A complete English transcript of al-Yazid's message can be accessed via the NEFA Foundation website.

My employer, the Laboratory for Computational Cultural Dynamics (LCCD) at the University of Maryland is one group seeking to develop the theory and algorithms required for tools to support decision-making in cultural contexts. LCCD has developed numerous systems including T-Rex, which can rapidly scan text in several languages and convert it into a database and SOMA (Stochastic Opponent Modeling Agents) which can extract rules of likely behaviors by organizations from their past behaviors.

LCCD sponsors an annual conference, the International Conference on Computational Cultural Dynamics (ICCCD2009) – to be held this year on December 7-8 at the University of Maryland. Papers being presented include efforts to model insurgencies as well as piracy in Somalia, a tool used to map the Indonesian blogosphere, and SCARE (Spatial Cultural Abduction Reasoning Engine) which can help predict the locations of weapons caches in an urban environment. (See the full program here.)

Augmenting the Mind
The human brain is an impressive system, which also builds models. In some regards it far exceeds anything on the horizon in the realm of computer science. The ability of human beings to take information and place it in context and draw conclusions from it is profound. We build complex models of how the world works in order to function in it. But computers can process some forms of data far faster than humans and will do so systematically. Human minds cannot quickly process large quantities of data. In attempting to make sense of large amounts of information a human beings may discount or ignore information that does not fit in their model of how the world works – or alternately draw significant conclusions based on a very limited amount of data. Imagine an economist ignoring issues of ethnic identity in analyzing a nation’s policies or a political philosopher focusing on ideology while ignoring logistics in studying a terrorist group’s behavior. In short, computer systems are capable of substantially augmenting the power of human reason.

Things to Come
The impacts of these technologies will be profound. Real-time data collection and processing will potentially improve decision-making in many ways.

Read the complete post here.

Dr. Farooq also waved off the frequent criticism that "the Muslims provoked the Kuffar into fighting at a stage when they were not fully prepared to resist them" and that the 9/11 attacks were "premature" because they provoked an American military invasion "which is said to have caused the fall of the Islamic Emirate." He insisted, "9/11 did not worsen the situation; rather, the state of affairs was altered for once, and the Kuffâr were forced to pay back for the horrors they had been inflicting upon the Muslims... The other thing is that there was no other way to fell a monster like America except that it approached Muslim land itself. Stationed far afield, it was controlling us as though with a remote-control: through our marionette rulers. It is by the Grace of Allah that it has come within our reach... Allah blessed the blood of those nineteen martyrs with great inspiration... And the sequence did not discontinue here…it marked the beginning of a chain reaction. Then came 7/7, the Madrid blasts and the succession carried on. By the Grace of Allah, it is still in progression and shall continue in future, Allah willing."

One further note -- Dr. Farooq also emphasized the propaganda value that Al-Qaida gains from hot-button issues like Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay. He referred to the existence of Gitmo as "another great benefit these attacks brought... America had hidden its charlatanic face with an innocent mask…and many amongst the Muslim Ummah considered it to be different than Russia…to be ‘civilized’. Allah set straight the truth. Whatever happened in Guantanamo…the horrors of Abu Ghraib; this was how Allah revealed the hideous, Crusader and secular face of America in front of the world. This is none but a blessing of the Jihad…the blessing of the Tuesday attacks.”

A complete English transcript of Dr. Ahmad Farooq's remarks can be accessed via the NEFA Foundation website.

An October 2009 shootout at a warehouse in Dearborn, Michigan, claimed the life Luqman Abdullah, the imam of Detroit’s Masjid al-Haqq, and in the process garnered national attention. Abdullah had been a Detroit representative to al-Ummah, which the Muslim Alliance in North America (MANA) describes as “an association of mosques in several cities in the U.S. that coordinates religious and social services primarily in the Black American community.” In contrast, a criminal complaint filed by an FBI special agent describes al-Ummah as “a nationwide radical fundamentalist Sunni group consisting primarily of African-Americans.

