The Counterterrorism Foundation Board, publishers

The visualization was neat, because it cleverly brought in four different factors (unemployment, median age, GDP per capita, and oil exporter or not.) But it also did not provide much of an obvious pattern. Libya had, by far the highest unemployment while Tunisia and Egypt (although this seems low) were more towards the middle of the pack. Tunisia has one of the highest median ages, while Egypt and Libya are again in the middle. As for GDP per capita, Libya is a substantially higher then Egypt and Tunisia (although lower then Bahrain). In short, the graphic does not point to an obvious next domino, although it does indicate that almost everyone in the region is a possible candidate.

But knowing that the nations in the Middle East are ripe for turmoil is hardly news, but the critical questions are when, where, and why. To model that problem requires a lot more variables. In one of my own efforts to model terrorist group behavior I cited Tolstoy who stated:

Happy families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.

Read the full post here.

To be sure, significant ideological differences separate al-Qaeda from the likes of the Muslim Brotherhood, not the least of which is the sharp contrast between al-Qaeda's distaste for national boundaries in it quest for an Islamic Caliphate and the Muslim Brotherhood's ability to mold its Islamist ideology to the specific nationalist contexts of each country in which it is present. And yet, the Brotherhood's Islamist, illiberal ideology includes tenets that raise significant questions about its qualifications as a partner in the democratic process. The threshold for partnership cannot simply be that a group is not quite as extreme or violent as al-Qaeda.

The full article is available here

A key criticism of the British Prevent strategy has focused on its failure to recognize the importance of ideology in the radicalization process, as evidenced by partnerships with nonviolent Islamist organizations. Though many of these groups reject violence against the UK itself, they are either silent about or even supportive of attacks against Israel or coalition troops in Iraq. Counterradicalization efforts cannot be effective when partnerships are made with those who explicitly reject liberal values. And we must not forget that extremist ideology calling for violence in the name of Islam presents the most pressing terrorist threat to the West. Whether advocated by violent or nonviolent extremists, such radical ideology promotes a worldview at odds with the fundamental principles of Western society and must be contested.

American society has a fundamental discomfort with the government dictating acceptable versus unacceptable ideas. Freedom of speech and religion are arguably the most cherished values in the United States. This position stands in stark contrast with legal and societal norms in the UK or the Netherlands, where distribution of terrorist literature can be investigated and the drafters jailed for creating a threat to national social cohesion. Therefore, in keeping with American values, the United States must develop a strategy that confronts the ideology head-on. While the state cannot act as thought police, it can offer and amplify an abundance of voices, thereby dispelling the notion that Islamist ideology offers the only solution to one's problems and, in effect, limiting its appeal. Without banning extremist (but protected) speech, the government can and must take action to contest extremist ideas and undercut their attraction.

Lacking a version of Britain's Communities and Local Government Department, the United States must immediately develop a roadmap delineating the responsibilities of agencies and departments -- federal, state, and local -- in addressing local grievances, engaging immigrant communities, and contesting extremist ideologies. The last of these items remains the missing link in an otherwise robust effort by the United States to foster social cohesion and counter violent extremism.

For the full summary of this event, which also featured Mark Williams, first secretary for justice and home affairs at the British embassy in Washington, DC., and Mr. Seamus Hughes, a professional staff member on the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee see here. The audio of the event is available here.

Soon after the killing, Taliban spokesman Ihsanullah Ihsan said that ‘Assassination of Bhatti is a message to all of those who are against the blasphemy laws." A letter found from the killing site claimed that Taliban killed the minister because he was leading a committee set up with the objective to change the blasphemy law.

On January 4 this year, the Punjab Governor Salman Taseer was killed in Islamabad by one of his guards identified as Malik Mumtaz Qadri, a radical extremist. Qadri confessed during interrogation that he killed the governor for his views against the blasphemy law. The largest body of the Barelvi group, the Jamaate Ahle Sunnat Pakistan (JASP) issued a statement that time saying that “No Muslim should attend the funeral or even try to pray for Salmaan Taseer or even express any kind of regret or sympathy over the incident.”

After Taseer's assassination, Bhatti vowed to fight against the law bringing some necessary amendments. Bhatti once said: "I am ready to sacrifice my life for the principled stand I have taken because the people of Pakistan are being victimized under the pretense of blasphemy law." Bhatti was very active in promoting the equal right of minority communities (Hindus and Christians) in Pakistan. Shahbaz Bhatti was the second high-ranking official killed by Islaimic radicals in the country due to the blasphemy law.

