The truth is probably a combination of both. Many criminals seek to justify their actions as somehow contributing to a greater good by empowering the powerless. But intentions aside, Bout’s capabilities are the real cause for worry.

Read the full post here.

"This could have a snowball effect, even leading to the risk of ungovernability," Luís Astorga, a Mexico City-based sociologist and drug expert, said in an interview. "It indicates terrible things, a level of weakness in our institutions -- they can't even protect themselves."

By most accounts the police chief, Edgar Eusebio Millan Gomez, was a good cop trying to do an impossible job-fighting drug organizations that have more resources, better weapons and the ability to buy or kill those that oppose them.

President Felipe Calderon also wins high praise for sharply ratcheting up the pressure on the trafficking organizations, who have responded in the most predictable and lethal fashion-murdering high-profile symbols of the enforcement effort.

It is worth remembering that the chaos the traffickers are wreaking in Mexico is not just aimed at the Mexican state, it is also aimed at undermining the already-battered viability of our southern border. The hundreds of dead across the border states of Mexico show where the battles are being fought.

The easier it is to cross dope, weapons, illegal aliens from around the world, the higher the profits for the traffickers.

And the FARC rebels in Colombia are now in a direct business relationship with Mexican trafficking organizations, according to the recently-captured FARC documents resulting from the raid that killed rebel leader Raul Reyes.

The FARC, in turn, is allied with Nicaragua (Ortega) and Venezuela (Chavez), who in turn are allied with Iran, which in turn runs Hezbollah, which in turn is actively working to expand its beach head in Latin America. My full blog is here.

On May 8, Congressman Peter Hoekstra attempted to strike a blow for reason and sanity in the war against global jihadism, by making the rational and consistent definition of our enemy a priority in allocating budget resources for U.S. intelligence programs. Specifically, Congressman Hoekstra was seeking an amendment that "would prohibit the intelligence community from adopting speech codes that encumber accurately describing the radical jihadist terrorists that attacked America and continue to threaten the homeland."

A majority of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence disagreed, and Congressman Hoekstra's Intelligence budget amendment on this issue was rejected. To be specific, Congressman Hoekstra states that his amendment was "rejected by committee Democrats". Certainly those 12 members of this Committee should clarify their position. Is it true that the majority of Congressmen Reyes, Boswell, Cramer, Holt, Ruppersberger, Tierney, Thompson, Langevin, Murphy, Schiff, Congresswomen Eshoo and Schakowsky, are not concerned about defining the Jihadist enemy? This is a far more disturbing development than the recent DHS and NCTC memos themselves.

Clearly the American people need an accounting of who voted against this amendment.  The members of this House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (of any party) who rejected this amendment have an obligation to inform the American people why they do not view defining the Jihadist enemy as a priority in authorizing funding for intelligence operations. American citizens have a responsibility to contact these members and get an explanation as to why the consistent understanding of the jihadist enemy is not a priority in our intelligence operations, according to House Committee members who voted against the Hoekstra amendment. Americans concerned about jihad should take action and register their concern to these Congressmen and Congresswomen.

The failure to clearly identify America's enemy is a symptom of the larger failure to develop an overall blueprint strategy to expand on the September 18, 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) - and develop a definition of the enemy and comprehensive strategy to defeat them. While most of the focus in the media and political leadership remains on debating individual tactical operations, AP and UPI recently reported about efforts of National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) groups to redefine the enemy as anything but "jihadists", as well as telling U.S. government employees not to use any references to "jihad", "Islamic", "Islamist", "mujahadeen", "caliphate", etc. - when discussing the enemy. On April 24, AP reported that the U.S. State Department officially authorized these memoranda on terminology for distribution to U.S. government employees.

Since the initial AP report on this story, the Investigative Project on Terrorism has released a January 2008 DHS Civil Rights and Civil Liberties memorandum on terminology to use in defining the enemy based on recommendations from American Muslim "experts" and a March 2008 NCTC memorandum on guidance from NCTC's Extremist Messaging Branch as to terms to use in defining the enemy.

Since the initial reports, there have been numerous reports and commentary on the illogic of banning "jihad" from America's lexicon in describing the enemy. Just two days earlier on May 6 at the House Rayburn Building, Dr. Walid Phares was addressing this very issue on the "War of Ideas" and the vital need to effectively define the threat of Jihadism, which he has also addressed in his book "The Confrontation: Winning the War against Future Jihad".

