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Why Hamas has been Quiet in 2009
By Aaron Mannes
The Jewish Policy Center's Palestinian Rocket Report has just published an article I wrote with my boss about why Hamas has kept the cease-fire since Operation Cast Lead. In it we to apply some of our work modeling terrorist group behavior, our models strongly suggest that internal Palestinian politics plays an important role in Hamas' strategic calculations.
The piece is below.
Why Hamas Has Been Quiet In 2009
by Aaron Mannes and V.S. Subrahmanian
Palestinian Rocket Report
September 15, 2009
Since Israel ended Operation Cast Lead―a massive incursion into the Gaza strip intended to suppress rocket fire into Israel―in January 2009, Hamas has largely held to a ceasefire on rocket and mortar attacks on Israel. The obvious explanation for this change in behavior is that Israel's incursion into Gaza and Hamas' corresponding heavy losses have re-established Israeli deterrence. Another explanation is that this unprecedented period of quiet is proof that Hamas has changed politically, and that Western nations and ultimately Israel should negotiate with it directly. There is also substantial countervailing evidence that HAMAS remains committed to its campaign against Israel and that the cease-fire is strictly tactical.
Models of organizational behavior built at the University of Maryland's Laboratory for Computational Cultural Dynamics suggest all of these explanations may be wrong. Indeed, intra-Palestinian politics may be playing an important yet overlooked role in Hamas' calculations.
Read the full post here.
Gaza Conflict Provokes Anti-Jewish Violence in Europe
By Victor Comras
Since the beginning of the war in Gaza there has been a dramatic upsurge in anti-semitic activities in Europe, perhaps the most violent since post World War II reconstruction days. Jews, synagogues, and Jewish schools and institutions across the continent, from Sweden to Turkey, have been attacked or threatened. And several non Muslim organizations have joined with Islamist groups in blending an intensified anti-semitism with their anti-Israel rhetoric.
While some of this virulence against Jews in Europe stems directly from the violence in Gaza, its roots run far deeper. For there is a strong anti-Jewish current that has long been fed by organized Islamic groups across Europe, and particularly by the Muslim Brotherhood. As acknowledged in Leiken and Brooke's well researched Foreign Affairs Article, "The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood," the Brotherhood's claim that it is not "anti-Jewish," but only "anti-Zionist," is belied by its own actions, and the literature and preachings of its leaders and theologians.
It is somewhat ironic that as Sunni Muslim Government Leaders from Egypt to Saudi Arabia seek to mute their, and the local popular response, to the Gaza events, the contrary seems to be the mood in Europe. European cities have seen some of the largest anti-Israel demonstrations in history. Earlier this month, over 100,000 protesters marched in Madrid, convinced that Israel’s military incursion into Gaza to stop rockets being fired into Israel, was unjustified.
The Brussel’s Journal, published by the Society for the Advancement of Freedom in Europe (SAFE), a Swiss non-profit organization, reports a dramatic upsurge in “anti-Semitic violence.” Synagogues and Jewish centers have been firebombed in Belgium, Britain, France, Germany, Sweden and Denmark. More than 100 anti-Semitic motivated attacks have taken place in France alone since the opening of the Gaza conflict on December 27th. Jewish schools have also been targeted for attack, and, in some cases, Jewish students expelled from local public schools. Death threats have also been directed against Europe’s Jewish Community leaders. Police in Sweden, France, Britain and Germany advised prominent Jews to redouble their security arrangements after several of their names were found on “Jewish Hit Lists.”
The Muslim Brotherhood has long manifested an anti-Jewish sentiment, dating back to its founding and the close association of many of its early and most senior leaders with Nazi Germany. Muslim Brotherhood literature, and teaching material, remains replete with anti-Jewish rhetoric, and the Gaza war has brought many of these tendencies back to the fore. Building on popular sympathy for the Gaza Palestinians as the misperceived underdog, it has provided the Muslim Brotherhood and other even more radical European Islamic groups a new rallying cry and recruitment tool. The anti-Israel popular sentiment along with European government fears of setting off a new series of Muslim riots in the streets of Europe, has also caused several governments to largely ignore, or give these Muslim organization a pass concerning their “violent outrage.”
While most European journalists attribute this surge in anti-Jewish violence to the events in Gaza, and downplay the notion of a resurgence of anti-semitism in Europe, considerable reason for concern remains that the problem runs far deeper. Europe’s media has played Israel’s actions against Gaza, and its causes, nature, and conduct, much differently than the American media. European journalists have generally portrayed a greater sympathy for Hamas, largely ignoring Hamas' sworn commitment to the destruction of Israel and to their conduct that gave rise to the present conflict. In one of the more outrageous examples of an anti-Israel bias, the France 2 TV network used graphic, but outdated video footage dating back to an accidental truck explosion in 2005 as current footage demonstrating current violence in Gaza. In Greece, the center-right Avriani daily newspaper The Brussels Journal reports ran a story charging that a Jewish plutocracy, was preparing to put in motion “war machines” in various hot spots around the world in order to control the price of oil, redistribute the world’s natural resources and start a new cycle of weapons production.
Many of the same concerns I raise here are also expressed in a poignant article by Daniel Schwammenthal, titled “Europe Re-Imports Jewish Hatred” that appeared last week in the Wall Street Journal. Schwammenthal writes:
Hamas and other Islamists are not even trying to hide their ideology. Just read the Hamas charter or check out Hamas TV, including children's programs, for a nauseating dose of murderous anti-Semitism. .... Muslims in Europe, watching Hamas and Hezbollah TV with their satellite dishes, are being fed the same diet of anti-Semitism and jihadi ideology that Palestinians and much of the Middle East consume.
***
… Anti-Semitism… is not alien to Europe's culture -- to the contrary, the Continent once excelled at it and many still share the feeling. A Pew study from September shows 25% of Germans and 20% of French are still affected by this virus. In Spain, 46% have unfavorable views of Jews. Is there really no connection between this statistic and the fact that the Spanish media and government are among Europe's most hostile toward the Jewish state? Is it just a coincidence that Europe's largest anti-Israel demonstration took place Sunday in Spain, with more than 100,000 protesters?
***
With little hope that the media coverage will become more balanced and the incitement of the growing Muslim community will abate, the Jews in Europe are facing uncertain times.
This new wave of anti-semitism in Europe is likely to continue long after the violence in Gaza subsides. It is incumbent on European governments to recognize this factor, and equally apply and enforce its anti-preaching of hate legislation and programs, and to insist on a equal level of civil behavior from all its citizens and residents. One should also expect that Europe's mainstream media will again live up to its pledge to fight discrimination, racism and xenophobia from whatever source. This means restoring a semblance of objectivity and balance in its reporting concerning Israel-Palestinian relations, the Middle East Peace Process, and other matters impacting Islamic - Jewish relations.
Discussion about the feasibility of a Gaza demilitarization
By Walid Phares
As the Israeli Government has decided to commit to a unilateral cease fire in Gaza, and in light of the US-Israeli agreement on blocking the flow of weapons to Hamas; also in light of a NATO exploration of a possible high sea control of arms shipments to the pro-Iranian organization and as news of Arab financial grants to the enclave, components of the internationalization of the strip are now being taken into consideration. But at the same time, Hamas and its supporters in the region, Iran and Syria, are adamantly opposed to any form of UN or international role in the enclave. At the same time, Egypt rejected the deployment of any international force on its side of the border with Gaza. In this context, I conducted the following media discussion with military expert Thomas Smith published in the International Analysts Network and on the Family Security Matters site.
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World Defense Review Maj. W. Thomas Smith, Jr. interviews Dr Walid Phares on the feasibility of the "Ten Points Plan for Demilitarization and Internationalization"
"Dr. Walid Phares, director of the Future Terrorism Project at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, recently proposed to the United Nations a 10-point plan for Gaza – essentially a new UN Security Council resolution – aimed at resolving the ongoing conflict through demilitarization. The Phares Plan calls for a multinational force-deployment to Gaza, and a disarming of all militias, which, if administered properly, would de-fang Hamas. The deployment and disarmament would lead to a complete withdrawal of Israeli Defense Forces followed by significant financial aid to the war-torn enclave.
The plan is ambitious to say the least, and favors both Israel (victims of Hamas’s rocket attacks and suicide bombers) and the Palestinian people living in Gaza (basically lorded over and held hostage by the Jihadists).
If nothing else, any push to implement Phares’ Plan would expose the Jihadists for what they are: Groups like Sunni Hamas – and their Shia cousins, Hizballah – want to appear as simple Islamic faith-based political parties caring for their flocks. In reality they are armed terrorists who wage Jihad on Israel and the West, all the while crying victimization and calling for peace (the latter when they are being soundly whipped on the battlefield). But Phares’ plan, which truly would bring peace to Gaza, would demand Hamas relinquish its rockets and other offensive weapons: A demand Hamas would likely reject, kicking and screaming in their rejection.
