

**WHITE PAPER  
SEPTEMBER 11, 2006**

**A GLOBAL  
ASSESSMENT OF TERRORISM:  
PERSPECTIVES FROM CURRENT  
AND FUTURE LEADERS ON POLICY,  
DOCTRINE AND OPERATIONAL  
IMPLICATIONS**

**PRODUCED BY:  
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GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES OFFICE  
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and  
THE GLOBAL CONNECTIONS FOUNDATION  
ORLANDO, FLORIDA  
U.S.A.**



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IMPLICATIONS**

**Orlando, Florida, U.S.A.**

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The Office of the Special Assistant to the President for Global Perspectives (Global Perspectives Office) at the University of Central Florida was established by President John C. Hitt in 2001 to sharpen the University's international focus. The office helps advance UCF's goal of providing international emphasis in curricula and research. In addition, it endeavors to expand the University's efforts to enlarge Central Florida's awareness and understanding of the interconnectedness of the global community.

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# **A GLOBAL ASSESSMENT OF TERRORISM: PERSPECTIVES FROM CURRENT AND FUTURE LEADERS ON POLICY, DOCTRINE AND OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS**

## **INTRODUCTION**

In the five years since September 11, 2001, the war against terrorism has delivered certain measurable results. Those range from the early successes in dislodging al-Qaeda and the Taliban from Afghanistan to the recent foiling of an alleged airline-terror plot emanating from the United Kingdom.

Still, Osama bin Laden continues to evade capture. Terrorists remain dangerous, and have launched devastating attacks in Amman, Jordan; Bali, Indonesia; Istanbul, Turkey; London, England; and Madrid, Spain, to name but a few. And the U.S.-led intervention in Iraq, which resulted in the opening of an expansive front in the terrorism struggle, has generated debate and opposition to the waging of the war.

At the end of the day, the war has raised at least as many questions as it has answered, leaving policy-makers with a difficult task: How to confront the challenges of a pervasive, resilient, ever-changing, and complex adversary in an increasingly hostile and skeptical world?

Concerns about whether the counter-terrorism policies of the United States and its allies are sufficient to meet global needs inspired an international gathering of specialists (see end of text for a complete list) in Orlando, Florida, U.S.A. The group met under the auspices of the University of Central Florida for a three-day working conference in November 2005. Sponsors included:

- 1) The Office of the Special Assistant to the President for Global Perspectives (established in 2001 as a presidential, interdisciplinary, internationalization initiative, it includes a Terrorism Studies Program, which is dedicated to public education, evaluation and research about terrorism/counter-terrorism issues, trends and policies), University of Central Florida, Orlando, Florida, U.S.A.

- 2) The Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (established in 1994 as an independent academic research centre within the School of International Relations of the University of St. Andrews, it is dedicated to the study of the determinants, manifestations, and consequences of terrorism and other forms of political violence. The Centre investigates the responses of states, civil society and international organizations to violent modes of waging conflict), St. Andrews, Scotland;

- 3) The Institute for Transitional Democracy and International Security (established in 2003 as a multidisciplinary public policy institute, it is dedicated to research and public education on the challenges facing transitional democracies. The members and staff of the Institute are committed to the core values of democracy, rule of law and free markets. Their mission is predicated on the belief that while many of the post-Communist nations are ostensibly graduates of transition, individual liberties are still under threat, and democratic institutions and practices are being compromised), Budapest, Hungary.

Another key sponsor of the conference was the Global Connections Foundation, which assisted in facilitating the entire program.

Furthermore, the Orlando program – titled “A Global Assessment of Terrorism: Perspectives from Current and Future Leaders on Policy, Doctrine and Operational Implications” – had participants from 20 countries. The findings of this report, though, do not necessarily represent the views of the working conference’s sponsors, individual participants or their organizations.

This critical, worldwide gathering of terrorism and counter-terrorism specialists produced incisive consideration of case studies, current and future terrorist threats, and counter-terrorism policy assessments and formulations. Ultimately the working groups collectively forged a consensus on several actionable policy recommendations that were subsequently expanded and refined. The results are explored in this White Paper.

The working groups’ overall general determination was that the United States and its allies must act more innovatively and forcefully to counter the elusive and uncertain terrorism threat.