The blasphemy law, which is part of the constitution of Pakistan as the Criminal Code, (See esp. , Part XV: OFFENCES RELATING TO RELIGION) prohibits and punishes blasphemy against Islam and the Holy Prophet Muhammad. The Criminal Code provides penalties for blasphemy ranging from a fine to death.

See the video speech in which he said that Taliban could kill him for his stance on the Blasphemy law.

BBC NEWS: "Pakistan minister Bhatti predicts own assassination"

UN Security Council Resolution 1749 ( March 2007) prohibits Iran from “supply(ing), sell(ing), or transfer(ing) directly or indirectly ... any arms or related material." All countries are obligated to prohibit the procurement of such items from Iran by their nationals, or to use their flag vessels or aircraft to transport such items. And, these prohibitions are further re-enforced by paragraph 8 of UN Security Council Resolution 1929 (June 2010).

In November 2009, Israeli naval units interdicted the German-owned freighter Francorp in international waters near Cyprus. The ship had called in Iran prior to its transit to the Mediterranean through the Suez Canal. The Israeli navy seized 500 tons of Katyusha rockets, mortars, bullets, and grenades concealed aboard the ship in containers belonging to the Iranian shipping line. The ship’s manifest had indicated a much more benign cargo destined for Syria. This is believed to be only one of many occurences involving illicit shipments of Iranian origin arms in violation of UN sanctions.

Courtesy of WikiLeaks we can now read a series of State Department cables indicating that Sudan was also complicit in allowing Iranian arms to be passed to Hamas in Gaza. In March 2009, Jordan and Egypt were also warned by the State Department of imminent Iranian plans to ship a cargo of "lethal military equipment" to Syria for onward shipment to Hizbollah and Hamas in violation of UN Sanctions.

Canal authorities have indicated that they have obtained assurances from the Iranians that neither Iranian warship carries nuclear or chemical related cargoes, but, no attempt will be made to inspect either ship. And few should doubt that Iran wouldn’t use this opportunity to transport other proscribed cargo such as arms, rockets and other military items. Such items might well be destined for Syria, Hizbollah and Hamas, or elsewhere where it might do harm to US or Israeli interests. And, what cargo might such ships pick up in Syria to bring back to Iran on their return voyage. Iran is known, for example, to be in the market for numerous items to advance their uranium enrichment and ballistic missile development programs. And, Syria is a well known transit point for forwarding sanction contraband items to Iran. It has also served, in the past, as a transhipment point for North Korean contriband items into the region and to Iran.

UN Security Council Resolution 1929 (June 2010) spells out a maritime interdiction system which calls upon all countries to inspect suspect cargoes in their harbor or, with the flag states permission, on the high seas. But, it is highly doubtful that such an interdiction regime could or would be applied to these Iranian warships. This makes it all the more important that the movement of these ships and their presence in Mediterranean ports be closely monitored, and that Syria be held accountable with regard to its international obligations.

The demonstrations shaking Arab governments raise questions not only about the political future of Tunisia, Egypt and possibly Jordan and Yemen but also the specter
of increased future terrorism that could trigger U.S. sanctions.

I describe the background and the possible impact on Lebanon, a potential Palestinian state and perhaps other governments, in this opinion piece on CNN’s web site today.

http://www.cnn.com/2011/OPINION/02/03/kraft.palestine.lebanon/index.html

In Lebanon, Hezbollah, designated under U.S. law as a terrorist organization since 1997, apparently is in the process of taking over the government via a Hezbollah-backed Prime Minister. The “state within a state” fired large numbers of rockets against Israel in the 2006 conflict and, with Iran’s help, has built up a huge arsenal of thousands of missiles. Many are long range, capable of reaching Israel’s cities.

The group also has taken Americans hostages in the 1980’sand attacked targets as far as way as Argentina. Will a Hezbollah dominated government continue to engage in terrorist actions as well as giving sanctuary to other terrorists? If so, it runs the risk of being placed on the U.S. government’s terrorism list, which means cutting off foreign assistance and other sanctions.

