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Indonesia Establishes New Counter-Terrorism Agency
By Kenneth Conboy
The Indonesian president on 16 July signed a decree establishing a new National Counter-Terrorism Agency that answers only to him. It is tasked with “preventing terrorism, protecting civilians, de-radicalizing terrorists, and building national preparedness.” It will be launched later this year, though no specific date has been set. Ansyad Mbai, who heads a counter-terrorism desk under the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs, will likely initially serve as its caretaker chief. The agency will have its own budget and staff, including members seconded from the police, State Intelligence Agency, and military.
The new body has been established after the Indonesian government came under criticism following the July 2009 hotel bombings in Jakarta. During this incident, several terrorist suspects were found to be repeat offenders—that is, they had been arrested once before and already underwent rehabilitation classes. Then this past February, more than a dozen terrorists released from detention joined a militant training camp in the jungles of Aceh. The new agency, therefore, will focus on ways of more effectively de-radicalizing captured terrorists. Meantime, Special Detachment 88, part of the Indonesian National Police, will continue to be the country’s primary counter-terrorism strike force.
Some rights groups have criticized the new body because of what they see as vague provisions in the presidential decree, and because they oppose the idea of military officers serving on the board.
Flashpoint Exclusive: Captive Pakistani Intel Officer Threatens to Reveal "Secret Game" Behind Afghan Conflict
By Evan Kohlmann
In the wake of the latest embarrassing disclosures about Pakistan's unhelpful role in the Afghan conflict, Flashpoint Global Partners has obtained an unpublished video of retired Pakistani military and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) officer Colonel Imam Sultan Amir Tarar, who has been held hostage by militants in Pakistan’s tribal region since March 2010, when he arrived in the area alongside another former ISI officer Khalid Khwaja.
Tarar, a veteran of the Soviet-Afghan war and a reputed expert on guerilla warfare, has acknowledged a long relationship with the Afghan Taliban and its leader Mullah Mohammed Omar—but has been far more critical of the Pakistani Taliban movement. During a recent New York Times interview, Tarar admonished the TTP and its leadership as “troublemakers” who should be “neutralized.”
In his latest video-recorded message, Colonel Imam Tarar claims that he has been kidnapped by “Lashkar Jhangvi al-Alami, Abdullah Mansour” faction and insists that the Pakistani government has done nothing to facilitate his release. If the government continues to refuse negotiations for his freedom, Tarar further threatens to disclose highly sensitive information about “the weaknesses of our nation” and the secret “game being played with Afghanistan, India, Russia, and America.”
Still images and an English transcript of the video of Colonel Sultan Amir Tarar are now available via the website of Flashpoint Global Partners - http://www.flashpoint-intel.com.
The Boston Cluster and Extended Connections: Case Study on Homegrown Radicalization
By Madeleine Gruen
The NEFA Foundation has released the 26th report in the “Target: America” series; a PowerPoint presentation on a cluster of men originally from the Boston area and their associates. Members of this cluster sought to join al-Qaida forces overseas to kill Americans and also contemplated an attack in a shopping center in the United States. Several participated in jihad by circulating jihadist propaganda to other Americans.
This case study provides insight into how U.S. citizens who sympathize with terrorists make connections with like-minded people on the internet, and through school and community activities. This case also provides insight into how American citizens arrange to access terrorist training camps overseas.
The PowerPoint can be viewed here.
Hezbollah Spies via Facebook
By Aaron Mannes
In an excellent article in The Washington Times, UPI’s Shaun Waterman described a “red team” activity in which a security consultant created a false persona on Facebook that appeared to be attractive young woman who was working in cyber defense. She quickly garnered hundreds of friends in the national security community, as well as job offers and invites to conferences. In the process she gathered a great deal of sensitive materials such as inadvertently exposed passwords.
This is not a hypothetical concern – Hezbollah (long a terrorism pioneer) has already employed this strategy. According to the Israeli news site MySay: The Hizbullah agent pretended she was an Israeli girl named “Reut Zukerman”, “Reut” succeeded during several weeks to engage more then 200 reserve and active personnel.
The Hizbullah agent gained the trust of soldiers and officers that didn’t hesitate to confirm him as a “friend” once they saw he/she is friends with several of their friends from the same unit. Most of them assumed that “Reut” was just another person who served in that elite intelligence unit.
In this way, Hizbullah collected information about the unit’s activity, names and personal details of its personnel, the unit’s slang, and visual information on its bases. This user / agent using Facebook is an example of a trend called fakebook.
The picture attached to “Reut Zukerman” was, of course, an appealing young woman (some tricks are timeless.)
Implications
The first concern regarding incidents of this nature is the raw intelligence collected. But more than the data, it creates opportunities to gather even more data.
Read the full post here.
Flashpoint Partners Exclusive: Video of Times Square Bomber with Pakistani Taliban Commander
By Evan Kohlmann
Flashpoint Global Partners has released a previously unpublished video excerpt of a meeting between confessed Times Square bomb plotter Faisal Shahzad and the leader of the Pakistani Taliban Hakimullah Mehsud. During the undated video clip, Hakimullah and Shahzad are shown shaking hands and hugging, as Shahzad speaks in an overlaid audio track: "Today, along with the leader of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan Hakimullah Mehsud and under the command of Amir al-Mumineen Mullah Mohammed Omar Mujahid (may Allah protect him), we are planning to wage an attack on your side, inshallah."
