The Ban on Hizb ut-Tahrir in Bangladesh May Provide Western Countries with an Opportunity to Evaluate Their Own Strategies to Combat Extremist Groups

By Madeleine Gruen

Hizb ut-Tahrir in Bangladesh was banned by the government of Bangladesh on Thursday, October 22 for 'anti-state', 'anti-government', 'anti-people' and 'anti-democratic' activities in the country. However, as Animesh Roul pointed out in his CT Blog entry on the topic, the ban, thus far, appears to have done nothing to stop the branch from its anti-government, anti-democratic activities. In fact, Hizb ut-Tahrir in Bangladesh is now absolute in defining its enemies, and has issued press releases faster in the past three days than it has in its entire previous public lifetime.

In an October 24th press release, Hizb ut-Tahrir in Bangladesh declared, "America bans Hizb ut-Tahrir in Bangladesh; her aim is to remove the obstacle in the way of her evil plans to subjugate the Muslims of Bangladesh."

While Hizb ut-Tahrir in Bangladesh has just assigned itself more thought than any American has ever given it, its amplified ferocity in the wake of the ban does raise an ideal opportunity for Western governments to factor any lessons learned into their own debates over banning Hizb ut-Tahrir branches, particularly what the ideal timing for instituting such a ban might be.

When considering a ban of Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) in a Western country, the essence of the debate should center on how effective HT could be as a radicalizing influence on domestic communities, not if HT actually has the potential to establish a unified Islamic State. HT establishes branches in Western countries in order to contribute to the group's overall objectives. It is not their objective to overthrow a western government in order to replace it with an Islamic government; at least, not at this point. For example, Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain (HTB) originates leaflets for distribution in Muslim countries, and its members recruit foreign students studying in the UK to prepare them for active membership when they return to their home countries. HTB operates freely and openly. While a ban has been debated seriously by the UK government, it has yet to be enacted. Some involved in the UK debate argue that to ban the group at this point is useless because it has gotten too large, too well established, and too powerful for a proscription to be enforced on consistent enough a basis to make that course of action effective.

In the case of Pakistan, and now Bangladesh, the governments decided to ban their HT branches after they had already reached a sustainable level of operations: they were comfortably in Phase II of HT’s three-tiered development scheme. (See here for background on HT’s method of operation). This means that by the time they were banned, the branches in Pakistan and Bangladesh already had a loyal and committed membership base, with members well positioned in the government and in educational institutions. They had methods for disseminating propaganda and for attracting supporters to their public demonstrations. Their operating systems are established, and the believers in HT’s system are driven, and are therefore unlikely to cease operations when faced with opposing pressure.

Perhaps the opportunity for Western countries (particularly the United States) to enact effective legislation is while the HT branches operating in their countries are still small and relatively quiet; before the branch has had an opportunity to establish a stronghold and cause adverse effects.