On May 8, no doubt Congressman Hoekstra (like many of us) was wondering what on earth the Civil Rights department of DHS and the Extremist Messaging Branch of NCTC was doing in making war policy and redefining the enemy as something other than jihadists. Per Congressman Hoekstra: "Al-Qaeda knows point blank that they want to kill Americans. How sad is it that as we approach the seventh anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, we are still debating how to define our enemy?" How sad and inexcusable, indeed.

The House Intelligence Committee's Decision

The Intelligence Bill being reviewed by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence was not any routine legislation. As described in the Committee's May 8 press release:
-- "the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence approved the Fiscal Year 2009 Intelligence Authorization Act (H.R. 5959), authorizing the largest funding increase in the base Intelligence Budget in history. The bill passed the Committee by voice vote and now goes to the full House for consideration."

While the majority of the Committee was unconcerned about defining the Jihadist enemy, it was concerned about other issues:
-- "funding to understand the impact of climate change on national and energy security"

How can the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence believe that "global warming" is more important to American taxpayer funding of intelligence operations than defining the Jihadist enemy? Has complacency about the Jihadist enemy gotten that severe, even among our elected representatives?

The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Chairman, Congressman Silvestre Reyes, will no doubt be remembered for his confusion about Al-Qaeda. It was Congressman Silvestre Reyes who demonstrated during an interview with Congressional Quarterly in December 2006, that he had no idea as to whether Al-Qaeda's ideology was based on Sunni or Shiite Islam. Per Chairman Reyes, Al-Qaeda is "[p]redominantly — probably Shiite", when it is Sunni-based. (Not surprisingly, Chairman Reyes didn't know what Islamic ideology Hezbollah was based on either.) Is it possible that the majority of Congressman Reyes' Intelligence Committee don't understand Jihad either?

Congressman Hoekstra's amendment was to ensure that intelligence program funding would reflect a coherent and consistent definition of the jihadist enemy. But apparently that was just too much common sense for the House Intelligence Committee. However, the larger issue is that if there are members of the House Intelligence Committee think that America is not at war with Jihadists, the American public needs to know who and why.

Sources and Related Documents:

May 8, 2008 - Hoekstra Effort to Strip Earmarks from Intelligence Bill Successful - Bill Still Fails to Close Terrorist Loophole
May 8, 2008 - House Intelligence Committee Approves Funding for Intelligence Operations and Critical Oversight
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Members Web Page
Online Petition to the U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence - regarding Congressman Hoekstra's Amendment
December 8, 2006 - Congressional Quarterly - Democrats' New Intelligence Chairman Needs a Crash Course on al Qaeda -- by Jeff Stein
"War of Ideas" Sources on the Debate over the Identity of the Jihadist Enemy
May 8, 2008 - It's Islamic Jihad, Not Extremism, Uncle Sam -- by Diana West
May 6, 2008 - UPI: U.S. officials urged to avoid linking Islam, jihad with terrorism
May 2, 2008 - Investigative Project Releases Gov't Memos Curtailing Speech in War on Terror - by Steven Emerson
April 30, 2008 - The Continuing Debate Over "Jihadists" As The Enemy -- by Jeffrey Imm
April 24, 2008 - Who is America Fighting - Jihadists or Extremists? -- by Jeffrey Imm
April 24, 2008 - AP: Terms to use and avoid when talking about terrorism
April 24, 2008 - AP: 'Jihadist' booted from government lexicon
April 22, 2008 - JihadWatch.org: New State Department lexicon forbids use of the words "jihad" or "jihadist"
March 14, 2008 - National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) - Counter Terror Communications Center (CTCC) Memorandum, Volume 2, Issue 10 - "Words that Work and Words that Don't: A Guide to Counterterrorism Communication"
January 2008 - Department of Homeland Security Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties - Terminology to Define the Terrorists: Recommendations from American Muslims
July 18, 2007 - Preventing the West from Understanding Jihad - by Dr. Walid Phares
Dr. Walid Phares - The Confrontation: Winning the War against Future Jihad
September 18, 2001 -Authorization for Use of Military Force (Enrolled Bill)


House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Members Contact Information:

List of Committee Members and Contact Information

1. Silvestre Reyes, Chairman - Democrat, Texas
1.1. Congressman Reyes Email Web Page
1.2. Congressman Reyes Address and Telephone:
2433 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515
Phone: (202) 225-4831
Fax: (202) 225-2016

2. Leonard L. Boswell - Democrat, Iowa
2.1. Congressman Boswell Email Web Page
2.2. Congressman Boswell Address and Telephone:
1427 Longworth House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515
Phone: (202) 225-3806
Fax: (202) 225-5608

