Peacebuilding amid Terrorism: Fragile Gains in Somalia

By Matthew Levitt

The Washington Institute published Part 2 of Professor Andre Le Sage's analyis of jihadism in Somalia today. The first part focused on the country's growing insurgency, while this one addresses peacebuilding efforts in the context of terrorism in Somalia.

Here is an excerpt:

On September 14, 2009, U.S. special forces killed Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, a senior leader of al-Qaeda's East Africa cell, near the town of Barawe on the coast of southern Somalia. Although the death of Nabhan will seriously disrupt and degrade the capabilities of al-Qaeda and its support groups, without political progress and peacebuilding in Somalia, targeting the terrorist group's leadership will have a short-lived strategic impact.

Training Camps and Foreign Fighters

With leadership support from Harakat al-Shabab and Hizb al-Islamiyah -- two Somali Islamist movements -- al-Qaeda's East Africa cell has long used Somalia as a safehaven. Al-Qaeda perpetrated the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the simultaneous attacks in 2002 on Kenya's coast against the Paradise Hotel and a failed effort to shoot down an Israeli charter airliner full of tourists, and the failed attempt in 2003 to attack the new U.S. embassy in Nairobi.

The relationship between al-Shabab, Hizb al-Islamiyah, and al-Qaeda's East Africa cell is close but complicated. On many occasions, the groups appear united and fight side by side against the transitional federal government (TFG). Despite rumors, however, a merger between al-Shabab and al-Qaeda has not yet occurred. Nonetheless, al-Qaeda is able to benefit from al-Shabab's gains, which increase al-Qaeda's space to maneuver and prepare for new attacks. Prevalent rumors suggest that Hizb al-Islamiyah leader Hassan Dahir Aweis is attempting to reinvent himself as a political leader, and may be willing to break his alliance with al-Shabab by negotiating a power-sharing deal with the TFG. While such talks would further isolate the insurgency, it is unknown how realistic Aweis's demands would be. Moreover, granting him any senior TFG position would not be welcomed by either Ethiopia or the United States -- two countries that consider Aweis a terrorist.

The full article is available here.