Failed States and Terrorism: Interesting Reading

By Douglas Farah

My favorite magazine edition of the year just came out: Foreign Policy's Failed State Index.. As always it is full of interesting data points that help one understand how and why state's fail. But this year there is also a ranking of the worst leaders in the world.

What is striking, from my perspective, is that only two Latin American leaders are named: Hugo Chávez, weighing at number 17 of the 23 worst listed, and Raúl Castro at number 21. What is also striking is that their three primary allies outside of Latin America are also among the world's worst: Mahmoud Ajmadinejad of Iran at number 8; Basher al-Assad of Syria (recently jointly bashing Israel and calling for an end to the empire, meaning the United States) at number 12; and China's Hu Jintao, busying buying up all the natural resources he can, at number 10.

Sub-Saharan Africa, of course, has the most of the worst, including my personal favorite, Equatorial Guinea's Teodoro Obiang (number 14), who has hired Lanny Davis and other prominent and once respectable people as lobbyists. Obiang deposed and killed his uncle before assuming power in 1979, and was well-loved for continuing his uncle's heart-warming custom of having his political enemies beaten to death with metal bars in the main stadium while the band played "Happy Days are Here Again."

But back to Latin America: One can tell a great deal about leaders by the company they keep and the alliances they build. Chávez, rather than embracing any government with a liberal democratic form of government, has gone for the most repressive. Not coincidentally, both Syria and Iran are among the world's foremost sponsors of terrorism. Cuba, toying with modest internal reforms, remains a formidably repressive state, and has been busy helping the Bolivarian states implant state of the art internal security apparatuses that are sure to improve their respective repressive capacities.
My "a href="http://www.douglasfarah.com/article/540/failing-states-and-despots-interesting-reading.com">full blog is here.

Giving Teeth to the Iran Sanctions: Targeting Re-Export Loopholes

By Matthew Levitt

Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee this week, Undersecretary of State William Burns and Undersecretary of the Treasury Stuart Levey laid out the administration's game plan for leveraging the sanctions mandate created by UN Security Council Resolution 1929, adopted earlier this month. Central to this strategy is "vigorous" implementation, in part through a monitoring committee. The resolution, Burns noted, includes "new platforms" and "new tools," including a tough cargo inspection regime to detect and prevent Iranian smuggling efforts aimed at circumventing the sanctions. Now that these measures have been passed, he emphasized, we "need to make the maximum use of them." One key area that would benefit from greater attention and enforcement is closing the re-export loopholes through which Iran has successfully evaded sanctions in the past.

Deceptive Trade Practices

Mirroring the Iranian banking sector's deceptive financial practices -- which the Treasury Department has studiously exposed over the past few years -- procurement agents, businesses, and transporters in Iran have developed a network of front companies and willing partners as a means of procuring controlled military and dual-use technologies. Some of these fronts are aware of the deception, while others are not.

Resolution 1929 highlighted such conduct by both Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) and IranAir's cargo division. For example, since Treasury designated IRISL in 2008, the company has sought to evade sanctions by not only establishing new front companies, but also renaming and repainting its vessels.

The just-released annual report of the Czech Security Information Service (BIS) offers similar findings. In 2009, Iran used "mediating firms" in the Czech Republic to procure items that could facilitate the production of weapons of mass destruction. According to the report, Iran orchestrates "complex business channels in which companies from various countries fulfill only partial tasks without knowing the whole chain of suppliers and customers." Iranian procurement agents have been active within the United States as well.

The complete article is available here.

Fighting the Ideological Battle: The Missing Link in America's Effort to Counter Violent Extremism

By Matthew Levitt

Although the United States continues to successfully target high-level al-Qaeda leaders along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, efforts to contest the Islamist ideology that fuels and supports violence have not kept pace. At home, incidents of domestic radicalization have increased dramatically in 2010, while abroad, the myriad, complex security challenges inspired by various violent strands of Islamist ideology have multiplied from Yemen to Pakistan. Indeed, just today several Muslim-American youth from Northern Virginia were convicted in a Pakistani court of plotting terrorist acts with militants in Pakistan they had met via the internet and sentenced to 10 years in jail each.

In the context of the recent release of the Obama administration's National Security Strategy and the one-year anniversary of the president's Cairo speech, the Washington Institute convened a special Policy Forum marking the release of recommendations from the Institute's forthcoming report on Obama administration efforts to address violent extremism -- a follow-up to the Institute's 2009 bipartisan task force report Rewriting the Narrative: An Integrated Strategy for Counterradicalization This new report, soon to be released in full, was the product of a study group comprising J. Scott Carpenter, Matthew Levitt, Steven Simon and Juan Zarate.

A rapporteur's summary of the event, which featured Mr. Carpenter, Dr. Levitt and Mr. Zarate (Coauthor Steve Simon was unable to attend due to travel conflicts), is available here. Audio of the event, which also appeared on C-SPAN, is available here.

Police Raid in Central Java

By Kenneth Conboy

The Indonesian police counter-terrorist unit, Special Detachment 88, conducted a raid in North Klaten sub-district, Central Java province, late on Wednesday afternoon (local time). One suspect, Juli Hartono (alias Yuli Sartono) was shot dead, and three others were captured. Unconfirmed reports indicate that one of the three is Abdulah Sunata, Indonesia's most-wanted terrorist fugitive who reportedly helped organize the paramilitary camp uncovered in Aceh last February. Sunata is a repeat offender, having served an earlier prison sentence for terrorist offenses before being released ahead of schedule for good behavior.