The shootout occurred during an FBI raid designed to disrupt a variety of illegal activities being carried out by Abdullah and at least ten of his associates—activities that were uncovered by an undercover investigation stretching back for about three years, and a series of transactions pursuant to a Group I Undercover Operation. According to local news reports, the shooting came after FBI agents and police from the Joint Terrorism Task Force “surrounded a warehouse and trucking firm on Miller Road near Michigan Avenue where Abdullah and four of his followers were hiding.”

Abdullah did not surrender when ordered to; instead, he opened fire. He was shot to death, as was an FBI K-9, a three-year-old Belgian Malinois named Freddy. Although press reports do not detail how the dog was shot, it is common practice for the FBI to introduce a K-9 to “locate and detain” a suspect who refuses to surrender. The four men with Abdullah did lay down their arms and allow themselves to be arrested, although the DOJ’s press release leaves some ambiguity as to whether they did so before or after Abdullah was killed.

The FBI has arrested ten of Abdullah’s associates, most of whom were members of his mosque and the al-Ummah movement. Three of them—Yassir Ali Khan, Mohammad Philistine, and Abdullah’s son Mujahid Carswell—were arrested in Windsor, Ontario, to which they fled following the raids. Windsor is located directly across from Detroit, over the U.S.-Canada border.

The arrested men face charges that include conspiracy to receive and sell goods that the defendants believed were stolen from interstate shipments, conspiracy to commit mail fraud through an insurance scam involving arson, providing firearms to a known convicted felon, and tampering with motor vehicle identification numbers to further the theft of a vehicle.

The Al-Ummah Movement

Al-Ummah is either a splinter from, or a cover for, the Darul Islam movement. One commonality between the two movements is the leadership of Jamil al-Amin, who was formerly known as 1960s firebrand H. Rap Brown. Though al-Amin is reportedly still considered al-Ummah’s leader by the group’s members, he has not been involved in day-to-day operations for some time: he is currently serving a life sentence at the Supermax prison in Florence, Colorado, following his 2002 conviction for shooting two police officers in Georgia.

In May 2009 in Alabama, Luqman Abdullah claimed while under surveillance that al-Amin had created al-Ummah out of fear of government interference. Two years before Abdullah became part of the movement, several Darul members were killed in a shooting in New York. “Jamil Al-Amin said they had to divide the group because having too many people in one organization made them an easy target,” the criminal complaint against Abdullah recounts. “According to Abdullah, the group is still Dar-Ul, but this is not widely known because of the United States government. The Ummah is a cover name for Dar-Ul.”

The full article, co-written by Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, can be read at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies web site. This is an excerpt from the upcoming issue of CTR Vantage, titled "The Luqman Abdullah Shooting and Cause Célèbre Islam."

And it's not the first time the group has slurred Jasser this way.

RM's latest attack against Jasser came in reaction to a video, originally posted by AIFD, showing him and U.S. Representative Keith Ellison (D-MN) engaged in a Capitol Hill forum about Islam's internal struggle against radicalism. Rather than assessing the complete debate, RM elected to post just one segment (of nine) where, it says Ellison "gives the Murtad Zubi [sic.] Jasser a schooling." We at IPT News must have heard something completely different when we attended and reported on the forum last month.

Jasser, a Navy veteran, is a devout Muslim who challenges radical Islamists and advocates a separation between religion and political ideas such as the spread of Shariah law.

RM's radical reaction is hardly surprising considering the group's record. As noted in an October 2009 Anti-Defamation League (ADL) "backgrounder" on RM, the group has, on numerous occasions, promoted attacks against Jews, Hindus, Americans, and other non-Muslims. In one recent case, "RM posted to its Web site a poem asking God to 'kill the Jews' and listing ways Jews could be hurt, including by burning 'their flammable sukkos while they sleep' and throwing 'liquid drain cleaner in their faces.'" Fox News reports that the post was removed and replaced with a more innocuous article soon after it caught the eye of the NYPD.