Yesterday, I spoke with Phares – who now also serves as secretary general of the Trans Atlantic Legislative Group on Counter Terrorism (a consortium composed of terrorism experts, as well as U.S. and European legislators all focusing on the challenges posed by international terrorism) – about his plan.
W. THOMAS SMITH JR.: You were among those who drafted the initial plan for UN Security Council Resolution 1559 regarding the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon and the disarming of militias, namely Hizballah, in 2004. Syria withdrew in 2005. There was a deployment of UN forces in 2006. But Hizballah was never disarmed. Why would you think the “Phares Plan” would work in Gaza? Would Hamas accept any mandate to disarm?
DR. WALID PHARES: Yes, it’s true, UNSCR 1559 called for Syrian withdrawal and the disarming of militias. The resolution was clear and set the path for the liberation of Lebanon. Syria's troops pulled out and that was a significant victory. The non-disarming of Hizballah was due not to the perceived hollowness of the resolution, but it was a result of the inability of Lebanon's politicians – who supported the resolution – to call on the international community to help them in its application.
In Gaza, you have a different situation. The UN Security Council has already issued a resolution calling for a ceasefire. It was rushed, particularly by the Arab bloc, acting under pressure from the media and because of public demonstrations. They should have addressed the roots of the crisis, not the roots of the conflict as a whole. The current crisis between Gaza and Israel is about missiles being fired at – and impacting inside – Israel. Thus it is about who in Gaza is firing these missiles. While Mahmoud Abbas’s Palestinian Authority is engaged in a peace process, hence ending the military confrontation, Hamas – an ally of Iran and Syria – has rejected the process, and claims that employing missiles against Israel is a "resistance right." That's where the problem is. So a ceasefire and a return to the status quo, won't solve the problem. There needs to be a new dynamic wherein there are no missiles, thus no Israeli retaliation. But will Hamas accept to let go of its heavy weapons? I am not sure. What I am sure is that their allies in Damascus and Tehran won't permit them to do so.
SMITH: In your proposal, you suggest the formation of a 30,000-man multinational force that would essentially move into and seize control of the entire enclave. How would that happen?
PHARES: I am a realist. At this stage, I do not see this happening. As long as all parties feel they can still change the dynamics on the ground, they won't accept a UN military presence. But if the conflict goes deeper and wider, or if dramatic new developments, then one or both parties would begin accepting the idea. Already Hamas has said it would accept the idea of monitors. Israel may consider a Franco-Turkish force, but it wants to make sure Hamas isn’t resupplied via its borders with Egypt. My plan is more or less a final-stage platform not an early stage one. I am projecting a force that can not only effectively separate Israel and Gaza, but would manage Gaza's security and population until the reestablishment of a reformed Palestinian Authority.
SMITH: What do you mean by reformed PA?
PHARES: I mean that the UN-mandated forces would train and organize a Palestinian police force and place them gradually under an elected Palestinian Authority. Gaza's borders would be under the control of the multinational force with a growing Palestinian police presence to manage the ports of entry. There wouldn’t be any militia in the enclave. But there would be officially mandated Palestinian units and UN forces to protect the civilian population.
SMITH: So Hamas would be disarmed – perhaps dismantled – according to this plan?
PHARES: All militias would be dismantled. But Hamas as a political party, as a social structure and even as a government may remain if Palestinian voters give it seats in the parliament. This would be when Hamas demonstrates to the world that the Palestinian people really want this organization to represent them, and not under the threat of weapons and not through financial enticements. Fatah, Hamas, and other and new Palestinian parties can run for office in a new demilitarized Gaza and eventually form the cabinet. Demilitarization is about militias. But everything else should follow a democratic process under UN control. This is one option, and a continuous irrational war is the other option. I assume that all people who want to end this war should support the internationalization of Gaza. Those who will oppose it will show they aren't interested in the Gaza population’s future or well-being. To stop the miseries in Gaza, you need to have a sound government engaged in peace and security. No militias. No rockets. No blockade. No bombardments, etc. What you need is normality. And at this stage, normal life can only be brought about by the United Nations taking over in Gaza, fully.
SMITH: Some might ask, is the Palestinian Authority with its current forces capable of ensuring security in Gaza’s interior and on its borders?
PHARES: The PA police can of course manage security and related services in the strip if supported by the international community and under the protection of a multinational force. But there must be some form of international protection for the Palestinian police so that they won't be attacked by militia forces as was the case in June 2007. Hamas will have to accept becoming a political party like all other movements, and the PA will have to become a real government, not a political party. If that happens, the Gaza conflict can be resolved. Hamas refuses the international solution because it assumes that under the UN it will lose its power. In fact, under the UN we will all know what Hamas' popularity is really about. The fact that the Jihadi movement rejects the internationalization shows us that their projection is that the voters may not bring them back to government. That's the deep-end of the issue. It is about Hamas wanting to remain in power, and that power being a result its weapons not its popular support.
SMITH: Would Israel accept such a plan: a reliance on the UN or a multinational force for security in Gaza?
PHARES: What are the choices? If a multinational force under the UN is the only way to reconstruct a Palestinian governing-structure in Gaza, why would Israel oppose? The borders and the passages will be under international control and the area managed by UN and PA. Hence the peace process will be ready to move forward. Israeli officials have said their issue is with the militias’ intentions to employ rockets against Israelis in Israeli territory, not with the management inside Gaza.
SMITH: In your proposal, you mention several countries by name as potential force contributors, but you excluded the U.S. and the UK.
PHARES: Yes, I even excluded France and many – though not all – other Western countries. I did so because al Qaeda and Hizballah will continue to be present. And in the case of Bin Laden's cells, they will target America and its allies, and create incidents where there is a U.S. presence. That is not needed. American and NATO military forces can still help on the borders with Egypt and on the seas for interdiction, and they may remain in the area for strategic support. I named many countries with good capabilities such as NATO members Spain, Greece, Norway, and Turkey. Also Latin American countries such as Chile, Brazil and Argentina. Asian and African countries such as Japan, Mongolia, the Philippines, India and Nigeria. In addition, countries such as Egypt and Jordan may also contribute. All participants need to have diplomatic relations with both the PA and Israel. As you see there are enough members of the UN who can deliver, but the force has to be strong and operating under Chapter 7, not as with the UNIFIL in south Lebanon, which is operating under Chapter 6. In the end, many formulas are possible. I have advanced the most idealistic equations. Reality could be otherwise.
SMITH: Your proposal asks for a massive financial-aid package from the oil-producing countries in the region. You estimated 10-billion dollars from OPEC to Gaza. Why?
PHARES: Because I noted that the Arab League and the Organization of the Islamic Conference were the most active in moving along toward an end to the conflict, and because they claim Gaza's crisis is an "Arab and Islamic" cause. So to follow the logic, if indeed it is advanced as such, then the money should follow from the same direction. We all know that if the Arab League and OIC oil producers want to, they can easily advance 10-billion dollars for a Gaza fund that would be – of course – dispensed and managed by a UN agency to rebuild Gaza and ensure that every family in the enclave would get a fair share. Ten-billion dollars would transform the one million residents into middle-class status within one year, if the will is there. After I advanced the proposal, Qatar announced that they are ready to pay a quarter of a billion. So, if all other producers do the same, you have your 10-billion or so package. Iran's "foreign aid" to Hamas goes for weapons and war. An OPEC-OIC super grant would end the war in Gaza.
SMITH: But this means the Arab governments have to be unified, and they aren't. You have the pro-Iranian line such as Syria, Qatar and Sudan and the Egypt-led camp. How do we solve that?
PHARES: This fact shows where the problem is. If the governments and regimes who claim internationally they are mobilizing for Gaza, are serious about it, they will move quickly along these demands: Put Gaza under UN management and fund a full recovery of the area. They will basically transform the miserable situation there into a success, and help the peace process move faster than ever, because the West Bank would rapidly want to match Gaza and Israel would rapidly have to meet the PA halfway to finalize the solution.
SMITH: Do you think the Obama Administration will move along these logical lines?
PHARES: I really don't know. It will depend on the advisors to be appointed and on the preexisting plans. If the forthcoming administration reverts back to the ideas of the 1990s, it will fail. If it moves forward into a new thinking, it may make a difference. In the end, the plan I propose has a main goal: it is to show that there are solutions. I have discussed this widely on Arab TV and radio so that the people of Gaza hear the ideas. They have the right to know that solutions are possible if the ideologies of endless wars are reversed. In a sense, I am using Obama's main slogan: "Yes we can." But will the Jihadists let go of their world-view for the people to live peacefully? We'll see."
W. Thomas Smith Jr « Close It
Who was Said Mohammad Siyam?
