freedom through compassionate justice".

Youssef serves as Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the dissolved government in Gaza but is usually described by the western media as a political adviser to Ismail Haniya, senior political leader of Hamas and one of two disputed Prime Ministers of the Palestinian National Authority. His Middle East Affairs Journal is published by the United Association for Studies and Research (USAR), part of the Palestine Committee of the U.S. Muslim Brotherhood and generally thought to be part of the Hamas infrastructure in the U.S.

Dr. Crane, who was very briefly U.S. ambassador to the UAE in 1981 and who converted to Islam in Bahrain during that year, has been a board member of the USAR as well as holding positions with the American Muslim Council and the International Institute of Islamic Thought, both also part of the U.S. Muslim Brotherhood. In 1998, Dr. Crane wrote that he had a “structure for Islamizing America.”

Shortly after 911, Dr. Crane published an article blaming the terrorist attacks solely on the U.S, and specifically on “active U.S. support of secularized and xenophobic Zionism”

In 2007 wrote that he looked forward to the collapse of the “American Empire” which he said would come about “only with the help of Muslims”:

The American Empire must eventually collapse, as John Whitehead predicts, and as all empires have. The challenge is to transform America so that it is no longer an empire and therefore can serve the intent of its founders to be a moral model for the world based on the universal wisdom of all the world religions. This transformation can come only with the help of Muslims who are pursuing the mission of educating their fellow Muslims for the good of America.

Crane's public acknowledgement of being a principal advisor to a leader of Hamas, as the GMBDR notes, may be a violation of U.S. law regarding the provision of material support for designated terrorist organizations, which is what Hamas is. At the least, it shows the ties between the legacy MB groups in the US and Hamas remain strong.

Dear As-Sahab: Please Take Away Adam Gadahn's Microphone

By Evan Kohlmann

Late yesterday, Al-Qaida's official media wing--the As-Sahab Media Foundation--released yet another meandering, half-baked video message from American Al-Qaida member Adam Gadahn, formerly of Los Angeles, California. Gadahn--who perhaps at best can be described as an arrogant, pasty-faced computer nerd--has nonetheless become a key spokesman for Al-Qaida over the past five years. Making his initial debut in October 2004, a masked and angry Gadahn cut a much more fearsome figure. Aside from the relatively silent "American Taliban" John Walker Lindh, most people had never seen a U.S.-born jihadi in the flesh before--and his words left little to the imagination. Awkwardly jabbing into the air with his chubby pale fingers, he insisted, “what took place on September 11 was but the opening salvo of the war against America and … Allah willing, the magnitude and ferocity of what is coming your way will make you forget all about September 11. … Allah willing, the streets of America will run red with blood … casualties will be too many to count, and the next wave of attacks may come at any moment.” We next saw Gadahn in September 2005, this time wearing something suspiciously reminiscent of a woman's veil. Ratcheting things up a notch, he swore revenge on his own hometown: “Yesterday, London and Madrid. Tomorrow, Los Angeles and Melbourne (Australia, God willing.”

With words like that, big things were obviously expected from Mr. Gadahn and a hoped-for wave of likeminded souls from within the U.S. who would rise up and follow his call. Yet, the scattered groups of fanatics who have been detained in Europe and North America in possession of Gadahn's videos seem to largely suffer from the same fatal flaws as Mr. Gadahn himself: they have an overdeveloped sense of grandeur, they lack any sense of humility, and they are often emotionally infantile. Meanwhile, Gadahn has turned into a bloated and bizarre media caricature of himself--the undisputed Rush Limbaugh of Al-Qaida. He now appears regularly on "Bin Laden TV", dispensing bits of personal wisdom about everything from the 9/11 attacks to the affairs of the Palestinians. His persistent threats against America no longer seem so prescient, and his eyebrow-raising ideological tangents into controversial Muslim issues would appear to be strongly inadvisable for Al-Qaida. With each new consecutive video he appears in, he only adds to the punchline and further dilutes the underlying seriousness of Al-Qaida's intentions.

Were Al-Qaida's leadership to read this, they could perhaps dismiss these criticisms by explaining it away as merely a "crusader" attempt to rain on Al-Qaida's parade, no matter who the messenger. Yet, for those who would defend Gadahn on this basis, there is a clear, recent example of an effective American mujahid who has appeared on video and who admittedly does have a certain distinct "Che Guevara"-style appeal. I speak here of "Abu Mansour al-Amriki", the erstwhile star of a recent propaganda video produced by the Shabaab al-Mujahideen Movement in Somalia. While Abu Mansour certainly displayed his own set of eccentricities--including rapping freestyle about Al-Qaida and terrorism--he fits much more closely into the mold of an Ibn-ul-Khattab or an Usama Bin Laden. Abu Mansour speaks softly, carefully, and deliberately. He offers deference to others, and in a tone that suggests coolness and confidence, not frothy rage. He is shown fighting in the field, hiding from the enemy, and without any sense of script or pretension. In a word, in contrast to the constantly posturing Gadahn, Abu Mansour appears genuine. Not the least of all, his incredible pronunciation of Arabic makes Adam Gadahn's Quranic recitation sound by comparison like someone banging trash cans together.

Thus, on behalf of all of us, this is an open appeal to As-Sahab to please take away Adam Gadahn's microphone. There has got to be someone more influential--or at least somewhat more interesting--to constantly parade around on camera.