Similarly, just last week, RM posted a video on YouTube in which group member Abdullah As-Sayf Jones rants on the streets of New York City to passersby about the justification for Major Nidal Hasan's wanton act of violence at Fort Hood. In an effort to show Hasan's act had the moral upper-hand as compared to U.S. military actions overseas, Jones says:

"This did not take place at a hospital. This was not a civilian target. Not a school, not a hotel, nothing else. This took place at a military base….compared to American military tactics, in which they drive drones over the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan, indiscriminately killing Pakistanis. A U.S. drone does not tell the difference [between legitimate targets and civilians]…but yet, here it is, the so-called terrorist making sure specifically to target military targets."

In the aftermath of the Fort Hood shooting, RM also posted a link to another controversial video – this one put out by a group called AIM Films – in which a man identified as Bilal Abdul-Kareem defends Hasan's killing spree as an act against an enemy in a state of war, rather than a criminal or terrorist act.

RM's mission, as stated on its website, includes uniting the "Muslim world…under the banner of Islam." In pursuing this mission, RM regularly pushes the limits of 1st Amendment freedom of speech protections in showing support for violence. This strategy is very similar to yet another New York-based group, with whom RM shares membership and often cooperates: the Islamic Thinkers Society (ITS). ITS, "an offshoot of a British group by the name Al Muhajiroun…that supports violence in order to create a global Islamic state," according to the ADL report, has openly shown support for Al Qaeda and has spewed hate against the FBI, CIA, and others.

I was interviewed by Wired's "Danger Room" blog about al-Awdah's chilly response to Anwar al-Awlaki's endorsement of Maj. Hasan.

"Kohlman[n] said that the contrast between Awlaki’s and Awdah’s statements reveals a gap between al-Awdah’s generation of Salafi jihadists, many of whom have mellowed in recent years, and the post-Iraq generation of jihadists. 'The naive younger guys have been raised and fed on bright-eyed propaganda about the ‘Shaykh of the Slaughters’ Zarqawi, beheadings, and suicide bombings. On the other hand, many of the older celebrated advocates of jihad and the mujahideen are increasingly opposed to the fanatical takfiri direction of Al-Qaida — casting it as counterproductive and even criminal…And, of course, these critical issues of jihadi jurisprudence are now being debated and contested largely over the Internet.'"

Treasury's Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC), one of the lead agencies in the fight against terrorist financing, froze the assets of both al Haramain and Kindhearts in 2004 and 2006 respectively. In both cases, the defendant charities were accused of providing financial support to terrorist groups. Al Haramain allegedly funneled money to Chechen rebels and Kindhearts was accused of funding Hamas.

Neither of the asset seizures was conducted with prior judicial warrants, and consequently, defendants challenged the Treasury actions as a violation of the Fourth Amendment's proscription against warrantless seizures. Although both federal courts agreed with the defendants that the freezing of assets was a "seizure" for Fourth Amendment purposes, they diverged when determining whether an exception to the warrant requirement may apply to seizures of terrorist finances.

The government argued that asset seizures in counter-terrorist financing investigations are exempted from the warrant requirement. Relying upon the "special needs exception," the government explained that no warrant is needed where: (i) the primary purpose of the seizure is beyond criminal law enforcement; and (ii) a warrant and probable cause are impracticable. Applying these factors, the al Haramain court upheld the search on the grounds that a warrant was unnecessary, whereas the Kindhearts court found the exception inapplicable, and invalidated the seizure.

Read more at: http://www.investigativeproject.org/1517/when-a-warrant-isnt-warranted

To date, little has been achieved. Indeed, Syrian President Bashar Asad lamented to SANA on November 1, 2009: “What has happened so far is a new approach. Dialogue has replaced commands, which is good, but things stopped there…It is hard to say that big steps have been taken in bilateral relations [with Washington].” Assad echoed these sentiments in an interview just a few days ago in Le Figaro
  
It’s not surprising US-Syrian relations have not improved. On a broad range of fronts, there has been little or no positive change in Syrian behavior. As recently as September 15, 2009, US commander in Iraq General Ray Odierno noted: "Syria continues to allow the facilitation of foreign fighters through Syria that both come into Iraq as well as, I believe, into Afghanistan.”