By Matthew Levitt
Sheikh Said Mohammad Siyam, killed in an Israeli airstrike this week, was one of the most senior political and military leaders of Hamas in the Gaza Strip. His death is a significant loss to Hamas, both politically and militarily. Indeed, he offers a telling case study of the types of leaders now running Hamas in Gaza.
Born in the Shati refugee camp in Gaza , Siyam became a former protégé of Sheik Abdel Aziz al-Rantissi, co-founder of Hamas, and was a former teacher at an UNWRA school. An early member of Hamas, he was first arrested during the First Intifada, in 1988, by Israel for security offenses and for his membership to the organization. Four years later, in 1992, he was one of the hundreds of Hamas members deported to southern Lebanon. He emerged as a spokesman of Hamas in early 2004. In the 2006 elections, Siyam won a seat in the Palestinian Parliament, representing Gaza City. Shortly after, he was appointed Interior Minister, where he established Hamas’s Executive Force. In a 2007 interview with Ma’an News Agency, he stated that the Executive Force was one of his achievements “which I felt proud of.” The Executive Force, under Siyam’s direction, played a significant role in armed confrontation with Fatah. Considered a hardline leader, Siyam lost his cabinet posts when Fatah and Hamas formed a short-lived national unity government in March 2007. He was soon appointed as the head of Hamas’s Parliamentary Bloc by the Shura Council. Siyam’s influence in the Gaza Strip continued to grow, as he was a leader of the Executive Force, and he was instrumental in Hamas’s take over of the Gaza Strip in June 2007. In the Hamas government, Siyam was considered to have the role of Defense Minister. He was killed on January 15, 2009 by a bomb dropped by the Israeli Air Force. His assassination is the second, after Nizar Rayyan, of Hamas’s top leadership in the Gaza Strip.
For the Hamas, politics and terrorism are just two equally legitimate and viable tactics to reach their desired goals. It should therefore not surprise that Hamas seeks to muddy the waters between its political, social and military activities.
Nor should anyone have been shocked when Hamas took pages straight from the Hezbollah playbook and developed a coherent strategy leveraging parallel and complementary political, social, military and terrorist activities.
As the international community presses the parties to conclude a ceasefire agreement, one critical yardstick by which any agreement must be measured is not only its focus on preventing Hamas from rearming through the Rafah tunnels but also the extent to which it denies Hamas political victories for its recent military adventurism. Said Siyam school of Hamas leadership -- effortlessly merging terrorsim and politics -- must not be allowed to carry the day.
NEFA Foundation: New Bin Laden Audio - “A Call for Jihad to Stop the Gaza Assault”
By Evan Kohlmann
The NEFA Foundation has obtained and translated a new Arabic-language audio recording of Al-Qaida leader Usama Bin Laden titled, "A Call for Jihad to Stop the Gaza Assault." During the recording, Bin Laden called upon Muslims around the world "to mobilize the youth into jihadi fighting units in the cause of Allah against the Zionist-Crusader alliance and their agents in the region—and not to waste the energy of the youth in street demonstrations without carrying any weapons." Bin Laden blamed the Israeli invasion of Gaza on the sagging U.S. economy: "Today, the U.S. is staggering under the attacks of the mujahideen and their consequences. [It is suffering from] a human, political, and financial drain. It is drowning in a financial crisis, so much so that it is begging from big and small countries alike. Now, its enemies are no longer in fear of it and its friends have no respect for it... The dramatic and rapid decline of U.S. power was one of the important motivations for the Israelis to launch this brutal attack on Gaza, in a desperate attempt to make use of the last days of the two terms of Bush and the neoconservatives."
During his address, Bin Laden also demanded that faithful Muslims contribute financing to help support jihadi operations: "the religious donations of a single prominent Muslim businessman are enough to cover the entire expenses of jihad on all active frontlines with our enemies today… I know that greed does not prevent many of the Muslim merchants from spending money in the cause of Allah, but rather they are prevented by their fear of the United States and its agents in the region... Can one not find a place to hide somewhere? Is the land of Allah not vast enough to carry out the religious duty of financial jihad?"
An English translation of Bin Laden's address can be downloaded from the NEFA Foundation website.
The Real Connection between Iran and Hamas
By Matthew Levitt
Iran’s active state sponsorship of Middle East terrorist groups is well documented, from terrorist
and insurgent groups in Iraq and Afghanistan to Hizballah in Lebanon and Hamas and PIJ in the West Bank and Gaza. The Iranian regime has been described by U.S. officials as the “central banker of terrorism” and has a nine-digit line item in its budget to support terrorism, sending hundreds of millions of dollars to terrorist groups annually. Illustrating how the support
for terrorism is part of an official government policy, Iran has used its state-owned financial institutions to dole out these funds.
For most, this is not news. Even the technocratic Financial Action Task Force (FATF), a multilateral body that operates by consensus and includes Russia and China, has issued a series of warnings about Iran’s deceptive financial practices, including its money laundering and terror financing. That’s why I was surprised when NPR asked me to talk about "The Real Connection between Iran and Hamas" for a point-counterpoint style piece debating whether Iran really does finance Hamas. The story, on this weekend’s NPR Weekend Edition, featured me highlighting Iranian financial and material support for Hamas and Hillary Mann Leverett, a former Foreign Service officer who is CEO of Stratega, a political risk consulting firm, arguing that while Iran would surely like to support Hamas it does not.
That’s right. According to Mann Leverett in all her time in government she came across no hard evidence of Iran financial or material support for Hamas. Since U.S. officials regularly cite evidence to the contrary, one wonders how Mann Leverett missed the memo. She proceeds to suggest that the idea that Iran could get arms to Hamas is “implausible,” suggesting she is unaware of such well documented examples as the Iranian-funded Karine-A weapons smuggling ship, the traditional weapons smuggling routes that cut across Yemen into East Africa and up through Sudan and Egypt, and alternative means of moving funds through trade-based and other money laundering schemes.
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Mann Leverett suggests that Hamas efforts to smuggle cash in suitcases highlights how useless banks are in funding Hamas and how impractical arguments are that Iran may use banks or find more creative means of funneling money to Hamas. In fact, Hamas recetly attempted to set up its own bank in Gaza and has used the local Post Office to facilitate basic banking transactions as well. Banks also send money to Hamas leaders outside Gaza, who then smuggle the cash into the Strip. Most bizarre, Mann Leverett seems to suggest that it may be al Qaeda-related cells in the Sinai who are funding and arming Hamas – a suggestion that indicates a complete unfamiliarity with the phenomena of salafist groups operating in Sinai and Gaza.
So, to set the record straight for Mann Leverett and other readers who may not be aware, here are just a few snippets of information with which Mann Leverett should become familiar (for sources for these examples see “The Money Trail”):
* In March 2007, Khaled Mashal, the leader of the Hamas political bureau based in Damascus, visited Iran and stated that Iran had been providing financial support for Hamas since it took office in 2006. Mashal indicated that funding from Iran would continue, although he did not provide any specific amount
* Iran engages in a variety of deceptive financial practices to conceal the nature of its sponsorship of terrorist groups. Iran has used Bank Saderat as a preferred means of transferring funds to terrorist organizations such as Hizballah, Hamas, PIJ, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command. The Treasury Department revealed one case in which Iran sent $50 million to a Hizballah-controlled organization between 2001 and 2006.
* In March 2008, the Treasury Department followed up one of the FATF warnings noted above by issuing a broad alert to the financial sector about the problems with Iran’s anti–money laundering efforts, noting that Iran “disguises its involvement in proliferation and terrorism activities through an array of deceptive practices specifically designed to evade detection.”
* A particularly effective method Iran has used to hide illicit transactions under the cover of legitimate business is by engaging in money laundering through trade. A prominent example of suspected trade-based money laundering reportedly involves the Committee for Palestinian Welfare and Aid (CBSP), a French charity designated as a Hamas front organization by the United States. Officials suspect Iran provided the funding for these transactions—funding that was passed either directly or indirectly along to terrorists through a trade-based money laundering scheme. Abu Aker has been involved in a number of other suspicious transactions in which foodstuffs or money either reached or was intercepted en route to Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) through the El Ehssan Charitable Association, one of the PIJ’s charities. In one case, Israel blocked the passage of five containers of vegetable oil paid for by European charities and sent to the Palestinian territories by a Turkish firm. According to Israeli officials, Iran leveraged a connection between an Iranian company and its European partners to initiate the scheme, while Abu Aker was reportedly in direct contact with PIJ officials in Damascus who pointed him to these same companies.
* In addition to providing financial support, Iran has been training members of the Hamas military wing in sniping and other technical capabilities. Iranian trainers reportedly have taught Hamas bomb makers how to use household items and everyday materials to fashion explosives for its homemade mortars and Qassam rockets. Additionally, Grad-type Katushya rockets bearing Iranian serial numbers, Farsi lettering, and Iranian paint have been spotted in the Gaza Strip. Iranian engineers reportedly have designed and manufactured a version of the Grad rocket that disassembles into several pieces so that it is easier to transport through the underground system of smuggling tunnels between Egypt and Gaza.
