![]() |
| The first multi-expert blog dedicated solely to counterterrorism issues, serving as a gateway to the community for policymakers and serious researchers. Designed to provide realtime information about terrorism cases and policy developments. |
|
September 2009 Archives
Al-Qaeda and Taliban Status Check: A Resurgent Threat?By Matthew Levitt
Despite recent reports of a wounded al-Qaeda core, the terrorist organization's affiliates in Yemen, Somalia, and elsewhere appear to be gaining strength. In Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Taliban -- al-Qaeda's close ally -- also continue to pose a growing challenge. The Washington Institute's Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence invited Richard Barrett to discuss these issues at a special Policy Forum. This event is part of the Institute's ongoing lecture series with senior counterterrorism officials. Over the past few years, Mr. Barrett noted, the pace of attacks perpetrated by the al Qaeda network has slackened, due to challenges internal to al Qaeda as well as improvements on the national security front. Most critically, intelligence collection – in particular the ability to penetrate terrorist networks and collect human intelligence —has steadily improved. Counterterrorism officials today have learned from past mistakes, have better intelligence, and a clearer understanding of the threat. Today, there are fewer individuals engaged in terrorism, and new recruits are often not as skilled or ideologically committed. For al Qaeda, today’s key audience is comprised of young adults now in the late teens and twenties for whom 9/11 was less a personal experience than a learned memory. Meanwhile, al-Qaeda’s international image has deteriorated into one that is unsustainable. Groups that subscribe to al-Qaeda’s ideology increasingly preoccupy themselves with parochial concerns that are local, not global. Al-Qaeda’s emphasis of global issues is becoming dated as local issues begin to play a more substantial role in determining the sequence of events. Public opinion, too, has turned against al-Qaeda for the most part. Surveys indicate while anti-Americanism has not decreased in recent years, support for al-Qaeda and its tactics has. A transcript of Mr. Barrett's full remarks is available here, and an audio of this event is available here. The World Can't Trust IranBy Matthew Levitt
In a oped for the Guardian, Michael Jacobson and I argue that Iran has been deceptive on every front. As Iran's record of deception makes clear, trusting in Iran's good intentions at the negotiating table is simply a fool's errand. Standing with the leaders of France and Great Britain at the G20 meeting in Pittsburgh on Friday, Barack Obama disclosed Iran's construction of yet another secret nuclear structure: a uranium enrichment facility near the holy city of Qom. How much hope should western powers have for the upcoming diplomatic negotiations when the regime in Tehran continues to pursue a secret nuclear programme beyond the reach of international inspectors? The answer, based on Iran's record of deception, is little to none. Describing the Iranian nuclear programme as "the most urgent proliferation challenge that the world faces today," Gordon Brown noted that Iran has accumulated a record of "serial deception". Iran's deception, however, has not been limited strictly to what it has disclosed -- or failed to disclose -- about its nuclear programme to the IAEA. Iran has engaged in deceptive conduct along many fronts over many years, including international finance, shipping and trade. The complete article is available here. Iran and Its Latin American Ambitions Get Some ScrutinyBy Douglas Farah
Iran's somewhat outsized global ambitions are finally getting some of the scrutiny they deserve. The decision to test fire its most advanced mid-range missile as pressure mounts because of hidden nuclear facilities is the most visible action. But less noticed was Venezuela's surprise acknowledgment that Iran is helping it find uranium, of which Venezuela may have a good deal. Such help from Iran had previously been announced as possible, but not recognized as currently underway. Mining Minister Rodolfo Sanz said Iran has been assisting Venezuela with geophysical survey flights and geochemical analysis of the deposits, and that evaluations "indicate the existence of uranium in western parts of the country and in Santa Elena de Uairen," in southeastern Bolivar state. "We could have important reserves of uranium," Sanz told reporters upon arrival on Venezuela's Margarita Island for a weekend Africa-South America summit. He added that efforts to certify the reserves could begin within the next three years. The announcement came as revelations that Iran has secretly been building a uranium-enrichment plant provoke concerns among countries including the U.S., Russia, France, Britain, Germany and China. The announcement comes as Venezuela, which had been rebuffed at several turns (particularly by Brazil and Argentina) in trying to get nuclear technology because of its insistence of including Iran in any deal, has undertaken to build a nuclear village with Iran. Russia is willing to work with the rogue coaltion. Brazil and Argentina rebuffed Venezuelan overtures in 2005 because of the insistence of Chávez that Iran be allowed to participate, despite international sanctions. This is hardly the repudiation by an anti-Chavista bloc. After all, Chávez helped finance the successful election of the president of Argentina and Lula has more credible credentials with the Latin American left than Chávez ever could or should. My full blog is here. (NEFA Foundation) English Transcript of Bekkay Harrach ("Abu Talha the German"): "Security is a Mutual Interest"By Evan Kohlmann
The transcript can be downloaded from the NEFA Foundation website. Spread of Jihadi "operations" inside America: a quantitative warningBy Walid Phares
It is unprecedented in American counter terrorism annals: in one day the nation was dealing with three separate Jihadist plots to blow up civilian and other targets inside the Homeland. Although the cases were addressed at different time periods by the FBI and other agencies, nevertheless, the thickening web of Terror attempts breached the crossing line of US national security. This week, authorities revealed three conspiracies by American Jihadists: Michael C. Finton, (other name: Talib Islam) a 29-year-old man who wished to follow the steps of American-born Taliban John Walker Lindh, was arrested after trying to detonate what he thought was a bomb inside a van outside a federal courthouse in Springfield, Ill. Hosam Maher Husein Smadi, a 19-year old Jordanian national was arrested after placing what he believed was a bomb at a downtown Dallas skyscraper. But perhaps the most troubling case is of Afghan-born Najibullah Zazi who set up shop in suburban Denver, scouting the Web and visiting beauty supply stores in a hunt for chemicals needed to build bombs for Al Qaeda. Sources called the alleged plot one of the most significant terror threats to the U.S. since 9-11. Add to the list the North Carolina Jihad cell, led by Saifullah Boyd, which was planning on attacking civilian and military targets across the country. The immediate question raised by an increasingly worried public is about the connection between all these terror cases: are they all connected? While law enforcement and certainly judicial authorities proceed in a bottom up reasoning, that is to build the case for a global connection between all what is happening with the help of legal evidence, analysts in the field of counter terrorism and conflict are already realizing the meaning of what is happening inside America. Read More » Safe for Now - Assessing Recent Terror PlotsBy Aaron Mannes