NEFA Foundation: New Video From American Al-Qaida Spokesman Adam Gadahn

By Evan Kohlmann

nefagadahn.jpgThe NEFA Foundation has obtained a new video recording of most wanted American Al-Qaida spokesman Adam Yehiye Gadahn, titled "Let's Continue our Jihad and Sacrifice." During the video, produced by Al-Qaida's As-Sahab Media Foundation, Gadahn sharply criticized the Obama administration for its policies towards the Palestinians. According to Gadahn, "The Obama administration is an old/new American administration led by a clique of Zionist Jews and Zionized Christians who respect in a believer neither kinship nor convenant... So, patient Mujahid brothers in Palestine, continue your jihad and heroics against the ferocious Zio-Crusader assault on the lands of the Muslims... Zio-Crusader interests everywhere are legitimate targets for us... the Jewish enemy doesn't abstain from striking us wherever possible... So is it logical after that for us to abstain from striking their interests wherever possible?"

An English transcript of Gadahn's remarks can be downloaded from the NEFA Foundation website.

NEFA Foundation "Target America" Report: "The Little Rock, Arkansas Recruiting Station Shooting"

By Evan Kohlmann

nefatargetamerica2.jpgThe NEFA Foundation has released the eighteenth installment in the “Target: America” series, which examines the June 1, 2009 shooting attack by Muslim convert Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammed, formerly known as Carlos Bledsoe, at a U.S. Army/Navy recruiting center in Little Rock, Arkansas. The attack killed Pvt. William Long, while Pvt. Quinton Ezeagwula suffered non-life threatening injuries. Describing the attack as something that has "been on" his mind "for awhile" and that "was just...heat of the moment," Muhammed explained that "U.S.soldiers are killing innocent Muslim men and women. We believe that we have to strike back. We believe in eye for an eye. We don't believe in turning the other cheek." For Muhammed, who was enraged by allegations that U.S. military personnel desecrated the Quran and raped and murdered Muslims, "the shooting was an act, for the sake of God, for the sake of Allah, the Lord of all the world, and also a retaliation on U.S. military." According to the FBI, Muhammed also “conducted Google map searches related to Jewish entities, a Baptist church, a child care facility, a US post office and military recruiting centers in…Atlanta, Georgia; Little Rock, Arkansas; Louisville, Kentucky; New York, New York; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and Memphis, Tennessee." The report provides information on Muhammed's background, from his time in Tennessee and Ohio to his journey to Yemen, and also describes other plots targeting military facilities in the U.S. after 9/11.

The report can be downloaded from the NEFA Foundation website
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Punitive Power: Combating Proliferation with Sanctions

By Matthew Levitt

On April 5, despite repeated warnings from the US and others, North Korea launched a rocket the regime claimed was sending a satellite into space, but which Washington viewed as another test of the regime’s ballistic missile systems. On April 6, the UN Security Council issued a non-binding statement condemning the launch as a violation of Security Council Resolution 1718, a 2006 resolution which prohibits North Korea from engaging in any missile-related activity.

More recently, North Korea’s recent nuclear and missiles tests leave the international community in a difficult position, where military options are limited at best, and where tough diplomacy is unlikely to achieve the desired results. The likely response will once again center around sanctions and financial pressure, including blacklisting numerous North Korean entities, including banks and trading houses, and imposing a trade embargo on dual use goods and technologies, and empowering navies to stop and search North Korean vessels suspected of carrying illicit cargo.

As the cases of North Korea and Iran highlight, sanctions are a frequent yet controversial tool used by the international community in dealing with proliferant states and nuclear non-compliance. But how successful can we expect these tools to be? What are their limitations? These are questions my colleague Michael Jacobson and I explore in an article published by Jane's Intelligence Review.

In other related news, The Washington Institute's work on the issue of combating the finances of transnational threats has not only been published recently by the Emirati Center for Strategic Studies and Research, it is now being cited by Jihadists themselves. An Arabic summary of our report "The Money Trail" is is circulating on jihadi Internet forums such as As-Ansar. We are pleased to see our scholarship receiving attention in such a broad range of outlets.

Strategic Importance of a Peshawar Hotel

By Aaron Mannes

The attack on the Pearl Continental Hotel in Peshawar was a major attack that will have important implications for the counter-insurgency in Pakistan. This is an issue that could have a ripple effect felt worldwide.

Strategic Guests
Hotels can be important symbolic targets. The Marriott Hotel in Islamabad, which was bombed in September 2008, was a gathering place for Pakistan’s elite (and a prominent watering hole for those Pakistanis who took a casual attitude towards Muslim restrictions on alcohol) as well as symbolizing the casual modern worldliness of this globalized age. This was also reflected in the Mumbai attackers targeting prominent hotels.

The attack on the Pearl Continental had fewer casualties then the Marriott bombing, but may have been more sophisticated - employing gunmen to pin down the guards allowing the truck bomb to get closer to the hotel.

The Peshawar bombing may also prove more significant historically then the Marriott bombing.

Read the full post here.

How Non-State Actors Learn and Teach

By Douglas Farah

One of the fascinating things about a spate of recent articles is that they point to how non-state armed actors acquire information and new, ever-more sophisticated techniques. Two examples are the Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan and the more sophisticated of the Somali pirates.

This shows that these groups talk and learn from other groups, have networks to transfer technologies and "lessons learned" and greatly accelerate the speed of their learning curves. Unconstrained by laws, acquisition regulations and budgetary considerations, these groups can rapidly acquire whatever they can afford. Thanks to the fact that dozens of shipping companies have paid tens of millions of dollars to the different Somali clans and sub-clans that carry out the piracy, they are cash flush.

The Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) says the pirates, until recently, had attacked during the day and were relatively unsophisticated in their tactics. Now, however, "pirates have attacked vessels at night and have conducted attacks far off the eastern coast of Somalia," the CMF said. Using "mother ships" as staging platforms and night vision technology, they are able to operate much further from the Somali coast than before.

This means that extra territorial actors are providing the pirate groups with what they need, in a space that has had virtually no functional government for more than a decade. Just as the RUF, deep in the bush in Sierra Leone, could be found by U.S. European and African diamond merchants and weapons purveyors, the pirates can find the market or the market can find them.

The Taliban is also showing increasing sophistication in their attacks.

Two commando-style assaults in Pakistan in the past two weeks show militants can now pierce the iron-fortified gates, concrete barricades and cordons of armed guards that are meant to secure hotels, housing compounds and even police stations across the country.

The level of organization and sophistication of the attacks has been rarely seen in Pakistan. They are designed to send a message that if the military launches an offensive against the Taliban's stronghold near the Afghan border it will face a highly determined and well-prepared enemy, analysts say.

"It is an improvement in their tactics; they are trying to enter the target through use of force," Mahmood Shah told The Associated Press. "It appears that they are in a hurry and they are becoming more aggressive."

One can trace the evolution of these tactics to the cross training, both on the ground and in cyberspace, that the Taliban has shared with other militant groups, including al Qaeda and Hezbollah. The terrorist organizations have the express intent of sharing tactics, strategies and lessons with each other, and spend a great deal of time in doing that. They have money from poppies and private donors that allows them to dedicate time and resources studying, sharing and acquiring the best off the shelf products, with no need for competitive bid contracts and the like.

But, as David Ignatius writes in today's Washington Post, our side seems to be somewhat fixated on internal wars and turf fights in a system that has not grown more streamlined since 9-11.

While there are some efforts put into transmitting lessons learned on the U.S. side, those efforts are sporadic and almost never cross over to those of lessons we could learn from our allies. One of the most interesting things in watching Latin America is how little the Colombian efforts against the FARC have been studied and taught.

Non-state actors have a built in advantage because they are not accountable to anyone, have no use for transparency and are not slowed by the niceties of democratic debate. And, as Ignatius notes, "There's a world of scary people out there, and the country can't afford this turf war any longer."
My site is still down. I hope it will be back up soon.

Combating the Financing of Transnational Threats

By Michael Jacobson

As the NEFA Foundation reported, Shaykh Mustafa abu al-Yazid (aka Shaykh Saeed), the former Al Qaeda finance chief and current head of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, recently released a statement again lamenting the poor state of his organization's finances. He explained how the lack of financing is affecting their ability to carry out operations and to run the organization, and proclaimed that contributing money to the jihad is a religious obligation.

Shaykh Saeed's statement highlights what has been one of the more effective aspects of the international counterterrorism efforts over the past eight years -- combating terrorist financing. In fact, targeting the finances of illicit actors has proven effective in other contexts as well, particularly Iran.

While ultimately no one tool will deter, disrupt or prevent the illicit activities of terrorists, proliferators, insurgents, or other transnational threats, combating the financing of transnational threats has shown particular promise, especially when used in concert with other policy tools.

My colleague Matt Levitt and I just completed a new study on this subject, which was published by the Emirati Center for Strategic Studies and Research. To read the study, click here.

Al-Qaida's No. 3 in Afghanistan Sent Begging for Cash, Again

By Evan Kohlmann

nefayazid.jpgThe NEFA Foundation has obtained a new audio message from Shaykh Mustafa Abu al-Yazid (a.k.a. “Shaykh Saeed”), during which Al-Qaida's No. 3 in charge desperately begs for cash donations in order to fund continuing jihadi operations in Afghanistan. In May 2007, Al-Qaida’s official As-Sahab Media Wing identified al-Yazid as “the overall head of al-Qaida Organization in Afghanistan.” According to As-Sahab, al-Yazid “took part in founding al-Qaida in 1989, and is a member of the Shura council of Qaida al-Jihad.” In this message, Abu al-Yazid stated, "Jihad needs a lot of money, and the Jihad battlefields need much money." He continued, "Jihad with money is also an obligation. And here we, in the battlefield in Afghanistan, are lacking a lot of money and a weakness in operations because of lack of money, and many mujahideen are absent from Jihad because of lack or absence of money with which they can carry out Jihad. Even many brothers…who want to sacrifice themselves for the cause of Allah, we cannot prepare them because of lack of money."

During the recording, Abu al-Yazid also spoke highly of "our Turkish brothers" and their growing role in the mujahideen in Afghanistan -- noting that several Turkish nationals have recently been "martyred" during jihadi operations along the Afghan-Pakistani frontier.

An English transcript of Abu al-Yazid's remarks can be downloaded from the NEFA Foundation website.

How Do They Radicalize Others?

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

Today I have a column in the Washington Times discussing recent homegrown terrorist events in Arkansas and the Bronx. I explore the overarching question of how some Americans, like Arkansas shooter Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad, decide to take up arms against the society where they were born and raised. An excerpt:

There has been debate among those who study terrorism over the extent to which ideology -- such as al Qaeda's dark worldview -- helps make a terrorist. Some observers think it is an important factor, while others argue that the feeling of grievance (legitimate or not) is critical and ideology provides only a veneer of pretext.

Interestingly, the Arkansas case provides fuel for both sides at first glance. Little Rock's police chief told the media that investigators think the shooting had "political and religious motives" (in other words, an ideology) but also mentioned that Mr. Muhammad told police he had acted out of anger at the United States killing Muslims in Iraq and Afghanistan (in other words, a grievance).