The police reportedly found a bomb and an unspecified firearm at the Klaten terrorist safehouse.

If it turns out Sunata was captured alive, this would be a major coup for Special Detachment 88, which has come under criticism in recent months for being too fast to kill senior terrorist suspects.

Terrorist Motivations –Shooting to be Big Shots?

By Michael B. Kraft

Some quotes and comments buried in recent press articles, including an article this week by Jessica Stern, should give pause to the theories fashionable in some circles that terrorism is prompted primarily by “root causes.”

Usually cited are poverty and despair and/or U.S foreign policy (especially support for Israel) and or support for Arab governments such as Egypt and Saudi that are often called repressive regimes. Another alleged cause is the U.S. invasion of Iraq that overthrew an oppressive regime, headed by Saddam Hussein. And of course there is the narrative promoted by some radical Muslims that the west is out to destroy Islam (never mind the U.S. and NATO support for the Muslims in the Bosnia conflict or the emergency aid that the U.S. has rushed to Pakistan, Bangladesh, and other Muslim countries in the wake of major natural disasters). Hundreds of thousands of words have been written on these theories.

The vexing question of “what makes terrorists tick” is an important one, especially as governments are paying more attention to the need to counter radicalization. Some countries such as Saudi Arabia and Indonesia have programs, with limited success, to try to deradicalize captured terrorist suspects. They and western governments, especially Britain, the Netherlands and more recently the United States have been trying to develop and strengthen programs to counter terrorism radicalization, including public diplomacy efforts.

This is important and necessary. It is essential that we try to counter the ideology, spread so easily on the internet that justifies mass murders for the sake of some “sacred cause” or restoring an idealized 15th century world of purity and/or the Muslim Caliph that stretched from the Middle East into Spain.

Ideology, however, is not the only factor in why some people, especially young men, embrace violence and terrorism and done suicide belts.

Although some writers have discussed the psychological aspects of terrorists, this aspect is often overlooked in the pontification about policies and “root causes.”

I am by no means an expert on the motivation of terrorism but I want to call attention to several recent articles that deserve a closer look.

They include the article by Ms. Stern, a respected counterterrorism expert, in Sunday’s Washington Post Outlook section describing her experiences in researching terrorism and her theories on the role of trauma in the outlook of some terrorists. An earlier June 15 Reuters article reported that Somali Islamists killed two persons and arresting dozens of others for the transgression of watching the World Cup soccer matches on television.

A June 11 New York Times in-depth article described the motives of two young New Jersey men who were arrested June 5 as they were about to fly to Egypt and then to Somalia to link up with a terrorist group and kill Americans.

And a June 22 New York Times front page article describing the path to radicalizcation taken by Faiesal Shahzad, who pleaded guilty to trying to set off a car bomb in Times Square.

Read More »

Material Support Court Ruling: More background and Free Speech Issue

By Michael B. Kraft

The Supreme Court’s 6-3 decision today upholding the 1996 law that makes it illegal for American citizens and residents to knowingly provide material support to designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations helps maintain a major tool to curb terrorist fund raising.

Here is some additional background on the case and the free speech issues raised in the court case. This piece supplements and emphasizes different aspects of the ruling than the excellent and more comprehensive blog item just filed by the Investigative Project on Terrorism, written by Stephen Landman.

The material support statute, signed into law in April 1996 by President Clinton and also used by the Bush and Obama administrations, is one of the U.S. Government most important tools against terrorism fundraising. Justice Department officials say it has been used more than 150 times since Sept. 11, resulting in 75 convictions. Additionally, there also have been plea bargaining and confessions by persons charged with violating the provision that makes it illegal for persons to knowingly provide funds, services, training, weapons or other forms of material support to groups designated by the Secretary of State as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO.)

I won’t repeat the full legal text of the material definition contained in the 4th paragraph of Landman’s article, but note that most of those cases, especially relating to Al Qaeda and Hamas, involved money and other tangible support for terrorist groups.

Read More »

Supreme Court Upholds Material Support Law

By The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT)

The Department of Justice won a major victory Monday when the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the "material support" statute. In a 6-3 opinion announced by Chief Justice John Roberts, the court held that the Constitution does not preclude the government from criminalizing speech and other forms of advocacy in support of designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO), even if the intent is to support the group's "peaceful or humanitarian" efforts.

Under U.S. law, it is a crime for any person to provide "material support or resources" to a designated FTO. Known as the "material support" law, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B has become a cornerstone in U.S. counter-terrorism efforts. Since 2001, the U.S. has charged approximately 150 defendants with violations of the statute, and to date approximately 75 people have been convicted.

The statute defines "material support or resources" as:

"any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instrument or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel (1 or more individuals who may be or include oneself), and transportation, except medicine or religious materials" (emphasis added).

The Court began by rejecting the argument that the statute was violated the Fifth Amendment because it was unclear to an ordinary person what type of activity was actually prohibited. Explaining that "perfect clarity and precise guidance have never been required," the majority found the statute was sufficiently clear in what conduct was proscribed:

"Of course the scope of the material-support statute may not be clear in every application. But the dispositive point here is that the statutory terms are clear in their application to plaintiffs' proposed conduct, which means that plaintiffs' vagueness challenge must fail."

Next, the Court rejected the claims that the law violated free speech and free association guarantees in the First Amendment. Those challenging the statute sought to provide non-violent resources to support the humanitarian and peaceful efforts of terrorist organizations. The Court found that not only was there no distinction between the violent and non-violent wings of terrorist groups, but that terrorist groups benefit from any support given to them.