Egypt has been the victim of terrorist attacks and the Mubarak government has tried, not entirely successfully, to prevent the smuggling of more missiles and weapons to Hamas which took control of Gaza after gun battles against the Palestinian Authority. It remains to be seen what kind of role the Muslim Brotherhood will play and whether the non-violence profile it adopted in recent years was a matter of pragmatism --because of the Mubarak regime’s police and prisons-- or principle.

Jordan, like Egypt has done a good job of keeping the peace and preventing terrorists from using its territory for attacks on Israel. It also has been a target of militant Islamic fundamentalists. King Abdullah is trying to stay ahead of the wave of public unrest by replacing his cabinet. But if he loses control, and Islamic fundamentalist militants take over, that country could join Lebanon and Gaza in becoming a terrorist base. That would be a real tragedy irony as Jordan has taken a strong stance against terrorism and has even been helping train security forces from Iraq.

The US then, under Jimmy Carter, as now, under Barack Obama, supports democracy, freedom, and the right of local populations to determine their own destiny.

The autocrat's solid control of the country, backed by the military he commands, rapidly disintegrates. No half measures are accepted -- and suddenly, he is gone.

The question becomes -- what next?

Leaving aside wars for independence from foreign powers, popular revolutions have tended to run in either of two scenarios:

Scenario One: a transitional government proves to be weak, and after a series of violent twists and turns, coups, imprisonments, and executions, a replacement autocrat -- aristocratic, theocratic, or charismatic -- emerges. Come meet the new boss, same as the old boss. Examples include: France 1789 (Napoleon); Haiti 1804 (from Touissant to Aristide, in endless destructive cycle); Mexico 1910 (from Porforio Diaz to 75 years of one-party rule by the PRI); Russia 1917 (Stalin); Germany 1918 to 1933 (Weimer to Hitler); Cuba 1933 (against Machado) and 1956-1959 (Batista to Castro); Ethiopia 1974 (Mengistu); Iran 1979 (Khomeini/Khameini); Russia 1999 (Putin and Putinism); Kyrgyzstan 2005 (Bakiev).

Scenario Two: following mob protests destabilizing the entrenched autocrat, a transitional government steadies the country long enough to allow for a move towards a genuinely democratic government, involving multiple popular interests, without permanent one-party rule by a small insider clique. There are, unfortunately, fewer cases of this, and several of them were in important respects wars for independence from perceived foreign control. Perhaps the best examples include: Turkey 1908 (Young Turk Revolution, which led to Ataturk, but evolved into democracy); Portugal 1974 (the Carnation Revolution, establishing a real democracy); Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 1979 (the Singing Revolution); Czechoslovakia 1979 (Velvet Revolution); Romania 1979; Indonesia 1998; Georgia 2003 (the Rose Revolution, but the extent to which a democracy has succeeded Shvardnadze is open to debate in light of Saakashvilli's use of the legal system to crack-down on dissent).

There are forces visible in Egypt which provide hope for scenario two, and legitimate anxiety about scenario one.

The theme that international cooperation is essential to combating international terrorism has been a mainstay of U.S. counterterrorism policy for decades. Usually this means sharing intelligence information, counterterrorism techniques, and sometimes providing training and equipment.

Australia is one of the many countries with which the U.S. enjoys a close relationship.

The Australian Ambassador for counterterrorism, Mr. Bill Paterson, was in Washington recently for meetings with U.S. State Department and other officials, including sessions with experts from other countries.

He also made a public appearance at a Jan 19 round table event of the Homeland Security Policy Institute (HSPI) at George Washington University, which has held sessions with ambassadors from other countries that also are involved in the struggle against terrorism. Ambassador Paterson gave an excellent, comprehensive talk and I just received a copy of Mr. Paterson’s text from the Australian Embassy (delayed because the Ambassador had gone on to Yemen). I thought it worth sharing because of the wide ranging scope of his discussion of the terrorism situation as seen through the perspective of a close ally.

His remarks included a discussion of Afghanistan, saying “We share the view that failing to defend Afghanistan will almost certainly give AQ new momentum and greater freedom of action. It would also strengthen the hand of the Pakistan Taliban and the growing extremist alliance and capability in Pakistan. It would energise anti-western extremists elsewhere, posing a more complex security environment than we already face.

“Hence the commitment of Australia and others to this task… In the end, we are dealing with a globalised extremist movement, and if it is not addressed and neutralised at source, its credibility as well as operational capability will be sustained and potentially enhanced.”