The video excerpt can be accessed via Flashpoint’s website: http://www.flashpoint-intel.com.
The Ghazi Brigade: Lal Masjid Episode Conitinues to Haunt Pakistan
By Animesh Roul
Last week I published one report on the Lal Masjid offshoot ‘Ghazi Brigade’, a relatively new comer and named after the slain radical Abdul Rashid Ghazi. The Ghazi Brigade has stepped up its Jihadi actvties recently in Pakistan primarily to enforce Islamic Shari’a in the country through the use of force and to punish those who stormed the mosque in July 2007.
"Little-Known Ghazi Brigade Now a Major Player in the Punjabi Jihad?", Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 8 (28), July 16, 2010.
Abstract of the article:
A recent spurt in sectarian attacks in Pakistan has been blamed on a lethal but lesser known group affiliated with Taliban and al-Qaeda elements: the Ghazi Abdul Rashid Shaheed Brigade, also known as the Ghazi Brigade or Ghazi Force (Daily Times [Lahore], July 2). What was formed as an Islamic vigilante group has now emerged as a radical jihadi organization in response to the July 2007 Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) siege in Islamabad. Over one hundred religious students were killed by Pakistani security forces during the siege, including the mosque’s deputy leader, Abdul Rashid Ghazi. Thousands of mourners pledging their commitment to jihad thronged the funeral of Abdul Ghazi, held in his native village of Basti Abdullah in Punjab (PakTribune, July 12, 2007). Indeed, his death heralded the start of a neo-Taliban movement in Pakistan, with radical students calling for jihad against Pakistan and its allies.
The events at Lal Masjid prompted al-Qaeda's Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri to call for revenge attacks in Pakistan. Maulana Abdul Aziz, the brother of Rashid Ghazi, also issued a threat of “bloody revolution” in the country (Dawn, July 10, 2009). Addressing an Islamic gathering to commemorate the Lal Masjid standoff, an unidentified cleric said, “You killed one Ghazi. Here are thousands of Ghazis ready to sacrifice in the way of Allah.” In effect, the events at the mosque have unleashed a wave of suicide attacks across Pakistan.
According to intelligence sources, the organization is led by Maulana Niaz Raheem (a.k.a. Bilal), a former student at the Red Mosque’s Jamia Faridia seminary. Pakistani agencies have arrested a Ghazi Brigade terrorist identified as Fidaullah (a.k.a. Junaid) who was allegedly involved in the attacks on the Police Special Branch and the FC checkpoint in Islamabad. Fidaullah has been identified as one of the top strategists for the Ghazi Brigade, operating from the Galjo area in Hangu, part of the North-West Frontier Province (Geo TV, June 1, 2009). Two of his accomplices also involved in the FC checkpoint attack, Khairullah and Khurram Shahzad, were arrested on earlier occasions. Ghazi Brigade terrorists adopted decapitation as a tactic to instill fear among those civilians supporting security forces in the battle zones. Fidaullah himself beheaded three people publicly in Sultanwas and Pir Baba in Swat (The News [Islamabad], June 2, 2009).
Read Full Text Here
Arab Bank Case Ruling: A Victory for Victims of Terrorism
By Victor Comras
It looks like the 6 year old Linde v Arab Bank case may finally move into its trial on the merits phase following a ruling July 12th by US District Court Judge Nina Gershon that:
"The factual allegations of the complaints sufficiently support an inference that Arab Bank and the terrorist organizations were participants in a common plan under which Arab Bank would supply necessary financial services to the organizations which would themselves perform the violent acts. Administering the death and dismemberment benefit plan further supports not only the existence of an agreement but Arab Bank's knowing and intentional participation in the agreement's illegal goals. No more is required."
The case had been locked in its discovery phase for some time pending rulings on Arab Bank’s refusal to provide documentation concerning such financial transfers. Plaintiffs maintained that such documents, if provided, would establish that Arab Bank participated knowingly in this money raising and transferring scheme. Arab Bank’s attorneys maintained that they were precluded from providing such documents because of Jordanian and other country bank secrecy laws. The ruling reflects Judge Gershon’s determination that the refusal to comply with the court's order that such documents be made available to the plaintiffs pursuant to discovery requests merits legal sanctions against Arab Bank. And, the judge's instruction to the jury that they can draw the above inference from this lack of production of such documents is the appropriate remedy. This ruling is fully in line with legal precedent in such cases of non production of court ordered documents.
The Linde case was brought before the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York in July 2004 by six American families, victims of Palestinian terrorism in Israel during the Al Aqsa Intifada. They sued Jordan's Arab Bank under section 2333 of the Anti Terrorism Act of 1996 alleging that Arab Bank had encouraged such terrorism by disbursing millions of dollars in support payment for families of suicide bombers, which served as a further incentive for attacks.
Section 2333 provides that “Any national of the United States injured in his or her person, property, or business by reason of an act of international terrorism, or his or her estate, survivors, or heirs, may sue {in Federal Court} … and … recover threefold the damages he or she sustains and the cost of the suit, including attorney’s fees.” The District Court also permitted foreign nationals to join the lawsuit via the Alien Torts Claims Act. Currently, more than 100 families and 700 individuals in the Linde case and related cases are seeking more than $1 billion in damages based on Arab Bank’s role in financially supporting terrorist activities. The foreign nationals consist mostly of Israeli citizens but also include Afghani, Argentinian, Australian, Belarusian, Canadian, French, Iranian, Iraqi, Peruvian, South African, Turkmenian, Ukranian, and Uzbeki citizens.