The case on appeal involved groups and individuals who wanted to support the humanitarian and political activities of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)—groups that were designated as FTOs in 1997.

Hoping to continue supporting the PKK and LTTE, the petitioners challenged the law, aiming to have it struck down as unconstitutional. As they explained in their opening brief to the court, "plaintiffs here seek only to safeguard their right to promote lawful, nonviolent activities through pure speech," and the statute violated their First and Fifth Amendment rights by preventing them from doing so.

Rejecting each of the challenges, the Court conceded that the PKK and the LTTE may engage in political and humanitarian activities. But overwhelming evidence also showed that both groups have committed numerous acts of terrorism, some of which have harmed Americans. In light of the dual-use qualities of terrorist organizations, the Court went on:

"Whether foreign terrorist organizations meaningfully segregate support of their legitimate activities from support of terrorism is an empirical question. When it enacted section 2339B in 1996, Congress made specific findings regarding the serious threat posed by international terrorism. One of those findings explicitly rejects plaintiffs' contention that their support would not further the terrorist activities of the PKK and LTTE: 'Foreign organizations that engage in terrorist activity are so tainted by their criminal conduct that any contribution to such an organization facilitates that conduct.'"

Read our full report by Stephen I. Landman here.

OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE – An Open Discussion

By Michael B. Kraft

A group of U.S. experts on open source intelligence today said that the U.S. intelligence efforts are negatively affected by the cutbacks in the number of newspaper correspondents overseas and the terrorists’ own use of the internet to gather information on the United States.

They made their comments at a crowded forum at the National Press Club today, June 17, titled “The Future of Open Source Intelligence,” sponsored by LexisNexis.

Mr. Daniel Butler, Assistant Deputy Director for Open Source in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) said that open source intelligence gathering is basically good research and analysis and that the internet has been a “game changer” in gathering material. This raises new challenges in organizing and prioritizing the material to be analyzed, he said

Butler, a former Defense Department official and military intelligence officer, and other panelists noted that open sources include a wide variety of information, not only from the media but from academia and other sources. They also predicted that open source intelligence will be increasingly integrated into traditional intelligence analysis that heavily relied on classified sources.

In response to a question, Butler said that the open source program had been impacted negatively by the reduction in the number of foreign correspondents. He said the quantity, breadth and quality of overseas reporting has declined because of the decisions by many news organizations to cut back the number of their correspondents overseas. During the past several years several major newspapers and television networks have eliminated or minimized their foreign correspondents posts, mainly for financial reasons. Butler quipped that one only has to pick up the Washington Post every morning to see how much lighter it is.

Kevin O’Connell, who has served in the CIA, and in Defense Department and State Department analyst positions, said that reporting from foreign correspondents often provides a context and depth of understanding a country that is not always available to analysts who have not been there. * O’Connell, who also served in the Vice President’s office and at Rand, is now an adjunct professor at Georgetown University said that is important that our education system emphasis the development of critical analytical training. He is also President/CEO of Innovative Analytics & Training.

The terrorists are also exploiting open sources, said Kenneth Rapuano, a former White House Homeland Security Advisor in the Bush Administration, who resigned from his civilian post in 2006 to serve in Afghanistan as a Marine Corps officer on a special joint operations task force. He said that, although the popular image of the Afghan Taliban was that of guys in ragged clothes toting AK-47’s, U.S. forces found they had computer hard drives with information on the U.S. infrastructure, GAO reports and even Congressional testimony. Rapuano is now Director of Advanced Systems and Policy at the MITRE Corporation.

Dr. Mark Gabriele, trained as a computer science specialist, said the technology was changing quickly. Even though the cell phones and equipment in Africa lagged 10 years behind the United States, they were adequate for most purposes. Dr. Gabriele, previously with Rand and now with Booze Allen and Hamilton, noted that even the GPS is now an open source device.

Other panel participants were Mr. Doug Magoffin, Chief of the Defense Department Open Source Program, who spoke of the need to develop and recruit people with good language skills, and Mr. Alexander Joel, Civil Liberties Protection Officer, ODNI, who emphasized the efforts to develop guidelines to protect civil liberties.

* A personal observation: as a consumer of intelligence while in the State Department Office of Counterterrorism, I and many of my fellow officers closely read press articles for information and context that often was not contained in the official message traffic from embassies or the intelligence community. In an earlier career as a news agency correspondent overseas, it was apparent that correspondents often would have a wider range of local contacts and more freedom to move about than intelligence or embassy political officers.

More on Hezbollah in Latin America

By Douglas Farah

There is still significant debate within the U.S. government and among members of the national security establishment over the level of threat posed by Iran's growing presence and the increasing presence of Hezbollah that this presence brings.

So the arrest of a suspected Hezbollah fundraiser with an outstanding US arrest warrant in the Tri-border area is another important indicator of just how deep this relationship has now become.

Moussa Hamdan is the latest in a long line of suspected Hezbollah financiers who have been arrested in and around Ciudad del Este, the main hub of the Tri-border (where the borders of Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay meet near Iguazu Falls) region. U.S., European and Latin American investigations have traced tens of millions of dollars from the region back to Hezbollah in Lebanon, using the formal and informal money remittance systems. Hezbollah operatives in the 1994 AMIA bombing in Buenos Aires have been documented as having used Ciudad del Este as their base while planning their attack on a Jewish target, operating under orders from Iran.