In an attempt to better understand the radicalization process, my colleague Laura Grossman and I released a study in late April, "Homegrown Terrorists in the U.S. and U.K.: An Empirical Examination of the Radicalization Process," that explores external manifestations of radicalization of 117 homegrown "jihadist" terrorists from the United States and Great Britain.

The study examines several specific manifestations. These include adopting a legalistic interpretation of Islam, coming to trust only select and ideologically rigid religious authorities, perceiving Islam and the West as irreconcilably opposed, manifesting a low tolerance for perceived theological deviance and attempting to impose one's religious beliefs on others. We found that all of these steps occurred frequently enough among the sample to be significant.

The prevalence of these factors suggests the importance of religio-political ideology as individuals become radicalized (an ideology that cannot be described as Islam itself, but rather a rigid and non-mainstream understanding of that faith). Underscoring this finding, more than a quarter of the homegrown terrorists examined had a spiritual sanctioner in their plot, an individual with perceived religious authority who provided theological approval for the violent activity. About 20 percent had a spiritual mentor, a more experienced Muslim who gave instruction and direction during the radicalization process.

You can read the full Washington Times column here. The study on homegrown terrorism in the U.S. and U.K. that my column discusses can be downloaded here.

Hack-Jet: Losing a commercial airliner in a networked world

By Roderick Jones

When there is a catastrophic loss of an aircraft in any circumstances, there are inevitably a host of questions raised about the safety and security of the aviation operation. The loss of Air France flight 447 off the coast of Brazil with little evidence upon which to work inevitably raises the level of speculation surrounding the fate of the flight. Large-scale incidents such as this create an enormous cloud of data, which has to be investigated in order to discover the pattern of events, which led to the loss (not helped when some of it may be two miles under the ocean surface). So far French authorities have been quick to rule out terrorism it has however, emerged that a bomb hoax against an Air France flight had been made the previous week flying a different route from Argentina. This currently does not seem to be linked and no terrorist group has claimed responsibility. Much of the speculation regarding the fate of the aircraft has focused on the effects of bad weather or a glitch in the fly-by-wire system that could have caused the plane to dive uncontrollably. There is however another theory, which while currently unlikely, if true would change the global aviation security situation overnight. A Hacked-Jet.

Given the plethora of software modern jets rely on it seems reasonable to assume that these systems could be compromised by code designed to trigger catastrophic systemic events within the aircraft's navigation or other critical electronic systems. Just as aircraft have a physical presence they increasingly have a virtual footprint and this changes their vulnerability. A systemic software corruption may account for the mysterious absence of a Mayday call - the communications system may have been offline. Designing airport and aviation security to keep lethal code off civilian aircraft would in the short-term, be beyond any government civil security regime. A malicious code attack of this kind against any civilian airliner would, therefore be catastrophic not only for the airline industry but also for the wider global economy until security caught up with this new threat. The technical ability to conduct an attack of this kind remains highly specialized (for now) but the knowledge to conduct attacks in this mold would be as deadly as WMD and easier to spread through our networked world. Electronic systems on aircraft are designed for safety not security, they therefore do not account for malicious internal actions.

While this may seem the stuff of fiction in January 2008 this broad topic was discussed due to the planned arrival of the Boeing 787, which is designed to be more 'wired' --offering greater passenger connectivity. Air Safety regulations have not been designed to accommodate the idea of an attack against on-board electronic systems and the FAA proposed special conditions , which were subsequently commented upon by the Air Line Pilots Association and Airbus. There is some interesting back and forth in the proposed special conditions, which are after all only to apply to the Boeing 787. In one section, Airbus rightly pointed out that making it a safety condition that the internal design of civilian aircraft should 'prevent all inadvertent or malicious changes to [the electronic system]' would be impossible during the life cycle of the aircraft because 'security threats evolve very rapidly'.

Boeing responded to these reports in an AP article stating that there were sufficient safeguards to shut out the Internet from internal aircraft systems a conclusion the FAA broadly agreed with - Wired Magazine covered much of the ground. During the press surrounding this the security writer Bruce Schneier commented that, "The odds of this being perfect are zero. It's possible Boeing can make their connection to the Internet secure. If they do, it will be the first time in the history of mankind anyone's done that." Of course securing the airborne aircraft isn't the only concern when maintenance and diagnostic systems constantly refresh while the aircraft is on the ground. Malicious action could infect any part of this process.

While a combination of factors probably led to the tragic loss of flight AF447 the current uncertainty serves to highlight a potential game-changing aviation security scenario that no airline or government is equipped to face.

Comments on Hack-Jet:

(Note - these are thoughts on the idea of using software hacks to down commercial airliners and are not specifically directed at events surrounding the loss of AF447).

If you would like to comment on Hack-Jet go to discussion blog linked here.

From the author of Daemon Daniel Suarez:

It would seem like the height of folly not to have physical overrides in place for the pilot -- although, I realize that modern aircraft (especially designs like the B-2 bomber) require so many minute flight surface corrections every second to stay aloft, that no human could manage it. Perhaps that's what's going on with upcoming models like the 787. And I don't know about the Airbus A330.

I did think it was highly suspicious that the plane seems to have been lost above St. Peter & Paul's Rocks. By the strangest of coincidences, I had been examining that rock closely in Google Earth a few weeks ago for a scene in the sequel (which was later cut). It's basically a few huge rocks with a series of antennas and a control hut -- with nothing around it for nearly 400 miles.