Within the past week law enforcement has revealed the disruption of three separate terrorist plots against the United States. These actions highlight the continuing threat to the continental United States, but also the barriers discussed here before to conducting successful terrorist attacks within the United States. Two of the plots were self-starters; individuals who became motivated to commit acts of violence and in their efforts to find allies inadvertently attracted the attention of law enforcement agencies. One had traveled to Pakistan where he may have received some training. All of them highlight the difficulties of carrying out a terrorist attack. The two self-starters, in Texas and Illinois were both lured into law enforcement‘s clutches by promises of access to explosives. Weapons are frequently the lure that government informants use against suspected terrorists. This has also worked on the Fort Dix Six and against cells of right-wing domestic radicals in the past. The case of Najibullah Zazi is a bit different. He had the wit to attempt to produce his own explosives, but that raises problems of a different sort. It appears that the process of acquiring the supplies and preparing the explosives left an extensive trail for law enforcement to follow. It is also appears that some intelligence agencies were interested in his activities beforehand, probably due to his travels to Pakistan, as his cel-phone was tapped. These plots reinforce the reality that terrorist desire to strike the United States remains strong, but that their capabilities have been reduced. The abilities to move, communicate, and to acquire the skills and equipment needed to carryout terror attacks are limited and efforts to do so frequently tip-off law enforcement. Tools to address the desire end of the equation still need to be developed. Nor can the current apparent limits on terrorist capabilities be taken for granted. These threats have been neutralized due to diligent efforts by American intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Terrorists can continue to turn to other countries with less capable security forces. There may be flaws in the U.S. security net that can exploited. Terrorists may “shorten their punch” by developing a lower-cost weapon of mass murder then previously deployed. None of these possibilities can be ignored. (NEFA Foundation) Video: "The Battle for Control of Somalia: Shabaab al-Mujahideen on the Frontline"By Evan Kohlmann
(NEFA Foundation) Full Text: "A Message from Shaykh Usama Bin Laden to the People of Europe."By Evan Kohlmann
A complete transcript of Bin Laden's remarks can be downloaded from the NEFA Foundation website. Probing the PATRIOT Act and More MisadventuresBy The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT)
Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick Leahy (D-Vermont) and Sen. Russ Feingold (D-Wisconsin) have introduced legislation that would effectively gut the USA PATRIOT Act. This week, against the backdrop of multiple domestic terrorism-related investigations and arrests, Leahy and Feingold tried to use hearings on extending the PATRIOT Act to advance legislation that would substantially weaken it. The reauthorization hearings focused on three controversial provisions of the PATRIOT Act set to expire on December 31, 2009. If legislators fail to act, the laws will expire automatically. Following the September 11th attacks, members of the Legislative and Executive branches came together to review the tools available to United States counter-terrorism officials. They found that existing statutes were inadequate in combating the asymmetrical threat posed by international terrorist organizations and that, consequently, new laws were necessary. Within forty-five days, Congress passed and President Bush signed into law the USA PATRIOT Act, a comprehensive counter-terrorism bill. Members of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees convened this week to discuss the reauthorization of three controversial provisions of the national security legislation. Holding a series of hearings over a two-day period, the Committees drew together diverse panels of experts in the field of national security law and policy. However, rather than engaging in a debate limited to the three sunsetting provisions, members of Congress pandered to a vocal minority of critics in calling for comprehensive overhaul of the PATRIOT Act. Although Congress paid lip-service to the need for a candid assessment of existing counter-terrorism measures, the introduction of the Justice Act by Senator Feingold, and the USA PATRIOT Act Sunset Extension Act of 2009 by Senator Leahy, reveal a different goal – gutting the PATRIOT Act and weakening U.S. national security. The general tenor of the hearings suggested that the provisions would be reauthorized. What remains to be seen is what form these renewed portions of the PATRIOT Act will take in light of the pending legislation. For instance, while both the Leahy and Feingold bills would reauthorize the provisions, they would also make substantial changes to current law – arguably to the detriment of future national security investigations. Although these bills would result in sweeping overhaul of our nation's national security laws, of immediate concern must be the effect that the legislation would have on the three sunsetting provisions. Read the complete story here. Video: Shabaab al-Mujahideen's "Abu Suleim Training Camp"By Evan Kohlmann
Increasing the Focus on Iran's CorruptionBy Michael Jacobson
Although Iran has formally accepted the U.S. offer to meet on October 1, expectations are low, particularly since Tehran has made clear that the nuclear issue is not negotiable. The United States and its allies have already begun to prepare for the possibility of failed negotiations by developing potential sanctions packages that could be imposed on Tehran. Unfortunately, due to Chinese and Russian opposition, pushing a strong resolution through the UN Security Council appears unlikely. Washington, however, can adopt other multilateral approaches to increase the pressure on Iran, such as ramping up its anticorruption enforcement efforts against companies doing business in Iran, and encouraging other countries to do the same. Given the widespread corruption in Iran, and the powerful anticorruption legislation in place in many countries worldwide, this approach could have a significant impact on the regime. Anticorruption Legislation Laws prohibiting U.S. companies from engaging in corrupt activity overseas have been on the books for more than thirty years. In 1977, Congress passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), which prohibited U.S. companies from paying bribes to foreign government officials to obtain or retain business. The FCPA also imposed various record-keeping obligations on companies in an effort to make it more difficult to hide these types of payments. Both civil and criminal penalties exist for violating the FCPA, which is jointly administered by the Justice Department and the Securities and Exchange Commission. Although the U.S. government's efforts have focused primarily on illegal activity by U.S. companies abroad, the statute gives the government extraterritorial reach over non-U.S. companies as well. Most importantly, any foreign company listed on the U.S. stock exchange falls under FCPA jurisdiction. To read the rest of the piece, click here. Al-Qaida Declares New "Cabinet Roster" for its "Islamic State of Iraq" (ISI)By Evan Kohlmann