The Tri-border has historically been a smuggling and black market center for the Southern Cone of Latin America, generating hundreds of millions of dollars in illicit profits. That is not new. What changed over the past 15 years is the importance of the region as a financial hub for terrorist groups, from Hezbollah to the FARC in Colombia to Hamas.

So Hezbollah and other terrorist groups have an expanded playing field. Venezuela is friendly territory, Ecuador is hospitable and the Tri-Border network gives them access to Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay, none of which want to acknowledge there is a problem.

The key factor in looking at this expanding territory is the expanding networks that develop among groups operating there, and their ability to cross pollinate and help each other logistically and financially. It also creates new areas in which to move illicit goods, and those goods are likely not to simply be cocaine and knock off watches.

There is another little tidbit pointed out by a blog reader that goes to the network aspects. It turns out that Dror Feiler, an outspoken Swedish-Israeli musician who was a main organizer of the flotilla to Gaza, is also on the editorial board of ANNCOL (Agencia de Noticias Nueva Colombia or New Colombia News Agency), a key part of the FARC's external propaganda machine.
My full blog is here.

Hunting Bin Laden in Chitral? Maybe Not Anymore

By James Gordon Meek

A year ago, I reported in the New York Daily News that the hunt for Al Qaeda kingpin Osama Bin Laden had focused on a vast swath of mega mountains in Northwest Pakistan called Chitral. Not only did dozens of sources pinpoint Chitral as his most likely hideout, many said it's where the CIA had been hunting him using contractors disguised as adventure tourists in a region renowned as a trekkers' paradise. The drone fly-bys were also a hint.

On Sunday, Gary Brooks Faulkner, 50, was arrested in the woods of Chitral near Afghanistan's Nuristan province, reportedly armed with a 40-inch blade, a loaded pistol and night-vision goggles -- and looking for Bin Laden. Faulkner is a construction worker and a devout Christian, his family told The News.

Reports in Chitral's two English-language news services today say Faulkner was apprehended by Chitrali police or scouts in the Bumburet Valley after he went missing from a nearby hotel. Bumburet is inhabited by the Kalash, ethnic caucasians tracing their lineage to Alexander the Great, who are not practicing Muslims in the largely Islamic nation. Their women are known for colorful outfits and often draw attention because they do not cover their faces.

Here's how close the Kalash village is to the neighboring war across the border: Earlier this month, 15 Afghan National Army soldiers were arrested there by Pakistani forces after fleeing fighting in Nuristan, the Chitral News reported.

Could the top terror leader with a $25 million bounty still be in Chitral? Probably not. After thousands of years as a hideout for brigands, something has changed in the past year that makes Chitral's valleys and soaring peaks (ranging from 5-25,000 feet) much less secure as a hideout. A travel route was created that established, in effect, an I-95 superhighway into the once isolated landscape.

The Pakistani government has all but completed a vehicle tunnel through the Lowari mountain pass, which has made Chitral accessible to the rest of Pakistan during the long winter months for the first time in history. Typically snowfall atop the 10,000-foot overland Lowari Pass cuts off the district from the rest of the country for half the year -- making Chitral virtually impenetrable.

Despite putting out several dozen audio and videotapes since Sept. 11, 2001, an exhaustive review by The News had found relatively few that appeared to have been recorded by Bin Laden during winter months, suggesting to experts that he had been unable to dispatch couriers carrying thumb drives during the heavy snow season. Though unable to communicate to the outside world, conceivably Bin Laden was also safe during winter by being snowed in. The same high-altitude snow drifts that prevented his couriers from moving also would have kept out potential assassins.

But the Lowari Tunnel may have changed all that by opening up a travel artery that would make Chitral open year 'round. The completion of the Lowari Tunnel was conveniently delayed by fighting that spilled over from the Swat Valley southeast of Chitral last year. Foreign construction firms refused to work on the tunnel project while Taliban extremists were roaming the Dir Valley due south of Chitral (where three U.S. Special Forces troops were recently killed in a suicide bombing). But once the fighting in Dir subsided, Chitral was not as isolated during the past winter.

And Bin Laden? He's produced only two tapes so far this year. But he'd be a fool to stick around Chitral.

Read more @meekwire

Hizb ut-Tahrir Uses Social Media to Promote Its "Emerging World Order" Conference

By Madeleine Gruen

The radical Islamist group Hizb ut-Tahrir America (HTA) will host a conference in Chicago on July 11 to hype the virtues of an Islamic state ruled according to the strictest interpretation of Islamic law. The group launched an online social media campaign to promote the event; one that serves as a prime example of how extremists are able to expose the mainstream to their ideology.

HTA hosted a similar conference outside of Chicago last year, which drew about 500 participants. This year, the campaign to promote the conference is more comprehensive, and the group expects many more participants as a result; it has booked an 11,000-square-foot ballroom at the Chicago Marriott Oak Brook that can accommodate more than one thousand.

HTA is part of a worldwide organization, Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT), which works towards the establishment of an Islamic state (Khalifah) in a Muslim country. Once a government and a military have been installed, it intends to spread Islam to the rest of the world. HT condones violence against Western troops in Muslim countries and advocates the eradication of Israel, but has so far maintained a non-violent approach to its objectives.
9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed is a former HT adherent. He, like others, joined a militant organization after becoming impatient with HT’s softer methods, which is why some observers have labeled HT “a conveyor belt to terrorism.”