The payments were transferred by Arab Bank to and through several charities that allegedly serve as fronts for Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Al Aqsa Martyr’s Brigade and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. These funds were originally collected by two special committees established in Saudi Arabia with the stated intention of raising funds for the families of those carrying out suicide missions at the behest of the named terrorist organizations. Some of these funds were routed through Arab Bank’s New York office in order to convert the funds into U.S. dollars. The Palestinian charities named in the suit include, inter alia, the Popular Committee for Support of the Intifada (the “Popular Committee”), the Coalition of Benevolence (the “Coalition”), the Humanitarian Relief Association (the “HRA”), the Al-Ansar Society, and the Tulkarem Charitable Committee.
The Arab Bank case will likely move forward before a jury at the same time as Canada’s Parliament takes up new legislation that would also grant victims of terrorism the right to hold those that finance terrorism liable for damages. Final Parliamentary committee hearings on this legislation were held earlier this month, and passage of the act is expected when Parliament reconvenes in October. This is due in large part to the unceasing efforts of C-CAT, the Canadian Coalition Against Terrorism, which has become the leading voice for victims of terrorism in Canada. I had an opportunity to testify in the course of these hearings. A webcast of the hearings can be found here.
Fighting the Ideological Battle: The Missing Link in U.S. Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism
By Matthew Levitt
As nonaffiliate terrorist actors begin to take center stage and al-Qaeda's core strength diminishes, it has become clear that America is at war with a larger enemy: the extremist ideology that fuels and supports Islamist violence. Unfortunately, the United States is not well equipped to fight on this ideological battleground, and U.S. efforts to confront the ideology worldwide have not kept pace with more successful military targeting of high-level al-Qaeda leaders.
In a new Washington Institute Strategic Report my co-authors and I argue that rather than avoid any mention of the religious motivation behind the terrorism of al-Qaeda and other like-minded organizations, the Obama administration should sharpen the distinction between the religion of Islam and the political ideology of radical Islamism to successfully defeat Islamist terrorism at its most fundamental source.
Engagement and counterterrorism are key elements of this comprehensive strategy, we argue, but the wide space between them must be addressed. Missing are the policies and programs that should suffuse the space between these two poles on the counterradicalization spectrum, including efforts to contest the extremist narrative of radicalizers, empower and network mainstream voices countering extremism, promote diversity of ideas and means of expression, and challenge extremist voices and ideas in
the public domain. Contesting the radical Islamist narrative does not mean arresting or banning despicable but protected speech; rather, it means openly contesting
extremist views by offering alternatives and fostering deeper ideological debate. The objective in either case is to strengthen the moderate center against the extremist pole and help Muslim communities become more resilient in confronting the challenge.
This report, Fighting the Ideological Battle: The Missing Link in U.S. Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism, follows on the Institute's 2009 bipartisan Presidential Task Force report Rewriting the Narrative: An Integrated Strategy for Counterradicalization. It is a joint project of The Washington Institute's Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence and Project Fikra: Defeating Extremism through the Power of Ideas.
This new report recognizes the important steps the Obama administration has taken to address violent extremism and suggests ways to address remaining gaps in U.S. homeland security and foreign policy. The report has benefited from a series of interviews with administration officials at numerous cabinet level agencies and the White House and is the product of a small study group including myself, my Washington Institute colleague J Scott Carpenter, and former White House counterterrorism officials Steven Simon and Juan Zarate.
The complete report is available here.
Iran's Global Terrorist Reach
By Walid Phares
The United States became painfully aware of the threat posed by global jihadism after the terror attacks of September 11, 2001. Until that day, Iranian-backed terrorist networks, such as Hezbollah, were responsible for killing more American citizens than al-Qaeda. In the years since, the balance has been gradually tilting back towards Iran. In the words of former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, al-Qaeda may be the 'B' team of international terrorism, but Hezbollah is the 'A' team. Indeed, Iran's Khomeinists began their war on the U.S. and other democracies years before Osama bin Laden began his jihad.
The takeover of Iran's government in 1979 by radical Islamist forces faithful to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was the breakthrough after which the so-called Islamic Revolution spread throughout the Middle East and beyond. The Khomeinist revolution is ideologically rooted in a radical Islamist doctrine that stands in opposition to the more traditional "Quietist" school of thought among Shia clerics. In a sense, the Khomeinists are the Shia world's equivalent of the Salafists within the Sunni world. The Islamist Shias are also jihadists, in the sense that they call for the establishment of a future Imamate, a Shia form of Islamic Caliphate, by any means necessarily, including what they coin as "Jihad," which practically means war.
Because it cannot project much conventional military power, Iran threatens the United States, Israel and other democracies by unconventional means. Through the use of its terrorist surrogates—such as Hezbollah—Tehran's reach extends around the world.