3. Robert E. (Bud) Cramer, Jr - Democrat, Alabama
3.1. Congressman Cramer Email Web Page
3.2. Congressman Cramer Address and Telephone:
2184 Rayburn HOB
Washington, DC 20515
Phone: (202) 225-4801
Fax: (202) 225-4392

4. Anna G. Eshoo - Democrat, California
4.1. Congresswoman Eshoo Email Web Page
4.2. Congresswoman Eshoo Address and Telephone:
205 Cannon Building
Washington, D.C. 20515
Telephone: (202) 225-8104
Fax: (202) 225-8890

5. Rush D. Holt - Democrat, New Jersey
5.1. Congressman Holt Email Web Page
5.2. Congressman Holt Address and Telephone:
1019 Longworth House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515
202-225-5801
202-225-6025 (fax)

6. C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger - Democrat, Maryland
6.1. Congressman Ruppersberger Email Web Page
6.2. Congressman Ruppersberger Address and Telephone:
1730 Longworth House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515-2002
Phone: 202-225-3061
Fax: 202-225-3094

7. John Tierney, Democrat - Massachusetts
7.1. Congressman Tierney Email Web Page
7.2. Congressman Tierney Address and Telephone:
2238 Rayburn House
Office Building
Washington, DC 20515
Phone: (202) 225-8020
Fax: (202) 225-5915

8. Mike Thompson - Democrat, California
8.1. Congressman Thompson Email Web Page
8.2. Congressman Thompson Address and Telephone:
231 Cannon Office Building
Washington, DC 20515
Phone: (202) 225-3311
Fax: (202) 225-4335

9. Jan Schakowsky - Democrat, Illinois
9.1. Congresswoman Schakowsky Email Web Page
9.2. Congresswoman Schakowsky Address and Telephone:
1027 Longworth House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515
Phone: (202) 225-2111
Fax: (202) 226-6890

10. Jim Langevin - Democrat, Rhode Island
10.1. Congressman Langevin Email Web Page
10.2. Congressman Langevin Address and Telephone:
109 Cannon House Office Building
Washington D.C. 20515
(202) 225-2735
fax: (202) 225-5976

11. Patrick Murphy - Democrat, Pennsylvania
11.1. Congressman Murphy Email Web Page - 19007
11.2. Congressman Murphy Address and Telephone:
1007 Longworth HOB
Washington, DC 20515
(202) 225-4276
Fax: (202) 225-9511

12. Adam Schiff - Democrat, California
12.1. Congressman Schiff Email Web Page
12.2. Congressman Schiff Address and Telephone:
326 Cannon HOB
Washington D.C. 20515
Phone: (202) 225-4176
Facsimile: (202) 225-5828

13. Peter Hoekstra, Ranking Member - Republican, Michigan
13.1. Congressman Hoekstra Email Web Page
13.2. Congressman Hoekstra Address and Telephone:
2234 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515
(202) 225-4401
Fax: (202) 226-0779

14. Terry Everett - Republican, Alabama
14.1. Congressman Everett Email Web Page
14.2. Congressman Everett Address and Telephone:
2312 Rayburn Building
Washington, DC 20515
Phone (202) 225-2901
Fax (202) 225-8913

15. Elton Gallegly - Republican, California
15.1. Congressman Gallegly Email Web Page - 91361-3018
15.2. Congressman Gallegly Address and Telephone:
2309 Rayburn HOB
Washington, DC 20515-0523
Phone: (202) 225-5811
FAX: (202) 225-1100

16. Heather Wilson - Republican, New Mexico
16.1. Congresswoman Wilson Email Web Page
16.2. Congresswoman Wilson Address and Telephone:
442 Cannon House
Office Building
Washington, DC 20515
202-225-6316 Phone
202-225-4975 Fax
ask.heather@mail.house.gov

17. Mac Thornberry - Republican, Texas
17.1. Congressman Thornberry Email Web Page - 79101
17.2. Congressman Thornberry Address and Telephone:
2457 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515
Phone: (202) 225-3706
Fax: (202) 225-3486

18. John McHugh - Republican, New York
18.1. Congressman McHugh Email Web Page - 13601-3370
18.2. Congressman McHugh Address and Telephone:
2366 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515-3223
PHONE (202) 225-4611
FAX (202) 226-0621

19. Todd Tiahrt - Republican, Kansas
19.1. Congressman Tiahrt Email Web Page
19.2. Congressman Tiahrt Address and Telephone:
2441 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515
Phone: 202.225.6216
Fax: 202.225.3489

