Detroit Attack: Adaptive threats meet tired security response

By Roderick Jones

Stagnant Counter-Terrorism response

The visible US response to the latest attempted terrorist attack on the country, has so far sadly conformed to past mistakes and strategic blunders. The attempted attack by the Nigerian Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab as the NorthWest Airlines flight 253 was coming into land at Detroit airport has led to an increase in security by the TSA, which has so far taken the following form: restrictions surrounding in-flight entertainment on International flights coming into the USA, extra screening on flights coming into the USA, extra screening at domestic airports, restrictions on moving around the cabin one-hour before landing and discussion of restrictions on taking electronics on the airplane and of course the default extra screening of baby food, which seems to happen after every terrorist event. This is eloquently described as, 'TSA Security Burlesque' by an Atlantic Commentator.

It could reasonably be claimed that most people regard the security regime surrounding air-travel as at best a nuisance and at worst a catastrophic drain on economic resources. In large part the west's terrorist opponents have won this battle. Low-cost terrorist attempts at aviation infrastructure create enormous security reactions - truly exhausting and bleeding the west's financial and psychological capital to resist. Nobody who has suffered through a US domestic flight since 9/11 would argue the airline industry is in good-shape. As a key-component in global economic growth destroying the aviation industry is a good place for a nihilistic terrorist movement to start.

What has caused this? At this point, it is the reaction of United States Department of Homeland Security to any terrorist event involving aviation [which then spreads throughout the global aviation system], which heightens the operational success of militant Islamist terrorists against aviation targets. The noted, counter-insurgency expert David Kilcullen expertly puts this into focus [in his book Accidental Guerrilla] by highlighting the detrimental effects of US counter-terrorism policy. In short al-Qaeda does not represent an existential threat to the US, it has no path to victory looking at any reasonable scenario including the use of WMD-- but the US can defeat itself by unnecessary over-reaction and a fundamental misunderstanding of basic risk management and terrorist theory. Once again this is being demonstrated by the events in Detroit and the DHS reaction, which creates more disruption than the attack itself, destroys DHS and US credibility by mandating absurd responses, which focus on securing events after they have happened (for example, turning off in-flight entertainment because passengers can see a map - passengers can still look out the window or use their watches).

If the US and other states are to contain terrorism they needs to adopt the more thoughtful responses, which have been developed within and outside of government. The work of inside/outside experts such as Killcullen largely moves in one direction conclusive direction -- less is more and multi-agency approach is paramount. The central thesis of Kilcullen's book is that the west creates 'accidental guerrilla's' by using military force and thus creating 'guerrilla anti-bodies'.

"The threat is that a zero-risk approach to terrorism, one that seeks to drive the chances of another 9/11 attack down to zero, might cause Western countries to take well-intentioned precautionary measures that would be so divisive internationally, and so repressive domestically, that we would end up destroying our way of life in order to save it, compromising freedoms and values to guard against a relatively remote risk" [Killcullen, Accidental Guerilla's]

I would simply add to his by arguing that excessive security regimes within western countries similarly have the capacity to create accidental guerrillas out of all of us.

Information War

One area, which cries out for some instant attention is the west's utter failure with regard to information war. Political leaders and western media quickly jump onto terrorist events and inflate them giving them their potency. At this point surely, it would be in everyone's interests to try some kind of self-censorship system around these events to prevent the kind of over-heated commentary, from politicians and media figures, which exactly meets terrorist aims. The UK maintains the D-Notice system, which is a request system from the government to news editors to constrain the reporting of certain sensitive information. This may be impractical for the media given the diffuse flow of information through a variety of channels but perhaps politicians could act more strategically in their post-incident communications. It was noteworthy that Rep. Peter King was immediately briefed on the event and then chose to say, "This was the real deal" and "This could have been devastating". Perhaps future briefings to politicians could include guidance on what terrorists would want them to say and therefore, how to make a more understated comment. Similarly, someone in Mr. Kings' position on the Homeland Security Committee could be trained or advised on what terrorist operations are composed of and how to mitigate their success by downplaying their potency. It really isn't the "real deal" unless you say it is.

Aviation Security, the arrival of the PersonBorne IED's and smart screening

The subject of aviation security will not go away. The system is globally complex and vulnerable and will continue to be a compelling target for current and future terrorists. The only way to approach it is to understand that security should be predictive rather than reactive, technology can and will help. It would appear that UFA used a syringe strapped to his thigh - relying on the personal sensitivities of security screeners to pass through security. It is thought that a similar 'Person Borne IED' technique was used to try and assassinate the Saudi Prince Mohammed bin Nayef in August 2009. In this case a bomb was concealed in the attackers rectum to defeat security screening and then remotely detonated. While this would seem to be an testing conundrum for the current security regime at airports there are technical scanning solutions being developed such as by the company ThruVision, which has developed a system for detecting these 'person borne concealed objects'. There are answers to security concerns, which meet the challenges but it requires systemic predictive thinking.

PersonBorne IED's are likely to be the next significant security challenge to the aviation industry but systems designed to prevent them should be able to adapt to next-gen challenges. If an array of sensors are going to be used to scan individuals entering aeroplanes then they should be developed with next-gen threats such as bio-hazards and software hazards in mind. To some degree this threat could be met by the market; just as airlines, which provide good in-flight services are more pleasant to fly on, an airline, which effectively screens passengers at the door for a variety of threats may attract more customers. A smart screening system operated by the airlines, using its own intelligence and backed by government when appropriate may be preferable to the current lumbering response and would certainly be a welcome addition to security in countries where government screening is best described as sporadic.

New arc of Insecurity

Perhaps the attempted Detroit attack provides a glimpse of where terrorism's next geographic focus is likely to be -- an arc of instability from Nigeria through Somalia to Yemen. This region contains a host of challenges, which rival the current quagmires in Afghanistan and the Middle-East. However, it also offers some opportunities for applying the lessons hard won elsewhere - the use of soft power and civilian agencies to develop governance and permanent security solutions.

If Al-Qaeda is the first variant of globally networked information smart terrorists who are likely to form the security challenge for at least the next fifty years through differing iterations it is imperative that the west begins to learn and apply the lessons from the first generation of this conflict to sustain itself through the second and third over varying geographic and virtual terrain. In short, act smartly and speak softly.