* According to a December 2000 Palestinian intelligence report confiscated by Israeli authorities, Iran had transferred $400,000 directly to Hamas’s Qassam Brigades specifically to support “the
Hamas military arm in Israel and [encourage] suicide operations,” and another $700,000 to Islamic organizations opposed to the PA. A confiscated Palestinian document describes a May 19, 2000, meeting between the Iranian ambassador and Hamas, PIJ, and Hizballah at the Iranian embassy in Damascus. According to the report, “During the meeting the Iranian ambassador demanded that the abovementioned persons carry out military operations in Palestine without taking responsibility for these operations.”
* While estimates of Iran’s financial assistance to Hamas vary, there is consensus that the sum is significant. According to Israeli estimates, Iran contributes around $3 million a year in direct aid to Hamas. Canadian intelligence cites Canadian Secret Intelligence Service (CSIS) assessments that Iran transfers somewhere between $3 million to $18 million a year to Hamas. According to the CSIS report, “in February 1999, it was reported that Palestinian police had discovered documents that attest to the transfer of $35 million to Hamas from the Iranian Intelligence Service (MOIS), money reportedly meant to finance terrorist activities against Israeli targets.” Palestinian sources estimate Iranian assistance to Hamas “at tens of millions of dollars.” According to experts testifying in the case of Diana Campuzano et al v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, Iranian financial support to Hamas in 1995 totaled $30 million and ranged from $20 million to $50 million annually between 1990 and 2000. According to expert testimony in another case involving a Hamas attack and Iranian support for Hamas, Susan Weinstein et al v. The Islamic Republic of Iran et al, “the Islamic Republic of Iran gave the organization at least $25-50 million in 1995 and 1996, and also provided other groups with tens of millions of dollars to engage in terrorist activities. In total, Iran gave terrorist organizations, such as Hamas, between $100 and $200 million per year during this period.”
In short, as I stated in the interview, Iranian support for Hamas is extremely significant – to the point that Hamas could not function as it does today were it not for Iranian financial and material support. I expected Mann Leverett to argue that while Iran does support Hamas it could be convinced to terminate such support if the right incentives were offered. I think that unlikely, but at least that would have been grounded in reality.
The broadcast of "The Real Connection between Iran and Hamas" on NPR Weekend Edition can be heard here. « Close It
Will Hezbollah take part in the Gaza war?
By Olivier Guitta
I just wrote an article for The Middle East Times analyzing the possibility of Hezbollah opening a second front against Israel.
You can read it in full here.
Here is an excerpt:
While the Gaza war enters its third week, the question of a second front remains very accurate. Even though lots of experts have asserted that Hezbollah would not enter the war at this point, some troubling elements are questioning this assertion. Just last week northern Israel was hit by a few Katushya rockets just like in the summer 2006. The paternity of this act remains a question but it proves Hezbollah's ambivalence when it comes to facing off with Israel again.
The most logical culprit for last Thursday's attacks on Israel is the Syrian-backed Palestinian extremist group PFLP-GC. Ahmed Jibril, its leader, is based in Damascus and was behind the June 2007 Katushya rockets - modified in Iran - attacks against Israel.
The PFLP-GC has allegedly prepared more than 80 rockets of this type to bomb Israel.
Even if Jibril's group is behind this latest attack, there is no way he did not get the nod from Hezbollah. In fact, nothing happens in southern Lebanon without the knowledge and blessing of Hezbollah. What does Hezbollah have in mind? Is it testing the waters? Is Hezbollah using PFLP's action as a dry run to see how UNIFIL forces and Israel would react?
A Plan for Gaza: Demilitarization and Internationalization
By Walid Phares
As the UN Security Council was voting for Resolution 1860 calling for a cease fire in Gaza, for the stopping of the flow of weapons to Hamas and for the withdrawal of Israeli forces, I had sent a memo to the members of the Council advising for a more comprehensive plan based on Chapter 7. In 2004, I wrote an identical memo also remitted to the UN Security Council calling for Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. The memo was part of an NGO process leading eventually to the issuing of UNSCR 1559 in September of that year. The memo sent this week is not part of a formal NGO process but is signed by the secretariat of a newly formed Trans Atlantic Legislative Group (US and European legislators) and published in several outlets. It was remitted to several missions including the US, France, UK, Russia, the European Union, the Arab League, the Palestinian and Israeli delegations.
The central idea is to have the UN seizing the actual control of the Gaza strip but only under Chapter 7, that is with the massive deployment of a multinational force, the disarming of Hamas and other militias, and the rehabilitation of a reformed Palestinian Authority. Evidently my memo-article received different types of reactions. The Hamas and "Iranian axis" players definitively rejects the idea of any UN sponsored security measures in Gaza. They feel this will take away the only card they have: military pressure on Israel. But many on the other side are skeptical about any UN role. However diplomats are now discussing what seems to be some forms of international role and PA presence. The Cairo discussions are going in that direction. I am projecting that unless a wider conflict smashes all initiatives, the diplomatic resolution cannot evolve outside an international security system in Gaza.
I made several of these remarks on BBC TV and Radio, al Hurra TV, France 24, and I summarized the Ten Points Plan in a You Tube Posting. (Link at the end of the article).
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The Ten Points Plan
It may be too early to discuss both a comprehensive solution for the future of a Palestinian state and to anticipate an end to the global War on Terror at the same time but here goes. In any discussion of peace in the Middle East it’s important to remember the intentions of the Iranian and Syrian regimes and their proxy, Hezbollah when we think about saving the civilian population of Gaza from war, shielding the Israeli populations from rockets and avoiding an escalation of violence that could engulf the entire region. The Iranian and Syrian regimes and their ally Hezbollah will always oppose the peace process and try to sink it.
So is there a plan to bring peace to the southern shores of the Levant? In an interview with Al Jazeera, Israeli President Shimon Peres said his country will stop military operations when the strikes by Hamas and its allies will come to an end. Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas said his Palestinian Authority (PA) is ready to assume responsibility for the sake of his people. Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and Jordan’s King Abdullah said their governments are ready to solve the crisis in Gaza if the PA is part of it. The United States, the European Union and the United Nations all affirmed that everything has to be done to end the war in Gaza. Excellent.
If all the players listed above are ready to stop the violence, end the war and save Palestinian and Israeli civilians from bloodshed, then the plan seems to be clear: demilitarization and internationalization of Gaza.
Establishing a fully-fledged U.N. sponsored and managed security system in the enclave has precedents across the planet: Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, and to some extent in Lebanon and possibly in the near future, Darfur.
When an area slips under the control of a militia which is not bound by a peace treaty, or operating under international law, and when a population comes under fire from any party because of the military actions of such a militia, and until a recognizable and recognized sovereign state becomes responsible for such an enclave, the U.N. Security Council must step in and apply Chapter 7 of the charter, that is to bring peace to civilian populations.
In this case, the United Nations has a duty to seize Gaza and manage its peace until an internationally recognized and responsible Palestinian state rises again in that province. How will this be accomplished?
1. The Security Council meets and declares Gaza as an area under U.N. emergency management and vote, under Chapter 7, for a strong multinational force (MNF) to enter the enclave in coordination with Israel and the Palestinian Authority.
2. The MNF should not include forces whose governments are in a state of war with Israel or with the Palestinian Authority and must have diplomatic relations with both, for the purpose of peace building.
3. The MNF proceeds with the disarming of Hamas and all other militias first. Gaza should be demilitarized fully. Israeli forces would withdraw to the lines of demarcation fully.
4. The MNF would reestablish police centers and remit them to a reformed and transparent PA.
5. The MNF would protect the civilian population, in coordination with the PA units.
6. The Arab League and the Organization of the Islamic Conference would provide all needed expenses for the MNF and the PA security forces. A consortium of oil producing governments from the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) would grant Gaza’s U.N. sponsored local administration $10 billion or so to end the economic crisis, fund new schools, hospitals and basic infrastructure.
7. The Arab League would commit to grant Gaza residents visas to visit all Arab countries and work permits if they wish so.
8. Israel commits to allow Gaza workers to travel to the West Bank and vice versa.
9. The final security and economic arrangements would be integrated in the final status negotiations between the PA and Israel.
10. The PA and Israel would resume their direct negotiations for a peace settlement.
This 10-point plan can, first and foremost, bring peace and security to the Palestinian population in Gaza, the Israeli civilians in the surrounding areas, and also engage the responsibility of the United Nations, the European Union, the Arab League and the OIC in peace making.
Evidently, such a plan will never see the light of day as long as any party to the conflict thinks they can only count on a military solution — and particularly as long as Hamas is instructed by Tehran and Damascus to sink the peace process. Sadly as long as democracy is not on the rise in Iran and Syria we cannot predict the end of the War on Terror.
