The Dynamic Terrorist Organization: The Implications of the Bali Bombings for Jemaah Islamiyah

By Zachary Abuza

The likely perpetrator of the 1 October bombings in Bali in which some 25 have been confirmed dead and 100 wounded is Jemaah Islamiyah. JI was formerly close to Al Qaeda, though that relationship has been in doubt owing to concerted counter-terror operations that have led to the arrests of much of the respective organization�s leadership.

What are the implications of these attacks? Rather than a major truck-bomb on an annual basis, we�ll be seeing a lot more attacks like the recent ones in Bali, against highly vulnerable soft targets.

The hallmark of JI�s past three major attacks that have targeted western interests were large truck bombs, in the order of 100+ kilos, mainly comprised of ammonium nitrate and diesel, but also perchlorate and sulfur. Based on confessions from detainees and other investigations, these bombings cost under $30,000 each; of which the purchase of the vehicle was a significant portions. These bombs displayed significant technical skill, ambition and a desire to make a statement. They were a far cry from JI�s string of bombings in 2000. In the Christmas 2000 bombings for example, 30 bombs were deployed, 15 went off and only 18 people were killed. The October 2002 Bali bomb put JI on the map: 202 people were killed, making the attack the single most lethal terrorist incident since the 9/11 attacks on the United States.

JI�s subsequent bombings JW Marriott and the Australian Embassy, in August 2003 and September 2004, were also large bombs, though they killed far fewer people (only 15 at the Marriott), and westerners in particular.

Secondly all of those attacks involved a suicide bomber.

What can we infer from the apparent shift back to smaller bombs? Does this indicate the inability to procure the materials and indicate limited human and material resources to put together large bombs? Does it signify that the link to Al Qaeda, which passed over $130,000 to JI for operations no longer exists? The fact is we really don�t know the extent of the current relationship.

Does it indicate a fundamental change in tactics? Has JI temporarily abandoned large truck bombs in favor of small pipe bombs, that are easy to assemble and small enough to conceal?

In fact, JI has been using smaller bombs for quite some time now, especially in the Malukus and Sulawesi where they have been trying to foment more sectarian violence. In May this year a bomb in a marketplace in Poso killed 22. 28 March 2005, police raided safe houses used by Islamic militants in Ambon, seizing a cache of some 95 IEDs and ammunition and in October 2004, 123 IEDs were discovered in a cache hidden in a cemetery outside of Poso.

We should expect that this is how they hope to increase the tempo of bombings to more than once a year. Small, cheap bombs, easy to mass assemble, easy to conceal that nonetheless are quite lethal. Three well-placed pipe bombs killed more people than the attacks on the JW Marriott and Australian Embassy combined; at a fraction of the cost and with arguably a greater economic impact. Rather than a major truck-bomb on an annual basis, we�ll be seeing more attacks like the recent ones in Bali, against highly vulnerable soft targets.

The simultaneous bombings (three were detonated and between 4-10 were set) are a traditional JI and AQ hallmark, and indicate that a pretty large cell was used in the operation.

Does the apparent non-use of suicide bombers mean that their ranks are depleted? Don�t count on it. Indonesian intelligence has intercepted a number of letters, communications that suggest that people are waiting in the wings.

Terrorism is asymmetric warfare: Terrorists marshal scarce resources and attack when and how they have the capabilities to do so and a high probability of success. Their targeting and tactics change quickly in order to cope with their changing security environment.

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