Al-Qaida's "Islamic State of Iraq" (ISI) has issued an updated leadership "cabinet roster." The roster reads as follows: - Deputy Emir and Minister of War: "Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, Abdel Moneim al-Badawi" Why McChrystal Should Be Listened to on AfghanistanBy Douglas Farah
The bleak assessment by NATO and U.S. commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal, of the Afghanistan conflict is strikingly similar to a bleak assessment given by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) of the Colombia conflict in 1998. While one must be careful not to overdue comparisons of conflicts that have significant differences, I think the parallel shows two things in conflicts where the non-state actors receive haven in neighboring countries and derive much of their funding from the drug trade: 1) One should listen carefully to Gen. McChrystal, particularly on the loss of legitimacy of the Afghan government and 2) the situation is not irreversible, as Colombia has shown. As a reporter for the Washington Post at the time, I was given access to the report, which predicted the Marxist FARC rebels could take over the country within five years. At the time this is what I wrote, and see if it sounds vaguely familiar: The Colombian military has proved to be inept, ill-trained and poorly The pessimistic assessment of the situation in Colombia, which "The primary vulnerability of the Colombian armed forces is their At the time, Colombia's electoral campaign had been badly tainted by the fact that the victor, Ernesto Samper, had taken $6 million from the Cali cartel for his electoral campaign. The government had lost much of its legitimacy in the eyes of the middle class, and had already lost it in much of the rural areas where the FARC was strongest. McChyrstal, in his assessment, echoes the weakness of the local forces and the lack of credibility of the the Karzi government. My full blog is here. NEFA Foundation: Four-Part Package Examines Competing Voices Within the Taliban Leadership in PakistanBy Evan Kohlmann
1.) An analysis titled, "Inside the Mufti Kifayatullah Interview: Competing Voices Within the Taliban Leadership in Pakistan"; The interviews are focused on the rivalry between Hakimullah Mehsud and Waliur Rehman, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan commanders who aspire to succeed Baitullah Mehsud, and provide a valuable perspective on the ongoing tussle between Taliban powerbrokers in Pakistan's tribal areas. Dr. Mehsud suggests Al-Qaida's role in the FATA would still be critically important, with the its Arab fighters backing Waliur Rehman and the Uzbek faction in support of Hakimullah's bid for the leadership. A pivotal role is also played by the so-called 'Punjabi Taliban', Sunni sectarian fighters hailing mainly from southern Punjab and affiliated to, or inspired by, SIpah-e-Sahaba, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, and Jaish-e-Mohammed. In this context, the role of mainstream religious parties such as the Jemaat-e-Ulema Pakistan-Fazlur, cannot be neglected, as they emerge as the only mainstream/institutional actor capable of influencing, and reigning in, the Pakistani Taliban movement. The four documents can be accessed on the NEFA Foundation website. New Shabaab al-Mujahideen Video: "At Your Service, O' Osama" (featuring Abu Mansour al-Amriki)By Evan Kohlmann
The Shabaab al-Mujahideen Movement in Somalia has released a new propaganda video titled, "Labayk Ya Osama", or "At Your Service, O' Osama." The video includes footage of the "Abu Suleim" training camp in southern Somalia and new scenes of "Abu Mansour the American" (a.k.a. Omar Hammami). See images below:
NEFA Foundation: Afghan Taliban Release Ramadan Message from Mullah OmarBy Evan Kohlmann
An English-language version of the letter can be accessed on the NEFA Foundation website. Feingold Moves to Strike Material Support LawBy The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT)
As we reported on the IPT blog earlier this week, Congress is set to debate the reauthorization of several provisions of the PATRIOT Act next week. While that discussion will focus on three of the more controversial provisions of the much maligned law, some members of Congress are more interested in seeking expansive overhaul, effectively gutting the PATRIOT Act. Friday, Senator Russ Feingold introduced the JUSTICE Act, a bill proposing wide ranging amendments to this critical counter-terrorism tool. Among the provisions in the JUSTICE Act is an amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, commonly referred to as the “material support” statute. If the amendment suggested by Senator Feingold is approved, the “new” statute will read in part: “Whoever knowingly provides material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do so, knowing or intending that the material support or resources will be used in carrying out terrorist activity…[shall violate the statute].” [amendment text italicized] Under current law, federal prosecutors must show that an individual provided financial, logistical, or other resources to a terrorist organization, whether or not they intended the donation to support violence. In announcing this change, Senator Feingold explained that the revision would require “that a person must know or intend that support provided will be used for terrorist activity.” In reality, this amendment would eviscerate the statute—stripping the government of a valuable tool in the fight against the support structure of international terrorist organizations. The fact is that the italicized portion above is a tremendous departure from Congressional intent, long standing judicial precedent, and common sense. Supporters of this type of amendment often argue that terrorist groups are also engaged in charitable, humanitarian, educational, and political activities, and that donors should be able to promote these lawful activities. Each time this argument has been put forth in a federal court, it has been quickly dismissed. As the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit explained in Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno: “all material support given to such organizations aids their unlawful goals. Money is fungible; giving support intended to aid an organization’s peaceful activities frees up resources that can be used for terrorist acts.” The argument that there are multiple “wings” in terrorist organizations has been repeatedly rejected. When it was enacted, the material support statute was intended to make these groups radioactive—in the words of Andrew McCarthy—“an entity that merits only our contempt, not our contributions.” Senator Feingold and any other members who would support the proposed amendment to Section 2339B must remember that any support given to a terrorist organization furthers their violent acts. Requiring federal prosecutors to show that a defendant specifically intended to support acts of terrorism would make it almost impossible to shut down networks of individuals who are complicit in these acts of violence. See full text of bill here. Europe's new security dilemmaBy Lorenzo Vidino