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Dr. Walid Phares is the coordinator of the Trans-Atlantic Legislative Group on Counter-Terrorism based in Washington D.C. and Brussels and the director of the Future Terrorism Project at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies as well as a visiting scholar at the European Foundation for Democracy.
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The You Tube Summary http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dnsU-4RKUEE « Close It
Modeling Terrorist Group Behavior: Hamas & Hezbollah
By Aaron Mannes
In my day job at the University of Maryland’s Laboratory for Computational Cultural Dynamics I work with a team of computer scientists and socials scientists to build models of terrorist group behavior. As the in-house TerrorWonk my role is to “interpret” the results and see if they yield any useful insights. I’ve co-authored papers on both Hezbollah and Hamas ( only the abstract is posted online).
The models use a system called SOMA (Stochastic Opponent Modeling Agents) that calculates probabilities of a group acting in a given way in a given situation.
Obviously, we hope that our models can achieve a high level of prediction accuracy. But, regardless they can often reveal facets of an organization’s behavior that were not previously evident. Just as military experts say, “Plans are nothing, planning is everything,” I heard one speaker at a conference say, “All models are wrong, but some are useful.”
Following are short summaries of the findings.
Read the full post here.
NEFA Foundation: Zawahiri Issues Orders to “Strike Everywhere” in Revenge For Gaza
By Evan Kohlmann
The NEFA Foundation has obtained and translated a new audio recording from Al-Qaida Deputy Commander Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri released on January 6 and titled, “The Massacre of Gaza and the Siege of the Traitors.” During his address, Dr. al-Zawahiri condemned the ongoing Israeli raids in Gaza and blamed the actions of Israel on Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and incoming U.S. President Barack Obama: “These attacks are the gift of Obama to you, before he shall receive his position… this is Obama, whom the American machinery of lies attempted to portray before the world as the deliverer, who would change the policy of the U.S. He is killing your brothers and sisters in Gaza without any mercy or compassion.” As a consequence of the U.S. role in the events in Gaza, al-Zawahiri called upon Al-Qaida supporters around the world to carry out indiscriminate revenge attacks on American and Israeli interests: “O’ Muslims everywhere, fight against the Zionist-Christian campaign, and strike its interests wherever you encounter them… attack the Zionist-Christian alliance and its interests. O’ lions of Islam everywhere, the leaders of the Muslim lands are the protectors of the interests of the Americans and Zionists… so thwart the efforts of these traitors by striking the interests of the enemies of Islam—namely, the Christians and the Jews—wherever and by whatever means you can.”
An English transcript of Zawahiri's remarks can be downloaded from the NEFA Foundation website.
The Role of the Muslim Brotherhood With Hamas and Iran
By Douglas Farah
Former CIA analyst Reuel Marc Gerecht has an important piece in the Wall Street Journal on Iran's Hamas strategy. The Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Report (free subscription required) fleshes out the picture even further.
The fundamental truth is that Hamas' road to Iran runs through the international Muslim Brotherhood, and has for two decades.
What is often missing in the discussion of the Muslim Brotherhood is that Hamas, according to its own founding charter, is an integral and armed part of the Ikwhan, not separate from it.
According to Article Two of the Hamas Charter:
“The Islamic Resistance Movement is one of the wings of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine. The Muslim Brotherhood Movement is a universal organization which constitutes the largest Islamic movement of modern times. It is characterized by its deep understanding, accurate comprehension and its complete embrace of all Islamic concepts of all aspects of life, culture, creed, politics, economics, education, society, justice and
judgment ,the spreading of Islam, education, art, information, science of the occult and conversion to Islam.”
The most open analysis of the relationship of the Brotherhood to Iran comes from the public interviews of Yousef Nada, the self-described foreign minister of international Muslim Brotherhood. Unfortunately, there is no English language link to the extraordinary series of statements he gave.
In a series of interviews he gave to al Jazeera in late 2001 and 2002, Nada described how the Ikhwan sent a delegation to Tehran immediately after Khommeini assumed power in 1979. He states that the MB delegation was the third plane to land in Tehran after the revolution-the first was Khommeni's, then security from the PLO, and then his.
As the Brother in charge of relations with Iran, he tells how his group worked with the Iranian revolutionary regime, and how he personally tried to mediate an end to the Iran-Iraq war. My full blog is here.
Israel Attacked from the North
By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross
My colleague Josh Goodman and I published a Center for Terrorism Research Intelligence Briefing this morning that examines today's Katyusha rocket attacks into Israel from Lebanon. An excerpt:
* ROCKETS LAUNCHED FROM LEBANON. According to reports, at least three Katyusha rockets were fired today from Southern Lebanon into Northern Israel. One landed in the kitchen of an old age home in Nahariya, wounding two elderly Israelis. Israel immediately responded by firing artillery shells at the location from which the Katyushas were fired. An Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) spokesman told Haaretz that the retaliation was intended as a "pinpoint response at the source of fire." * LEBANON'S RESPONSE. The Lebanese government was quick to condemn the rocket attacks into Israel. According to a statement released by Prime Minister Fouad Siniora's office: "Prime Minister Siniora regards what happened in the south as a violation of the international resolution 1701 and something he does not accept and Siniora called for an investigation into the incident." * WHO BEARS RESPONSIBILITY? No group or individual has, to this point, claimed responsibility for the Katyusha attacks. Lebanese Information Minister Tarek Mitri was swift to deny Hizballah's role, saying that the group "assured the Lebanese government that it remains engaged in preserving the stability in Lebanon and respects Security Council resolution 1701." Israel blamed Palestinian factions in Lebanon, and does not believe this signals a broader escalation. Minister Rafi Eitan said, "I think these are isolated incidents. We expected this." FDD research fellow Tony Badran writes that the Damascus-based PFLP-GC is believed responsible for the rocket attacks, and that Hizballah "naturally knew about it and turned a blind eye, in order to conveniently maintain deniability."
You can read the full intelligence briefing here.
Strategic Reading in the Gaza Conflict (Part 2): An Eight Points Assessment
By Walid Phares
After having advanced ten questions about the ongoing conflict in Gaza, at the onset of the Israeli military operations against Hamas (December 28, 2008 on CTB) and as Israel chose to commit ground forces inside the enclave, here is a working reading of the main strategic developments and indicators at this time:
1. Israel’s land thrust in Gaza indicates that the long range goal of the campaign is to create changes on the ground, which are supposed to stop Hamas’ future rocket launches inside Israel. Many critics of Israel’s action, particularly the Jihadi propaganda machine, claim the ground operation didn't silence the shooting. But the counter arguments here are that a) the operation didn't end yet and b) Hamas’ ability to launch is linked to its ability to resupply its batteries or to build new missiles. Hence, the final military outcome of the operation, if indeed this is a silence-the-rockets campaign, will only show its success or failure at the end of the operation, or even after the supplies of Hamas are depleted.
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2) On the propaganda level, it is clear that the “Jihadi bloc” in the largest (and most mainstream) sense is dominating the airwaves. The combined effects of a number of Arab and Iranian media outlets (including the Qatari-funded al Jazeera, al Manar, al Aalam, etc) on the region’s audiences, as well as the international media treatment of the conflict, all that, has tilted the balance against Israel, so far. But one has to note that the blogosphere is witnessing a different battle. On a variety of web sites and even in some newspapers many dissident voices and pens in the Arab and Muslim world are voicing their opposition to the Iranian-led “strategy” of shelling Israel. The anti-Hamas wave is not necessarily a pro-Israel mood, but an anti-Iranian attitude.
3) On the diplomatic level, one can see two messages. A surface narrative adopted by both the “Iranian led bloc” and their opponents in Egypt, Riyadh and the West Bank, that is a criticism of Israel’s action in Gaza. And a deeper game underneath: The Tehran “axis” is inciting political escalation but would accept a cease fire based on the initial status quo. The anti-Iranian bloc (Egypt, PA, Saudi, Jordan, etc) does not wish a victory for Iran’s allies in Gaza but a come back to Abbas’ Authority to the area. Interestingly, two governments who were neutral on the conflict in general decided to shatter this “official” neutrality: Qatar’s Emir has sided with Hamas and Turkey’s AKP Government has blasted Israel openly. Hamas’ new equation is now showing clearly who’s who in the region.
4) Many in the analyst community have been speculating on Hezbollah’s next moves. Some predict that Hezbollah has to strike in order to fulfill its “alliance duties” while other commentators go as far as asserting that the Iranian backed organization in Lebanon will sell out Hamas. I believe the two assessments are extreme. Hezbollah, as much as Syria and Iran are solidly behind Hamas, is part of the “axis.” But the timing and weapons of intervention against Israel is a matter of regional consultation with Tehran. Hezbollah is awaiting Iran’s decision as to where and how to strike, and more importantly, when. Analysts need to better understand the geopolitics of the region and its players.