Iran

Syria
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Hezbollah
The formation of the Iranian-Syrian alliance in 1980 allowed Tehran to penetrate Lebanon's Shi'ite communities and build a militia that enabled it to extend its influence to the Mediterranean. Through Hezbollah, Iran controls the resources of a large religious community in Lebanon and has established itself as a dominant force inside the country. Iran is therefore able to develop networks overseas more easily and engage Israel in direct confrontation from across the border. Furthermore, the alliance has granted greater access to U.S., European, and other interests on behalf of the Khomeinist regime.

Hezbollah zones

Hezbollah forces
Hezbollah was an Iranian project designed to export its revolution globally and it fast became the single most dangerous terrorist network. Since the 1979 revolution, the ayatollahs have invited radical Shia clerics from Lebanon to Iran for theological training. They also recruited militants, including Imad Mughniyeh, who became the central figure in the terror nexus for decades. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (Pasdaran) established its first bases in the northern Bekaa valley in 1980. From there, it connected with "Islamic Amal," an offshoot of the Amal Movement, and with radical religious scholars who studied at the holy cities of Qom in Iran and Najaf in Iraq.
Hezbollah was born in a gradual process under the auspices of the Pasdaran and launched from the Bekaa towards South Lebanon and Beirut's southern suburbs. It took part in limited clashes against Lebanon's Christian enclave in early 1982, and as the Israeli invasion destroyed the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) infrastructure in the South in June, Iran sent Hezbollah into the fray. Its first strikes were directed at the U.S. embassy and Marines, and French troops. Throughout the 1980s, Hezbollah took U.S. and European hostages and engaged in operations against Israeli forces and their local allies in the South Lebanon Army (SLA).
In 1990, Syria invaded East Beirut, seizing the central government and conferring a mantle of state legitimacy on Hezbollah. Iran consequently gained a third ally in the region, the Syrian-controlled Lebanese Republic. After a decade of attacks, including suicide bombings, the Iranian-funded organization won another victory when Israel withdrew from the security zone in southern Lebanon and the SLA was disbanded.
In May 2000, Hezbollah was poised along the international border with the "Zionist enemy." Through Lebanon's institutions, ports of entry, and security apparatus, Iran has expanded its base inside the country, obtained additional funding, and penetrated many countries around the world, from Africa to Latin America. In 2005, the organization intimidated members of Lebanon's Cedar Revolution, using terrorism to put down a democratic uprising against Khomeinist-Baathist domination.
Connection with Hamas
In the early 1990s, Iran finally connected with Hamas through Hezbollah. The hundreds of jihadists exiled by Israel into Lebanon were absorbed by the Khomeinist organization in various training camps. The encounter between Hezbollah (a Shia Islamist organization) and Hamas (an offshoot of the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood) created the first hybrid of Sunni extremists acting in alliance with Shia fundamentalists. Iranian funding further strengthened Hamas.

Gaza

Hamas forces
The new strategic partnership gave Iran influence inside the Palestinian communities, particularly in Gaza. As a jihadist organization, Hamas rejects the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians, as it does not recognize the existence of a Jewish state. Initially, its Muslim Brotherhood training and Wahhabi funding directed its efforts against the PLO negotiations with Israel, but when Hamas entered an alliance with Hezbollah and Iran, it became part of a regional axis commanded from Tehran, and thus became part of the ayatollahs' strategy to expand across the region and topple moderate Arab governments. Hamas's 2007 coup d'etat against the Palestinian Authority signaled that Hamas had become another Iranian tentacle in the region.
Iran's stooges in Iraq and Afghanistan
The Iranian plan for Iraq is nothing new. Since the first days of the 1979 revolution, Iranian intelligence fomented trouble in the Shia areas of Iraq. Its long-term goal would see the Shia majority in Iraq sympathetic to the regime in Tehran and provide a land bridge to Syria and Lebanon in the west – from Tehran to the Mediterranean Sea. With southern Iraq dominated by Iran, it would change the nature of the confrontation with Israel and threaten the oil-rich states of the Arabian Gulf.

Mahdi forces
The Shia Hizb al-Dawa of Iraq had struggled to establish an Islamist state in Mesopotamia since the 1960s. During the Iraq-Iran War, Khomeini planned to seize Basra and Iraq's southern provinces and declare an Islamic Republic there. After Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait and was routed, thousands of Shi'ites fled to Iran, where they were trained by the Pasdaran. The Badr Brigade, Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, and other Iraqi factions were born in exile in Iran.
With the collapse of Iraq's ruling Baath party at the hands of the U.S.-led coalition in 2003, Iran began another secret invasion of Iraq, dispatching operatives, special forces and Hezbollah trainers throughout the Shia areas of the country. Iran penetrated most political parties with Islamist (Shia) inclination, and organized a bold pro-Khomeinist force: the Mahdi Army. Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah worked in unison to establish a "pro-axis" force inside Iraq.
In Afghanistan, Iran's strategists were undeterred by the presence of NATO troops after 2001. Despite the collapse of the Taliban regime that year, Tehran infiltrated Afghanistan's Shi'ite Hazara community in the center of the country and provided logistical support to the Taliban insurgency. Evidently the Iranian regime is interested in driving out the U.S.-led effort, weakening the Karzai government in Kabul, and carving out its own influence in the Central Asian country. And Tehran's reach in Afghanistan will only increase as Pakistan becomes increasingly unstable.
Infiltrating Arabia: Yemen, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf
Over the past few years, Tehran has widened its subversive activities in the Arabian Peninsula, quarreling with the Gulf Arab states of Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates. Although the UAE claims the island of Abu Musa as part of its sovereign territory, Iranian forces have occupied it, and reject calls to withdraw. Recent statements by Khomeinist clerics assert that Bahrain, too, is an Iranian possession under the name of Mishmahig Island, and it has triggered a severe diplomatic crisis with the small kingdom.
Behind these historical disputes lay greater geopolitical ambitions. Iran has been investing large amounts of oil money in the UAE with the aim of expanding its political and military influence in the Gulf. Iranian intelligence has also been expanding its cells and cadres in the large Shia community of Bahrain.