Brian Jenkins, senior adviser to the president of RAND Corporation, one of the world’s most respected terrorism analysts and a program participant, offered these conclusions at the end of the conference: “We cannot with any confidence forecast the future trajectory of terrorism. It will almost certainly persist. It clearly has escalated. With or without weapons of mass destruction, terrorists will surprise us with attacks that could profoundly affect our society. We remain vulnerable. We are sliding into complacency.” Jenkins further noted that “whatever we do must be consistent with our values,” and we should not do so merely for moral reasons. Rather, it is a strategic imperative which, if ignored, would risk alienation and isolation.

To avoid complacency and deal more effectively with the terrorism threat, the United States and its allies must seriously review and overhaul their counter-terrorism policies, with an emphasis on fresh thinking: a new mindset – anticipating the unexpected; a new focus – recognizing that all terrorism ultimately is local; a new learning emphasis – expanding terrorism education at all levels; a new multilateralism – avoiding any “America-first” strategies against terrorism; and a new sense of innovation – countering terrorist propaganda with ideas and acts that expose the hypocrisies and attack the roots of the problem.

**POLICY RECOMMENDATION NO. 1:  
A NEW MINDSET – PREPARE GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY TO ANTICIPATE  
THE UNEXPECTED IN THE AGE OF TERRORISM.**

The requirement here is to develop in government and in the general public a mindset that dispenses once and for all with the idea that terrorism and terrorists are temporary irritants that time and occasional policing efforts will resolve. This “perspective of denial” places both governments and individuals in a perpetual mode of surprise, guaranteeing terrorists an advantage that civil society should never cede.

It is impossible, of course, to shake the sense of shock and disgust that spontaneously accompanies acts of terrorism. But in 2006 and beyond, there is no reason for nations and their peoples to be surprised by what terrorists do. The public psyche world-wide would benefit from a powerful injection of reality, exposing the full range of the terrorism threat, the intentions of its perpetrators and the long-term implications for global society. People must learn to anticipate the unexpected.

Although terrorists in some respects appear to pursue “conservative” approaches, using relatively simple weapons and tactics, the possibility always exists for destructive creativity in terms of both weapons and operations.

In regard to weapons, there is a valid concern about increased capabilities and the accompanying motivation to use weapons of mass destruction. The fact remains, though, that smaller conventional explosives are becoming more sophisticated in terms of power and detonation techniques – but also have the capability to achieve maximum destruction through effective planning.

The London underground and bus bombings of July 2005 underscored how terrorists can use conventional explosives as a force-and-fear multiplier by their selection of numerous targets. 9/11 illustrated how a “conventional hijacking” can become an “unconventional” form of suicide-bombing that converts commercial aircraft into essentially weapons of mass destruction against iconic structures. The August 2006 airline-terror plotters apparently had planned to combine commonly available products for use as explosives on a mass scale, hoping to blast as many as 10 commercial planes from the sky.

While it is vital to address a new generation of destructive devices, the increased power of existing weapons through different applications cannot be ignored.

Moreover, while identifying and seeking remediation against chemical, biological and nuclear weapons is absolutely vital, a third generation of threats – the weaponizing of the Internet – may increasingly endanger the civil order. Through the resort to “netwar,” tomorrow’s “techno-terrorists” might create life-threatening situations by interfering with air-traffic control systems and other critical infrastructure.

At the same time, terrorists – through the staging of incidents on the Internet – could in effect create a form of virtual terrorism. That is, an act may not actually have taken place, but it is staged to create a perception that could lead to public concern and panic. If “terrorism is a form of theater aimed at the people watching,” the terrorists have new venues and capabilities to carry out their horrific acts.

The landscape of terrorism will also be subject to change. While violent Islamic fundamentalism will remain a major threat, it should be recognized that a wide variety of other groups – ranging from anti-globalization anarchists to criminal enterprises to cults to right-wing militias to extremists within the ecological movement to other organizations that are currently under major scrutiny – will increasingly become significant.

As another example, the tensions created in debates over illegal immigration in the United States and other countries will recruit more terrorists who reject the existing social and political orders. Immigration disputes also will attract those who seek to “protect” the existing social and political orders through their own resort to terrorism, such as through vigilante activities. Vigilante militias could then be seen as engaging in their own form of terrorism.