The text of his speech, which also covers Indonesia and his perspective on threats elsewhere in the world, follows.

For further details, also see the HSPI website: http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/events/australiaART301.cfm

The LeT had sent a cache of ‘Arges’ grenades to HuJI’s Bangladesh franchise which were used in at least seven major terror attacks, six of them targeting then opposition Awami League leaders including AL leader and present Prime Minster Sheikh Hasina, British High Commissioner in Dhaka Anwar Choudhury and Awami League legislator and a former finance minster Shah AMS Kibria. These deadly Austrian manufactured Arges grenades (allegedly counterfeited by Pakistan military/ISI) have been used by Pakistan based terrorists and more recently used in Mumbai 2008 attacks.

List of High Profile Assassination attempts with Arges Grenade:

May 21, 2004: British High Commissioner to Bangladesh Anwar Choudhury was wounded in a grenade attack. While Anwar miraculously escaped the attack with minor injuries, at least three people got killed in that attack and 70 others injured. The attempted assassination by HuJI terrorists came when Anwar was visiting the Shrine of Shah Jalal in Sylhet.

June 21, 2004: Similar grenade attacks took place at a rally of AL leader Suranjit Sengupta in Sunamganj (at Derai subdivision). One AL activist was killed and nearly 30 people were injured in that attack. Suranjit Sengupta escaped unhurt.

August 07, 2004: HuJI terrorists lobbed a grenade targeting an Awami League gathering that left one AL leader (AL publicity secretary Mohammad Ibrahim) killed and 25 others seriously injured. The attack took place moments after the City Mayor and AL’s Sylhet chief Badaruddin Ahmed Kamran left the venue after the meeting.

August 21, 2004: In an attempt to assassinate Sheikh Hasina, terrorists lobbed a series of grenades targeting Awami League (AL) leader Sheikh Hasina’s rally on Bangabandhu Avenue in Dhaka. Attacks left at least 24 people killed and hundreds including senior AL leaders Abdur Razzak, Amir Hossain Amu, Suranjit Sengupta, and Kazi Zafarullah critically injured. A lesser known Islamist outfit Hikmat-ul-Zihad claimed responsibility for the grenade attacks in Dhaka. A person named Hider Rob had e-mailed a message to a vernacular daily Prothom Alo issuing a threat to kill Sheikh Hasina. The message reads like this: “Don’t think that Sheikh Hasina is out of danger. We missed our previous chance but now we are very careful for our mission. Tell her to be prepared. We are coming and this time we will accomplish our target within seven days.”

January 27, 2005: AL leader and former finance minister, Shah AMS Kibria, and four other AL members were killed and at least 50 persons sustained injuries during a grenade attack on an AL rally at Boidder Bazaar in the Habiganj district, some 120 kilometers northeast of the capital Dhaka.

December 02, 2005: Sylhet city Mayor Badruddin Ahmed Kamran escaped similar grenade attack (a dud one) again during a local Badminton Competition at Tilagarh area of the city.

Investigating agencies in Bangladesh claimed that at least 32 Arges grenades sent by Lashkar e Taiba to Huji-B operatives and those were used in at least seven major terror attacks during that period: Six of them targeted AL leaders and the other was on Anwar Choudhury. Huji along with its political patrons aimed to eliminate AL leaders considered Anti Islam and Pro-India and used these imported Grenades with great effect.

Subsequent investigations into these terror acts unearthed how this cache of Grenades shipped into Bangladesh from Pakistan. Many of the accused including HuJi chief Mufti Abdul Hannan, are behind bars now. Now Bangladeshi agencies are probing to find out the extent of LeT and HuJi links that plagued the region.

In the words of Brookings Institution expert Ken Pollack, "The history of revolutions is that they only succeed when the government loses the will or the capability to use violence and so far there is nothing that is happening in Egypt that suggests that either one is going to happen."

From this perspective, it doesn't matter that Egypt's government, like that of Iran under the Shah, faces resurgent Islamic fundamentalism attacking a government seen as corrupt and overly close to heretic governments in the west. It's insufficient that the government is unpopular, perpetuating and exploiting gross income inequality, and for ordinary Egyptians, fundamentally unjust. So long as the local military doesn't lose its will to retain power, the center will hold.

By this calculus, the Iranian Revolution was only possible because the Shah left town on January 16, 1979 after being unwilling to be sufficiently ruthless in using his secret police, the SAVAK, to crack enough heads.