Assuming the theoretical attacker didn't make the exploit time-based or GPS-coordinate-based, they might want to issue a radio 'kill' command in a locale where there would be little opportunity to retrieve the black box (concealing all trace of the attack). I wonder: do the radios on an A330 have any software signal processing capability? As for the attackers: they wouldn't need to physically go to the rocks--just compromise the scientific station's network via email or other intrusion, etc. and issue the 'kill' command from a hacked communication system. If I were an investigator, I'd be physically securing and scouring everything that had radio capabilities on those rocks. And looking closely at any record of radio signals in the area (testing suspicious patterns against a virtual A330's operating system). Buffer overrun (causing the whole system to crash?). Injecting an invalid (negative) speed value? Who knows... Perhaps the NSA's big ear has a record of any radio traffic issued around that time.

The big concern, of course, is that this is a proof-of-concept attack -- thus, the reason for concealing all traces of the compromise.

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From John Robb - Global Guerrillas:

The really dangerous hacking, in most situations, is done by disgruntled/postal/financially motivated employees. With all glass cockpits, fly by wire, etc. (the Airbus is top of its class in this) it would be easy for anybody on the ground crew to crash it. No tricky mechanical sabotage.

External hacks? That is of course, trickier. One way would be to get into the diagnostic/mx computers the ground crew uses. Probably by adding a hack to a standard patch/update. Not sure if any of the updates to these computers are delivered "online."

Flight planning is likely the most "connected" system. Easier to access externally. Pilots get their plans for each flight and load them into the plane. If the route has them flying into the ground mid flight, it's possible they won't notice.

In flight hacks? Not sure that anything beyond outbound comms from the system is wireless. If so, that would be one method.

Another would be a multi-directional microwave/herf burst that fries controls. Might be possible, in a closed environment/fly by wire system to do this with relatively little power.

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There has been continuous discussion of the dangers involved with fly-by-wire systems in Peter Neumann's Risk Digest since the systems were introduced in the late 1980s. The latest posting on the subject is here.

Investigator: Computer likely caused Qantas plunge
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Links to Note

PodCast Analysis of flight AF447 error messages from Innovation Analysis Group [Analysis suggest all computer systems failed simultaneously]

Pilot Network online discussion

Aviation Safety Network

Photograph of Jet from spotter site

Twitter Feed for Flight AF447

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Iran, the Taliban and Russia

By Douglas Farah

The Daily Telegraph of London brings news that Iranian weapons are still flowing to the Taliban, despite the Obama administration's efforts to forge a fragile alliance with the radical Shiite government on cutting off this lethal supply line.

As the story notes, most of the weapons are brand new, and fairly sophisticated, inflicting serious damage on U.S. and NATO forces.

Sources said Tehran was still "hedging its bets", with elements within the country believed to be supporting Afghan insurgents.The Shia-Muslim dominated country has no wish to see extremist Sunni groups like the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan but it remains deeply suspicious of the US presence.

International forces believe elements within the Iranian regime are either behind the smuggling or at least doing little to stop it. The disclosure that weapons are still freely flowing across the border follows Afghan army claims that Iranian weapons were recovered from a notorious Taliban and drug trafficker haven in Helmand province.

One needs to step back and see where the Iranian weapons come from, and why the suppliers to Iran don't seem to care where the weapons end up. The answer is that Russia, who we still like to pretend is an ally in combating radical Islam, is the main supplier, and Russia has shown no qualms in arming radical groups (often via Iran).

The clearest example of the Russian-Iranian pipeline came in the 2006 conflict between Hezbollah and Israel, where the pipeline provided the Shiite militants with armor-piercing rockets and other armament that the Israeli forces clearly were not expecting. Victor Bout (still held in jail in Bangkok, awaiting supposedly the final hearing on his extradition in August) helped move those weapons.

Now the same pipeline is helping the Taliban, although the two have many differences. This continues the Iranian tradition of playing all sides that it believes could be convenient, often with Russian complicity and support. Following the 2001 coalition attack on Afghanistan, several senior members of al Qaeda, including Osama bin Laden's son and at least one of his wives, along with the families of other senior al Qaeda leaders, transited Iran on their way to safety. Other senior AQ leaders were placed under some sort of domestic detention, and most have been allowed to leave Iran and continue their jihad against the West. It has no qualms about seeing its weapons go to radical Islamist groups, no matter the persuasion, to hurt the West.

Russia, with its desire to increase its arms sales to bolster the economy and stature as a world power, is selling Iran billions of dollars worth of weapons, and, in exchange, Iran has opened the doors for Russia in Latin America, particularly Venezuela. (Venezuela has declared publicly some $4.5 billion in weapons purchases from Russia in the past 4 years, and that does not account for the huge amount of off the books purchases that have been made as well.) There are apparently few controls placed on who Iran passes the weapons on to.

The Obama administration may be right in wanting to hit the reset button with Russia and begin anew in its relationship with a very important country that is occasionally our ally. But the reset button should not erase or obscure the fact that Russia is what it is-a constant and steady supplier of weapons and technology to nations who have expressed the desire to attack the United States and its allies. It does not prize the rule of law (the government is in many ways an organized criminal syndicate) and it does not value a relationship of trust with the United States or others.

Otherwise, why would Russian government and organized crime spend billions hacking into every major government and non-government computer system in a far more sophisticated spying operation than they ever mustered during the Cold War?

One can reset to reality. The Bush administration, with its infatuation and blind belief in the goodness and democratic intentions of Putin, was clearly not reality based. I hope the Obama reset is not in the same mold.

NOTE: My personal website is under a viral attack, so I won't link to it here. I will link again when we get that cleaned up.