A component of HTA’s strategy is to instill a sense of alienation among American Muslims so that they will turn away from their country and instead identify themselves as members of the Ummah (worldwide Muslim community). HTA tells Muslims not to vote or to embrace the culture of the “unbelievers.” However, HTA will indulge in socializing online in order to generate support.

2010 Propaganda Campaign

Social media is more popular than ever. The web is no longer simply a series of static billboards for celebrities and corporations that do not allow for two-way interaction. Social media lets users generate content, creating a sense of propriety. Facebook and Twitter provide instant satisfaction derived from the approval of peers in response to the sharing of ideas and experiences. Peer endorsements are an effective element of political propaganda and marketing campaigns.

You may continue reading this article at the Huffington Post.

Turkish Jihadists in Waziristan Respond to Charges Against Gaza Flotilla Charity IHH

By Evan Kohlmann

In the wake of the controversy over the Turkish charity Insani Yardim Vakfi (IHH), a principle sponsor of the Gaza aid flotilla, Turkish jihadists fighting alongside the Pakistani Taliban in Waziristan have now weighed in with their own perspective. On June 7, the "Taifatul Mansura" Turkish-speaking foreign fighter contingent issued a communique acknowledging that IHH has promoted itself as a channel to provide financing and recruits to frontline mujahideen fighters in Chechnya and Afghanistan. However, the group thereupon accused IHH of misappropriating those resources and instead serving as a tool of Turkish intelligence agencies. According to "Taifatul Mansura", the IHH "was sincere at the beginning [but] was later used by the MIT (National Intelligence Organization) and the Psychological Warfare Department of Turkish General Staff in order to prevent the emergence of a mujahideen movement that could pose a threat to Turkish government. Both Chechen mujahideen and Turkish mujahideen who have taken part in operations in the Afghanistan Emirate are fully aware of the activities and scheming of this organization. None of the donations collected by this organization and advertised as if they had been delivered to the mujahideen were actually received by the mujahideen... We, the Taifatul Mansura Organization in the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, argue that this organization is only a burden to the mujahideen.” Taifatul Mansura also accused IHH of sparking quarrels and infighting amongst various mujahideen commanders.

A translation of the statement from Taifatul Mansura can be accessed via Flashpoint Global Partners.

Why the Iran Sanctions Matter

By Matthew Levitt

Wednesday's U.N. Security Council resolution sanctioning Iran marks a critical turning point in the U.S.-led efforts to target Iran's illicit activities. The resolution focuses on Iran's nuclear-weapons and ballistic-missile programs; the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which is responsible for these programs as well as the regime's support for terrorism; and the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), which has been directly involved in proliferation shipments. The sanctions included in this resolution are, as U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Susan Rice put it, "as tough as they are smart and precise." If anything, this new resolution is both too precise and purposefully vague. And therein lies its strength.
The list of 40 entities and one individual listed in the resolution's three annexes is extremely targeted. Employing such "smart sanctions" -- pinpointing the specific entities and persons involved in Iran's illicit conduct and holding them accountable while shielding the general Iranian public from old-fashioned, shotgun, regime-wide sanctions -- has been very effective. This tactic denies Iran's revolutionary regime the chance to deflect blame for the country's economic woes, while disrupting its ability to finance and transport material necessary for its nuclear-weapons and ballistic-missile programs. But the number of entities excluded from the resolution is even more telling than the list of those that made the final cut. Most entities designated this week, for example, had already been designated by the U.S. Treasury Department and/or the European Union. They have therefore already been subject to most of the impacts a U.N. resolution would hope to achieve, such as economic isolation by major financial institutions.

The full article, published by ForeignPolicy.com, is available here.

Banning Terrorist Groups: India’s Counterterrorism Priorities

By Animesh Roul

I have contributed an article in the latest issue of Terrorism Monitor (Jamestown Foundation). The article titled "100 More Terrorist Groups Banned in India: What are India’s Counterterrorism Priorities?," Vol 8 (22) June 4, 2010).

Here is the abstract of the article:

India, one of the most terrorism-troubled countries in the world, is finally pursuing the idea of proscribing nearly 100 terrorist entities, both regional and international. The proscription will exist in tandem with the United Nations’ consolidated list of al-Qaeda and Taliban linked groups. Many of these outlawed entities have staged numerous attacks either in India or abroad and threaten to continue their transnational terrorist activities in order to further their violent jihadi ideology.

Facing a Range of Threats: India has already outlawed 36 terrorist organizations which have carried out operations and have a physical presence across the country. The prominent terrorist groups currently outlawed reflect diverse ideologies and objectives.
......
Quoting Home Ministry sources, the Indian media indicated that the terror organizations soon to be added to the revised and expanded list include Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), the Groupe Islamique Combattant Marocain (GICM), Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), the International Islamic Relief Organization of the Philippines (IIRO PHL) and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).
.....
The Ministry of Home Affairs listing often receives criticism at home for excluding homegrown groups posing a threat to India’s national security and territorial integrity. In actuality, besides the 35 terror entities currently under proscription, there are more than 100 separatist and extremist armed groups, both active and dormant, that remain a threat to the state (Times of India, June 24, 2009, Hindustan Times, April 13, 2008). However, the official listing overlooks many of these clandestine networks and fails to put any curb on their activities. India’s northernmost state of Jammu and Kashmir and the northeastern states of Manipur and Assam share between them more than 100 terrorist organizations operating from their soil. The Ministry’s list also fails to take note of the activities of pan-Islamic terrorist groups based in Bangladesh that operate both internally and externally across the Indian border.