5) Hamas will continue to fight inside Gaza and launch rockets onto Israel until it loses (or about to lose) its command and control systems inside the enclave. It is only then that it may strike beyond the scope of its tactics: meaning deeper inside Israel with suicide bombs and possibly overseas. One has to understand the escalation parameter that Hamas and its backer, the Iranian regime, have adopted. Also keep in mind, that Hamas’ and the “axis’” immediate goal is to reach a cease fire, thus not using the last-choice-weapons is a rational choice, for now.
6) From the statements made by Mahmoud Abbas’ cabinet and spokespersons over the past days, one can conclude that the PA is very nervous about a Hamas victory, because it will mean the final demise of the Fatah legacy and influence. But Abbas is also nervous about a full “regime change” in Gaza because it would frame his government as a “collaborator” with Israel. Hence the most pragmatic position Abbas can adopt at this stage is to condemn "Israeli" actions but wait for final results on the military level.
7) President Bush will continue his support to Israel (with concerns over the humanitarian situation) and his criticism of Hamas till January 20th. At first, President elect Obama will continue a US policy of backing its ally and supporting a two-state solution. But the forthcoming administration may try a different route, possibly identical to French President Sarkozy’s shuttle diplomacy in the region. However, as I believe, the Iranian confrontation with Israel (via Hamas) is much deeper and wider than any moderation can reduce, at this stage.
8) The United Nations' institutions will eventually become the last resort to resolve the crisis but only after a new strategic landscape would have emerged in Gaza. The US is vetoing any Security Council resolution which will bring back the status quo ante. A resolution in the UN General Assembly can be easily voted by the OIC members, but won't have effects on the military situation. The Secretary General has already called for a cease fire but would need a chapter 7 resolution from the Security Council to seriously end this round of violence.
More assessment is to come.
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Dr Walid Phares is the Director of the Future Terrorism Project at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies and a visiting scholar at the European Foundation for Democracy. He is the author of The Confrontation. « Close It
Political Hardball Within Hamas: Hardline Militants Calling Shots in Gaza
By Matthew Levitt
Despite its myopic focus on promoting violent conflict rather than peaceful negotiations with Israel, Hamas is by no means a monolithic movement. Divisions within the Hamas leadership were evident, for instance, when the recent six-month ceasefire came to a close and varying Hamas leaders issued conflicting statements that both terminated the ceasefire and called for its extension. With Israeli forces currently deployed in Gaza targeting Hamas's military and political leadership, untangling the fissures within the organization is critically important to understanding the group's decisionmaking process.
With its electoral victory in January 2006, and even more so after it defeated Fatah and forcibly took over Gaza in June 2007, the external leadership of Hamas based in Damascus lost some control to the group's Gaza leaders. While the Damascus leadership remained dominant, in large part because it still controlled the organization's purse strings and oversaw relationships with Hizballah, Iran, and other foreign entities, Hamas leaders in Gaza were making the day-to-day decisions. Then, in August 2008, Hamas hardliners dominated the secret ballot election for Gaza's Shura council. Less-extreme Hamas leaders like reportedly did not even bother to run when they saw the electoral slate dominated by young Hamas members affiliated with the Qassam Brigades. The election reportedly brought hardline Hamas military officials into the movement's Gaza political bureau, and chief among them was Ahmed Jabari, Hamas's "chief of staff," who oversaw the group's military wing.
The emergence of Gaza's hardline Hamas leadership, one that is closely affiliated with the movement's military wing, provides critical background to understanding recent events. It provides context not only for Hamas's decision to terminate the ceasefire and resume rocket attacks against Israeli civilian communities, but also for the Israeli decision to strike back hard -- first from the air and then on the ground -- at the group's military and political infrastructure in Gaza. It also clearly indicates that as the international community attempts to craft an enforceable ceasefire -- one that presumably protects Israeli civilians against indiscriminate Hamas rocket attacks -- a key prerequisite for success will be to weaken the militant Hamas leadership currently calling the shots in Gaza.
The full article is available here.
The other dangerous actors in Gaza
By Olivier Guitta
I just wrote an analysis for the Middle East Times looking at the other dangerous radical Palestinian groups present in Gaza. Indeed Hamas is far from the only one on the ground.
You can read the full article here.
Ehud Barak, Israel's defense minister, told the French daily Le Monde six months ago, regarding the ceasefire with Hamas in Gaza: "It is unclear how long it might hold, two days or two months. Historically, we are in a curve of a collision with Hamas."
And he was right: the ineluctable military conflict is unfolding in front of our eyes. After a week of aerial strikes, Israel has implemented its plan with a dangerous ground incursion. Where do we go from here?
Did Israel fall into the Hamas/Syrian/Iranian trap? Possibly. Syria thinks that Israel is getting into a messy quagmire. Hamas and Hezbollah clamor that the only reason Hamas broke the ceasefire is that they are now totally ready to face Israel militarily.
In fact, in the past few months, Hamas put in place a war cabinet headed by Ahmad al-Jabari, one of the leaders of its Ezzedine al-Qassam branch, and Said Siam, its former interior minister in the Palestinian government.
While Hamas is no Hezbollah as far as firepower, sophistication and know-how, it seems that they have greatly improved and learned a lot from the summer 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah.
First, hundreds of Hamas members went to training camps in both Syria and Iran. Second, Hamas has built an extensive network of tunnels and bunkers where its most prized leaders are hiding. Third, like Hezbollah, Hamas has at its disposal very mobile small units that communicate via hand-held radios.
Muslim Brotherhood Reacts Defensively As Israel Takes On Hamas
By Victor Comras
Muslim Brotherhood leaders are already engaging in something akin to “damage control” as they rationalize Hamas' breach of the ceasefire with Israel, and condemn Israel, Egypt and the West for Israel’s incursion into Gaza. The Brotherhood is also trying to tell its members and followers that Israel’s defeat of Hamas in Gaza, and the possible re-establishment of Fatah control in that Palestinian territory, is a reversible set-back, and that it will provide the Muslim Brotherhood a golden opportunity to strengthen their movement in Egypt, the Middle East, Europe, and around the Muslim world. The Brotherhood is already busy turning these events into a major recruitment tool, and for proselytizing and broadening its support base. They have targeted Egypt and other moderate Arab leadership as well as the Israelis. But, it is also clear that they were caught short by Europe's reaction to the conflict and to the degree of understanding and sympathy expressed by European leaders with regard to Israel’s actions. This represents a real setback for them.
Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader, Sheikh Yousef Al-Qaradawi publicly and loudly castigated Egyptian and Arab leaders last Friday (January 2nd) for their lack of support. Like Hezbollah's Hassan Nasrallah, he called for a popular uprising throughout the Middle East against Israel. "Supporting the Palestinian people in Gaza,” he said, “is a religious duty on every Muslim individual according to his capabilities, and no one is exempted from that duty." At the same time Muslim Brotherhood General Guide Muhammad Mahdi 'Akef, called on Muslims everywhere to wage Jihad against Israel in support of Hamas. He charged also that Israel's operation in Gaza was planned and coordinated with Fatah’s leadership and with Egypt and the United States. While demonstrators filled the streets of several Arab capitals, the response from Arab countries to Israel's actions will likely remain modestly muted.
European Muslim Brotherhood leaders, who continues to portray the Brotherhood there as a moderate and peaceful Islamic organization, shied away from calls for violent Jihad against Israel. Nevertheless, they strongly criticized European leaders for their placid responses, and actively organized a number of protests across Europe. Israel would not have hit Gaza like this without western complicity, complained Hamdi Hassan, a Muslim Brotherhood member of the Egyptian parliament.
The Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe (FIOE), the umbrella group representing the European Muslim Brotherhood, issued a statement December 28th calling on the European Union “to take action to control the Israeli military machine which is continuing its bloody massacres
. (and) for the ending of all the assistance and privileges granted to invading Israel.” The Union of Islamic Organizations of France (UOIF), a Muslim Brotherhood group, condemned France and Europe’s failure to react strongly "to the bloody massacre just committed by the Israeli occupation army against the people of Gaza.” The British Muslim Initiative, another Brotherhood group, condemned “the shameless silence of Western and Arab Governments towards the continued violations and crimes committed by Israel.” Ahmed Al-Rawi, MAB President and former FIOE President, went further insisting on action by the International Criminal Court and referring to Israeli leaders as “Zionist war criminals.” None of these Muslim Brotherhood statements made any mention of the Hamas rocket attacks against Israel that precipitated the Israeli response, nor the refusal of Hamas to renew the six month truce with Israel when it expired on December 19th. (see "Global Muslim Brotherhood Reaction to Israeli Airstrikes in Gaza" Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Report)
Despite the rhetoric, Muslim Brotherhood leaders are evidently quite concerned that Hamas overplayed its hand in Gaza, and by the muted responses of Arab governments that appear perfectly willing to allow Hamas to be ejected from its position of control in Gaza. They were also caught offguard by European government and popular sympathy for Israel's reaction - a rare occurrence these days. A curious editorial by noted Palestinian journalist Khalid Amayreh, just posted on the Muslim Brotherhood’s website sums up some of these concerns, and goes on to state that Israel’s attack against Hamas in Gaza may yet be a blessing in disguise for the Muslim Brotherhood. After hyperbolically comparing Israel's attack to Nazi atrocities and the WWII Allied bombing of Dresden, he writes: “the contemplated elimination of the Hamas government by Israel would eventually be proven to be one of the stupidest Israeli misdeeds ever. First of all, it would free the resistance group from the burden of government and allow it anew to carry out more ferocious attacks against Israel without having to worry about the bombing by Israel of buildings and security headquarters and hospitals.” He maintains that Hamas never really wanted to be in the government anyway. It had desired only to be in a position of influence in Palestinian affairs, he says. So, he writes “the disappearance of the Hamas government in Gaza would be a blessing in disguise for Hamas.”