Yemen

Houthi forces
In the majority-Sunni Yemen, the Pasdaran's networks have hooked up with the Houthis, who are waging an armed insurrection in the northern tip of the country. Yemeni President Ali Abdallah Saleh has accused Iran and Hezbollah of training the insurgents, who have battled government forces and attacked Saudi positions across the border. By 2009, the Khomeinists had practically established a military enclave in the southern corner of the Arabian Peninsula, threatening Saudi Arabia and its most sensitive province, the Hejaz, home to Islam's holiest shrines Mecca and Medina.
Targeting North Africa
Although North Africa has been home almost exclusively to Salafi jihadists, it has witnessed increased activity by Tehran's Shi'ite operatives. According to Moroccan authorities, Iran has funded religious institutions whose first mission is to convert Sunnis to Shia, in what is coined as "Tashyeeh." In 2009 and 2010, the Rabat government shut down a number of these entities and arrested people involved in them.
Moreover, Moroccan and Algerian opposition sources believe Iran is attempting to convince Algiers to proceed with cooperation agreements similar to the Iranian-Syrian treaties or the latest Syrian-Turkish accords. If this thrust were to bear fruit, the benefits for Tehran would be incalculable. Not only would the Khomeinists have a solid base south of the Mediterranean, but they would also gain a wide gate into the weak states of Central Africa and beyond.
Hezbollah infiltrates Egypt
Meanwhile, last year in Egypt, Hosni Mubarak's government accused Hezbollah of creating cells inside the country and planning attacks against Egyptian and Western targets. Egypt, the most populous and powerful Arab country with a Sunni majority, has been targeted significantly by Sunni Salafi terror networks. The new addition of Hezbollah cells acting on the inside dramatically raises the threat Egypt faces from jihadists.

Hezbollah cells in Egypt
Egyptian courts have sentenced a number of Lebanese Hezbollah members as well as Egyptian citizens working with them. From Beirut, Hezbollah's secretary general sent veiled threats to President Mubarak's government, claiming that Hezbollah and the "Islamic resistance" have the right to operate from any Arab and Islamic land against their enemies, principally Israel. Hassan Nasrallah had previously threatened Cairo when he exhorted the Egyptian military to rebel against its government.
But the Iranian strategy to build terror networks along the Nile Valley by way of Hezbollah has not been limited to Egypt. Sudan, whose regime has been both Islamist and jihadist since 1989, has undergone a rapprochement with Tehran. This convergence of interests between the elites of the two rogue states has only increased since the International Criminal Court indicted Sudanese dictator Omar al Bashir for the genocide in Darfur. In the weeks and months following the indictments, Hezbollah delegations followed by Iranian delegates supported Bashir against the West, and thus against the African uprisings in the south, west and east of the troubled country.
Ahmedinijad and Bashir allies

Iran's access to Sudan also brought strategic advantages to the Pasdaran: Hezbollah and Iranian intelligence benefit from the immense land mass by building military bases and training regime militias for potential confrontations to come. By linking up with Sudan, Hezbollah and its Iranian sponsors now have a host south of Egypt, where they can access the Red Sea via Port Sudan and use paths to Eritrea and Chad.
Facilities in East and West Africa
Towards the end of 2008 and 2009, intense contacts between Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's representatives and Eritrean officials culminated in the signing of an agreement granting Iran's navy facilities along the coasts of the Eritrea. This strategically significant development provided the Khomeinists with hundreds of miles of access in the Red Sea. While U.S. and allied naval forces deter Iran in the Persian Gulf, Iranian assets—though not as sophisticated as the Western forces in the region—can now operate in the Red Sea. Indeed, where the Iranian regime goes, Hezbollah follows. Israel is thus surrounded by Iranian proxies and the Horn of Africa is under the increasing risk posed by the axis of resistance.

Ahmdinijad in Eritrea
Iran has also worked to penetrate West Africa since the 1980s. Taking advantage of the substantial size of the Lebanese communities in Senegal, Liberia, Sierra Leone, the Ivory Coast, Benin, and Nigeria, Hezbollah has developed financial and intelligence networks that span the entire region. This increase of Iranian-backed activities in West Africa could have negative effects on security coordination between these countries and the West, including the U.S. and Europe.