20. Mike Rogers - Republican, Michigan
20.1. Congressman Rogers Email Web Page
20.2. Congressman Rogers Address and Telephone:
http://mikerogers.house.gov/Contact.aspx
133 Cannon House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515
Phone: (202) 225-4872
Fax: (202) 225-5820

21. Darrell Issa - Republican, California
21.1. Congressman Issa Email Web Page
21.2. Congressman Issa Address and Telephone:
211 Cannon House
Office Building
Washington, DC 20515
phone: 202-225-3906
fax: 202-225-3303

The big picture was very predictable. The Syro-Iranian “axis” which is flaring up various battlefields in the region, from Basra to Gaza, has instructed its local “force” on the Lebanese battlefield to surge against the pro-Western Government of Fuad Seniora. Hezbollah is a disciplined Iranian asset on the Eastern Mediterranean. All of the arguments advanced by its secretary general Hassan Nasrallah in his last press conference and grievances against the Government have always been raised since the summer of 2005. These criticisms of the cabinet are invoked when a large scale action is ordered by the Tehran strategists. The local “issues” are part of the greater puzzle, but in Lebanese politics, they seem to be “the” issues at hand. What are they?

Back in September 2004, a UNSCR 1559 has asked all militias, including Hezbollah to disarm and Syria to pull out from Lebanon. The “axis” responded with a string of assassinations against Lebanese critics. An attempt against Minister Marwan Hamade in the fall of 2005 was followed by an earth shaking massacre of the former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and his assistants and friends in February 2005. A Cedars Revolution followed with one million and a half people taking the streets to demand the departure of the Syrians and the disarming of Hezbollah. Assad pulled out his troops in April of that year leaving the “second army” behind, Hezbollah. As of July 2005 a series of murders targeted Lebanese anti-Hezbollah politicians

The Lebanese Government finally reacted by asking Hezbollah to remove the cameras, and begin the dismantling of the parallel telephone communications system. In addition, the Government ordered the Airport commanding officer to join his headquarters at the Defense Ministry. In 24 hours, the “Hezb’s” secretary general Hassan Nasrallah reacted and launched his phased coup. In his press conference he declared war against the Government and accused it of being an “agent of the Americans.” Few hours after, Hezbollah’s Special Forces and snipers tightened their grip around the Airport and moved into Sunni West Beirut. They seized the strategically located neighborhood of Ra’s al Nabaa overlooking both (Christian and Muslim) sides of the capital, fought their way into Hamra Street and practically controlled more than 90% of West Beirut. By midnight, half a million Lebanese Sunni, Druze and Christians found themselves under an Iranian-sponsored “occupation.”

Across the former green line, the Christian sectors of the capital remained outside the control of Hezbollah, with hundreds of armed youth taking position on the roof tops of buildings. Will Nasrallah order an invasion of East Beirut or will he ask his “Christian” puppets to do the job for him? In the Shuf Mountains, south of Beirut, the anti Syrian Druzes are strategically besieged. The Syrian-Iranian axis have already prepared a special task force with Druze figureheads ready for the man hunt: The March 14 Coalition seem to be physically targeted for elimination, unless a third force protects it. Where is the Lebanese Army? Well, its commander General Michel Sleimane made sure his units would not side with the Lebanese Government of Seniora in its struggle against Hezbollah. This was called “neutrality.” That would be the equivalent of the U.S forces not intervening if a gigantic militia emerges in America and surrounds the White House, the U.S Congress and all federal buildings. Unreal in a democracy but very real in a country where the influence of Syria and Iran have not been reduced by the mere rise of the Cedars Revolution. And that is precisely what Washington’s foreign policy architects weren't able to comprehend.

Within the beltway, lots of analyzing on both sides of the Potomac: What can the U.S do to respond to the Syro-Iranian offensive which is obliterating a young democracy so dear to the speech writers of the President and many congressional leaders from both parties? A crushing defeat to democracy in Lebanon under the eyes of an American public eager to see advances in the War on terror will be devastating. U.S warships are patrolling the international waters along the Lebanese coasts. A ten thousand strong UNIFIL force is deployed inside southern Lebanon. But what can this deployment of force do to deter Hezbollah’s determination? Many had advised the U.S Government years ago to implement gradual steps to contain Hezbollah in Lebanon, before this drama would unfold. But it was the Lebanese politicians who failed to call for rescue. The precious four years since the issuing of UNSCR 1559 have now expired and the Government of Fuad Seniora is on the verge of collapse or reduction. What can the coalition of the willing to-save-Lebanon do at this point?