Access the full text of this article here:Terrorism Monitor

Read More »

More Documentation on Gaza Flotilla Charity IHH

By Evan Kohlmann

The NEFA Foundation has released two new documents relating to the Turkish Muslim charitable group Insani Yardim Vakfi (IHH), sponsor of the Gaza freedom flotilla.

1.) During court proceedings involving U.S. national Abdurahman Alamoudi, who was later sentenced to 23 years in prison after pleading guilty to 3 federal offenses including violating the IEPPA Act, ICE Special Agent Brent Gentrup provided information pertaining to links between IHH and the Alamoudi-linked Success Foundation. According to Gentrup, "I have reviewed several pieces of correspondence on the letterhead of Insan Hak ve Hurrhyetleri Insani Yardim Vakfi, aka The Foundation for Human Rights & Humanitarian Relief and commonly referred to by the initials on it logo 'I.H.H.' This correspondence was seized from the offices of Success Foundation at 3606B Forest Drive, Alexandria, VA in March 2002. The first letter, on IHH letterhead is dated August 1999 and states that IHH accounts have been closed by the Turkish government. It states that 'we are only accepting cash/in-kind donations.' For more, see the affidavit on the NEFA Foundation website.

2.) The NEFA Foundation has also released a photo of representatives of the Turkish Islamic charity Insani Yardim Vakfi (IHH) speaking at an IHH-sponsored event celebrating the “martyrdom” of senior Hamas leader Mohammad Said Seyam. U.S. State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley previously told reporters that "we know that IHH representatives have met with senior Hamas officials in Turkey, Syria, and Gaza over the past three years. That is obviously of great concern to us." IHH sponsored the flotilla of vessels that attempted to break the ongoing blockade on Gaza. The photo is available on the NEFA Foundation website.

Hizb ut-Tahrir America Announces Annual Conference

By Madeleine Gruen

Hizb ut-Tahrir America (HTA) released a video announcement for its 2010 "Khilafah Conference," to be held on July 11 at the Chicago Marriott, Oak Brook. The conference is titled, "Emerging World Order: How the Khilafah Will Shape the World."

Last year, HTA announced its presence in the United States by hosting a conference at the Hilton in Oak Lawn, Illinois. The conference drew approximately 500 supporters, but did not appear to generate lasting momentum for HTA beyond the flurry of press reporting surrounding the event.

Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) has a presence in more than 45 countries around the world and seeks to establish an Islamic state. Once its government has been established, HT intends to spread Islam to the rest of the world.

To read about HTA's history, please click here.

Defining Homeland Security Intelligence

By Matthew Levitt

Earlier today The Washington Institute's Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence hosted DHS Deputy Undersecretary for intelligence and analysis Todd Rosenblum. In his remarks, Mr. Rosenblum noted that one "particularly disturbing" phenomenon "is the significant increase in al-Qaida and its affiliate’s ability to use operatives that have access and familiarity with the United States." The need to fully integrate homeland security intelligence -- which is in many ways very different from traditional foreign intelligence -- into our overall national security strategy is critical, something stressed in the new National Security Strategy.

The audio and text of Mr. Rosenblum's full comments are available here.

Hammering the West Africa-FARC Criminal-Terror Pipeline

By Douglas Farah

It has been an unprecedented week of drug busts and designations designed to slow the criminal-terrorist nexus in Africa, mostly through cocaine supplied by the FARC in Colombia through air shipments originating in Venezuela.

We have, in the past day, seen a major cocaine ring linked to the FARC in Liberia dismantled, the son of (now dead) dictator Lansana Conte designated a drug kingpin in Guinea (Conakry), and the designation of a major drug kingpin in Mozambique.

As noted by Main Justice, linked above and including a link to the indictment, the son of Liberian president Ellen Johnson Sirleaf wore a wire for the DEA while pretending to accept bribes for a shipment worth hundreds of millions of dollars. Fombah Tea Sirleaf, the son or step son of the president, is the head of Liberia's National Security Agency, and participated in "Operation Relentless."

According to the indictment unsealed yesterday, a Nigerian was coordinating two shipments (one of 4,000 kilos and one of 1,500 kilos) on two different aircraft departing from Venezuela. A Colombian, a Ghanaian and a Russian all played roles. The shipment originated with the FARC in Colombia.

That is about as good as summary as one could want of the current state of alliances in the Latin American-West African drug nexus. The FARC to its state sponsor in Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, to the long-standing Nigerian network in West Africa, through a weak and highly corruptible state (Liberia). The traffickers must have been shocked to find an official in Liberia who actually did not take a bribe. Heroes are few and far between in the war on drug corruption, but there were some in this battle.
My full blog is here.

The Gaza Flotilla Decoy for Iranian Missiles to Hezbollah?

By Walid Phares

"De-Blockading" Hamas?

At first glance, the takeover by the Israeli Navy of the "humanitarian flotilla" heading towards Gaza is just one more of the disputed crises between Israel and its foes. As in all previous incidents, the spiral of accusations will eventually reach bottom. While media attention will highlight the tactical events—seizure of the ships, rules of engagement, who fired first, the legal location of the incident and the other dramatic details—the rapidly expanding debate will soon reach the strategic intent of the "flotilla." After all the governments involved issue their condemnations and warnings in all directions, after the UN issues a statement and international forums mobilize to indict their predictably targeted foe—in this case Israel—the question unavoidably will be: why is there a flotilla heading towards a military zone, and what is the ultimate goal of the operation?