Given Syrian meddling in the Government formation process—in August a senior US official commented to Annahar: "The Syrians are mistaken if they think that their relations with us will not be affected as a result of what they are doing in Lebanon...Syria and its friends in Lebanon continue to cripple the democratic institutions”—it’s not surprising that Imad Moustapha would say: “It is exactly the sort of government we think should rule Lebanon.”

In addition to continuing political interference in Lebanon, Damascus remains actively involved in arming Hizballah, in violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701. Of course, the Asad regime made it be known from day one that it would not abide by the resolution, which stipulated an end of arms transfers to Lebanese militias. During a speech on August 15, 2006 Asad explicitly threatened the deployment of international forces to Lebanon tasked with enforcing the resolution if the mandate conflicted with Syrian interests (i.e., attempted to secure the Syrian-Lebanese frontier to prevent weapons smuggling to Hizballah). UNSCR 1701, Asad warned, will “either not be implemented or will lead to instability.”

Damascus has undermined UNSCR 1701 on several fronts, not least of which by continuing to arm Hizballah. This Syrian violation of UNSCR 1701 made headlines in early November, when the Israeli Government announced that it had siezed the German vessel Francop, carrying in excess of 60 tonnes of weaponry, including rockets, assault rifles, mortar shells and grenades destined for Hizballah via Syria.

More recently, the Syrian Government announced it would not be willing to demarcate the border between Syria and Lebanon, another element of UNSCR 1701. On November 11, during a panel discussion at American University in Washington DC, Imad Moustapha explained the Syrian opposition to border delineation. What follows is (an edited) transcript of the exchange between Mousapha and Robert Satloff, executive director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy:

Question: How soon will you demarcate [the border with Lebanon]?

Imad Moustapha: …Today Syria’s borders are not completely demarcated with Jordan, or with Iraq, or with Turkey, and the same applies to Lebanon. But we have no issues with Lebanon. Syria does not have—this is official, I am here talking as the official representative of the Syrian Arab government—Syria does not have any claims on Lebanese territories whatsoever, whatsoever! So the whole issue is an issue that is only discussed here and among the circles of the friends of Israel. Why? Because Israel is technically today occupying Lebanese territory….The short answer is: this is not an issue in our region. It’s only an issue for the pro-Israeli circles here in America and for the Israeli policymakers in our region. It’s not an issue for us.”

Robert Satloff: This discussion about borders… No one is claiming the Syrians are after Lebanese territory. The issue, Mr. Ambassador, is the illegality of shipment of weaponry. UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which ended the Lebanon war, talks about the need to demarcate these borders under international supervision. You just heard the ambassador of Syria say, we don’t know where the border is, we don’t know where the border is and we have no intention of defining it. This is exactly the problem. That’s the problem.”

Moustapha: For you, of course.

Satloff: This is not for me.

Moustapha: Of course…for the Washington Institute.

Satloff: This is not for me. This is the Security Council resolution. Why are you accusing me? Of course it’s not a problem for you, because you’re shipping the weapons across the border. It’s a problem for the poor people who are on the receiving end of these weapons.

Upon learning of the reported "missed" link between the alleged culprit responsible for the massacre at Ft. Hood -- Maj. Malik Nidal Hasan -- and Anwar al Awlaki, my heart sank for a multitude of reasons. Al Awlaki is an infamous character in the halls of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and he has been for several years at least. The cleric's recurring presence again in the Ft. Hood case seems to be powerful and disturbing evidence of how fringe extremists -- who otherwise might remain in obscurity with no real means of living out their private jihadi fantasies -- are quite literally being equipped for battle by so-called "theological" advisors known only to them through the Internet. In short, it is a reminder of how real online terrorism networks have become...

It is high time to back up the tough talk with action. The good news is that there are ways to effectively disrupt Iran's international weapons smuggling. The question is whether the Francop episode will provide the political impetus for the international community to take action. Previous cases of Iranian arms smuggling prompted no such action.

The full article, written for Middle East Strategy at Harvard (MESH), is available here.