Furthermore, the field of operations, while wide-ranging, will be intensified in existing “tension areas” where there are failed states, an absence of governments, a lack of governmental legitimacy, and profound economic and social dislocation created by corruption or potential pandemics. The conditions for an intensification of terrorism, ranging from the conventional to varieties of weapons of mass destruction, are already in existence in parts of Africa and Latin America.

Faced with these diverse threats, there is a vital need to break through the conventional wisdom and bureaucratic inertia that still characterize the war on terrorism. The United States and its allies must outthink a very imaginative and dangerous adversary instead of primarily reacting to the latest terrorist innovation. The general public must brace itself for any possibility instead of shifting from surprise and shock to indifference and complacency in between terrorist acts.

The idea is not to force people in government or in the general public into a state of

perpetual fear but to motivate them to think protectively and vigilantly 24/7. This approach can become a powerful psychological defense against an enemy that savors the element of surprise and typically acts without warning or pity.

In governments at all levels, the encouragement of such thinking should become a standard part of the orientation for any position. The idea here is not to present public employees with nuts-and-bolts primer on terrorism. Rather, the goal is to give them a context (the big picture, the strategy and the overarching goals of those who engage in terrorism) in which to relate their official duties to what is happening in the outside world, and to encourage greater, regular awareness of terrorism developments.

For the general public, governments should make an extra effort to produce relevant public service announcements, not simply when terrorism alert color codes change but as a matter of routine. They also should work more closely with primary schools, high schools, colleges, universities and other non-governmental partners to produce regular, interactive public forums – with a good mix of governmental, academic and other specialists – on terrorism issues as they relate to daily life. These could include live forums where people gather in a conference hall to see speakers or virtual forums with speakers electronically beamed to the audience.

Encouraging a mindset of anticipating the unexpected is crucial to preparing the United States and its allies for every eventuality.

**POLICY RECOMMENDATION NO. 2:  
A NEW FOCUS – RECOGNIZE THAT ALL TERRORISM ULTIMATELY IS  
LOCAL.**

This requirement points to the need to direct attention where it belongs in the war against terrorism – at the local/regional level. The suggestion is not meant to contradict the idea of the globalizing of terrorism or the development by terrorist groups of a “global reach.” Rather, it seeks to remind people of what may seem self-evident at one level but is somewhat obscured at another – the fact that terrorists still largely maintain local roots and connections.

Furthermore, local, radical subcultures that might be inspired by broader movements such as al-Qaeda have recruited individuals to engage in terrorism in the country/countries of their citizenship or where they have permanently resided.

In addition, a combination of local factors – such as economic stagnation for immigrant and ethnic groups, the failure of reconciling the development of a national identity that recognizes minority differences, and the power of personality, both religious and secular – creates unique dynamics that can lead to the emergence of small terrorist cells, acts and campaigns of domestic terrorism.

Thus, without minimizing the significance of international cooperation, it is important to understand that the localization of international terrorism requires individual countries and regional partners to work more closely together in combating terrorism.

National responses should be tailor-made to the unique circumstances of a particular location. The United States and its allies cannot afford a one-size-fits-all counter-terrorism policy.

Whether it is the threat of further bombings in London, the continuing terrorism tactics by secessionists in southern Thailand or the targeting of private and public sites by Kurdish extremists in Turkey, there is a need to “relocalize” the requirement to identify potential movements, thwart recruitments of terrorists and prevent or preempt them from acting.

The need to “think globally,” “organize regionally” and “act locally” is required to

meet the changes in terrorists' tactics, organization and capabilities at the country, state and community levels.

The need to act locally is also vital in preparing for and responding to threats or incidents. No matter how effective a national government might be, responsibility falls to the first-responders and the local community to address initially and cope with the destruction caused by an act of terrorism. Even if the local community may be overwhelmed and need outside assistance, how it responds at the start of and in the early phases of an incident may well determine the longer term credibility of government at all levels to manage a crisis effectively.

For instance, the legacy of Hurricane Katrina for New Orleans and the Gulf states illustrates the loss of confidence in the ability of authorities to deal effectively with weather of mass destruction and other natural disasters. With the threat of weapons of mass destruction, human-made, terrorism-driven disasters of a similar scale are no longer unthinkable.