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WILL EU PRIVACY RIGHT CONCERNS IMPEDE CRITICAL COUNTER-TERRORISM INFORMATION SHARING?

By Victor Comras

Four years ago I had the opportunity to write a blog here concerning a controversial story in the New York Times which revealed the ongoing sifting of SWIFT intra bank transfer information by US intelligence agencies. The NYT report incensed US government officials who viewed the revelation as a serious setback in their ability to use "follow the money" strategies for tracing and finding terrorist cells. They were deeply concerned that the article had alerted those funding terrorism to the practice and that they would now avoid such transfers. But, the real damage to the program came from a different source – the European-wide outcry concerning what Europeans perceived as violations of their privacy rights. The NYT story provoked an arduous European reconsideration of its data sharing practices and a debate over the correct balance between preserving privacy rights and effectively combating terrorism and terrorism financing. This debate continues today.

Last month members of the European Parliament took up two important resolutions related to data sharing with the United States. They expressed strong concerns over the way the EU Council and Commission were handling these issues with the United States, particularly in the areas of banking data and traveler-related information. And, they warned the EU leadership that they would continue to stand in the way of any agreement which unduly sacrificed privacy rights or subjected private data to potential abuse. They also provided their own advice and guidance to the EU Council and Commission on what safeguards information sharing agreements with the United States must contain.

Bank data transfers

International bank account transfers are now channeled, for the most part, through correspondent banking relationships and large-value message and payment clearance systems. The Belgium based Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication ("SWIFT") is one of the largest of these clearing centers, handling some 3.76 billion transaction messages and linking some 8,740 financial institutions in 209 countries. It seemed quite evident and logical that the US would target these critical banking transfer nodes to obtain vital information concerning the financing of terrorism and to trace and locate terrorist cells. And that is precisely what the US Treasury Department did under its Terrorism Finance Tracking Program (TFTP). It developed its own criteria for identifying and subpoenaing specific records and data from Swift.

Following publication on June 23, 2006 of the New York Times story about this practice, and the resulting European uproar, the EU and US agreed to put in place a more formal accord which called for procedures to protect against unauthorized use of the data gleaned from the TFTP SWIFT program. But, European Parliamentarians balked at the arrangement. They insisted that more specific safeguards be put in place that would comply fully with EU privacy legislation. On February 11, 2010, the EU Parliament formally rejected (378 to 196 with 31 abstentions) the US-EU interim data sharing agreement, causing considerable consternation in both European and US counter-terrorism circles.

With the data sharing agreement now supposedly in abeyance, MEP’s have moved forward on providing specific guidance to the EU Council on the protections they want. A new resolution, passed by a raised hands vote, foreclosed inclusion of so-called bulk data sharing and transfers. They also insisted that any new agreement include "strict implementation and supervision safeguards, monitored by an appropriate EU-appointed authority." This authority would be charged with filtering the day-to-day extraction of and use by the US authorities of all such data. The maximum storage period, they indicate, must not exceed five years and the data may not be disclosed to third countries. They also insist on reciprocity that would require the United States to permit EU authorities access to data stored in servers in the US. Finally, they insist that Europeans be given the same rights and access to US courts to challenge errors, and unauthorized use and abuse of the shared data. At present the privacy rights guaranteed under the US Privacy Act can only be invoked by US citizens and permanent residents of the United States.

Passenger name records (PNRs)

While deferring official Parliamentary action on the sharing of information gathered on potential travelers, the MEPs nevertheless reflected grave concerns on the current arrangements in place. The US now requires all airlines flying to the United States to provide the Department of Homeland Security with full electronic access to detailed personal information on all passengers, in the form of Passenger Name Records (PNRs). The MEP’s are aware that interrupting this process might seriously impede international travel. Therefore, they agreed to postpone taking any action. Rather, they indicated in committee discussions with the EC Commission that they wanted the Commission to move ahead on drafting a model PNR and procedures for safeguarding the information against potential abusive release or use.

PNR's contain data collected by airline reservation systems on individuals who make reservations whether or not they actually travel. Each entry is logged in a PNR "history" which is retained by the various reservation systems now in operation. Over time they put together a more complete profile of the potential traveler including the places he has gone, when, with whom, for how long, and at whose expense. This information can be very useful, and is often essential, in identifying potentially dangerous travelers and subjecting them to closer inspection or “no fly” restrictions.

The appropriate balance between protecting privacy rights and counter-terrorism concerns entails many subjective determinations. The essential element in preserving privacy and combating terrorism must be the confidence that has hopefully already developed between US and counter-part EU agencies which have already long handled and processed such data. Few, if any, cases of abuse have arisen so far. Perhaps it is time to rely on this close cooperation and confidence, rather than on new detailed legislated rules, and to make sure that vital counter-terrorism information is available and appropriately assessed in a timely fashion.

Fallout from the Gaza Flotilla Tragedy

By Matthew Levitt

The Gaza flotilla tragedy has given Hamas at least a short-term political boost while undercutting the sea blockade of Gaza, fitting well with the agenda of the flotilla's organizers, Turkey's Humanitarian Relief Fund. At the same time, the incident -- to the extent that the details are known -- has shown that U.S.-Israel relations have proven resilient in the face of the first major international incident since the two parties worked to mend relations following the Jerusalem building-permit crisis in March.