I have an article in the latest issue of the Washington Quarterly. Entitled Europe's New Security Dilemma, the article analyzes counter-radicalization programs implemented in various European countries, focusing on what is the dilemma facing authorities throughout the Old Continent (and, of course, not only): can nonviolent Islamists be engaged and used as partners against violent radicalization? You can read the piece here. Contending with Transnational Threats: The Role of Special OperationsBy Matthew Levitt
U.S. secretary of defense Robert Gates has argued that military power alone will not ensure victory in the war on terror. Nonetheless, the precise role of the military continues to pose a challenge, particularly for transnational threats cutting across the military's geographic commands. How did the U.S. Special Forces evolve, and how should they be integrated into the overall national security structure? What serious threats loom on the horizon, particularly in the Middle East, and how are the Special Forces adapting their efforts in anticipation? Adm. Eric Olson, commander of U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), discussed these important issues at a special Policy Forum sponsored by The Washington Institute's Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence. This event is part of the Institute's ongoing lecture series with senior U.S. counterterrorism officials. Adm. Eric Olson is the eighth commander of USSOCOM, headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. Admiral Olson qualified as a Naval Special Warfare (SEAL) officer in 1974 and has served as a SEAL instructor, strategy and tactics development officer, joint special operations staff officer, and assistant deputy chief of naval operations. His overseas assignments include service as a UN military observer in Israel and Egypt, as well as a Navy programs officer in Tunisia. His statement for the record is available here. Would-be Al-Qaida Franchise Claims Lebanon Rocket Attack on Northern IsraelBy Evan Kohlmann
Uighur Militants from the TIP Celebrate America's Economic "Demise"By Evan Kohlmann
An English translation of the TIP magazine article can be accessed on the NEFA Foundation website. NEFA Foundation: Text of Shabaab Response to U.S. Airstrike on Al-Qaida Suspect Saleh NabhanBy Evan Kohlmann
The English translation of the Shabaab communique can be downloaded from the NEFA Foundation website. Noordin Top UpdateBy Kenneth Conboy
In a dramatic press conference on Thursday afternoon, the chief of the Indonesian National Police, General Bambang Hendarso Danuri, announced that Jemaah Islamiyah fugitive Noordin Top was among the four persons killed in a raid on a terrorist safe-house in Solo, Central Java province. The police found fourteen points of similarity between the fingerprints of the corpse and those on file for Top. Although initial reports claimed Top died when he detonated a suicide vest as the police were closing in this morning, General Bambang insisted that the police had shot him dead. The three other dead terrorists included Bagus Budi Pranoto (alias Urwah), who had served four years for involvement in the 2004 Australian embassy bombing and was tied to the car bomb found on the outskirts of Jakarta last month; Ario Sudarso (alias Aji), who reportedly studied under the late JI bomb-maker Azhari Husein; and Hadi Susilo (alias Adib), who had rented the safe-house. Two other terrorists, Rahmat Pudi Prabowo (alias Bejo) and Supono (alias Kedu), were captured alive. Hadi Susilo's pregnant wife was allegedly wounded in the raid. The police also uncovered a pistol, an M-16 rifle, a laptop, and 200 kilos of explosives at the residence. Noordin Top Killed?By Kenneth Conboy
The local Indonesian media is now reporting that top Jemaah Islamiyah fugitive Noordin Top was likely among the four persons killed in a police raid in Solo, Central Java. One of the four apparently detonated a suicide vest earlier this morning, leaving police to find a headless torso. This corpse is thought to belong to Top, who reportedly wore such a vest on all occasions. The other three fatalities are thought to be Urwah (said to be a field coordinator during the 17 July hotel bombings in Jakarta), Adib Susilo (who had rented the house where the raid took place), and one of Top's closest colleagues, Maruto. Adib's pregnant wife was said to have been seriously injured. Given that Top has been incorrectly reported dead on several previous occasions, the police have refused to issue any comments about the casualties until DNA results come back in about four days. Police Raid in Solo, IndonesiaBy Kenneth Conboy
The police counter-terrorist unit, Special Detachment 88, staged a raid against a suspected terrorist safehouse in Solo, Central Java, on the evening of 16 September. The house was reportedly rented five months ago by Adib Susilo and his pregnant wife, Putri Munawaroh. Four persons were allegedly killed during the raid, including Urwah (alias Budi Pranoto), who is suspected of involvement in the 17 July hotel bombings in Jakarta. As of the morning of 17 September, the police had yet to release details on the three other casualties. Why Hamas has been Quiet in 2009By Aaron Mannes
The Jewish Policy Center's Palestinian Rocket Report has just published an article I wrote with my boss about why Hamas has kept the cease-fire since Operation Cast Lead. In it we to apply some of our work modeling terrorist group behavior, our models strongly suggest that internal Palestinian politics plays an important role in Hamas' strategic calculations. The piece is below. Why Hamas Has Been Quiet In 2009 Since Israel ended Operation Cast Lead―a massive incursion into the Gaza strip intended to suppress rocket fire into Israel―in January 2009, Hamas has largely held to a ceasefire on rocket and mortar attacks on Israel. The obvious explanation for this change in behavior is that Israel's incursion into Gaza and Hamas' corresponding heavy losses have re-established Israeli deterrence. Another explanation is that this unprecedented period of quiet is proof that Hamas has changed politically, and that Western nations and ultimately Israel should negotiate with it directly. There is also substantial countervailing evidence that HAMAS remains committed to its campaign against Israel and that the cease-fire is strictly tactical. Models of organizational behavior built at the University of Maryland's Laboratory for Computational Cultural Dynamics suggest all of these explanations may be wrong. Indeed, intra-Palestinian politics may be playing an important yet overlooked role in Hamas' calculations. Trans Atlantic Legislators gather to discuss Jihadist TerrorismBy Walid Phares