Hezbollah in West Africa
Iran in Europe
Since the so-called "Islamic revolution," Iran has undertaken sinister intelligence activities throughout Europe, intimidating and occasionally assassinating opposition figures and dissidents. But Tehran's most dangerous presence in Europe comes in the form of active Hezbollah cells. Since 9/11, a number of European governments have detected Hezbollah activities on their soil. Indeed, Germany has arrested and tried members of the organization who were planning illegal activities.
Iran has extended its strategic reach into European countries, penetrating them with intelligence and terrorist networks, and weakening their resolve to join forces with the U.S. in sanctions or other punitive measures against Tehran.
Stretching into the Americas
Iran's longest arm stretches into Latin America. As of the early 1990s, Hezbollah had established a presence in the tri-border area between Brazil, Argentinaand Paraguay. This lawless zone enables the Khomeinist network to develop illegal financial activities and train and plan for terrorist attacks in the region. The 1992 bombing of the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires and the 1994 bombing of a Jewish center there are prime examples of Tehran's terrorist activities and global reach.

Iran and the Chaves regime
With the rise of the Hugo Chavez regime, Iran's Latin American presence expanded even further. The Venezuelan strongman has signed several agreements with Ahmadinejad's regime, including an April 2009 defense treaty that provides for military and intelligence cooperation. Venezuela has granted Hezbollah operatives permission to organize their presence under the protection of Iran's Pasdaran and local intelligence, and according to U.S. Department of Defense reports, the Venezuelans are providing Iranian units with Spanish language instruction with the aim of inserting them in a Latin American context. One of the most dangerous aspects of Iran's presence in Venezuela is the increasing ability to install Iranian missiles aimed at the United States and other countries in the region.
As of now, Iran's reach within the United States is principally—but not entirely—in the hands of Hezbollah's networks, which have been trying to recruit new agents since they established their own foundations in Lebanon in the 1980s. Working naturally through Lebanese communities, beginning with its bases in the home country, Hezbollah established groups and cells inside the U.S. in states such as Michigan, New York and North Carolina.
The main activities detected by U.S. law enforcement organizations have centered on smuggling, fundraising, and providing material support to the mother organization in Lebanon. But Hezbollah has gained valuable experience in penetrating Lebanon, Egypt, Iraq, Yemen and the countries of northern Africa, which enables Iran to do considerable damage to the U.S. in case of open conflict. American authorities have also been monitoring Iran's financial presence in the U.S., with recent discoveries showing Iranian front companies even holding assets in Manhattan.
Facilitators: Turkey's AKP and Qatar
Over the past few years, two additional Middle Eastern governments—supposedly close U.S. allies—have been aiding Iran in its attempts to emerge from international isolation. Since 2002, Turkey, led by the Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP), has slowly become more supportive of Iran's policies, including Tehran's nuclear program. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan recently endorsed Ahmadinejad's controversial reelection despite the massive democratic opposition inside Iran. Ankara's Islamists also rejected UN sanctions over Iran's nuclear program.

Ahmedinijad and Erdogan
According to several Arab governments, Qatar, which has been funding the Al-Jazeera network since the late 1990s, has also made life easier for the Iranian regime in the region. Qatar's emir made diplomatic maneuvers to prevent the UN from implementing Security Council Resolution 1559, which provides for the disarming of Hezbollah in Lebanon. Instead, Qatar held a counter-conference in Doha in 2008 to help bring Hezbollah into the fold of the Lebanese government, at the expense of the democratic Cedar Revolution.

Iran and Qatar
The Iranian Threat
The threat from Iran goes far beyond its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Its use of terrorist proxies and its creation of global terror networks has been one the longest-standing bones of contention with the West. Despite the current focus on the Taliban and al-Qaeda, no group has had more practice in global terrorism than Hezbollah, and no state has proved a better and more consistent patron than Iran.

