Lashkar-e-Taiba's Terror Tentacles in the Gulf
By Animesh Roul
I just published one article on the Lashkar-e-Taiba's gulf based cells and operatives who have masterminded series of recent attacks against India. The article titled,"Lashkar-e-Taiba’s Financial Network Targets India from the Gulf States" in Jamestwon Foundation's Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 7 (19), July 2, 2009.
Here is an excerpt:
An impending threat from the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) terrorist group has prompted security establishments to raise an alert along India’s western sea-coast. According to intelligence sources, the LeT’s marine wing is planning a Mumbai-type incursion to target vital installations in the three coastal states of Gujarat, Maharashtra and Goa. The group is also reported to have funneled huge amounts of money from its Gulf-based networks to fund jihad activities in India (Times of India, June 30). This is not an isolated intelligence alert. The threat emanating from the LeT was partially revealed following the recent arrest of Muhammad Omar Madni, a close associate of LeT/Jamaat-ud- Dawa chief Hafeez Muhammad Saeed. The arrest and interrogation of Madni revealed several startling details, including new routes used by terrorists, the location of bases inside and outside India, terrorist finances, and the recruitment strategy of Lashkar-e-Taiba.
...........
Besides the usual routes of intrusion in Jammu and Kashmir, LeT has managed to build alternate routes through the porous borders of Nepal and Bangladesh while establishing bases in the Gulf countries. Investigating agencies have now confirmed that LeT is working on a new strategy which involves using Dubai as the center of planning for future strikes against India (India Today, June 22). Past and ongoing terror investigations suggest the Gulf countries have been the major hubs for LeT terrorists and many terrorist plots against India are now hatched outside Pakistan’s territory.
.......
Mumbai’s crime branch probe revealed that the November 2008 Mumbai terror events were financed by LeT’s Gulf cells and Gulf-based operatives masterminded and executed a series of blasts in Indian urban centers ( Bangalore, Ahmadabad, Delhi and Surat) in 2008. These operations were carried out in collusion with militants of the Indian Mujahedeen (IM) and the proscribed Student Islamic Movement of India (SIMI).
While investigating the August 2003 twin blasts in Mumbai (car bombs at the Gateway of India and the Zaveri Bazaar), Mumbai Police unearthed a strong Dubai link. The plot was hatched by LeT’s Dubai operatives, who colluded with sleeper cells in Hyderabad, Ernakulum and Chennai. The blasts were claimed by an unknown group—the “Gujarat Muslim Revenge Force” (GMRF)—one of the many groups set up by SIMI and LeT following the 2002 Gujarat communal riots to avenge atrocities perpetrated against the Muslim community (Press Trust of India, October 10, 2003). Hanif, one of the Lashkar militants arrested in connection with the blasts, reportedly told police about the planning, logistics and targets of the LeT’s GMRF wing. Since 1993, Hanif worked in Dubai as an electrician and was sent to Mumbai in September 2002 to organize and execute the attacks. Police also interrogated Hanif about his ties to Basheer, a fugitive SIMI figure who fled to Sharjah in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and one Abu Hamza, affiliated to Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) (Frontline [Chennai], September 13-26, 2003).
The recent spurt of terror activities by the LeT in India has a direct connection to contributions from the Gulf-based cells that have planned and financed most of the group’s operations. The LeT’s Gulf based networks are becoming the lifeline for LeT/JuD operations in Pakistan and India. With this threat in view, India is now seeking a comprehensive anti-terrorism treaty with the Gulf nations. For now, Madani and Nawaz’s confessions have provided investigating agencies an outline of the shape of things to come regarding the LeT’s plans for terrorist operations in India.
For Complete Issue, Read Here.