Iran Sanctions: Still A Viable Option?

By Victor Comras

Earlier this month I had the opportunity to address a Canadian House of Commons Foreign Relations Subcommittee concerning the potential use and impact of sanctions on Iran and its quest for nuclear weapons. This oral testimony can be found here. At that time we were all awaiting the outcome of the Iranian Presidential elections and there was much speculation that a significant change might be in the offing. The outcome of those elections did effect change, but few could have predicted the context or direction those changes took.

We are now faced with an even more dangerous Iran – An Iran in the throes of a domestic upheaval that has illegitimized the government as representative of the Iranian people, hardened its position vis a vis the outside world, and made productive dialogue with Iran’s current leaders a virtual impossibility. What Western government leader would, in the present context, now be willing to engage with, and thereby strengthen and re-legitimize the Ahmadinejad administration and his Mullah regime overseers?

Yet, through all the turmoil in Iran there is no indication that those now ruling Iran have indicated any willingness to change course, or slow down their unmonitored uranium enrichment and their daily advances toward nuclear weapons capability. Each day brings Iran closer to that irreversible point after which Iran’s neighbors, and the rest of the world, must consider Iran to be nuclear weapons capable. It is that point that risks setting off an unstoppable proliferation of nuclear weapons programs in the Middle East, and beyond.

If dialogue with the current Iranian regime is not now possible, other options must be pursued. And the one option that stands out is for the West to apply significant sanctions pressure against the Ahmadinejad regime, and the mullahs, IRGC and other quasi military forces that are upholding it. We don’t need a UN Security Council resolution to accomplish this. But, we do need our European allies and friends, and other countries opposed to what is going on in Iran to join us in apply such measures. Europe remains the key. Western Europe alone accounts for Iran’s largest slice of trade and largest sources of revenues. Together we must impress also on the UAE, and especially Dubai, that it can no longer do business as usual with Iran with regard to circumventing sanctions Iran, or providing Iran’s corrupt leaders a safe place to deposit their money.

Let’s be clear. The low-impact sanctions now on the table simply will not work. We need to move forward now on putting in place sanctions that really target Iran’s political and economic vulnerabilities – the elements that can truly heighten the stress on its leaders. These vulnerabilities include Iran’s fragile financial system, Iran’s energy sector, Iran’s transportation and communication sector, and Iran’s elite investment entities..

Iran’s leaders will only change course if and when they are convinced that the international community will, in fact, take the steps necessary to deprive them of the resources they depend on to retain their positions of power and authority, or that they have squirreled away. Iran’s Mullahs and favored business leaders must be made to feel the pinch of sanctions. So far they have enjoyed a free ride, and with corruption running high throughout Iran’s ruling circles, there is quite a bit of their money outside Iran that could and should be frozen.

Europe, Japan and Canada should be convinced to join with us now also in cutting off Iran’s access to high tech items, including potentially dual-use, equipment and expertise. Together, we must put Dubai and the freeport of Jebel Ali on notice that we will no longer countenance their acting as intermediaries for transshipments of such goods to Iran.

With a daily consumption of more than 18 million gallons of gasoline Iran must now import some 180 to 200 million gallons of gasoline per month. The availability of gasoline exports to Iran should be curtailed. Rising petroleum prices have already been the cause of civil unrest, and gasoline shortages could have a significant impact on local business activity and put increased pressure on Iranian leaders to alter course.
Europe, Canada and Japan should also act restrict Iranian ship access to their ports, and refuse to insure or re-insure, or at least impose extra premiums on insuring, Iranian ships and cargoes.

Travel restrictions on Iran’s leaders should also be broadened, and cultural, sporting and scientific exchanges with Iran curtailed.

These are examples of measure that can be taken now to convince Iran we mean business. These are the kind of measures that give us our last best chance of heading off a graver crisis just a few years down the road.