Thawahiri?s last letter: Al Qaeda and Iraq; an old project..

By Walid Phares

Walid Phares

When US media showed significant interest in the Thawahiri letter addressed to Abu Mus'aab al Zarqawi (see for example The Washington Post on October 7), I attempted to monitor the "Jihadi Chat" regarding the so-called letter. To my surprise, the next day, a letter was being read in a couple chat rooms. It was a lengthy text of about 30 minutes. All of the points summarized in the daily media were included, but the oral paragraphs were much longer. The "moderator" said he was reading the letter from the "doctor"; hence it is assumed to be the same letter. The moderator also mentioned that this document was also read back in August, but I had no way to confirm it. My first conclusion though was that the so-called letter -or a copy- was indeed released internally within the Tanzeem (organization) for dissemination and "discussion." That day, I had no evidence about the first date of the internal release, nor who released it to the network all the way to the "rooms." Was it released back in July, since July or after segments of the letter transpired in the Western press? It seemed to me that, although Thawahiri's letter was on the face of it "personal" and directed to Abu Mas'aab, it was nevertheless circulated (or pieces of it) among the Jihadists before it was publicized gradually in the US and West. Was there a reason? Until the Government posted the entire translation of the text on the web site today (see Andy Cochran's earlier post), the situation was somewhat peculiar: Was it meant to be sent only for the eyes of Abu Mus'aab? I am not sure anymore. For a Thawahiri letter to be read by the room(s) moderators and "descended" on to the cadres, shows the initial intent of he writer(s) and the sender(s). Ironically, while some paragraphs of the letter were surfacing through the media, the (alleged) entire text of the letter (or at least a much longer version) was circulated within the Jihadist community on line.While pieces were appearing in the US press, the entire letter was read in the chat rooms... enigma?

In any event, the moderator a week ago didn't seem reading some extremely secret letter, but a "strategic document" from al doktor. Couple days later, another reading was performed in a newly formed ghurfa (room). The reading was followed by an interesting discussion, rather Q and A about the "rules of engagement." As reported in the Western press, and tonight visible on the web, the issues of beheading, attacks against the Shiites, and the issue of focus on American forces were in the heart of the "debate." Which is telling about the original importance of the letter: it had the shape of a confidential and personal letter but its content is written as policy guidelines to be "descended" on to the cadres. Hence, regardless of the internal "enigma" the document raises important points:

One, the document seems to be a "policy" directive sent by al Qaeda's high command, to the most critical battlefield of the Jihadists: Iraq. Two, and more importantly, the main points made within the Western media were about the strategic plan ordered by al Qaeda in the Middle East and the centrality of Iraq in al Qaeda�s planning. The Washington Post article, based on fragments of the letter wrote:

"The letter of instructions and requests outlines a four-stage plan, according to officials: First, expel American forces from Iraq. Second, establish a caliphate over as much of Iraq as possible. Third, extend the jihad to neighboring countries, with specific reference to Egypt and the Levant -- a term that describes Syria and Lebanon. And finally, war against Israel."

This warrants some remarks. Yes, this is the plan of al Qaeda; but no, it is not revolutionary new "news." I wasn't�t surprised, (and I am sure many readers of Jihadism aren't) to read that paragraph, (and the entire letter tonight) but I was surprised to see the press treating the substance as a brand new or explosive material. The so-called four-stage plan has been "digested" a while ago by the circles of Jihad on line and even on al Jazeera and other media: Defeating the US in Iraq, declaring the Khilafa in the most extended Sunni areas in Iraq, then moving beyond, has been a classical plan for a while. A reader of Islamist geopolitics would understand that "extending the Jihad" towards Egypt and the Mashreq (translated by Levant) -meaning Syria, Lebanon (and I'd add Jordan) is equivalent of spreading within the Sunni realm of the region. The latter move, according to earlier Salafist analysis, should culminate with a clash with the Jewish state. We're talking about the Muslim Brotherhood old song: Nothing really innovative, but certainly new to our public, once translated and published.

The Washington Post article said: "US officials say they were struck by the letter's emphasis on the centrality of Iraq to Al Qaeda's long-term mission." Why would the officials (according to the daily) be even surprised, let alone "struck?" What is stunning about the centrality of Iraq to al Qaeda?

The article adds as a basis for the revolutionary character: (of Thawahiri's letter) ''I want to be the first to congratulate you for what God has blessed you with in terms of fighting in the heart of the Islamic world, which was formerly the field for major battles in Islam's history, and what is now the place for the greatest battle of Islam in this era." What seems to be a scoop in the eyes of many in the media is a daily bread in the Jihadists ideological meals. Every single day of every week, one emir, imam, cadre, or speaker in one chat room or even on al Jazeera reconfirm what Thawahiri wrote in his letter. Is Iraq central to the Jihadi global offensive worldwide? I wouldn't even consider it a question: of course it is.

Baghdad has been the direct objective of Usama Bin Laden at least since February 2003, when he asked his Jihadists to be ready for the big moment. He openly announced that Saddam will fall, and that they should move on the "second capital of the Caliphate." A good reading of the Jihadi thinking and literature, even when Saddam was in power, would leave you with one conclusion: with or without the removal of Saddam, al Qaeda, the Salafists "wanted" Baghdad. The place has a value of its own, deeply rooted in history and in the Islamist vision of the renewal. The real question in our so-called American debate should be about the strategy to stop the Jihadists from achieving this goal, not about "re-discovering" their intentions.

The debate is not about the plans of the Jihadists regarding Iraq and Baghdad. That is old business. The debate is about what should have been and what should be the steps and moves to allow Iraqis to resist the al Qaeda strategy. Hence, if the Thawahiri letter is important, it is because of its clarification of what was always the grand design of the Jihadis, not because it is revealing some deep secret. But having stressed the fact that we should not be surprised at all, nevertheless the document is the clearest statement made so far by Thawahiri (and Bin Laden) about al Qaida's plans for Iraq. The letter is important because it was written by the number two of the organization and states clearly what are the strategic intentions, even though they were announced, discussed and applied a while ago. In short, the public has them now in English and signed by Doktor Ayman personally..

It cuts down tons of poor interpretations of the Jihadi wars in the region including the strange explanation that Jihad Terror was born "because" of the removal of Saddam Hussein.

Dr Walid Phares is a Senior Fellow with the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies in Washington and a Professor of Middle East Studies

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