Swat Analysis: Taliban Retaliation, Tribal Backlash and 'Greater Pakhtunistan' Buzz

By Animesh Roul

'Swat Analysis’ is a Daily brief on the resurgent Taliban and their safe sanctuaries in Pakistan. The brief will be posted in regular intervals focusing on the developments in Swat province, NWPF and other Taliban hotspots.

Taliban’s footprints have reached capital Islamabad after over a month long Swat offensive. As threatened earlier, Taliban militants have carried out retaliatory attacks with series of bombings across Pakistan’s northwest and major cities.

On Saturday, June 06, at least two people were killed in a suicide attack on a police emergency response unit in the national capital, Islamabad. A day earlier, Taliban suicide bomber struck a mosque located in Hayagai Sharqai village of Upper Dir district (NWFP) killing nearly 40 people, including 12 children.The Dir mosque mayhem received widespread condemnations. The United Nation Chief Ban Ki-moon too condemned this ‘indiscriminate and reprehensible acts of violence.’

Besides indiscriminate suicide attacks, suspected Taliban militants are also resorting to parcel /letter bombs. In Khyaban-e-Rahat area of Karachi, a political leader Yaqub Bizenjo (of Balochistan National Party (Awami)) was among four people injured when a parcel bomb exploded in Bizenjo’s house.

Even though the Karachi attack was not of high intensity and the Islamabad attack was foiled before it could create bloodbath, the fear of Taliban reaching fortified cities of Pakistan has now become a deadly reality. Both Islamabad and the garrison city of Rawalpindi have been on the Taliban terror radar since long and recently security forces unearthed a cell comprising ten suicide bombers and their handlers in this twin city area. These two places are considered as high value target for Taliban militants now.

In the latest round of violence, Amir Izzat Khan and Mohammad Alam, two senior leaders of TNSM and close aides of Sufi Mohammad were killed. However, no senior Taliban leaders have so far been captured alive or killed in the battle.

The government has claimed that Mingora, Kalam, Buner and Mardan have been completely cleared by security forces. But recent spurt of Taliban violence in Buner and Mardan shows that there is still a strong force of Taliban element has been operating in these areas. Taliban forces are still resorting to guerilla war tactics carrying out ambush on army convoys in these areas.

The villagers of Upper Dir area had reportedly opposed Taliban earlier and now Pakistan's military is increasingly using the public disenchantment against Taliban forces in the tribal dominated areas of Waziristan and NWFP. In a first such instance, a group of Tribal lashkars (militia) have attacked Taliban militants following the mosque blast and killed at least 13 of them and destroyed their hideouts in Upper Dir.

Another development occurred in NWFP which reinforces the fear of a possible disintegration of Pakistan. Pakistan government is now taking seriously the buzz of “Greater Pakhtunistan” which has been doing the rounds in Bannu and Lakki Marwat districts of the NWFP. There were signboards depicting maps of ‘Greater Pakhtunistan’ which sparked controversy in November last year in NWFP. Greater Pakhtunistan’ is a controversial movement or idea for an independent country constituting the Pashtun dominated areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan. However, whether the current buzz is for a separate Pakhtun state to be carved or just for Pakhtunkhwa (by renaming NWFP), is not clear.

Hizballah Campaigns at Home, Exposed Abroad

By Matthew Levitt

As the Hizballah-led March 8 coalition campaigns ahead of Lebanon's June 7 elections, the group has been forced to contend with the unexpected exposure of its covert terrorist activities both at home and abroad. At home, Hizballah now stands accused of playing a role in the assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Hariri. Abroad, law enforcement officials have taken action against Hizballah support networks operating across the globe, including in Egypt, Yemen, Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire, Azerbaijan, Belgium, and Colombia. Together, these activities pose what Hizballah leader Hassan Nasrallah recently described as "the largest and most important and serious challenge" facing Hizballah today.

Implicated in Hariri Assassination: Last week, the German weekly Der Spiegel revealed that the UN special tribunal investigating Hariri's assassination has now implicated Hizballah. According to the report, which cites Lebanese security sources, investigators identified cell phones linked to the plot and found that "all of the numbers involved apparently belonged to the 'operational arm' of Hizballah." The report identified Abdulmajid Ghamlush as one of the main suspects and described him as "a Hizballah member who completed training courses in Iran." The investigation of Ghamlush, who reportedly purchased the mobile phones, led officials to Hajj Salim, the alleged mastermind of the assassination plot and commander of a "special operational unit" reporting directly to Hizballah secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah.

The full article is available here.

India's Military Battles Taliban Anxiety

By Animesh Roul

Originally published as "Indian Army Reacts to the Taliban Threat," Terrorism Monitor, (Jamestwon Foundation) Volume: 7 Issue: 15, June 04, 2009.

I just published one article on the Indian army's reaction and prepardness for the impending Taliban threat.

Here is an excerpt:

For India’s military, the Taliban is a threat looming large on the horizon. The perception of the Taliban making inroads to India has increased since December 2008, when Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) chief Baitullah Mahsud vowed to fight alongside the Pakistan army if a conflict broke out between India and Pakistan (The News [Islamabad], December 23, 2008; see Terrorism Focus, December 12, 2008). The verbal threat has since been underlined by the Taliban’s eastward movement inside Pakistan, from its bases in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) to the city of Lahore, close to the Indian border in Pakistan’s Punjab province (India has its own, smaller Punjab province on the other side of the boundary). The advance on Lahore was marked initially by the Manawan police academy siege just outside of Lahore on March 30, in which 8 policemen were killed and 95 wounded, and more recently by the May 27 suicide bombing of the Lahore headquarters of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (The News, May 28; Geo News, May 28). Manawan is strikingly close to the international border with India; hence the fear of the Taliban reaching India through the Wagah border drew enormous public and military attention at the time. These fears are now reinforced by the Taliban bombing in Lahore.