Facts about economic stagnation and reports of human rights abuses can tell the story of Egypt’s decay under Mubarak – but perhaps this newsbrief best encapsulates the situation:

Egyptian security forces detained a schoolboy for several hours after he wrote in an exam that President Hosni Mubarak was a tyrant who ruled over cowards, an Education Ministry official said on Monday. Safwat Hassan, 17, wrote in his end of high school exam in the southern city of Luxor that Mubarak was "a tyrannical leader" and Egyptians were "a cowardly people," the official in Luxor told AFP. The official said the boy wrote the answer in a maths exam because he was convinced that he was going to fail as he comes from a poor family that could not afford treating school staff to the customary meals during exam time. Egyptian teachers are notoriously badly paid and almost always have to take on private classes and accept gifts to make ends meet. Hassan was questioned for several hours by local security forces and "might be charged with defamation," the official said, without being able to say how security services found out about the boy's answer. The teenager has been barred from taking more exams this year and will have to retake them all next year, the official said.

Predictions in a situation like this are impossible – but a few observations are in order.

First, there have been innumerable calls for the United States to support the protesters and align its policy with democracy in Egypt. This is probably the least bad course of action. But there should be no illusions on several points. For the vast majority of Egyptians, the United States is inextricably linked to the hated regime. Nothing the White House or Foggy Bottom does can change that in a few days, weeks or months. Also, the ability of the U.S. to influence events is limited. It does appear that Secretary of State Clinton’s call for the Egyptian government to not respond with violence did send a message to Egypt’s generals that the U.S. would not support a violent crackdown. (A not dissimilar message was sent to Iran’s generals as the Shah’s regime was falling.)

Second, it has been observed many times that the protests are secular and the Muslim Brotherhood is not the driver. This is probably true. But there are no institutional mechanisms for a power transfer. If the regime falls, there is no opposition in the wings to take power. Effective institutions and political parties are essential for democracies to function. One of the major failings of the post-war planning for Iraq was that Iraqi institutions were reasonably functional and that there would not be a massive governance vacuum. In that chaos, the Muslim Brotherhood might prove to be the best-organized player and be well positioned to take charge.

Read the complete entry here.

In an opinion piece that appeared on the CNN web site today, Professor Sinai, an old friend and colleague, wrote in part:

"Most suicide attacks are commissioned by organized groups directly or by "self-starter" cells, such as London's 7/7 bombers. This is one of the reasons why the Moscow bomber was likely aided by accomplices.

"It is easier for groups to transform susceptible individuals into becoming terrorists by radicalizing, recruiting, indoctrinating and training them to become suicide bombers, sometimes in a matter of days, and then videotaping their commitment to martyrdom. It will be interesting to see if the terrorist group behind the Moscow airport's bombing posts a martyrdom video of the suicide bomber.

"Such groups get their oxygen from extremist religions and societies that glorify martyrdom into an afterlife in "paradise" -- which is a concrete reality in the communities where these bombers are indoctrinated.

It is true that grievances, whether legitimate or perceived, against their adversaries drive terrorist violence. But the cult of death through martyrdom is reinforced through indoctrination and hate propaganda in extremist religious houses of worship, schools, media and even popular music."

For the full text, see
http://www.cnn.com/2011/OPINION/01/25/sinai.suicide.terrorists/index.html?iref=allsearch

Until Taimour Abdulwahab al-Abdaly’s explosive belt went off prematurely in Stockholm last month, Sweden was the poster child for isolationism in the war on terror. While Abdulwahab’s bomb failed to achieve his desired result, it did obliterate the myth that nations can remain neutral to global terrorism.

Abdulwahab’s failed attack typifies the jihadis’ all-out war against “infidels.” He was a doctrinaire jihadist with ties to a local militant Islamist organization, and his attack didn’t spring up out of nowhere. There had already been warning signs that terrorists were mobilizing against the Scandinavian democracy. Militants had threatened Swedish artist Lars Vilks for his satirical cartoon portrayal of the prophet Mohammed, attacking his home and attempting to murder him with an axe. Others threatened Vilks.

The Iraq-born Abdulwahab was a member of the Facebook group “Islamic Caliphate State.” He lived in Luton in Bedfordshire, England, staging ground to four of the terrorists who killed 52 and injured more than 2,000 in the 7/7 train bombings.