Whatever the case, Muslim Brotherhood leaders are already actively working the street in Egypt and elsewhere in the Middle East and Europe, to make hay out of the Israeli attack, and the 'so-called' lack of action by "Western corrupted" Arab leaders, to respond. This, they hope, will serve to swell their ranks and their coffers.
Holding Hamas Accountable
By Matthew Levitt
Operation Cast Lead, initiated in response to resumed Hamas rocket attacks on communities in southern Israel, represents Israel's most furious attack on Hamas since the terrorist group assumed control of Gaza. For the past six months, an Egyptian-brokered cease-fire maintained an uneasy status quo, during which time Hamas smuggled some 80 tons of explosives, roadside bombs and longer-range rockets into Gaza. While Israel's military operation may succeed in weakening the heavily armed Islamist group, the Gaza crisis also highlights a vexing challenge awaiting the new Obama administration: the question of how to deal with Hamas.
Some will recommend that Obama approve direct talks with Hamas. Since Hamas controls Gaza, the theory goes, it must be brought into the political process, engaged not isolated, or else there is no hope for peace. But Hamas is dead set against a two-state solution, whether it joins a unity government or remains in the opposition. Indeed, Hamas deploys suicide bombers specifically aimed at derailing progress toward peace. Engaging Hamas will not help the peace process, but it will legitimize the group most violently opposed to such progress.
Meanwhile, as renewed rocket attacks make clear, Hamas remains committed to the use of violence targeting civilians. Engaging in direct diplomacy with Hamas while it targets civilian population centers would empower a movement designated as a terrorist group by both the United States and the European Union. It would also pull the carpet out from under Palestinian moderates who are truly interested in pursuing peace and are vying with Hamas for popular support.
There are a few concrete things the Obama administration could, and should, do. The full article is available here.
Shadow of Iran Looms Large Over Gaza
By Walid Phares
The Israeli air raids on Hamas’s infrastructure along with troop movements around Gaza’s enclave and the shelling of Israel by the jihadist organization are both troubling developments in the Middle East but they are certainly neither new nor surprising. Dramatic images of bloody Palestinian civilians fleeing from attacks and pictures of Israelis rushing to the shelters while under fire will always bring chills to observers and depress the entire international community.
Sadly, it’s hardly the first time we’ve seen these images and tragically seven years after 9/11 they seem to connect with similar bloodshed in Mosul, Kabul and Mumbai. Even if both sides in the current Gaza conflict insist that their confrontation is at the center of the world, in reality it isn’t anymore. Car bombs and missiles in Beirut, Baghdad and Islamabad are all horrifying. There is no “top horror” anymore, even in the never- ending cycle of Gaza’s turmoil. It has all become part of the so-called “War on Terror” even though the Palestinian-Israeli quarrel is a conflict all its own. Still, why is this escalation so dramatic, why did it happen, who triggered it at this particular moment and what can we expect going forward? It’s too grandiose to claim that anyone has all the answers, but here is my take:
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A Deadlock in the Peace Process
After decades of unstoppable enmity, Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization struck a deal in 1993 under the sponsorship of the United States: The Oslo Agreements. The two parties at the negotiations continued to complain about difficulties in the final stage but nevertheless moved forward in implementing piece after piece. A Palestinian Authority (PA) was established and funded by the West to become the partner in Peace of the state of Israel, as a first stage of Palestinian statehood. But by the mid-90s, the Syrian-Iranian “axis” armed and funded Hamas and other jihadi organizations to “sink” the process.
Wahabi quarters joined in funding the rejectionist forces. The equation was simple: Hamas attacks Israel, causing a collapse in the negotiation process; Israelis and Palestinians blame each other; suicide bombings blast inside the Jewish state triggering air raids on the Palestinian territories. The history of the past 17 years is one of obstruction toward any attempt to reach a final agreement between the two parties and one of efforts by the United States, Europe and the rest of the international community to push the process forward. In short, it’s a struggle between the fledgling peace process and an Iranian strategy designed to destroy it. Everything else is just a facet of this image, but the Iranian-imposed deadlock is the root cause for all frustrations, failures and bloodshed on both sides.
The Gaza Blockage
Despite the barrage by the “Iranian axis” via Hamas and Hezbollah against the Israeli-Palestinian settlement, which escalated even further after 9/11 and the Iraq US campaign, still small steps were achieved between Israeli Governments and President Mahmoud Abbas’ Authority. By 2005 Israel withdrew from the Gaza strip and the Palestinian Authority was closer to statehood than ever. But Hamas, which won the Palestinian legislative elections in January 2006 thanks to massive Iranian support and its armed omnipresence, refused to follow the course of the Camp David process. According to its ideologues and leaders, and unlike Arafat and Abbas, the radical group “cannot” recognize the existence of the state of Israel. Perfectly in line with Mahmoud Ahmedinijad’s stance on the “Jewish state,” Hamas is not simply another part of the Palestinian national movement (as many asserts) but is a Jihadist organization with a clear ideological goal: Establishing an “emirate” in Palestine — not a secular Palestinian state — similar to what Al Qaeda wants to establish worldwide — but with a much better international reputation.
Soon enough Hamas and Abbas’s Presidency clashed over the future of the Palestinian people. Hamas (per its Iranian and ideological commitments) wanted an endless “Jihad” against the pre-1967 Israel while the PA was moving forward towards the two-state solution. In June 2007, Hamas executed a bloody coup d’état in Gaza: Hundreds of Fatah members and other opponents were eliminated and tortured. A Hamas “regime” was established in the enclave. As I wrote then, “two Palestines” emerged: The Iranian-supported entity in the south and the embattled Palestinian Authority in the West Bank. Since that coup, Gaza’s forces blocked the process while the rest of the Palestinian territories moved slowly to normalization. As of this fall, for example, the number of tourists spending time in Bethlehem and other Palestinian Authority locations has reached the highest azimuths. One Palestine in the West Bank was slowly rising while another Palestine in Gaza was sinking rapidly. Meanwhile, Israel imposed a blockage on Gaza. Hence Hamas had to act to avoid a rotting process. Last week, the Islamist militant movement ended the cease fire, which obviously triggered this war.
Gaza on the Arab Map
Viewers and readers in the West have been overwhelmed since the Israeli air strikes began with footage and pictures from the so- called “Arab street.” This term was coined by regimes and ideologues in the Middle East to claim that the “region” as a whole has one voice, one set of feelings and one direction when it comes to the Arab Israeli conflict and all issues related to the “Umma” (Arab or Islamic nation). In fact the “street” in mostly non-Democratic societies reflects the desired agenda of either radical regimes or ideologues. Hence getting a real grasp on reality in the region is more subtle. When it comes to the public attitudes regarding any Israeli action in the region, there is a strong ideological force which will always drive all governments, regimes, political parties to be against the Jewish state, regardless of the context. That is a fact. But below the ideological level, there is a divided Arab map regarding Gaza. While Syria, Sudan, Hezbollah, the Wahabis, Qatar and also the (non-Arab) Iranian regime support Hamas, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, most of the Gulf States are nervous about Iran’s influence in Gaza. More importantly the Palestinian civil war initiated by Hamas against Fatah in June 2007 is still on. President Mahmoud Abbas, the head of the Palestinian Authority wants to resume peace negotiations but cannot confront Hamas head on. In short Arab governments are simply unable to solve the issue at this point.
Israel’s Options
From Israel’s perspective, the room for maneuvering is very tight. Hamas is a direct ally of Iran and strategic decisions by the jihadi group are made in Tehran. The Israelis seem to have decided to respond to the Hamas challenge now before their own elections and before the Palestinians also go to the polls and especially during the transition period in the United States. It looks like Israel has three options: Pursuing an air bombardment before reaching a cease fire; engaging limited ground troops at the edges of Gaza to alter the capacity of Hamas in shelling Israel; or going for a full-fledged incursion inside the enclave. The bottom line: Once Israel begins the operation they can’t return to the status quo. With this in mind, the minimal goal for Israel seems to be a Lebanon-like arrangement with a UN Security Council resolution separating the forces and freezing violence or a UN sponsored security deployment in Gaza to change the military landscape and bring about civil peace and stability. We will know more in the next days and weeks.