Global Threat
From a U.S. counterterrorism perspective, the threats posed by Iran, Hezbollah, and its global terrorist network are considerable. But the addition of nuclear weapons into this global network of Khomeinists may well prove as dangerous if not more so than nuclear weapons in the hands of al-Qaeda.
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Dr. Walid Phares is director of the Future of Terrorism Project at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. He teaches global strategies at the National Defense University and is author of The Confrontation: Winning the War Against Future Jihad
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"Iran's Global Terrorist Reach" was published initially in the summer 2010 edition of InFocus Periodical. The article shows the geopolitical expansion of the Iranian regime as well as its terrorist and strategic reach around the world. Iran has developed weapons, created terror networks and established a system of alliances, challenging and threatening the region and the international community. « Close It
Update on the Insurgency in Southern Thailand
By Zachary Abuza
Last week, four bombs went off in southern Thailand, killing 10, including four soldiers and four paramilitaries. An additional four people were gunned down. Pundits decry the 88 killed in the Red Shirt demonstrations in Bangkok in May, yet more than 4,100 people have been killed, and nearly 7,000 wounded since the insurgency in southern Thailand began in January 2004; 160 have been killed and over 400 wounded in 2010 alone. Yet the conflict gets little attention in this Bangkok-centric nation, obsessed with the elite’s political machinations, despite the Bt 3 billion ($91 million) a year spent on curbing it.
The administration of Abhisit Vejjajiva pledged to resolve the crisis in the south when it came to power in December 2008. The south has long been the Democrat Party’s heartland, and they believed they had a softer and more nuanced approach. But the government soon became embroiled in a popular uprising over how it came to power and the south became a low priority.
Nonetheless, in the 18 months since the Abhisit administration has been in office, violence has come down. An average of 32 people a month are being killed, while 66 are wounded. In 2007, the peak of the violence, 4 people a day were being killed and 8 were being wounded. In the first half of 2010, the ratio was down to just under 24.3 people a month being killed and 67 wounded.
For the full report, please click here.
Terrorists: Nitwits or Masterminds?
By Aaron Mannes
Recently, in the Atlantic Monthly Daniel Byman and Christine Fair (two first-rate analysts) argue that the reality is that the terrorist enemies of the United States are not highly disciplined religious fanatics – but in fact are a bunch of nitwits. The article is interesting, provocative, and makes some important points. But we cannot dismiss the terrorists as nitwits quite yet – they’ve had failings in attacking the U.S. homeland directly, but they have also had some important successes.
Byman and Fair point out the many cases of terrorist incompetence such as the Times Square bomber, the UK doctors, and the Miami jihadis. In many regards, I agree with them. Terrorist groups are extremely constrained in their efforts to hit “far targets.” I’ve argued that this is a logistical issue. With intelligence agencies worldwide on high alert it is increasingly difficult to move operatives long distances. This complicates long-range terror strikes. Self-starters do not have the necessary skills and groups do not want to risk well-trained operatives on operations that will probably not succeed. The failed attacks on the West aren’t because the terrorists are stupid. What’s more they are adaptable. My argument continued that the danger was now in the realm of geopolitics – terrorists destabilizing and important country rather than carrying out direct attacks in the U.S. or the West.
Fair and Byman also state that the Taliban are similarly stupid. They frequently blow themselves up and also become intimate with livestock (this has been caught on tape by drones and other battlefield cameras). Maybe, but they are also giving the U.S. military a run for its money so discounting their capabilities seems unwise.
Read the full post here.
Two Major Middle East Terrorist Figures Die in their Safe Havens
By Michael B. Kraft
The deaths within days this weekend of two major figures behind major Middle East terrorist attacks and the possible death of a third last month should serve as a reminder of how long the terrorist threat has been with us -- and the difficulty in taking action against terrorists when they enjoy safe havens.
In Damascus, Mohammed Oudeh, better known as Abu Daoud -- the mastermind of the 1972 massacre of Israel athletes at the Munich Olympics, died Friday of kidney failure at the age of 73.
In Beirut Lebanon on Sunday morning, a liver hemorrhage claimed the life of Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah, the Shiite spiritual leader of the Iranian-backed Hezbollah terrorist organization which conducted the 1983 bombings of the barracks of the U.S. and French peacekeeping forces and the U.S. embassy. The group was also involved in the kidnappings of dozens of American and other Western hostages in Lebanon in the 1980’s. He was 75.
Both deaths were announced separately by the families or associates.
In an unconfirmed report last month, the German press agency DPA reported that a drone missile strike in Pakistan on June 19 killed Mohammad Ali Hamadeh, a Lebanese Hezbollah member who was accused of killing of an American Navy diver, Robert Stethem during the hijacking of TWA 847 flight to Beirut 25 years ago in June, 1985. However State Department officials said they could not confirm the report when it came out and DOD did not respond to a query.
Both the Munich Olympics attacks and the Beirut bombings had wide ranging consequences although not necessarily those intended by the perpetrators.
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In the Munich massacre, 11 Israeli Olympic team members were killed, either outright by the Palestinian Black September terrorists, or during a botched rescue operation by German security officials. In the bombings a decade later in Beirut, 241 U.S. marines were killed and 58 French paratroopers were killed by nearly simultaneous suicide truck bomb attacks in October, 1983. In the earlier suicide bombing American embassy attack in April, 60 persons were killed, including 17 Americans.
Discussing the Munich attack in an 2006 AP interview, Oudeh was quoted as saying:
”Before Munich we were simply terrorists. After Munich, at least people started asking who are these terrorists? What do they want? Before Munich, nobody had the slightest idea about the Palestinians.”
Oudeh apparently had a short memory a very high opinion of himself, or a desire to rationalize the attack, which he claimed was intended to take hostages to swap for Palestinian prisoners, not kill the Israeli Olympic team members. It was the 1968 hijacking of four airplanes by a rival group, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the spectacular blowing up of three planes at Dawson field, an old World War II air base in Jordan, that brought the Palestinians large scale publicity for their terrorist attacks..
It is a dubious proposition that the killing of athletes at the widely televised international Olympics had a positive impact on the Palestinian image or cause. Palestinian leaders nevertheless, paid tribute to Oudeh.
Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas sent his condolences to Oudeh’s family, the Palestinian news agency, WAFA reported.
"He wrote in his letter to his family, 'He is missed. He was one of the leading figures of Fatah and spent his life in resistance [against the occupation] and sincere work as well as physical sacrifice for his people's just causes,' " the news agency quoted Abbas as saying.
(Abbas provided funds used for the operation, although he allegedly did not know what the money was being spent for, according to Oudeh in his autobiography, From Jerusalem to Munich, published in France in 1999, and later in a written interview with Sports Illustrated, Wikipedia said in citing the book as part of its description of the attack.)
Oudeh also was praised as “a fighter of the highest order,” by Amin Maqboul, Secretary General of the Fatah Revolutionary Council. (Some high order! The terrorists killed the eight Israelis who survived the initial attack by throwing hand grenades at them and raked them with gunfire when they were tied up in helicopters to be taken to an airport as part of an ostensible deal worked out with the Germans.)
Oudeh belong to that faction of Yasser Arafat’s Palestinian Liberation Organization. In 1996, Israel allowed him to attend a PLO assembly meeting in Ramallah where he voted to remove the PLO’s charter clause calling for an “armed struggle” to destroy the Jewish state. Three years later, he was barred from returning to the West Bank from a trip to Jordan after he published his book acknowledging his role in organizing the Munich attack. He found refuge in Syria, which harbors a number of terrorist organizations.
In one unintended consequence of the Munich attack, then-President Nixon established the first U.S government unit to focus specifically on countering terrorism. He first set up a Cabinet-level committee. That turned out to be too unwieldy to deal with day-to-day activities and the State Department established an office to coordinate counterterrorism activities overseas. It is now the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, and the Coordinator, currently Daniel Benjamin, has ambassadorial rank and is the equivalent of an Assistant Secretary of State.
The Munich attack, and the actions by several countries that provided sanctuary to terrorists, prompted Congress to enact legislation prohibiting foreign assistance to countries that support international terrorism by granting sanctuary to terrorists.
The attack also led to the eventual development of a 1979 Export Administration Act provision that authorizes the Secretary of State to formally designate governments that repeatedly provided support to acts of international terrorism. This law, initiated by the late Rep. Millicent Fenwick
(R- New Jersey), a House Foreign Affairs Committee member for whom I was working at the time as her foreign policy legislative assistant, became known as the terrorist list. Designations trigger a variety of economic sanctions against terrorist-supporting states. In 1979 Syria was among the first countries designated and to this day it remains on the list.
Ayatollah Fadallah was a major figure in the emergence of political activism among Lebanese Shiite Muslims, the poor cousins to the more powerful and affluent Sunni community in that country of many factions. He justified the use of suicide bombings against Americans and Israelis and western intelligence services considered him to be responsible for the nearly simultaneous truck bombings of the American and French peacekeeping units and the American embassy.
As described by the London Daily Telegraph foreign editor, Con Coughlin: ,
“ … he was right up there with other infamous terror masterminds, such as Abu Nidal and Carlos the Jackal.
“One of Fadlallah’s last acts before he died was to issue a fatwa authorising the use of suicide bomb attacks. The mystery here is why he waited so long. For as a founder member of Hizbollah – he sat on the organisation’s ruling council – Fadlallah gave his personal approval to the massive suicide truck bomb attacks that levelled the American Embassy and Marine compound in Beirut in 1983, killing more than 300 people, including the then CIA station chief. Fadlallah gave his personal blessing to the suicide bombers before they left for their deadly mission.”
The U.S Marines were bunched up in a barracks instead of sleeping tents because the unit commanders felt that would provide better protection from the mortar attacks that had been aimed at them by Muslim militia groups who considered the U.S. to be allies of the Lebanese Government Forces in the internal Lebanese strife. Although then-President Reagan had previously vowed to keep the Marines in Lebanon, he withdrew them three months later. This action reinforced a perception among Bin Ladin and many militants that the U.S. was a “paper tiger” and had no staying power.
The attack on the embassy also led to a commission led retired admiral Bobby Inman that led to new construction and physical security requirements for US embassies to make them more resistant to terrorist attacks. The refitting of existing buildings and construction of new ones –many of them in inconvenient locations where more land was available for setbacks from the nearest road—cost billions of dollars. The attacks also led to the creation and expansion of the State Department Diplomatic Security Bureau which is charged with the protection of US government personnel and facilities overseas and implementing counterterrorism training and rewards programs.
The embassy bombing killed the CIA station chief, Bob Aimes, and some of his colleagues. There has been speculation that the terrorists knew they were holding a meeting. This aspect of the attack has been previously and widely reported.
But overlooked was the fact that the large bomb that destroyed the embassy also killed Bill McIntyre and other Agency for International Development(AI.D.) team members who were planning major foreign assistance projects for Lebanon.
In early 1983 I and several other Senate Foreign Relations Committee staffers spent time with the team when we visited Lebanon to look at the possibility of stepping up the U.S. aid program in Lebanon following Israel’s withdrawal. Senators Rudy Boschwitz (R-Minnesota,) and Paul Sarbanes (D-Maryland), the chairman and ranking member of the Middle East Subcommittee, wanted us to look at the proposals in preparation for legislation supporting the assistance.
Bill had been our escort officer. He and his team showed us various proposed aid projects, including infrastructure projects and others planned to provide permanent jobs, such as citrus canning plants. Most of the projects were intended for the Shiite areas in Beirut and Southern Lebanon, which had been neglected by the central Lebanese government. McIntyre was a decent, hard working career foreign assistance officer. Had the plans and the planners not been literally blown up, the Lebanese Shiites would have benefited greatly.
Whenever I hear or read complaints that the U.S, has not done enough for the Muslims, especially the Shiites, or hear about Fadlallah I think of McIntyre and his colleagues. May they rest in peace.
As for Oudeh and Fadlallah, they were lucky to survive apparent assassination attempts and to find sanctuary in Beirut and Damascus where they could hide from everything but fatal illness.
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