In the short term, Hamas will benefit politically from its role as a supporter of the flotilla, its public calls for Israel to not interfere with the effort to break the blockade, and the burnishing of its fading "resistance" credentials. Ismail Haniyah set up the situation as a win-win for Hamas in his May 29 speech declaring that it was a victory if the flotilla got through or if Israel stopped it. The bloody outcome only increased the size of the victory for Hamas. Previously, Hamas had launched a broad media campaign to focus attention on the flotilla and warn of the possibility of an Israeli action against it. Since the incident, Hamas media organs have given extensive coverage to it, prominently depicting the role and actions of Hamas officials. Hamas's public role in the events makes the Palestinian Authority (PA) look bad by comparison. For the most part, Hamas has considerably trailed the PA in support among Palestinians, so Hamas is hoping the incident will give it at least a temporary boost. It should be pointed out that even the sympathy boost that Hamas garnered after the 2008-2009 Gaza war evaporated in just two months.

The Gaza flotilla interdiction incident cannot be seen as other than a major victory for Hamas. The outcome, the images, and the reflexive condemnation of the action by much of the world are all of direct benefit to Hamas and to the detriment of its opponents -- especially Israel, but the PA as well. Hamas will see immediate political gains as well as potential long-term practical benefits for its rule in Gaza.

The complete article, co-authored by myself, David Makovsky and Jeffrey White, is available here.

Shooting the Messenger: A Look at the Facts on the Turkish Aid Group IHH

By Evan Kohlmann

When I first published a research paper four years ago with the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) on the Turkish Muslim charitable group Insani Yardim Vakfi (IHH), I didn't imagine it would get much of a response outside the academic conference in which it was presented in Copenhagen. However, as a result of this weekend's tragic Israeli raid on an IHH-sponsored flotilla of vessels attempting to break the ongoing blockade on Gaza, the group has suddenly jumped into the headlines, and has become a focus of intense debate over the intentions of the flotilla organizers and the controversial killing of at least 9 would-be participants by Israeli commandos.

Though my DIIS paper made no mention of IHH's activities in Gaza or in support of suffering Palestinian refugees, some of those angered by the Israeli flotilla raid have instead turned their emotional animus on past critics of IHH, such as myself. While I certainly can't speak with any authority on what took place on the Gaza flotilla boats, I'm rather mystified why the flotilla killings--whether right or wrong--would have any bearing on the factual question of whether the IHH has engaged in illicit financing and episodic support to extremist groups. The evidence in this regard is fairly weighty, and much of it comes directly from the Turkish government -- not the United States, nor the Israelis.

On December 5, 1997, Turkish police raided the IHH headquarters office in Istanbul and arrested its principal leaders. Following their preliminary inquiry, on April 27, 1998, Turkish investigators launched a formal legal case against the IHH. According to a report produced by French counterterrorism magistrates, the inquiry was spurred by the sale of an AK-47 assault rifle to an IHH leader by "a member of the illegal organization VASAT." Turkish police reported seizing a series of disturbing items from the IHH in Turkey, including an explosive device, two sticks of dynamite, bomb making instructions, and a "jihad flag." The French magistrates report noted that:

"It appears that the detained members of IHH were going to fight in Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Chechnya... The essential goal of this Association was to illegally arm its membership for overthrowing democratic, secular, and constitutional order present in Turkey and replacing it with an Islamic state founded on the Shariah. Under the cover of this organization known under the name of IHH, [IHH leaders] acted to recruit veteran soldiers in anticipation of the coming holy war. In particular, some men were sent into war zones in Muslim countries in order to acquire combat experience. On the spot, the formation of a military unit was assured. In addition, towards the purpose of obtaining political support from these countries, financial aid was transferred [from IHH], as well as caches of firearms, knives, and pre-fabricated explosives."

An official review of the phone records from the IHH's office in Istanbul revealed two calls to the Bosnian Mujahideen Brigade unit headquarters in Zenica, five phone calls to a member of the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA) based in London, and at least one call to Anwar Shaaban's notorious Islamic Cultural Institute in Milan, Italy.

The IHH's connections to international terrorism have even surfaced in sworn witness testimony in the U.S. federal court system. During the trial of attempted Millenium bomber Ahmed Ressam, noted French counterterrorism magistrate Jean-Louis Bruguiere took the stand and testified that IHH had played “[a]n important role” in Ressam's bomb plot targeting LAX. Under repeated questioning, Bruguiere insisted that “[t]here’s a rather close relation”: "The IHH is an NGO, but it was kind of a type of cover-up… in order to obtain forged documents and also to obtain different forms of infiltration for Mujahideen in combat. And also to go and gather[recruit] these Mujahideens. And finally, one of the last responsibilities that they had was also to be implicated or involved in weapons trafficking."

None of this information is considered sensitive or secret, nor is it particularly difficult to come by. Turkish government officials have openly acknowledged as much in major Western media outlets. In August 1999, the governor of Istanbul was interviewed in the Washington Post after he personally ordered local IHH bank accounts frozen because of suspected criminal activity. He explained at the time, "All legal institutions may have some illegal connections. This might be the case here. If they don't like it, they can appeal in court."

To his credit, the former Istanbul governor here underscores another critical point. Contemporary terror finance networks are most effectively curtailed using accepted legal sanctions and transnational cooperation between regional allies. Incidents such as the deadly Gaza flotilla raid ultimately undermine the battle against illicit financing, and weaken shared international resolve to punish those who manipulate humanitarian relief as a cover to fund terrorism. The Israeli government must be more mindful in the future of the wider political repercussions its attempts at punitive actions can have, whether technically justified or not. Those repercussions impact not only the state of Israel, but also carry implicit costs for the United States and its European allies.