Once the credibility of a government has been lost in one area of disaster-management, it can affect other areas and prove exceedingly difficult to retrieve. The problem is particularly acute in developing countries where loss of credibility could strain the legitimacy of the government and state. This situation plays into the hands of terrorists who seek to portray governmental institutions as weak and incapable of meeting the terrorist threat.

Moreover, such a loss intensifies the public insecurity and fear that remain the hallmarks of contemporary terrorism. It is also absolutely vital, as the events of 9/11 underscored, that the same consideration also apply to counter-terrorism police and intelligence capabilities. That is why the key role of national intelligence is essential, even though it is simultaneously imperative that one not rely solely on it. There is also a need to disseminate more broadly information that is actionable, instead of the tendency to "over-classify" in the interest of national security. Intelligence can be shared without compromising source and methods.

There is also a need for "the localization of counter-terrorism intelligence." There must be a stronger partnership between the state and local intelligence organizations and the national intelligence community to achieve a unity of effort because, as noted earlier, terrorism in regard to where an act takes place and its impact are first and foremost local in nature.

The counter-terrorism intelligence capabilities of the Los Angeles Sheriff's Office can serve as a model of what can be accomplished on the state and local areas of concern. Its intelligence-sharing and analysis capabilities have been "enhanced with the forming of the Terrorism Early Warning Group. The Department has dedicated full-time investigators, analysts, supervisors and support staff to this effort. The Los Angeles Police Department and Federal Bureau of Investigation have contributed full-time assets to the Group, and several local law enforcement agencies are contributing personnel on a rotating basis. Additionally, Terrorism Liaison Officers have been designated at every local law enforcement agency and Sheriff's Stations in the County. These officers serve as a conduit for intelligence and training information between all agencies. This system has provided an unprecedented flow of information. The ability to respond to crisis situations (crisis and consequence management) has been greatly enhanced by the full-time participation of experts in the field of chemical, biological and radiological events. These experts prepare Course of Action recommendations for emergency managers during times of crisis" (for more information, visit [www.lasd.org](http://www.lasd.org)).

**POLICY RECOMMENDATION NO. 3:  
A NEW LEARNING EMPHASIS – EXPAND TERRORISM EDUCATION AT ALL  
LEVELS.**

This requirement speaks to the need for long-term preparation of societies against terrorism. It should entail nothing less than bringing the subject of terrorism into curricula at all levels on a semi-permanent (at least for a generation) basis. The goal would be to ensure that students in K-12 and in colleges and universities are receiving sufficient information about the terrorism threat to enable them to deal with problems that arise in the future.

Contemporary terrorism presents the kind of threat that civilized nations have faced before, for example, during the early years of the Cold War, when the former Soviet Union successfully launched Sputnik. The reverberations of that technological feat and all of its political, economic and military ramifications traveled deep into the West's consciousness, stimulating a heightened interest in mathematics and the sciences, along with a parallel emphasis on international relations, languages and cultures.

A similar effort today in response to the terrorism threat would require a long-term commitment in public schools and other institutions to expand education about the sources of terrorism, as well as training in culture, history and languages. This would need to be done in an appropriate context, with the goal of exposing the true nature of terrorists.

Such an emphasis would help dislodge the customary and counter-productive nature of the public's attention to terrorism, which is primarily episodic. Public concern routinely heightens when major threats and incidents occur, but then recedes as those threats and incidents subside or are resolved. Public awareness is, therefore, primarily reactive in nature, and acts of terrorism tend to be psychologically amplified, largely because the public typically moves from a posture of underreaction to overreaction.

A strong remedy lies in a public education initiative that would recognize that threats and acts of terrorism are protracted in nature, that there are no final decisive victories, and that the public and the political leadership at all levels must accept that the threat is enduring in nature.

Consequently there is a requirement to adjust to the reality of terrorism as a form of protracted political violence and conflict. This adjustment requires that students in elementary, middle and high schools understand the objectives of terrorists. Those those who engage in terrorism are not involved in mindless violence but seek through their actions to intimidate populations and, in so doing, change governmental policies. This intimidation can happen domestically by provoking a democratic government to overreact to a threat, therefore tempting the government to utilize anti-democratic measures in the name of security.