It can still do few things. First would be to invoke Chapter 7 at the UN Security Council. Let the international body decide on this matter. Meanwhile go to plan “B” and extend all support possible to a democratically elected Government in jeopardy. The international community has still significant allies inside the country. An overwhelming sector of the public with most of the Sunnis, Christians and Druze plus a minority among Shia, two thirds of the Lebanese Army, a majority in Parliament, backed by millions in the Diaspora. On the ground, Hezbollah has thousands of fighters but it has never experienced “occupying” other Lebanese communities. The Iranian-backed organization may be tempted to eliminate other Lebanese leaders, Druze, Sunnis and Christians but that would put Nasrallah and his assistants on an international list for war crimes. The next few hours and days are crucial in Lebanon. An interim compromise may also emerge. But as the Roman adage goes, Alea Iacta Est, the dice has already rolled. Hezbollah is not a “resistance” anymore, ironically, by now it is an occupier of its own country.

******
Dr Walid Phares is the Director of the Future Terrorism Project at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies and a visiting scholar at the European Foundation for Democracy. He is the author of the newly released book, The Confrontation: Winning the War against Future Jihad.

"We're going to fewer countries, staying for shorter periods of time, with smaller numbers of people than historically we have done," Adm. Eric T. Olson said May 5 in his first interview since becoming commander of U.S. Special Operations Command last July.

To illustrate that point, Olson said that when the 7th Special Forces Group, which is based at Fort Bragg, N.C., and whose normal area of focus is Latin America, rotates into Afghanistan for seven-month tours, it takes two of its three battalions, leaving just one in Latin America.

"That leaves us underrepresented" in Latin America, the admiral said.

In Latin America, as in other areas of greatest interest to the Special Operations Command, Green Berets deploy to friendly countries like El Salvador or Colombia to train local military forces.

Special operations units that are designated mainly for use in Africa and Europe, Olson said, also are under strength for their normal role in those regions because they, too, are tied up in Iraq and Afghanistan.
My full blog is here.

Initial findings by the Australian, Spanish and Singapore experts from INTERPOL reportedly have found that the computers' archival register, which show the time and date of each entry, show no changes to the computer following the raids. According to the Bogota newspaper El Tiempo, the INTERPOL experts will on May 15 release an inventory of the texts, photos, videos, and other types of content in the computer belonging to Raul Reyes, the FARC leader killed in the raid.

The leader of the lab Dr. Chen kindly forwarded their research paper to me and it can be linked to here (Cyber Extremism in Web 2.0: An Exploratory Study of International Jihadist Groups or here). In essence the Dark Web project’s methodology is to search for material with extremist or terrorist style language (but please read the paper for a better description of methodology). Interestingly, they concluded that sites such as Facebook and MySpace, which have been big components of the Web 2.0 milieu are not suited to the propagation of extremist views,

“We did not consider social networking sites, such as MySpace and Facebook, although they are a major component of Web 2.0. Based on our preliminary exploration, we found that the prevalent amount of personal data on these sites, the tight social linkages, and the potential issue of “guilt by association” (for site owners and “friends”) may have discouraged extremists from using such a medium.“

With regard to virtual worlds the Dark Web project found nuanced evidence of extremist ‘activity’ within Second Life, by using Second Life’s internal search system to look for text containing extremist language. More than anything this highlights the difficultly in researching extremist movements within virtual worlds as the worlds themselves do not easily allow themselves to be searched or data-mined in this fashion. The issue of search within virtual worlds has been grappled with by a number of commentators, the problem being what to search for, people, content, land, buildings, events, etc. But more importantly language used within virtual worlds doesn’t hold the same meaning when pulled out of its in-world context. For example the dark-web project cites a number of groups it discovered in Second Life using extremist language, one of who (Terrorists of SL) has a small virtual headquarters called ‘Taliban Towers’. An examination of this site and associated group would tend to suggest they are a role-playing collective with little real-world application. The same goes for other in-world organizations such as, Elite Jihadi Terrorist group.

Therefore, what this research does is point to something fundamental about how global intelligence and law-enforcement agencies need to approach the examination of virtual worlds, and that is that raw data-crunching is likely to prove unsatisfactory. Ironically, virtual worlds require a uniquely human approach. The only sure way to gather information on extremist or criminal groups operating in virtual worlds is to enter the environment and interact with the suspected groups. The United States Intelligence community is not short of computing power but what this new environment needs is the human touch or to put it in the language of the Beltway -- layer Virtual-HUMINT over the SIGINT mission.