Iran’s Gaza Battlefield
The big picture is obvious. The current conflict is not really about the classic Arab-Israeli process, which can resume between Israel, the Palestinian Authority and the Arab League anytime it is not obstructed. The Gaza fight is about Iran’s confrontation with Israel, and perhaps with the U.S. globally. A global strategic reading leads us to conclude that — just as we saw in Lebanon in 2006 -Tehran is pulling the strings and very smartly. Timing the Hamas end to the cease fire between two American presidencies in Washington and just before the Israeli and Palestinian elections, the Mullahs thought they would drag Israel into the Gaza battle on an Iranian timetable, triggering a “street” show of anger, boosted by the jihadi propaganda machine in the region with all the usual ramifications in the West. The astute Iranian move is to drag Israel enough into Gaza’s mud to indict it internationally so that any future Israeli strikes at Iran’s nuclear program will be seen as catastrophic. Tehran is calculating the minutia hoping Hamas will win at the end of the day, and that the Obama administration will begin its “talks” with Iran from an inferior position (since Israel will be blamed for the violence not the jihadists in Gaza). But the game has lots of risks, including the possibility that Hamas may lose its ability to be a military event maker after this campaign is over.
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Dr Walid Phares is the Director of the Future Terrorism Project at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies and the author of The Confrontation: Winning the War against Future Jihad « Close It
Gaza and Hizballah
By David Schenker
Israel completed its fifth day of air operations against Hamas in Gaza today. Meanwhile, throughout the Middle East, battle lines are being drawn between “moderate” Arab regimes like Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt and the militant camp, led by Syria, Iran, and their Lebanese ally Hizballah. Recent days have seen a flurry of verbal attacks launched against the “moderates,” accusing these states of not being supportive enough of Hamas.
The war of words reached a fever pitch earlier this week after Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah essentially called for civil insurrection in Cairo to compel the Egyptian Government to open the Rafah border with Israel ala August 2008 when Hamas destroyed the border fence allowing hundreds of thousands of Palestinians to enter the Sinai.
These are some excerpts from Nasrallah’s December 28 speech:
“We are facing a partnership by some Arab states, and a complicity by some other Arab states concerning events in our region
These Arabs are asking Israel to wipe out Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the rest of the resistance factions
they are demanding this and helping in this regard
“
we address the Egyptian regime, saying, O Egyptian officials, if you do not open the Rafah crossing, if you do not come to the rescue of your brothers in Gaza, then you will be partners to a crime, partners to the murders, partners to the siege, and partners to creating the Palestinian tragedy
“O people of Egypt, you should open this crossing with your bare chests
I am not calling for a coup in Egypt, nor am I in a position to do so. However, I am for the generals and officers to go to the political leadership and address it, saying the honour of our military uniform
.do[es] not allow us to see our kinfolk in Gaza slain while we guard the borders with Israel.”
Egypt, not surprisingly, has responded harshly to Nasrallah’s calls. During a press conference on December 29, Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmad Abu al-Gheit said: "If you do not know, let me tell you that the Egyptian Armed Forces are there to defend Egypt. If need be, they will also protect Egypt against people like you.” During the same press conference, Abu al-Gheit described Nasrallah’s statement as “a declaration of war against the Egyptian people.”
Despite Nasrallah’s outspoken rhetorical stance on Gaza, it’s unlikely that Hizballah will open a second front against Israel ala summer 2006. I wrote an article about Hizballah and Gaza published yesterday by the Washington Institute. It can be found here.
Iran activating its proxies
By Olivier Guitta
Iran is smartly playing its cards, using its main Sunni and Shiite proxy to create havoc in the region and de facto making it stronger. At this point, Iran’s next step is uncertain. But it is quite possible that Hezbollah will decide to open a second front against Israel. Also the destabilization operations against the Sunni regimes in the region hostile to the Islamic Republic are likely to continue unabated. At this point when it comes to terror, all roads lead to Tehran.
I wrote an article for the Middle East Times analyzing the current situation.
You can read it in full here.
Here is an excerpt:
After the six-month truce with Israel expired on Dec. 19, Hamas decided, or perhaps was urged, to resume its attacks on Israel. Thus Hamas went on a rampage campaign, firing rockets at Israel to create terror and death among Israeli civilians.
As could be expected, Israel reacted the way most countries would when attacked, and to protect its population against a group it considers to be a terrorist organization.
A new war in the region is likely to benefit only one country: Iran.
Indeed, following the model of the summer 2006 war against Israel triggered by the capture of two Israeli soldiers by the Lebanese Shiite organization, Hezbollah, Iran would benefit with a new front opening up.
This time Iran is turning to using its Sunni arm, Hamas. Contrary to what a number of experts in the region profess, Sunni extremists and Shiite extremists have no problem joining forces against a common enemy and putting aside their age-old rivalries.
While Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, the founder of the Palestinian Resistance Movement, also known as Hamas, was still alive, he refused to Iran's advances time and again. Yassin was adamant not to engage the Shiites. After his death, Hamas became much more open to Tehran's advances. Recently, Iran has become Hamas' main bankroller and as such wants to have a say in what Hamas should or should not do.
Managing Gaza
By Aaron Mannes
Israel’s operation in Gaza is reaching a critical point. While talking heads will debate grand strategy, the options are limited. Behind the headlines is the crucial issue of how Israel’s national security process works (or doesn’t - in light of the weaknesses revealed in the 2006 Lebanon war). The next moves will demonstrate whether or not Israel has successfully incorporated the lessons from the failures of the 2006 Lebanon War. This is crucial to re-establishing Israeli deterrence.
Strategic Limitations
A true peace agreement with Hamas is not realistic. A quick scan of clips from Hamas’ al-Aqsa network or of statements by Hamas leaders from the Middle East Media Research Institute - particularly horrible are these scenes from Hamas produced children’s television - should disabuse all but the most useful idiots of any notions of a moderate Hamas.
Fatah is theoretically an alternative to Hamas, but has been eliminated from Gaza and has little credibility or capability.
Military options also do not offer definite solutions. Re-occupying Gaza would require tens of thousands of Israeli troops and likely lead to hundreds of Israeli and thousands of Palestinian casualties. The Israelis do not want to pay this price. It also might not work. Hamas might be able to maintain an ongoing, costly insurgency against the Israelis, which would be perceived as a victory. (Hamas has taken lessons from Hezbollah’s 2006 war with Israel and has prepared and is hoping for an IDF ground campaign.)
Hamas’ supply lines are the tunnels into Egypt. The tunnels themselves are only the endpoint of a vast smuggling network that extends throughout the Sinai and into the heart of Egypt. Egypt is a poor country, the smuggling opportunities are lucrative, and law enforcement is weak. In Kashmir, criminal networks in an impoverished environment have fostered a self-sustaining insurgency. The same situation could occur Gaza.
Ultimately, there are no solutions in Gaza on the immediate horizon. This is a problem Israel will have to manage.
Read the complete post here.
Ten Top Questions about the ongoing Israel-Hamas confrontation
By Walid Phares
Following are ten top questions needed to engage in strategic discussion of the ongoing Israel-Hamas confrontation in Gaza. These items can be altered if ground developments would take different directions in the next days or weeks.
1. What is Israel's strategy and goals regarding the ongoing campaign in Gaza. Will it be mostly an air campaign with limited ground action or will it include a vast land campaign as well? What are the tangible goals?
2. Who is winning the propaganda war: Israel or Hamas? How is Arab and international media covering the clashes and to whose advantage?
3. How are Arab Governments reacting to the confrontation? Egypt, Saudi, Qatar, Jordan, Morocco, others. Are the demonstrations putting significant pressure on these Governments?
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4. Hassan Nasrallah called on an Arab Islamic revolt to support Hamas. Will Hezbollah intervene to help Hamas? can it? If yes, how?
5. Will Iran escalate against Israel in support of Hamas and how? Was Tehran behind Hamas escalation leading to the Israeli retaliation?
6. Will Hamas strike outside southern Israel?
7. Can Mahmoud Abbas convince most Palestinians to shift their support to the Palestinian Authority instead of Hamas? Can the PA influence return to Gaza anymore?
8. How will President Bush and President elect Obama react to the ongoing conflict in Gaza over the next few weeks and months?
9. Is there a possible new UN initiative to bring about a different solution in Gaza?
10. If Israel engages further in land operations in Gaza, how far will Hamas go in attacks against Israel and possibly in the West and the United States?
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Dr Walid Phares is the Director of the Future Terrorism Project of the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies. « Close It
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