The classic challenge of reconciling civil liberties and security must be addressed. Moreover, any program must also educate students on how terrorists seek to use their strategies to compel a government to change its foreign policies, whether that happens through traditional acts of terrorism or the threats created by weapons of mass destruction.

Public education also must emphasize that those who engage in terrorism ultimately seek to test the ability of societies to persevere in the face of continuing and evolving threats. At the same time, a program on terrorism education should emphasize that, despite the long-term nature of the threat, community awareness – coupled with effective law enforcement, intelligence, diplomacy and, where appropriate, military action – will lessen the likelihood for and impact of threats and acts of terrorism.

Education on the nature of terrorism should be an integral part of any civics or social

studies curriculum, although it need not necessarily take the form of a separate course. A few decades ago, civil-defense training was common in public schools, with an eye toward preparedness for nuclear attacks in particular. Aside from the questionable “duck-and-cover” aspects, students did receive some practical instruction on many aspects of disaster-planning.

A similar type of program in public schools today – required of all students – could make terrorism its core but take advantage of the opportunity to share information and strategies applicable to other disasters.

It is also essential that institutions of higher learning encourage the development of programs – curricular and co-curricular – that enable students not only to learn about but to engage and even specialize in research on terrorism. Although there are numerous colleges and universities that offer courses in this area and faculties that specialize in the subject, the academic pool is too shallow. The Centers for Excellence sponsored by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security may help fulfill crucial operational requirements in dealing with terrorism, but they are not a substitute for a broader critical analysis dealing with sensitive counter-terrorism issues and policies.

The need for critical, non-partisan, non-ideological and objective assessments may be best addressed in a university setting, whether it takes the form of a program, a major, a minor, a certificate or a co-curricular initiative.

Denial followed by overreaction is no answer in combating the long-term domestic and international reality of terrorism. The shortage of terrorism education enhances the ability of terrorists to spread fear and intimidation to the broadest audience possible.

**POLICY RECOMMENDATION NO. 4:  
A NEW MULTILATERALISM – AVOID ANY “AMERICA-FIRST” STRATEGIES  
AGAINST TERRORISM.**

The requirement here above all else is to discard any strategy that even hints of special positioning of or benefits to the United States in the war against terrorism. After all, it is a war that delivers death, destruction and despair to people around the world, regardless of geography, nationality, ethnicity or religion. It is, in short, a threat to civil society, a category in which most of the world finds itself.

Therefore, future strategies to combat terrorism should include agreed-upon goals and suggest clear advantages for all countries that participate. This emphasis is particularly necessary in a rapidly shrinking, increasingly interdependent world, where the gaps between haves and have-nots remain wide. The relative preeminence of the United States and its sole superpower status increases the urgency of signaling to other countries that their opinions, perspectives, ideas and assistance matter.

Otherwise, the United States could find itself in a world where other countries increasingly array themselves against it, as has happened historically when a single nation or empire acquired too much power. The United States should avoid behavior that brands it as unilateralist, self-serving, arrogant or dominating – in the war against terrorism and in other international endeavors.

Those who have used terrorism as a form of asymmetric warfare have effectively played on the vulnerability of a great power by having numerous targets from which to select and by neutralizing highly technical weapons systems through their imaginative use of conventional arms. While, as noted above, ultimately “all terrorism is local,” it is becoming increasingly international in scope and magnitude.

Global terrorism has been characterized by the growing ability of localized groups both to work independently and with a unity of action to coordinate acts and campaigns of terrorism.

In contrast, the bureaucratic turf battles that have acted as a barrier to a unified approach to combat terrorism have been exacerbated on the international level as respective states pursue their own agendas and national interests in defining their policies to combat terrorism. Realistically the concern of individual freedom of action by the respective states will continue, but there can and will be more willingness to act in concert if the United States is no longer perceived to want to dominate the global arena through its own version of the war against terrorism.

The key to achieving unity will require less heated rhetoric from Washington and more continuous formal and informal cooperation. Such cooperation is taking place to a certain extent but must be accelerated as the possibilities of greater terrorist incidents become a reality.