Particularly worrisome were the conversations intercepted by India’s intelligence services between Lashkar-e-Taiba militants in Jammu and Kashmir that gave hints of a Taliban presence inside Kashmir. [1] TTP spokesman Muslim Khan refuted the reports but said if the Taliban ever decided to fight the Indians in Kashmir, no power on earth could stop them (Greater Kashmir, April 20).

Amidst these developments, speculations are rife about the possible impact of the Taliban’s growing strength on India’s security. Fears are being expressed by political and military elites about a potential Taliban incursion into Indian territory in the near future. Similarly, anxiety over a “nuclear-armed Taliban” in the event it takes over Pakistan’s nuclear installations and missile arsenal also dominates the security discourse in India.

For Complete Article, Read Here.

Clinton Call on Obama's Speech Includes Jihad Advocate

By The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT)

On the eve of a Democratic primary election in Virginia, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has handed a public relations bonanza to an Islamist candidate who has praised Palestinians for choosing "the jihad way" to liberation.

Esam Omeish is considered a dark-horse candidate in the Virginia House of Delegates District 35 race. The primary is Tuesday.

On Thursday, Clinton invited Omeish to participate in a national conference call to discuss President Obama's Cairo speech aimed at repairing America's image with Muslims. In that speech, Obama made clear demands for Hamas to renounce violence and recognize Israel's right to exist:

"Resistance through violence and killing is wrong and does not succeed."

And

"Hamas must put an end to violence, recognize past agreements, and recognize Israel's right to exist."

That's more than Omeish has been willing to do. In a 2000 speech given at a rally recorded by the Investigative Project on Terrorism, Omeish congratulated Palestinians for choosing the jihad way and said "we are with you and we are supporting you and we will do everything that we can, Insh'Allah, to help your cause."

Two months earlier, Omeish said "we need to congratulate our brothers and sisters in Filastin (Palestine) for their bravery, for their giving up their lives for the sake of Allah and for the sake of Al-Aqsa."

The speeches came during the early stages of the second Palestinian uprising, this one called the Al Aqsa Intifada, which featured a series of deadly terrorist attacks against Israelis.

Omeish's words came back to bite him in 2007. He had just been appointed to a state immigration panel by Gov. Tim Kaine, but he was forced to resign shortly after when Kaine learned about the video. Omeish since has claimed his words were taken out of context and that the use of the word "jihad" was not a call for violence:

"It means emotional, intellectual as well as physical struggle. And I think it's important for us, if we want to engage the Muslim community, it's not to allow ourselves to define them but to allow them to define themselves for who they are."

As the IPT reported last month, the videos represent but two examples of Omeish extolling jihad, Hamas leaders or the need for a transformation in American culture to make it more compatible with Islam.

Read the full story here.

Jeopardy Doubled? Think Twice...

By Bill West

Youssef Megahed, an Egyptian former engineering student at the University of South Florida in Tampa, was acquitted in April of Federal terrorism-related felony charges. Days after his acquittal, Special Agents from DHS' Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) arrested Megahed for removal (deportation) violations, reportedly based on evidence that is essentially the same as that presented in his criminal trial. Predictably, there has been an outcry from various individuals and groups protesting the immigration arrest and detention as unfair and tantamount to double jeopardy.

Today, the New York Times posted an article concerning Megahed's case. Substantially, the Times reports on Megahed's supporters against his pending immigration case. The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT), an organization for which I consult, also posted an article today on its website. The IPT presents another view of the Megahed caper.

There are some aspects to all this worth consideration.

In the 1990s, O.J. Simpson was acquitted of felony murder charges related to the deaths of his ex-wife and her friend. Subsequent to his acquittal, he was found culpable for their deaths in a civil trial based on essentially the same evidence that was presented in his criminal prosecution.

Occasionally, accused tax cheats are acquitted of tax fraud in their criminal trials. This does not preclude the IRS from aggressively pursuing those acquitted defendants under civil/administrative violations that parallel the prior criminal charges and using the same evidence in order to collect back taxes, penalties and interest.

O.J. Simpson had virtually no one raising the banner of double jeopardy when he faced those civil charges. Similarly, but for the accused tax violators themselves, there is no outcry of "tried twice" unfairness resulting from those civil tax cases. Change the scenario to immigration proceedings against a publicly portrayed hapless immigrant, and the hue and cry from protesting apologists is almost deafening, notwithstanding the concept and legalities being the same.

Mr. Megahed will have his adversarial days in court. Any adverse decisions rendered against him he will be able to appeal...all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court if he so decides. The rule of law mandates the judicial process go forward in the Megahed case. Anything else may be just political pandering.

ARKANSAS' LONE JIHADIST: HOW ALONE IS HE?

By Walid Phares

In an armed attack outside the Army-Navy Career Center which handles recruiting, in Little Rock, AR, Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad, 23, killed one soldier wounded another. Muhammad, an American citizen who is a convert to Islam and previously known as Carlos Bledsoe, already had been under investigation by the FBI at the time of the shootings. He had traveled to Yemen, received indoctrination from radical clerics, according to a watch group, and possessed a false Somali passport. He was charged in the death of Pvt. William Long, 23, while a prosecutor said Muhammad admitted shooting Long and another soldier "because of what they had done to Muslims in the past."