Next week, an important summit will be held by a number of legislators from the European Parliament, the US Congress and the Canadian Parliament to discuss "al Qaeda's and other Jihadi forces' campaigns worldwide against Democracies." The closed meeting, to take place in the US, is sponsored by the newly formed "Transatlantic Group on Counter Terrorism (TAG)," launched in Washington and Brussels last year. TAG was launched in the winter of 2008 by Members of the European Parliament, led by MEP Jaime Mayor Oreja, Vice Chairman for Policy of the EPP Group at the European Parliament (present majority Party) and Members from both Parties of the US Congress, led by Representative Sue Myrick, Co-Chair of the Anti-Terrorism Caucus in the US House of Representatives. The goal of TAG is to create a working relationship between legislators from Europe and the United States (North America) to address terrorism and the threat it poses to democracies. Read More » The Importance of Physical Safe Havens for TerroristsBy Douglas Farah
Paul Pillar, former deputy CIA counter-terrorism chief, has an interesting op-ed in today's Washington Post posing an important question regarding the Afghanistan conflict: Whether preventing a safe haven in Afghanistan would reduce the terrorist threat to the United States enough from what it otherwise would be to offset the required expenditure of blood and treasure and the barriers to success in Afghanistan, including an ineffective regime and sagging support from the population. Thwarting the creation of a physical haven also would have to offset any boost to anti-U.S. terrorism stemming from perceptions that the United States had become an occupier rather than a defender of Afghanistan. Clearly Pillar is arguing that the answer is Afghanistan is not worth the price, given those terms of debate. One of his main points is that The preparations most important to the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks took place not in training camps in Afghanistan but, rather, in apartments in Germany, hotel rooms in Spain and flight schools in the United States. Here is where I disagree. Clearly training camps are not of paramount importance to terrorist groups, and the Internet provides a fluid and almost risk free way to communicate both ideologically and personally, and physical safe havens are not as vital to many aspects of the terrorist threat as they were before 9/11. But it misses a key point to dismiss their importance to the degree Pillar does. Almost all the personal ties and connections that were formed among those who have carried out different terrorist attacks took place because the actors had a place where they meet each other, understand they were not alone in their vision of jihad, and build relationships of trust. This is fundamental to any cadre, and something that virtual exchanges simply cannot replace. The meetings in the hotel rooms and apartments were possible because of the bond of trust forged in a broader common experience. My full blog is here. Video: "Martyrdom" Wills of Suicide Bombers Behind the Sept. 2008 Terrorist Attack on the U.S. Embassy in YemenBy Evan Kohlmann
Another Al-Qaida suicide bomber, Walid al-Gharam, offered similar threats of further terrorist attacks: "We are coming for you, not just in the Arabian Peninsula, the peninsula of Mohammed, prayer and peace be upon him. But, Allah-willing, we will attack the infidels everywhere, on any land and under any sky. O' America, we will attack you both inside Yemen and outside Yemen. We will attack you in Qatar and the [United Arab] Emirates and everywhere else. We will attack you, so be aware, by Allah, that we are thirsty for your blood and flesh." English-subtitled excerpts from the "martyrdom" wills can be viewed on the NEFA Foundation website. Contending with Iran's Sponsorship of Terrorism and Weapons ProliferationBy Matthew Levitt
Last week I had the opportunity to address the plenary session of the annual international conference of the Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) in Herzliya, Israel. The lecture highlighted the aggressive and proactive nature of Iran's support for terrorism, and concluded noting that this behavior should inform the world's analysis of and response to Iran's pursuit of a nuclear capability. I argued that were Iran to either have an actual nuclear weapon or the capacity to produce one quickly, the destabilizing impact on the region would be significant. Iran's proxies and allies throughout the Gulf, the Levant and beyond would be emboldened and empowered. And Iran, shielded by a nuclear deterrent, would likely increase its support for terrorist groups knowing other nations would be less likely to respond directly to a nuclear power with a proven track record of aggressive behavior. One critical common denominator between Iran's support for terrorism and its pursuit of a nuclear weapon is the IRGC. As policymakers grapple with how to tackle Iran's aggressive behavior and the regional and international threats presented by such behavior, it is critical that all tools be on the table. "Smart power," today's preferred term of the trade, does not mean the absence of kinetic tools but the strategic use of such tools in tandem with all other elements of national power. Whatever tools are leveraged to deal with these threats, it is clear that we must refocus our attention on the IRGC, the Qods Force, and the front organizations, bonyads, affiliated companies and other entities that comprise its sophisticated, international support network. Al-Qaeda, its affiliate groups and local groups inspired by al-Qaeda all continue to pose immediate threats to international security. The stability of both Pakistan and Afghanistan cannot be taken for granted, the international economic crisis is far from over, and health officials now expect another round of Swine Flu. There is no shortage of crises to distract our attention. But the international security threats posed by Iran's support for terrorism and pursuit of a nuclear weapon are at least as formidable as these other policy priorities, and perhaps even more immediate. The complete lecture is available here. Al-Qaida Again Resorts to Racist Name Calling, Labels Obama "Kunta Kinte"By Evan Kohlmann
Now, the GIMF has released a new document written by Ben Williams, titled, "Obama, What's Up?" During his essay, Ben Williams referred to Obama as "Kunta Kinte" and accused him of "forgetting about the black man... Do you remember who Kunta Kinte is now, Mr. Hussein Obama? ...This is you, Mr. Obama, who has failed to understand the true mentality of racism." Ben Williams also suggested that the recent peace summit in Annapolis, Maryland was tainted by racism as well: "We have not forgotten that Annapolis is the same town where Kunta Kinte was sold! It is a symbol of slavery and evil." Ben Williams likewise aimed vitriol at President Obama's efforts to free U.S. serviceman Bowe Bergdahl who is currently being held prisoner by the Taliban in Afghanistan. Ben Williams mocked Obama's interest in Bergdahl: "What are you doing, Mr. Obama? Are you going to liberate the white man and withdraw your soldiers from Afghanistan, offering a lesson and example to the world with this unprecedented step! Or will you take revenge for your ancestor Kunte Kinte and leave the white man Bowe Bergdahl to meet his inevitable fate?" NEFA Foundation: Interview with Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP) Commander Abdul HaqBy Evan Kohlmann
The translated interview can be downloaded from the NEFA Foundation website. U.S. forces kill al-Qaida leader in SomaliaBy Evan Kohlmann
Last year, Shabaab al-Mujahideen released a video recording of Nabhan, including footage of Nabhan at one of those terrorist training camps. A transcript and still images from the video can be viewed on the NEFA Foundation website.