The State Department's 2007 Country Reports on Terrorism and recent speeches by senior officials indicate that the U.S. government's communication strategy for combating al-Qaeda's ideology has shifted considerably in two respects. First, there is increased recognition that communication must be an integral part of counterterrorism strategy. As Ambassador Dell Dailey, the State Department's coordinator for counterterrorism, recently noted, "Communication should…be used by the United States and its allies to shape perceptions, build allies, and dissuade potential terrorists. This must be a central component in U.S. strategy because it influences attitudes and behavior." According to Deputy National Security Advisor Juan Zarate, this is particularly true when it comes to al-Qaeda, whose leaders are "sensitive to the perceived legitimacy of both their actions and their ideology. They care about their image because it has real-world effects on recruitment, donations, and support in Muslim and religious communities."

While the U.S. government paid attention to its communication strategy in the first few years following the September 11 attacks, counterterrorism officials were far more focused on capturing or killing terrorists. Today contesting al-Qaeda's ideology is an integral part of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy.

The complete article, co-authored with Michael Jacobson, is available here.

On this site and others, and in innumerable panels, seminars, and hearings, experts have discussed the strengths and weaknesses of the regime put in place following the 9-11 attacks; its costs and benefits; and the impacts on the financing of terrorism. Existing sanctions programs were significantly enhanced in order to choke off terrorist financing. At the same time, the US engaged in unprecedented cooperation with other countries. Hundreds of millions of dollars of assets were frozen, tougher legislation was passed in numerous countries, and the well-established network of money transfers that had been intensively used by terrorists before the 9-11 attacks was dismantled. But it's obvious that terrorists have adapted their funding strategies and sources in order to stay one step ahead of the authorities. Extremist groups now rely on a combination of private donations, smuggling rings (of drugs, human beings, and weapons), and a secretive, complex network of clandestine financial institutions (the latest example being a FARC-linked Colombian money service business which the Treasury Department has just designated). Terror “franchises” are increasingly raising their money through petty crime, drugs, money laundering, and front companies. Regulatory mechanisms imposed on financial institutions do not reflect successes in some areas and the changes in sources and methods. Regional bodies in the Middle East and Southeast Asia appear to stepped into the shoes of the U.N. as a recent source of AML-CFT guidance for individual countries, which could enhance local prevention and enforcement efforts but also lead to inconsistent international definitiions, standards, and sanctions.

A comprehensive review by government officials, the broader CT community, and financial institutions is needed to chronicle the current threats and weaknesses of terrorist financing and develop an improved and credible strategy for combating them. A previous example of the effort which I envision was the Council on Foreign Relations' 2002 report on terrorist financing (70 pages), which greatly assisted the Members of Congress for whom I worked on the House Financial Services Committee. I know that many experts in the private sector are ready to participate in such an effort, and I hope to post on progress during the remainder of the year.

When Rehman Malik, adviser to Pakistan’s Prime Minister on internal affairs welcomed Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) chief Baitullah Mehsud‘s latest offer for truce and peace talks, many observers (including me) thought that the newly crowned civilian government in Pakistan shouldn’t feel excited about these peace initiatives, especially when it involves Taliban militants. At the outset it seemed that the government was in a hurry to show the world that they have better counter terror tools to deal with Taliban or Islamic threat at large, than erstwhile Musharraf regime and US led collation. The government not only reverted the earlier policies adopted by Mushraff regime, but also it released some of the top rung terror leaders e.g. Tehreek e Nafaz e Shariat e Mohammadi (TNSM) leader Maulana Sufi Mohammad. Sufi’s release came after TNSM agreed to abide a six point agenda for peace in Malakand Agency. The tactics might be here that to put pressure on Maulana Fazlullah, the son in law of Maulana Sufi who has been virtually ruling the scenic Swat valley, North West Frontier Province, to stop violence and other subversive activities. The militants are not happy with the Sufi’s release and not convinced with this tactics of the Pakistan government. Their frustration is evident from the TTP’s vice chief Maulvi Faqir Muhammad’s reaction when he indicated that the government should have initiated dialogue with Fazlullah for peace in Swat.