The need for cooperation has been enhanced in the West by a recognition, for example, of the cross-cultural strains created by immigration. In France, during the fall of 2005, the immigration issue not only led to disorder but created a fertile ground for terrorist recruitment. The riots that disrupted French cities and towns might have been inspired by economic factors and social injustice, but groups such as al-Qaeda certainly saw an opportunity to infiltrate, agitate and propagandize communities that could serve as future bases of support.

The same concern applies to other European states and the new nations in the former Soviet Union. By the same token, there is a realization that unless the pace of reform speeds up in the Middle East, terrorists will use extreme interpretations of religion to continue to destabilize the region through the resort to terrorism by a younger generation that is economically, politically and socially frustrated. It is in their interests to address the vital need for reform, but the clock is running.

Nevertheless, Washington could be in a sense “first among partners” in engaging the international community to be in unison against international terrorists.

**POLICY RECOMMENDATION NO. 5:  
A NEW SENSE OF INNOVATION – COUNTER TERRORIST PROPAGANDA WITH  
IDEAS AND ACTS THAT EXPOSE THE HYPOCRISIES AND ATTACK THE ROOTS  
OF THE PROBLEM.**

This requirement takes aim at the area where both the United States and its allies have had the least success in their effort to combat terrorism. Despite various attempts at diplomatic, military and economic measures, terrorists and their supporters continue to recruit members and enjoy extensive overt support.

The difficulty is further complicated by the fact that traditional psychological efforts to combat terrorism are not effective. Such methods once were associated with terrorism as part of a territorially based insurgency, and were directed at “winning the hearts and minds” of the affected population.

In contrast, today’s terrorism, aside from being non-territorial and international in scope, has another potent feature – that is, it is often religion-based, appealing to “hearts and souls.” It is, therefore, transcendental in nature with the ultimate goal defined in achieving one’s fulfillment in the next life, if not in this one. Furthermore, faith-based terrorism provides the “true believer” with the certainty that not only history but God is on his or her side.

Those who have harnessed extreme, fundamental beliefs to justify their actions have also used modern technology to achieve their goals. Through the Internet and the mass media, they have been successful in engaging in campaigns of information warfare that are more effective than those opposed to them.

There are no guaranteed methods to win “the battle of ideas,” but there are policies that could start to take the initiative from extremists who have used the power of technology to further their goals. At the outset, it must be recognized that especially in the case of violent Islamic fundamentalism, terrorism has tapped into and has been nurtured by a deeply embedded societal movement as Islam seeks to define its own beliefs in an increasingly technological and secular world.

The ultimate outcome of the war of ideas will therefore not be determined by external forces, governments or power. The profound changes that are used to legitimize the resort to terrorism will be altered only if the religious/political leadership rejects the call to violence, and alters public opinion against the terrorists. The need to win the necessary reform to achieve such a goal may require major changes in existing authoritarian/traditional regimes. Indeed, such regimes now increasingly face the challenge that if they do not reform, domestic, regional and international terrorism could lead to their destabilization and potential destruction.

Delegitimizing terrorism is essential for the regimes’ survival and the security of their citizens. The United States and other countries committed to combating terrorism can use their diplomatic and economic power to encourage reform under the call for democratization. While democratization is indeed a very disorderly process, continued repression would only feed the appetite of terrorists. In seeking reform, the United States and its allies must break from the cultural, linguistic and ethnic misunderstandings that have expanded the gaps between traditional and modern societies.

Moreover, unless the political leadership has cultural awareness and individuals who are sensitive to and well-versed in interdisciplinary area studies, how can a government identify possible voices of moderation, much less support them in combating terrorism?

Such support must in most instances be indirect, or else the charges of cultural imperialism will simply enhance the capabilities of terrorists to attract sympathizers and recruits. Governmental and non-governmental programs initiated and conducted by organizations in a given region will be more effective than attempts to impose external values. Furthermore, unless governments address the frustrations of minorities, especially in the West, the expansion of extremism will spill over country and regional borders.

By the same token, there is ignorance on all sides. The requirement to establish long-term, fully funded programs to seek reconciliation through international and regional organizations can be more productive in terms of cost-effectiveness with a concomitant absence of the loss of life than the resort to military force.

One possible approach that might be appropriate in various areas is the work of the National Security Council of Thailand in developing and implementing a “strategic program of non-violence” to help neutralize the insurgency in the south of that country. The insurgency involves Islamic separatists who employ terrorism against the central government.