In Latin America's Arms Race, Chávez Leads the WayBy Douglas Farah
Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez has added another $2.2 billion to his shopping spree of Russian weapons, buying 92 new tanks and sophisticated anti-aircraft systems. Chávez's buying spree (he is up to some $6 billion in the past three years) has helped fuel a destructive arms race in the region. While Colombia has spent more, and received more from the United States, it is fighting not only a narco-Marxist insurgency (the FARC) but a host of other armed criminal drug trafficking, narco-paramilitary gangs that threaten the state. No other country is facing anything similar, yet as Andres Oppenheimer notes in the Miami Herald,the region is now engaged in an arms race that is wasting precious resources as the continent gets poorer. What is particularly interesting about Chávez's purchases is that they focus on anti-aircraft capabilities, the very think the FARC has asked Venezuela to provide, and a capability the rebels are desperately seeking. As multiple reports show, (and the Reyes computer documents clearly outline) the FARC has grown desperate for surface-to-air capacity because the military helicopters have been so lethally effective in the government's counter-insurgency campaigns. My full blog is here. Al-Haramain Foundation in News Again, For Obvious Reasons!By Animesh Roul
Infamous Saudi Arabia based charity Al-Haramain Foundation (AHF) once again appeared in the news. According to a report prepared by Pakistani police (the Crime Investigation Department), the AHF has funded approximately USD 15 million to Jihadi groups in Pakistan for carrying out terror attacks. These funds mostly went to the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) which is responsible for numerous suicide strikes in the last couple of years and also blamed for the assassination of Benezir Bhutto. The AHF, a Wahhabi Islamic charity, has been proscribed by the UN Security Council for its suspected links to international terror outfits like al-Qaeda and for its role in facilitating international terrorism through various ways of financing(it supports social, educational and humanitarian activities in countries with substantial Muslim population). Till 2004, the United States had designated at least thirteen AHF branch offices operating in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Pakistan, in many African countries and in the United States. But in 2008, the US Treasury Department has designated (under Executive Order 13224) AHF’s world-wide operation, including operations in Saudi Arabia. However, despite these measures, AHF continues to operate and fund terror activities, perhaps with the tacit support of Saudi billionaires and to some extent, the government there. NEFA Foundation: Bin Laden's 9/11 Anniversary Message to the American PeopleBy Evan Kohlmann
Bin Laden: "US Must eliminate the Israel Lobby to end war"By Walid Phares
In a 12 minutes address via an audio tape, al Qaeda's chief, Osama bin Laden, spoke to the American people on the eighth anniversary of 9/11. The tape was produced by as-Sahab propaganda arm posted on various Jihadists forums last night. His address directed "to the American People" asserted that the main reason for the al-Qaeda’s attacks on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001, was US support to Israel as well as “some other injustices.” Interestingly Osama claimed the war between the two "nations" i.e the American nation and the Islamic Umma, can stop if the White House eliminated what he coined as the "Israel Lobby." He accused the latter of pushing for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Note that in this speech he doesn't mention the battlefields of Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, and Chechnya, he only targets US-Israeli relations. He begins by insisting that Americans needs to know the real causes for this war "which costing you dearly in blood and wealth. The (past Bush) White House convinced you that this war (on Terror) is necessary for your security." The sentence used by Bin Laden can also mean the Obama Administration as the President has used the term "war of necessity," in the past few weeks. Bin Laden asked Americans to hear "both sides" (a concept taken from American political discourse and rarely referred to in Jihadist literature). Over-stressing the Israel factor unusually, Bin Laden reminded his audience that for two decades he had claimed that the main cause for his attacks is "America's support to its allies the Israelis". He added that there were also other injustices caused by the US, as well, but strangely refrained from citing them. Such an over-assertion is new in al Qaeda narrative, for in most previous speeches, including his declarations of war of 1996 and 1998, Israel was only one and not the main root cause for the Terror he unleashed since. His speeches during the fall of 2001 (all available online and in print) focused on the "evil nature" of American policies rather than only the specific support to Israel. Hence, one can see a shift in al Qaeda's strategic communications. We'll come back to this point. Read More » Evolution of US Global Confrontation with the Jihadists since 9/11By Walid Phares
Every commemoration of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 reveals further confusion in reading the global map of confrontation with the Terror forces, particularly the Jihadist streams. Eight years after 9-11, decision-makers and commentators are still asking too many questions, and in those questions are embedded the reasons the war has gone on so long. Who is this enemy and why do they want to harm us, many ask. Unlike in previous global confrontations, from WWI, WWII and the Cold War, the inability to determine the foe has created an inability to produce the appropriate strategies to defeat the threat. If you can’t define the enemy, you cannot defeat him. Where is the US this year in the confrontation with the forces that caused harm on 9/11 and wants openly to defeat democracies? Are the West and particularly the United States making progress in the war against the “terror forces;” are they far from victory; in popular terms how much more sacrifice will it cost us to get to the other side? Rarely over the past eight years has the public received good clear answers. The national security debate was hopelessly disabled by large segments of our own academic establishment, which advocated exaggerated apology; in addition public perception was outmaneuvered by the Jihadist propaganda worldwide as I argued in my book The War of Ideas. For years any clear identification of the enemy, its ideology, its strategies and how to counter them has been lacking within a central well defined national security doctrine. And when attempts were made to advance it, it was rapidly derailed. Read More » Assessing Counter-Terror Since 9/11By Aaron Mannes