Similarly a peace accord (a 15 point agreement) negotiated late April 2008 with Mesud tribe expected to end militant activities by warring Mehsud tribe and its rising leader Baitulah Mehsud. The deal aimed at ending militant activity, prisoner exchange and government troop withdrawal from the South Waziristan region (Derra Adamkhel and Swat). However, the Mardan blast on April 25 signaled a strong message that Taliban can break the agreement anytime, even though Tehreek's spokesman Maulvi Umer reiterated that the deal was still in place. Again on April 28 the TTP had announced that the peace talks with government had failed due to non-withdraw of troops from FATA and Swat, but the ceasefire remained intact, blaming ‘secret hands’ for derailing peace talks.

In the case of TTP and followers, they have perpetrated at least three suicide attacks (two targeting security forces) after the talks failed without much headway. The latest was the Bannu check post blast in NWFP that killed two policemen guarding the post.

Any peace deal or ceasefire accord with militants only effectively strengthens their manpower and firepower, giving them space to regroup and replenish. They make maximum usage of the ‘no-fire’ period to nourish the depleted armory and take a breather for a long war ahead. Remember how Taliban took control of North Wazirstan after the Sept 2006 accord and recuperated until mid 2007 there making it a safe hideout for both Taliban and Qaeda militants until now.

For now, the only good news is that Baitullah’s TTP has at least one opponent in own fraternity, Haji Namdar, the chief of Amar Bil Maroof Wa Nahi Anil Munker (Promotion of Virtue and Suppression of Vice) - organization enforcing Islamic laws in the tribal region, mainly in Bar Kambarkhel area. Namdar has ordered militants under Baitullah Mehsud to leave the Khyber Agency, following a failed attack on his life by pro Taliban Hakeemullah group recently. Namdar might stand strong as a counter force to TTP and Baitulah meshud in the future, if he survives coming suicide attacks. He is reportedly teaching militants (detoxification) true meaning of Jihad and urge them to shun violence against Pakistan. But not against NATO-led International Security Force in Afghanistan (ISAF), fighting in Afghanistan.

It would be prudent on the part of Pakistani government not to initiate dialogue process with Islamic extremists in a haste unless until militants surrender their arms and stop violent activities. The TTP’s motive is perhaps to stop fire in Pakistan’s territory maintaining ceasefire with troops now and then direct all strengths against the US /NATO forces fighting Taliban forces in neighboring Afghanistan. Unfortunately, the governments (at Islamabad and NWPF) seem to be still optimistic about a positive outcome of ongoing indirect talks with TTP and TNSM militants. Not to forget, any ceasefire accord between Pakistan and TTP/TNSM will adversely affect the ground situation in Afghanistan for sure.

During his incarceration, prosecutors in northern Virginia have sought to have Al-Arian testify before a Federal grand jury investigating an Islamic charity that was linked to a Tampa-based PIJ front think-tank run by Al-Arian and several of his cronies. To date, Al-Arian has refused to testify before the Virginia grand jury and has been held in civil contempt. Al-Arian and his attorneys claim he should not be required to testify because his Tampa plea agreement with the Government carried a non-cooperation clause. The Government claims his plea agreement did not extend to grand jury proceedings where he might be subpoenaed and granted immunity from further prosecution, as is the case in the Virginia inquiry. So far, two Federal appellate Courts, the 4th Circuit and the 11th Circuit, have agreed with the Government’s position.

The Government appears to be currently deciding if it wants to go forward with further contempt proceedings against Al-Arian or to simply move on his removal...as in deportation. Actual physical deportation of a felony convicted terrorist-linked stateless Palestinian is no easy task for the U.S. Government. This became evident with Al-Arian’s cohort Fawaz Damra, a former Cleveland Imam convicted of naturalization fraud in 2004 based on his lying about his Al-Arian-linked support for the PIJ and other radical Islamic organizations. Damra was eventually deported to the Palestinian territories, but not without significant obstacles. Al-Arian’s PIJ-linked brother-in-law Mazzen Al-Najjar was also deported, though not criminally convicted, several years ago after a lengthy legal battle that similarly became a public cause against so-called, but highly misrepresented and misunderstood, “secret evidence” in immigration proceedings. If and when the Government moves to deport Al-Arian, it should be understood that effort will have required substantial and difficult work on the part of several agencies, including Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the State Department.

Al-Arian reportedly just ended a hunger strike protesting his lengthy detention in the contempt proceedings. His supporters, seemingly spearheaded by the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), claim he is being “persecuted” by the Government because of his political beliefs and his support for the plight of the oppressed Palestinian people and because Al-Arian, of course, is Palestinian himself. They claim Al-Arian is no more than a vocal advocate for Palestinian justice pursued by overzealous Government agents and prosecutors. They claim Al-Arian pleaded guilty only to finally end the long case against him, to see freedom with his family and move on with his life. They claim the Government should simply deport Al-Arian and let him reunite with his family members, most of whom have reportedly moved back to the Middle East.