On a more monumental scale, perhaps a cultural equivalent of the Marshall Plan, funded regionally and internationally, would help to mobilize those who seek to replace the voice of extremism in its many forms with that of moderation attuned to the basic values of individual cultures and religions.

Furthermore, it is in the interest of the United States and its allies to promote in the fullest sense international public diplomacy through all communications media as a means of

seeking to lessen the support to those who at this time are winning, as noted earlier, the “battle for hearts and souls.”

Besides marshalling the power of words and images, more effective and efficient use of foreign aid could make a difference in combating terrorism and addressing its roots. Such aid usually focuses on providing various forms of anti-terrorism training, measures and technologies. While such a focus is necessary, there is a need to channel aid to the immediate, if not deeply underlying, causes of terrorism.

This kind of aid will require a high level of analytical skill in ascertaining the terrorist threat environment, ranging from the development of movements that can morph into terrorist groups to individual and collective recruitment to the financing of terrorist groups and their support mechanisms. The object of such support would not be to identify directly and apprehend those who are involved in individual acts or are part of a combat cell or larger organization.

Rather, the aid would be utilized to assist local authorities in developing their capabilities to break down or eliminate immediate causes and stop the cycle of terrorist recruitment. The focus would largely be on the encouraging of community organization, necessary grants and other forms of funding that could lessen the attraction of joining a terrorist movement, organization or combat cell.

If terrorism is correctly assumed to be a form of asymmetric warfare, where being small is an asset, the selective funding of organizations on the base level is as important as traditional funding of complex counter-terrorism intelligence organizations and accompanying security and military programs.

Such foreign aid should have flexibility as its hallmark. Clearly there will be issues of accounting for where the funding would go, but cooperative networks among members of a counter-terrorism network is a positive alternative to the classic problem of “throwing money” at a problem.

Counter-terrorism foreign aid would help to develop a capacity on the local level, be it in an urban or rural center, to lessen the appeal of terrorism. In pursuing this objective, the key requirement of providing meaningful employable education can act as a deterrent to the frustration generated by under-employment or unemployment. Such funding should not solely go through traditional governmental organizations, but community-based entities, such as micro-banks that offer funding to those who have been traditionally shut out from the marketplace.

As in the case of “the battle of ideas,” such funding ideally would be regional and functional in practice to avoid the charges of external domination by the United States. Effective counter-terrorism foreign aid would seek out critical areas where support could lead to the “preventive” as contrasted to the “reactive” side of combating terrorism.

## CONCLUSION

There are, of course, no “silver bullets” in combating terrorism. But the considerations raised at “A Global Assessment of Terrorism: Perspectives from Current and Future Leaders on Policy, Doctrine and Operational Implications” could assist those responsible for dealing with current and future threats.

The five policy recommendations are clear, forward-looking and actionable. They provide a roadmap that, if taken seriously and utilized, should help lead the United States and its allies toward a more successful resolution of the terrorism conundrum.

In summary, then, the recommendations are:

- **NO. 1:**  
**A NEW MINDSET – PREPARE GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY TO ANTICIPATE THE UNEXPECTED IN THE AGE OF TERRORISM.**
- **NO. 2:**  
**A NEW FOCUS – RECOGNIZE THAT ALL TERRORISM ULTIMATELY IS LOCAL.**
- **NO. 3:**  
**A NEW LEARNING EMPHASIS – EXPAND TERRORISM EDUCATION AT ALL LEVELS.**
- **NO. 4:**  
**A NEW MULTILATERALISM – AVOID ANY “AMERICA-FIRST” STRATEGIES AGAINST TERRORISM.**
- **NO. 5:**  
**A NEW SENSE OF INNOVATION – COUNTER TERRORIST PROPAGANDA WITH IDEAS AND ACTS THAT EXPOSE THE HYPOCRISIES AND ATTACK THE ROOTS OF THE PROBLEM.**

These recommendations provide an important, overarching view of alternatives to meet an enduring challenge, a view that is often not addressed by those who, because of their responsibilities, are driven by current contingencies. The urgency of looking “over the horizon” is very much needed to deal with a persistent contemporary and future threat to national, regional and international security.

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