Arkansas Jihad.jpg

Read More »


RADICALIZATION: MADE IN THE USA?

By Matthew Levitt

When officials announced the successful prevention of a plot in New York to bomb synagogues and down airplanes with rocket-propelled grenades, many reacted with shock at the prospect of locally radicalized violent extremists plotting attacks here at home. Indeed, policymakers, long focused on the radicalization problem facing our European allies, were slow to realize that domestic radicalization and terrorist recruitment is a problem here in the United States as well. While short of the acute radicalization and recruitment crisis facing many European countries, recent events from Minneapolis to Atlanta suggest the United States is not immune from similar phenomena on our side of the Atlantic.

Overall, Muslim-American communities have had a relatively positive integration experience—particularly in comparison to Europe. This is often attributed to the United States’ inclusive, immigrant-friendly environment, stringent and well-enforced anti-discrimination policies, and—most of all—the strong belief in an equal opportunity to climb the socio-economic ladder and achieve financial prosperity. In the United States communities are integrated into society without having to sacrifice their distinct cultural identities.

But recent months have seen troubling developments on this front. In October 2008, a Somali youth apparently radicalized and recruited in the Minneapolis area, participated in what the FBI believes is the first instance of an American suicide bomber anywhere. In Minneapolis, the FBI reports, “there has been an active and deliberate attempt to recruit individuals—all of who are young men, some only in their late teens—to travel to Somalia to fight or train on behalf of al-Shabaab.” None of these recruits are believed to have been tasked to return home and conduct attacks in the U.S., but the FBI remains concerned about such a possibility. Lashkar-e-Taibah, the group behind the Mumbai attacks, maintains “facilitation, procurement, fundraising, and recruitment activities worldwide, including in the United States,” according to the FBI.

For my full article, published by the Homeland Security Policy Institute at George Washington University, is available here.

Missing the Point on Hamas

By Matthew Levitt

Paul McGeough, an accomplished reporter with the Sydney Morning Herald, has written a page-turner of a book on the failed assassination attempt of Hamas leader Khaled Mishal, but as a serious and balanced study of Hamas, the book's flaws run deep and wide. The layman will find it hard to put down Kill Khaled: Mossad's Failed Hit . . . And the Rise of Hamas but should be forewarned that McGeough's lacklustre analysis does not match his expert storytelling.

McGeough expertly tells the tale of the failed assassination and the way Mishal leveraged his new status as Hamas's "living martyr" to great effect in fending off rivals to his leadership within Hamas. What McGeough fails to convey adequately are the events that led Israel officials to decide that targeting a then relatively unknown Hamas leader, on the streets of one of only two Arab countries at peace with the Jewish state, was a risk worth taking. Only after the book's first 126 pages is the reader eventually introduced, in passing, to the string of spectacular terrorist attacks Hamas carried out in the weeks before the attempted assassination of Mishal in Amman, Jordan.

Readers should not expect to read of these terrorist attacks in Kill Khalid, let alone of logistical and support networks Hamas maintains to support them. The Hamas suicide bombers who targeted an outdoor Jerusalem market in July 1997 are not the subject of a chapter or analysis in McGeough's telling of the Hamas story, nor are the suicide bombers who targeted Jerusalem's popular Ben Yehuda pedestrian mall in September of that year.

The attempt to assassinate Mishal immediately followed this second attack, carried out by a cell that the Israeli Shin Bet warned was planning still more attacks. According to US and Israeli authorities, Mishal personally funded and approved of just these types of attacks.

My complete review, published in Saturday's Weekend Review section of The Australian, is available here.

The Lulz takes on North Korea

By Roderick Jones

As a one-time student of the cold war, pondering the potential causes of a global nuclear war was something of a Sunday afternoon past-time. The historic classic is of course the Cuban missile crisis but equally important were the series of near misses based on the faulty reading of radar early-warning systems when flocks of birds flew over the Artic Circle, or overly aggressive NATO military exercises feeding Soviet anxieties. With the recent North Korean provocations, sadly this subject is back in vogue. In some ways, although there are no clear diplomatic solutions to the North Korean danger, it does play to traditional intellectual strengths the US has in the field of geo-political nuclear strategy - a relief from the messy world of non-state actors, insurgency and cyber-militias. However, there may be a new element in all of this that could act as the proverbial flock of geese: cyber-pranksters.

North Korea is famously a closed society, which hasn't registered or used its Internet domain designation (.kp). However, it does have a 'government' website operated by the Korean Friendship Association hosted in Spain. Over the past month the loose affiliation of hackers, pranksters and griefers operating under the 'Anonymous' theme have reportedly organized two Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)attacks against this site - knocking it offline for 90mins at a time. Would this be seen as western provocation by North Korea? Who knows, but it does raise the question of how uncontrolled or accidental cyber-warfare could have unintended consequences, a new factor in an old dynamic. Unlike nuclear technology the ability to conduct cyber-warfare is not the sole preserve of states. Individuals, or loosely affiliated groups of individuals operating on a trans-national basis can replicate some if not all of a nations capability. The image-boards, which are the home point for these 'Anonymous' cyber attacks operate collaborative wiki's to organize and co-ordinate their attacks -- this enables them to harness the power of the crowd. The targets vary substantially from YouTube to Club Penguin, therefore interest in overt political statements are more the exception than the norm. Clearly there is much more to say on the 'Anonymous' and 'Chan' phenomena but for now it is interesting to note this new factor in an all too familiar stand-off.

Thumbnail image for Kim Jong-il

PDF's of Insurgency Wiki relating to North Korea and 888Chan message board on the same subject.