Al-Arian’s supporters ignore the close financial, operational and personnel relationships he and his Tampa PIJ front organization shared with the Virginia charity being investigated; relationships that included at least $50,000 in transactions and the “exchange” of a PIJ-linked operative via immigration fraud (clearly, those Federal prosecutors in Virginia have solid reason to seek Al-Arian’s testimony). Those supporters ignore the multiple independent judicial rulings, including those two separate appellate court rulings, that go against Al-Arian...Sami has indeed had his many days in court. Those supporters are right about one thing...Al-Arian was vocal. As the Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT) has documented, Al-Arian provided ample examples of his Hitlerian speech abilities during various conferences in the late 1980s and early 1990s when he and his cohorts were seeking support for the Jihad movement, a movement that murdered hundreds of innocent people including Americans. You can see these speeches and more about Al-Arian here, here, here, here and here.

Sami Al-Arian will likely continue to be a hero and martyr to his die-hard supporters, and that may say something about some of them. An objective review of the facts in the Al-Arian case reveals he is anything but that.

Mr. Allen spoke on "Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century: Implications for Homeland Security." His on-the-record remarks are available here.

Press coverage of previous lectures in this series, is available here.

"Between November 2007 and March 2008, Bout agreed to sell to the FARC millions of dollars’ worth of weapons -- including surface-to-air missile systems (SAMs), armor piercing rocket launchers, AK-47 firearms, millions of rounds of ammunition, Russian spare parts for rifles, anti-personnel land mines, C-4 plastic explosives, night-vision equipment, “ultralight” airplanes that could be outfitted with grenade launchers and missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles. Bout agreed to sell the weapons to two confidential sources working with the DEA (the CSs), who represented that they were acquiring these weapons for the FARC, with the specific understanding that the weapons were to be used to attack United States helicopters in Colombia."

"(t)he Iran Sanctions Act requires — it doesn’t recommend, not a non-binding resolution, this is an act — that we identify those companies that are investing over $20 million in the Iran oil sector, and this administration refuses to do that. Now, once they identify, well, first they’ve named and shamed a company, and they don’t believe in annoying international oil companies, and second, they would then have to impose sanctions on a company or do a waiver, and the press might notice that...

So for example, the bill to just allow investors to divest from companies doing business — there’s one on Sudan, a separate bill that I was more involved in, I was involved with both on Iran — just to allow trustees, pension trustees, states and cities, their own money without facing frivolous lawsuits...

We’ve got to hit hard at the World Bank and say, look, we can’t sit by while you lend money to Iran. We can change our federal, state procurement and federal corporate assistance programs. We can facilitate divestiture, both in terms of our securities laws and our tax laws. So we have a whole list of ways outside of the U.N. to put economic pressure on Iran and to change the behavior of multi-national organizations and international corporations."

Our Contributing Experts have discussed a number of these options here, including one which would restrict or even shut down all airflights into or out of Iran. During our April 15 panel on Iran, Matthew Levitt urged listeners to remember that financial sanctions are only one available tool and would not be effective without other measures. Congress is increasingly ready to aim its bipartisan wrath at those businesses assisting Iranian's economy and to pass more stringent measures, whether the Administration agrees or not.

Here is an excerpt:

To many observers Iran is the big winner in the Middle East. While the end result remains to be seen, what seems certain is that the Islamic republic appears to be faring better geopolitically than domestically. And although uncensored information regarding the country's internal problems is scarce and tough to find, reports of increasing trouble in the country are starting to filter out.
The situation in some provinces inhabited by minorities is far from ideal for Tehran. The Kurdish province has seen regular violent clashes between Kurds and Iranian forces. Consequently, Tehran has recently stepped-up its repression of the Kurdish population.

Unrest, however, is not limited to the Kurds; the Baluch minority is cause of great concern to the regime. In fact, the newsletter TheCroissant.com reported that Iran is discreetly leading a violent military campaign in the Kerman province, bordering Baluchistan.

The latest clashes have claimed dozens of deaths in the ranks of Iranian forces and many civilian casualties. According to the usually well informed Internet web site Elaph, "Jund Allah," a faction of the Iranian Sunni opposition in Baluchistan, claimed responsibility for the April 25 abduction in the town of Fahraj of Jawad Tahiri, supreme leader, Ali Khamenei's representative in the Kerman province.