The Fort Hood attack was an intelligence failure, just like 9/11 and so many others before. In retrospect, it all seems obvious – these kinds of failures always do. It is easy to blame bureaucratic inertia, but it is also unfair. Large organizations need procedures to function. Priorities must be set and decisions have to be made and implemented.

Examining the system failure is revealing, both about the challenges in preventing these kinds of tragedies but also in how they reveal some of our society’s core values.

Army: Major Problems
It is now clear that Major Hasan’s colleagues were concerned about his actions and behavior. But there were limits to what they could do about. Firing an Army Major is a very big deal. It is now clear that Hasan’s colleagues had doubts about his commitment to the military and about his work habits. But, informally, they judged that he was not dangerous. Consider the situation from their point of view. First, Hasan was a psychiatrist – it is understandable that Hasan’s colleagues would assume that an individual practicing a profession rooted caring, healing, and empathy would not be likely to become a murderer (Hannibal Lector is a fictional character.) But also consider the bureaucratic challenges. Hasan’s relatives reported that when Hasan made informal inquiries about leaving the Army:

They told him that he would be allowed out only if Rumsfeld himself O.K.’d it.

No doubt, Hasan’s colleagues are no wishing that they had pursued this process nonetheless and in the future officers faced with comparable situations undoubtedly will do whatever is necessary to remove individuals.

Read the complete post here.

Others in the Pentagon and Obama administration feel strongly that nothing can be won on the ground until there are enough troops to do the job properly, if the mission is defined as remaking Afghanistan. They also argue (rightly, I believe) that if Afghanistan were again controlled by the Taliban, al Qaeda would have a safe haven of operation that we would rue, and a public relations and psychological victory that would help revive their cause.

The problem is that both sides are right. I am not an Afghanistan expert, but I have spent years in war zones where the government is viewed as corrupt and illegitimate (including the drug wars in Colombia, and the 1980s conflicts in El Salvador, Nicaragua and then, West Africa). Without state legitimacy there is no way one can create conditions on the ground for that government to take ownership of any sort of popularly supported programs.

The Karzai government, with its top-down corruption, disdain for action and embrace of massive fraud in an electoral process, appear to embody the worst of all the elements that drive people to take up guns in the first place.

Yet without the necessary resources, the war is lost and the most brutal option available -- hardliners who feel they have achieved the right to govern through military victory -- takes root. The Taliban in their earlier incarnation showed this. Either outcome leaves the U.S. vital interests damaged and the Afghanistan people thrown to the predatory wolves of either side.

The only real option (and it seems to be something Obama personally is asking about and thinking about) is to bypass the central government. My full blog is here.

A complete copy of Anwar al-Awlaki's manifesto urging Muslims to "fight against government armies" can be downloaded from the NEFA Foundation website.

A complete English translation of the Taliban statement can be accessed on the NEFA Foundation website.

U.S. government agencies are increasingly concerned about the ability of pro-Jihad ideologues to use the Internet to incite U.S.-based Muslims to conduct terrorist attacks. Indeed, there have been several terrorism cases in the years since 9/11 in which actors based in Western countries were influenced by lectures, writings, and videos downloaded from the Internet.

Anwar al Awlaki (a.k.a. Anwar al Aulaqi), an American who lives in Yemen, who is regarded as an Islamic scholar, may be a key player in Al-Qaida’s efforts to radicalize and incite American Muslims to commit terrorist acts.

A U.S. citizen, al Awlaki was born in New Mexico in 1971. After his father completed his college studies, the family returned to Yemen, where al Awlaki remained until 1991, then he came back to the U.S. to study for a B.S. in Civil Engineering at Colorado State University. He then went on to San Diego State University for a Master’s in Education Leadership. While in San Diego, he served as an imam at Rabat mosque. In 2001, he enrolled in a Ph.D. program in Human Resource Development at George Washington University, where he worked as the Muslim chaplain. At that time, he was also an imam at Dar Al Hijrah Islamic Center in Falls Church, VA. He left the U.S. in 2002 and lived in London,where he also gained a following. He moved to Yemen in 2004.

The rest of the report can be viewed here.