Internationalizing The "No Fly" List

By Victor Comras

The attempted Christmas bombing of Northwest Airlines flight 253 has focused considerable attention on the “No Fly List” and its importance to US homeland security. US intelligence agencies and the Department of Homeland Security have come in for intense criticism for failing to connect the dots that would have placed Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab on that list. But, consider this. While US and other intelligence services have identified a very significant number of Al Qaeda trained operatives, most of those identified continue to be able to travel freely internationally, even if they are to be refused boarding on US bound aircraft. The US “No Fly List” is not widely disseminated, particularly as many of the names contained thereon stem from intelligence gathering.

According to past Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff, the U.S. “No Fly” list contains only about 2,500 names, with an additional 16,000 persons that have been identified as meriting extra scrutiny. This probably includes only a small subset of those identified by US intelligence sources as having received Al Qaeda indoctrination and training. Hopefully, this shortcoming is rapidly being rectified.

US prescreening activity involves the required submission of passenger relevant data and the matching of passenger identifying information, including name and date of birth, against the U.S. No Fly and Selectee Lists. These lists are extracted from a much larger Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB). The identity matching is conducted by both air carriers and the U.S. government. A second prescreening activity, separate from identity matching, involves using risk assessment tools to analyze passenger data to assess the security risk that a passenger might pose. US airlines and authorities also review travel documents for evidence of possible forgery or fraudulent use.

International mobility is an essential element of Al Qaeda-related terrorism. And, while the United States remains a main al Qaeda target, much of the rest of the world also remains at high risk. That is why the UN Security Council, after 9/11, decreed in UN Security Council Resolution 1390 that all countries “prevent the entry into or the transit through their territories” of persons identified as members or associates of al Qaeda and the Taliban. However, this action only comes into play after such persons are actually designated by the UN’s Al Qaeda Committee and placed on the committee’s so called “Consolidated List.” And, that list is woefully short and out of date. A conscious decision was taken from the inception of the consolidated list not to add rank and file al Qaeda members. The list now contains only 142 Taliban members and 255 members, associates or material supporters of Al Qaeda.

In addition, UN Security Council resolution 1373, which “criminalized” international terrorism, also requires all countries to “prevent the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups by effective border controls and controls on issuance of identity papers and travel documents, and through measures for preventing counterfeiting, forgery or fraudulent use of identity papers and travel documents.

While airport physical security screening has now become common place at international airports around the world, only a handful of foreign transportation authorities or foreign airlines have adopted passenger pre screening procedures for non US bound passengers. This short list includes, among a few others, the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Relatively few other countries employ such pre screening or other effective border entry/exit controls on suspected terrorists that are not included on the UN’s consolidated designation list.

The nearly avoided flight 253 tragedy should serve as a warning to all. Airport physical screening is not sufficient and should be supplemented by passenger pre-screening. Such pre-screening procedures should include access to disseminated terrorism suspect lists. Perhaps consideration should now be given also to internationalizing the No Fly concept by expanding the functions of the UN Security Council’s Al Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee to include the establishment and maintenance of an international “no fly” list. There is no excuse for not identifying and stigmatizing Al Qaeda members and associates, and stopping them from traveling.