Among analysts, wonks, policy-makers, and pundits the question on the eighth anniversary on 9/11 is “Where are we?” To some extent, one’s answer to that question (like much else) is shaped by where one sits – politically, geographically, and occupationally. This analysis attempts to look across the globe soberly and assess where things stand for Islamist terrorists and their targets. Modes of Counter-Terror Success A fascinating article from National Journal’s James Kitfield about a disrupted plot in Spain in 2008 gives tremendous insight into the difficulties faced by Islamist terrorists seeking to attack the West. The attack was modeled on the Madrid 2004 bombings. There were many operational differences, but the strategy was the same. Just as the March 11 bombings contributed to Spain’s leaving Iraq, this plot hoped to pressure Spain out of Afghanistan. However, European and US intelligence services were on top of the plot and successfully infiltrated the cell. Counter-terrorism is the practical application of Murphy’s Law. Murphy states that if something can go wrong it will go wrong. Counter-terrorism is making sure things go wrong. Successful terror attacks require real skills at surveillance, security, and usually explosives manufacture. None of these skills are easy to acquire. Most successful attacks have involved someone with real training, usually acquired in Pakistan. By monitoring movements to and from Pakistan (and other areas that could be training centers) and extensive sharing between national intelligence agencies suspect activity can be identified and monitored. A replay of 9/11 in which nearly 19 people were moved around the world is almost inconceivable without attracting enormous attention from the intelligence community. Countering Today's Enduring and Adaptive Terrorist ThreatsBy Michael Jacobson
This afternoon, the Washington Institute hosted Lt. Gen. Ronald Burgess, the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, as part of a lecture series we've been running since December 2007, with senior US counterterrorism officials. General Burgess was the third military official to participate in the series. Given the key role that the military has played in the counterterrorism arena over the past eight years, and the critical role it continues to play in the Obama administration, we believed it was essential to have a number of the top military officials speak as part of this series. Here is an excerpt of his remarks: So, where are we in our fight against al-Qaida? The record is mixed. On the one • We see continued terrorist attacks by supporters of an uncompromising • Terrorists have learned to increase their lethality AND their political impact; • They are drawn to unstable and/or ungoverned territories where they fight, On the other hand, there are reasons for optimism: • U.S. and allied governments have impacted many of al-Qaida’s most lethal • The ideology driving al-Qaida is showing signs of wear and its popularity To read the entire prepared statement, click here: For CAIR, Duplicity Is the Best DefenseBy The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT)
Evasions, omissions and half truths -- the stock in trade of the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) -- abound in a recently issued document in which the group seeks to debunk what it describes as “Internet disinformation” about it. The document, posted on the group’s web site, provides no specific examples of the so-called disinformation, simply summarizing the allegations by what it terms “a small but vocal group of anti-Muslim bigots” in words chosen to fit its purposes. The CAIR document, which touts the organization’s supposed “principled advocacy of civil liberties, interfaith relations and justice for all people” back to its founding in 1994, ignores its roots in a Hamas support network or its consistent record of criticizing terror and terror-financing investigations. Instead, it delivers ad hominem attacks on the critics, painting them all as bigots and Islamophobes. To set the record straight, the Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT) has prepared a meticulous point-by-point 23-page analysis of CAIR’s claims, challenging the group’s typical CAIRlessness with the facts. Highlights of the analysis can be seen here. To see the full IPT Report, click here. Iran Banks Move to Ecuador to Avoid SanctionsBy Douglas Farah
In its latest bid to avoid international banking sanctions, Iran has reached an agreement with the Central Bank of Ecuador to allow the Export Development Bank of Iran to operate in this Andean nation. The move came even though Ecuador is fully aware that EDBI is under U.S. Treasury Department sanction for illicitly providing or attempting to provide financial services to Iran's Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). According to the Treasury Department's designation statement: "In response to international sanctions and the refusal of many responsible banks to do business with Iranian banks, Iran has adopted a strategy of using less prominent institutions, such as the Export Development Bank of Iran, to handle its illicit transactions." said Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Stuart Levey. "Today's action exposes EDBI's role in helping Iran violate UN sanctions so that financial institutions around the world can take appropriate steps to protect themselves." Established in 1991, the EDBI is an Iranian state-owned financial institution whose primary purpose is to serve Iran's import and export communities. In addition, the EDBI operates as the Iranian representative for the Islamic Development Bank, a multinational institution that cultivates economic and social improvements in member nations, in accordance with Islamic law. However, the EDBI provides financial services to multiple MODAFL-subordinate entities that permit these entities to advance Iran's WMD programs. Furthermore, the EDBI has facilitated the ongoing procurement activities of various front companies associated with MODAFL-subordinate entities. At the same it designated EDBI, Treasury also designated the "Venezuelan" Banco Internacional de Desarrollo (BID), a wholly-owned Iranian bank that was constituted in 2007. Its founding documents show the BID (not to be confused with the multi-national lending agency, Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, also known as BID) is wholly owned (all 40,000 shares) by Bank Saderat, an Iranian bank under U.S. and UN sanction. The BID (Venezuela) was also granted an operating license, along with EDBI, in Ecuador. My full blog is here. Hezbollah Financial Scandal: From Mughniyeh to MadoffBy Aaron Mannes
Salah Ezzedine, a leading Lebanese businessman, turned himself in to Lebanese authorities last week when his large-scale Ponzi scheme collapsed and he declared bankruptcy. This is could be a major blow to Hezbollah, which has already had a very bad year. Ezzedine was closely tied to Hezbollah and several top Hezbollah leaders personally lost money in investments with him. Now referred to as Hezbollah’s Madoff, he had once been known as the Mughniyeh of money (in reference to Hezbollah’s long-time operations chief Imad Mughniyeh who was killed in a car-bombing in February 2008.) Ezzedine was well known in Lebanon as a businessman and philanthropist. He ran an organization that arranged trips to Mecca and owned Dar al-Hadi, an Islamic publishing house that published books by senior Hezbollah figures and was visited by former Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati in 2004. Ezzedine’s companies took major losses when the price of oil began to fall and he reportedly sought to cover these losses by bringing in more investors. His investors not only included major Gulf businessmen (hence the extensive coverage of the case in the Gulf) but also thousands of modest Lebanese Shia. Reportedly people mortgage Implications Operation Overt: systemic vulnerability and investigative primacyBy Roderick Jones
Yesterday three British Muslims – Abdulla Ahmed Ali, Tanvir Hussain and Assad Sarwar – were convicted of plotting to blow up seven transatlantic airliners in mid-air in a coordinated attack intended to surpass 9/11. The coverage of the case in the British press is highly informative and there is little to add to the overall commentary here. The main points highlighted have been:
There are of course other ways of looking at this. There is little doubt that the work of the Police in investigating and preventing this plot was first rate. However, the claim made that the White House 'got edgy' and therefore jeopardized the investigation, doesn’t quite ring true. This assertion relies on the claim that the US government sent Jose Rodriguez to Pakistan in order to facilitate the detention of Rashid Rauf. If this did indeed occur it is worth pausing to consider what the potential benefit of this may be. The obvious line of questioning would have been to ask Rauf if there were any other plots running and who exactly was involved in the UK conspiracy. The US would then have been able to determine if the UK authorities had indeed got the full coverage of the plot they claimed and if similar action was being planned elsewhere. To paraphrase former Sec. Def. Rumsfeld – were there any unknown unknowns? While this certainly didn’t do the UK Police any favors, as they had to move quickly to then round up the plotters -- potentially damaging the evidential chain. It has to be considered that bringing Rauf into custody was a risk worth taking in order to potentially grab a fuller intelligence picture of a global plot that could have had simultaneous action in diverse national jurisdictions [what happened to Rauf in Pakistani custody and subsequently is in stark contrast to the fate of his co-conspirators in the UK]. It is surprising that given the clear knowledge that Islamist terrorism is transnational in nature that none of the UK reporting is considering that the alleged US action may have had this clearly in mind. An important final point is to consider how this plot will be viewed in the proverbial cave in Afghanistan [a phrase I would accredit to Brian Jenkins]. While the attack did not succeed it certainly had a large psychological and economic impact on transatlantic travel. Air-travel was disrupted and new security procedures had to be implemented to combat the threat of liquid bombs – all of this along with the costs of the surveillance and investigative commitment comes out with a large price-tag [some estimates claim $160M in the UK alone]. Not many countries could pay for this scale of terrorist event on a consistent basis. The fact of an open trial and a talkative former Assistant Commissioner of Police have revealed a large amount of operational detail from the investigation of the plot, from covert searches of luggage, bugging of residences, email interception, monitoring of Islamic bookshops and the mechanics of counter-terrorist work. This will be examined closely to adjust terrorist operational security for the future as well as to assess potential vulnerabilities. Finally, not all of the individuals associated with this plot were convicted – their success in avoiding justice will similarly be examined so it can be replicated. Therefore, a strategic observer would regard this as a score draw. Therefore, while it is a matter of great satisfaction that the main plotters were convicted – there are systemic issues, [outside of the obvious need for intercept evidence] which should be considered. The most interesting being the issue of primacy when investigating a global terrorist plot. The US currently simply assumes de facto primacy but it may benefit from a international arbiter – a UN terrorism co-coordinator – this seems unlikely, but the ability to present a transnational picture of unfolding terrorist plots may prevent the knee-jerk ‘The Americans got edgy” kind of commentary. A harder fix will be trying to stem the flow of information about counter-terrorist operations, disaffected former senior police officers are one thing but the use of an open trial is quite another. One of the aims of using the rule of law to prosecute terrorists is that the evidence is also seen in the court of public opinion in order to justify state security action. How far this goes is always a question of risk management. There is little doubt western governments need to continue to evolve their counter-terrorism response, sadly the conclusion of trials such as these do not provide an end but they may suggest a means to an end. Beslan: Jihadism against Children Must Trigger Global ResponseBy Walid Phares
Five years after the massacre of Russian children in Beslan at the hands of "Caucuses Jihadists" (Jihadiyu al Qafqaz), this attack is still catalogued as the lowest form of Salafi Jihadi Terror on civilian population. In the following piece I argue that the intention by the perpetrators to inflict pain on children and parents alike has reached the bottom of human rights abuse. Thus I argue that the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, all targeted by Salafi Takfiri Terror, must initiate a UN sponsored declaration against the ideology legitimizing this type of violence. Read More » A New Look at the Hydra of Organized Crime and Terror OrganizationsBy Douglas Farah
The DEA and the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York have unveiled a new indictment for drug trafficking that shows just how truly transnational and intertwined with terrorists, aircraft merchants, and little-scrutinized company registries these groups have become. The case centers on Jesus Eduardo Valencia-Arbelaez, aka "Padre," aka "Pat," who Valencia-Arbelaez was a leader of a sophisticated international cocaine Beginning in September 2007, members of the Organization sought to purchase a cargo airplane for the purpose of transporting metric tons of cocaine from Venezuela to West Africa. Between September 2007 and March 2009, Manuel It would be incorrect to assume the Organization has an organic structure in each of the countries named. Rather, it has carved out important links to existing criminal organizations there, and have key operatives in the country or region to keep an eye on the operations and collect or pay money, as necessary. My full blog is here. The Real Failure in AfghanistanBy Douglas Farah
It is clear that the counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan (only now seriously beginning as a counterinsurgency effort) is in serious difficulty. As the New York Times reports, there is little actual support from the central government's police or military forces outside of Kabul. Support for the war is dropping at home and among key allies, particularly Britain. The most optimistic assessment that the commanding general there, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, can come up with is that the situation is serious but salvageable. Hardly the rose colored glasses. But the underlying problem, as McChrystal and others know, is not the military, but the complete and utter incompetence of the Karzi regime, to which we are so tightly wedded. The corrosive corruption and unwillingness/inability/blindness of the Karzi is what will be the ultimate demise of that war. A foreign fighting force cannot win unless a host government, viewed as legitimate by its people, is fighting the war as well. That is not the case in Afghanistan. History should not be forgotten. What propelled the Taliban to power in 1996 was the public disgust with the corruption and state violence of that time. Transportation was impossible because of the multiple road blocks. Constant bribes made it impossible to rebuild the country or attract anything like foreign investment. Warlords fighting over poppy revenues and ethnic interests left the country a wreck. The Taliban's appeal then, as now, is rooted in the promise of restoring order and eliminating corruption. My full blog is here. |